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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL ISSUES
Traveling to Thirty Thousand
In 1968, it took five days in the dry season to travel from Chiang Mai to Thirty Thousand,
located in Chiang Dao District, Chiang Mai Province and Mae Hong Son Province.  Travel was by
foot, sometimes with the aid of a mountain ponies, through old growth forests and open patches
of swidden fields along routes that transported forest products, domestic cattle, and other trade
items from as far away as the Tibetan borderlands.  In the 20th century, these trails had carried
opium.  In the mid-1990s, it took as little as two and a half hours in the dry season.  Now the roads
brought down wheat, mango, coffee, flowers, lam yai (Dimocarpus longan Lour., like a small
litchee), cabbages, potatoes, and people, by bus, Land Rover, pickup truck or 4-stroke
motorcycles. 
This spatial and temporal difference encapsulated and encompassed the changes that
have occurred in the last twenty-five years of economic development and political intervention in
the mountains of northern Thailand.  The story I tell here sets up “the rest of the story:” how a Lisu
village known as Revealed River Village, located in the Thirty Thousand cluster of Lisu villages,
came to the circumstances it was in the mid-1990s.  The main vehicle for state penetration was
the Sam Muen Highland Development Project (SMHDP).  
The landscape was inhospitable to travel, comprised of a physical geography of steep
sloping mountains of complex limestone.  Thirty Thousand was northwest of Chiang Mai toward
Mae Hong Son, behind Chiang Dao mountain, cutting Thirty Thousand off from easy access to
government centers.  W hat had been an advantage 30 years ago was now inconvenient.  The
Lisu of Thirty Thousand going to their district office in Chiang Dao town to register a birth, a death,
a marriage, a new household, to apply for citizenship or to vote – all of the ordinary events of life in
2the village that under the Thai government system had to be recorded and verified – had to skirt
the mountain range by travelling southeast through Mae Hong Son Province to the town of Mae
Malai (Chiang Province) before turning north to Chiang Dao town on the road to Fang, a six hour
trip.  It was as quick, much cheaper, and more arduous to walk straight through the mountains
along trails. 
Traveling from the lowlands to Thirty Thousand, the paved road ascended the hills past
Pa Pae and the entrance to the Forestry Training Center for the SMHDP at Thung Joh, about
halfway between Mae Malai and Thirty Thousand.  The road became ever steeper as it headed up
the mountain through regenerating forests on the high slopes and irrigated rice fields in the narrow
valleys.  Travelers felt palpable relief from the dusty oppressive air of the bustling lowland towns
here, where the landscape felt cleaner, the air purer and lighter.  Past Thung Joh the road began
a series of switchbacks, up one ridge and down another, through the length of a narrow valley with
a Shan or Khon Mueang (Northern Thai) town, and back up the system of switchbacks again. 
Here, another change became evident.  Numerous signs declared the mountains to be the
domain of the Royal Forest Department (RFD): W ildlife Sanctuaries, W atershed Conservation
Areas, Forest Preserves, and National Parks were marked on each stretch of road.  This was the
realm of the RFD and the home of the mountain minorities – Lahu, Lisu, Hmong, Karen.  
Yet, amazingly few “hill tribes” people were evident on the road considering how many
lived in these mountains.  W hen I traveled with Lisu villagers, we sometimes passed people we
knew in other vehicles, but as often as not we were passed by strangers: passengers in the
Chiang Mai-Mae Hong Son bus, Thai in Mercedes sedans, villagers in pickups from all over this
neighborhood of the mountains, and trucks laden high with illegal timber from Burma.  Perhaps
the upland minorities were invisible because many of the men did not wear “traditional” dress
while traveling “down below” and avoided being marked as hill tribes, which would have subjected
them to the attentions of Thai authorities.  Upland minority women, who usually wore ethnic
clothes, traveled much less frequently than men.  The first significant sign of ethnic minorities
outside of the Night Bazaar in Chiang Mai, where they sold crafts and performed dances for
3tourists, was at the market town of Mae Malai where uplanders congregated in a few roadside
restaurants on their way to town for government business, or taking their children to government
and mission boarding schools.  There were a number of Lisu and Karen villages adjacent,
economically dependent on trekking tours and handicrafts sale.  But Thai government officials,
businessmen, and tourists were the main travelers.  
I traveled in different realities, depending on how I traveled.  On the bus, where I would
get off at the park entrance and hope for a ride for the next 25 km in to the village, I was seen as a
tourist, a back-packer, ignored and talked about, sometimes touched and rubbed by people
discussing me as if I were insensate.  Traveling with RFD officers, we were saluted by various
other government officials and I was assumed to be a female companion of some sort.   Lower-
level RFD officials tended to know local leaders and waitresses of certain restaurants where they
would stop for a beer.  Traveling with the teachers, we were greeted by other “mountain teachers”
and the market women who sold barbecued meat, noodles, and whiskey by the side of the road. 
Traveling with Lisu villagers was yet another experience.  W e were isolated.  W hen other Lisu
people drove by, they peered at each other to see who they knew sitting in the back of a passing
pick-up truck sitting on lumpy sacks of produce and then talk about them and where they were
going and why later, but made no acknowledgment of each other.  Nor did they greet or receive
greetings from businessmen, Thai officials, or Shan villagers.   
Rounding a sharp curve around an out-jutting hillock, the road passed onto a wide red
clay road, fronted by a tiny guardhouse – we were entering watershed conservation territory.  The
entrance to Thirty Thousand was through the Huay Nam Dang reserve (formally declared a
National Park in 1995).  Entrance was restricted, although I rarely saw this enforced except for
registering tourists and checking Lisu trucks for contraband. Most visitors only went in as far as
the Doi Kaew Lom viewpoint, about 7 km. off the main road where the older sister of the King of
Thailand had built a nice suburban-style split-level called the Silver Orchid Palace in 1992.  Thai
tourists visited for the vistas of Chiang Dao Mountain, the winter flower gardens, and the imagined
proximity to royalty.  It was the perfect setting for photos.  For the more adventurous, there was a
Thai: make merit.  It is a form of gift giving in Buddhism whereby the giver receives merit for1
future rebirth.  Traditionally, tham bun is presentation of gifts to monks but in modern times,
charitable gift giving has been redefined as suitable to do good and make merit.  It seems that it
had been extended to even minor gift giving.  Thai teachers at the mountain school used to
makes sweets to serve their students on the teacher’s birthday.  They defined this as tham bun,
and said that to make merit on their birthday brought them good luck throughout the coming
year.  
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“genuine” hill tribe village a few kilometers down the steep slope of the road.  Unlike the road to
the palace, this road was not surfaced and at points its grade was 35 degrees.  In the dry season,
dust lay 18 inches deep.  At the bottom of the road, a few row houses with tin roofs surrounded a
shallow fish pond, a resettlement built as part of a Royal Project.  Electrical wires led into each
house.  There, the middle class matrons of Bangkok bought little woven bracelets and clucked
over the poor, dirty children.  The Bangkok men winked as they asked the girls about their sexual
practices and single women wanted to know why the girls were not married or how many children
the women had; everyone “knew” that hilltribes practiced ‘free love’ (like westerners), married by
the age of 14, and had no less than 10 babies.  The tourists distributed candy to the children – a
form, perhaps, of tham bun  – and drove off.  This small segment of the village depended on1
tourism for much of their income.  Further up the hill, at the steepest section of the road yet, was
the other 80% of the village, the out-of-the-way genuine village.  Like every other Lisu village I
visited, the houses were built in clusters of kin groups set apart from each other, with a yard in
front for greeting visitors.  Here, the villagers had rejected electrical wires, fish ponds, and
Bangkok tourists.  
The headquarters of the Sam Muen Highland Development Project Center at the Nam Ru
Unit (W atershed Conservation District No. 9) in which Thirty Thousand was located lay another 18
kilometers past the entrance to Huai Nam Dang.  The road deteriorated rapidly after Huai Nam
Dang – narrow, clay, inches thick with dust in the dry season and feet deep with mud in the rainy
season – up and around a hill, down a steep slope to a muddy bottom, gaining speed so that we
can fly through that and up the next section of road before slowing to go around another terrifying
curve on cliff edges.  In the rainy season, Project trucks could get stuck for hours.  The RFD did
not waste its budget maintaining a section of the road they rarely used and the Nam Ru Unit used
5its limited budget to pay Shan refugees from Burma to plant trees, for which the foresters received
a bonus.  The foresters thought the Lisu should maintain the road, built for “their benefit.”  The
Lisu responded that the government used the road more. And every season, the bogs on the road
deepened.  
The road came to a straightaway and a few tiny roads etched off into the forest.  There’s
the new, unfinished road to the satellite village founded when the guardian of the “Old
Grandfather” shrine left Revealed River due to a fight with the headman over a marriage; the new
driveway to an older satellite village of Revealed River; through reforestation plantations of pine;
and the steep, well-used path through regenerated forest down into Revealed River Village, used
by forestry officials, development picnic-ers, Lisu villagers, but never by trekkers, who had been
banned when opium users were evicted.  The road entered the village at the head of a high,
narrow valley and split toward the upper part of the village, the home of one village faction, or
down through the center of the village, home of two other factions, and ended at an open plaza
originally constructed to accommodate Royal Thai Government Helicopters, now meant to be a
playground for the children in the Mountain School, who preferred the forest.  The plaza was
bordered by the school at one end and the “community meeting house” built by the Project, where
I slept, at the other.   
In the evening in the cold season, the village at evening was busy – dogs barking,
children playing, women sitting on verandahs sewing tunics and embroidering edges for garters,
men gathering to talk in public areas.  But in heavy rains, especially in the agricultural season, the
village shut down and appeared as an island insulated and isolated by waves of mist.  The rain
curtained the glow of hearths behind shutters and damped down trickles of smoke through thatch
roofs.  No lights shown from homes, no electrical wires passed from house to house.  On nights
like these, families went to sleep early.  All was silent except for the barking of watch dogs.  A
forestry official once almost refused to leave me in the village because he was convinced the
village had been abandoned in the few days since he had last visited.  In hardly any sense was
Revealed River a traditional village, yet coming upon it in late evening it gave off an air of timeless
6isolation and self-sufficiency.  Nestled against verdant mountain ridges, it seemed small, shielding
itself against the surrounding expanse of primeval forest.  W hat of this Shangri-La was true?  All
of it, for it was the sense anyone got of Revealed River on a foggy, rainy evening, even for those
of us who lived there.  Inaccessibility was part of the beauty of the place for visitors and the appeal
for villagers, especially the older ones.  And yet, none of this was true.  Revealed River was a
society more layered than the picture of the little village embraced in blue-green mountains
allowed viewers to conceive.  It had been established as Lisu village in the early 1970s when
poppy was grown from “horizon to horizon,” having been before that a Hmong and then a Lahu
village.  Between the 1970s and the 1990s there was a quantum increase in Thai state control in
the daily lives of upland peoples and fundamental transformations in their ways of making a living
and social organization.  Revealed River was fully incorporated into the Project.  Fields of poppies
had been replaced by fields of barley and potatoes; pioneering swiddening by orchards and
rotating swiddening with short fallows; mountain ponies by deteriorating pick-up trucks; frequent
migration by permanent settlement; and autonomy by emplacement of soldiers and forestry
officers in the village to ensure that the villagers adhered to the rules of the Project.  This
dissertation is about how transformations in Lisu social structure played out in the process of the
restructuring of the local economy through the end of the opium economy.  
Topic
How did these people get from there to here?  The tremendous changes in the lives of the
Lisu people of Thirty Thousand had resulted in historically specific transformations of kinship,
household, and village structure.  These transformations occurred in ways that were congruent
with previous historical and social formations of Lisu society in different times and places,
grounded in enduring cultural principles that manifested in different ways depending on political
and economic conditions.  This dissertation is a study of how existing Lisu social structure induced
people to choose certain strategies over others when faced with new political and economic
conditions and how they dealt with the consequences of their strategies.  People do not transform
7like automatons to suit changing conditions.  But what is continuity?  What is maintained and how
is it maintained?  I used an actor-based theoretical approach, drawn from both ecological and
praxis theory, to account for both altered and persistent social forms.  A key problem was to pay
attention to the multiple contexts of, and structurally generated transformations in, existing social
relations in the process of change.  I posited that the household was a core unit of adaptation, the
nexus of production, distribution, and consumption and of social and biological reproduction, and
a unit of social, economic, political and symbolic significance to the Lisu.  The household was also
the core of continuity as culturally formed expectations of family roles constructed meaningful
actions and relationships.  How households responded to new economic conditions was
understandable in the context of specific history, social relations, and culturally structured goals.  I
examined the multiple and conflicting tensions within the household and kin networks, fissions
shaped by gender and generation, and how these structured social change.  I found that
relationships among households expressed through patrilineal kinship had changed significantly in
the context of people’s integration this, but still within Lisu cultural ideals. 
Social relations are best understood by taking an actor-based or praxis approach in order
to understand both change and continuity (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984).  Despite the
differences in ecological actor-based (Bennett 1976; Orlove 1980) and cultural or
symbolic-oriented praxis theory (Bourdieu 1977; see also Ortner 1984), these approaches share
the ability to better explain the nature of social structure by accepting that people are the entities
through which culture exists and change occurs.  This theory is also better able to explain
variation in behavior in terms of actors taking advantage of ambiguities in meaning (see Turner
1967) or working out contradictions in social structure (see Kelly 1985; Leach 1965 [1954]).  In
this model, change is closely related to existing social and cultural structures.  People do not
make decisions and act in isolation; rather, they achieve culturally defined goals by culturally
defined methods and this structures action.  In this process cultural meaning and social relations
are recreated, although never exactly (Bourdieu 1977; Comaroff 1987).  Nevertheless, culture and
society do not exist only in and of themselves, sui generis; there are limitations on the resources
8available, both material and cultural (Giddens 1984).  Existing meanings and relations are
intentionally but not always successfully reproduced; there can never be complete reproduction of
what was before as the conditions in which they are reproduced – the material and cultural
resources – change.  But their lived experience is as members of Lisu households and kin
groups, so that the possibilities for action are channeled along particular paths even though the
outcomes change.  Economic systems and agricultural development projects were salient
resources in people’s actions, but so, too, was family.  
To study the effects of integration into Thai and international global regimes, as executed
through forestry and narcotics control policy, I focused on how social structure worked out in
practice in Lisu households.  The culturally constructed generative principles that motivated
people were central to understanding their strategies and action.  Familial and household tensions
have a cultural basis, and different positions are acted on and legitim ized through use of culturally
valid symbols (Yanagisako 1984; Comaroff 1987).  The radical change experienced by Lisu in
northern Thailand in the latter quarter of the twentieth century was played out within already
existing structures within Lisu society that themselves had been historically formed, and the
household was pre-eminent in this.  Household decision-making processes could only be partially
explained by economic factors.  
The relationship between family structure and economic change is a key issue in the
literature.  Some have argued that increased involvement in commercialized markets brings about
fragmentation of kin networks, nuclearization of extended family households, breakdown of
traditional social controls, and increased individualism (Parsons 1943; Goode 1963; Shorter 1975;
Caldwell 1982).  Arguments against this view take two main tacks.  Increased market dependency
may result in poverty and economic insecurity.  The maintenance of kin networks alleviated the
effects of fluctuation in the availability of scarce resources or to gain access to jobs (Szanton
1972; Stack 1974; Hareven 1982).  Second, historical research in Europe suggested considerable
cultural continuity despite radical economic change; that the nuclear household form common to
western Europe preceded capitalism rather than rising because of it (Laslett and W all 1972;
9Goody 1976; Segalen 1986).   I noted two significant gaps in the literature.  First, the theories
mentioned above did not account for the mechanisms through which either change or continuity
occurred.  The second was an empirical gap.  There was at the time a dearth of research on
agricultural change and its effect on the household and kin networks, except for work by W ilk
(1984) and Netting (Netting 1981; Netting et al. 1984).  This has since changed; more recent
literature will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
The evidence from my research supported cultural continuity in household forms.  There
is a caveat: the Lisu economy has been somewhat commercialized for a century, due to their
involvement in opium cultivation, a cash crop; thus, changes in social organization may have
taken place a century ago as I discuss in Chapter 2.  In fact Lisu had been oriented toward
individual household organization for some time.  Yet, there has been a recent trend toward more
cohesive and cooperative village-level organization, as individual households could not move
away when there was social conflict or poor agricultural production.  This latter fact is due to
political and environmental conditions in Thailand, much more than a strictly economic issue. 
However, the household has been shown to be the primary social unit in many Tibetan societies,
with village and kinship relations being the loci of adaptation to the political economy (Samuel
1993; McKhann 1999).  
Households were of great heuristic value in understanding local practice in conditions of
change.  The household is an appealing unit of study because researchers believed it to be more
objective than conceptions of kinship and family, being clearly bounded, based on observation of
behavior, and comparable across cultures (W ilk and Netting 1984).  Studies have found the
household to be a key analytical unit because it is the locus of social strategizing (Levine 1988;
Netting 1981; Netting 1993) and economic decision-making and resource allocation (Hareven
1977; Poats, Schmink and Spring 1988).  Marriage and household formation also have profound
demographic impact, with observable ecological consequences (Foster 1978a; Netting 1981;
Fricke, Syed and Smith 1986; Caldwell 1996).  Yet "the household" is as much a folk category as
"kin," and is too often grounded in folk conceptions such as "domestic functions" (Yanagisako
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1979; Harris 1981; W ilk and Netting 1984).  The degree to which production, consumption,
distribution, co-residence, and biological and social reproduction occur in a household varies (W ilk
and Netting 1984; see also Sahlins 1972; Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981; Harris 1981; Harris and
Young 1981; Medick 1981; Laslett 1983; Collier 1974; Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Caldwell
1996).  The overlap between the household and concepts of kinship and family in each society
are equally variable.  Nevertheless, the definition of the household to actors in society may prove
to be the most valid cross-cultural definition (Yanagisako 1979).  Something labeled a "household"
is often found to be a significant social unit to the members of a given society.  The household
was the primary social unit for the Lisu of Revealed River and elsewhere in northern Thailand, as I
discuss in Chapter 3.  
Especially where the household is congruent with concepts of family and therefore
"naturalized," it is also meaningful and symbolically significant to actors in a way that a wider
system may not be, in part because the latter is unperceived or unquestioned (Bourdieu 1977;
Comaroff 1987).  The household is a collective unit in part due to its meaning and the perception
of the shared interests of its members (Yanagisako 1984; Laslett 1984).  Because the household
organizes production, reproduction, and distribution, it is also implicated in the reproduction of the
social system.  Its stability across generations is brought about in part by a structure of complex
social and power relationships, such as inheritance rights (Goody 1976; Medick 1981; W ilk and
Netting 1984).  Conversely, as will be seen in the case of the Lisu, changes in political and
economic conditions can exacerbate inherent structural tensions and culturally constructed roles
that come to the fore at the time of marriage and inheritance, distorting previously accepted social
roles and principles.  
The heterogeneity and contradictions of wider social relations are exhibited within the
household.  Besides differential access to and use of resources (Harris 1981; Paris 1988), a
household may be involved in a multiplicity of enterprises that compete for the same resources. 
This sets up the possibility of exchange within the household and competing goals or priorities
that engender negotiation among household members (Evans 1988; Heald 1991).  Such
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competition may be a factor in fluidity of household composition.  This is significant for
understanding structural tensions in society, actors' strategies for social success, their
decision-making processes, and change and continuity in social structure and economic relations. 
Social categories such as age and gender may be the basis for social control and exploitation. 
Age divisions in "the lineage mode of production" (Terray 1972) are an example of this.  Through
control of the means of reproduction, such as control of access to wives, valuables, or ritual
knowledge, elders appropriate the labor of juniors and women (Meillassoux 1981).  This implies
conflicting interests on the part of young and old regarding land, inheritance, and household
continuity (Netting 1981; Levine 1988).  There are also other culturally significant categories of
people that must be considered, such as heirs and non-heirs (of material goods, social rights,
ritual knowledge).  
The power structure determines where actors are advantaged as well as disadvantaged. 
The exploited may resist change because they see themselves losing their few valued sources of
power  (Johnson 1983).  Categories based on gender ideologies seem particularly resistant to
change.  The social relations crucial to social reproduction are often institutionalized in
gender-typing validated by presumed biological or inherent spiritual difference.  Once a form of
the sexual division of labor is established, it becomes an embedded feature of the wider economic
structure, and difficult to challenge (MacKintosh 1981) especially as it is embedded in sets of
cultural meaning.  They are over-determined.  Gender relations and household practices thus are
crucial to the study of social continuity (Ortner 1981) as well as change.  In the case of Lisu, the
political economy and cultural categories of gender of both the Thai and the Lisu also affected
women’s differential assimilation. 
A key factor in household dynamics was the household developmental or demographic
cycle (Fortes 1958; Goody 1958; Cain 1978; Foster 1978a; Greenhalgh 1985; Heald 1991; Fricke
1994; Chelcea 2003).  This had been particularly salient in Lisu household-based production
strategies in the opium economy; it affected relative household wealth and strategies for post-
marital residence, although it was offset by the availability of cheap labor by opium addicts from
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other ethnic groups such as the Karen and the Lahu.  The intervention of the Thai state and
international bilateral aid had fundamentally altered the household developmental cycle, giving
rise to greater inequalities among households.  I discuss this in Chapter 4.  
This research is based on the supposition that congruency of interests between
household members (or any other social grouping such as lineage members) can not be asserted
a priori (Johnson 1983).  W here there is congruency between actors of any type(s), this must be
explained (Laslett 1984).  Moreover, congruency of interests does not mean similarity of interests
(Cain 1978).  All change, especially planned development, must be analyzed in the context of its
effect on the balance of power in the household (Poats, Schmink and Spring 1988; W hitehead
1981).  Therefore, the nature of intra-household dynamics is of particular significance to this
research.  Looking at intra-household dynamics enabled me to understand the structural tensions
of Lisu society and to understand how Lisu made use of the cultural, social, and economic
resources available to them as discussed in Chapter 4.  At the same time, social relations among
people in different households were expressed in terms of kinship, and the characteristics of
shared interests among kin had to be examined.  This is discussed in Chapter 5.
Change occurs in the context of existing social structure and economic practices, with
culturally constructed goals, methods, and internal contradictions.  There should, therefore, be
recognizable continuity between historical and current Lisu social practice.  Lisu tried to find
solutions to existing social tensions by finding possible new solutions within changing economic
and political conditions.  In this, the agricultural development and swidden/opium interdiction
projects of the Thai state provided new potential resources in household level strategizing.  For
instance, it gave fathers greater control over their children’s marriages and post-marital residence,
in keeping with Lisu patrilineal ideology.  Yet, at the same time, the difference between the
structural roles of older and younger brothers gave rise to tensions over rights to power and to
inheritance due to decreased access to land because of Project restriction of access to land. 
Many households resolved potential conflict by making use of patrilineal ideology to manage
access to land.  I discuss this in Chapter 5.  
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The Lisu
The Lisu are a Tibeto-Burman people found along the Salween River and its tributaries, in
northwestern Thailand, northeastern Burma, and the far west of Yunnan Province, China.  They
migrated to northern Thailand from Burma and Yunnan starting in the late 19  century, whenth
these northern reaches of Burma and Thailand were relatively peaceful as the British suppressed
local warfare, but before these regions were under direct government administration.  The main
population had entered Thailand by the 1950s, although a small trickle still came in from Burma in
the 1990s through marriage.  Of the six upland ethnic minorities in Thailand, the Lisu are
linguistically related to the Lahu and Akha, and culturally to the Lahu (Matisoff 1983; Lewis and
Lewis 1984; Tribal Research Institute 1989).  More recent linguistic work shows that the Lahu,
Lisu/Lipo, Lamu, and Lolo (Yi) languages are of the Central Ngwi (previously called Lolosh)
branch of the Burmic subgroup of Tibeto-Burman languages.  Historical linguistic work indicates
that this central branch originated in northwestern central Yunnan (Bradley 1997; Bradley 2004). 
The Lisu in northern Thailand generally belong to the Flowery subgroup of Lisu and are marked by
pervasive linguistic and cultural borrowings from the Yunnanese Chinese (Matisoff 1983; Conrad
1989).  I discuss the historical context of these ethnocultural relationships and identifiers in
Chapter 2.  
Lisu Society - An Overview
Reports of Lisu social society emphasized their marked individualism, competitiveness,
and an ideology of egalitarianism on the basis of evidence of frequent fission of villages, rejection
(or even assassination) of domineering headmen, and inter-personal competition in displays of
wealth as displays of "honor," "potency," or "repute" (see Chaipigusit 1989; Conrad 1989;
Dessaint 1972a; Durrenberger 1976b; Durrenberger 1983a; Hutheesing 1990a; Lewis and Lewis
1984; Scott 1932; Tribal Research Institute 1989).  Lineage, clan, and village were mentioned as
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well, but inconsistently.  Yet, other social structures were mentioned in varying contexts. I sought
to understand how these formations varied in different political economies.  
The only social unit consistently mentioned in the literature as being significant was the
household.  It is clear from Dessaint's, Durrenberger's, and Hutheesing's work that the household
was a significant unit to the Lisu themselves.  Kunstadter (1980) also notes that households were
the units of land management, rather than villages (see also Cooper 1984).  In swiddening
systems such as the Lisus', labor rather than land was the scarce resource (Durrenberger 1976b). 
A household that could command surplus labor through marriage was in a position to produce
surplus crops (usually opium, for cash) which could be converted into "repute" (Lisu: myi -do )3 5
through feasts, ritual, and fulfilling of obligations (see also Miles 1972a, 1972b).  In the case of the
Lisu, this was upheld by the core principles of social and political egalitarianism. 
Myi -do  is a significant generative principle in Lisu society that organizes people’s goals,3 5
strategies, and their relations with each other and their ancestors.  Generative principles are the
basic values that guide behavior and constitute the ways people implicitly evaluate their own and
others’ behavior on the basis of fundamental standards.  Myi -do  reflects the logic of their social3 5
relations.  Myi -do  is generally translated as “repute;”  Lisu translate it into Thai as mii kiat,3 5
meaning to have honor, face, fame, and especially repute as in to have or be imbued with repute. 
Etically, it might be comparable to what we call prestige in anthropology.
Myi I and do  are two separate words.  Do  is work, effort, agency or potency, and myi  is3 5 5 3
fate.  Do  is evidence for myi .  One is born with myi , it is the lifeline so to speak, and you have it5 3 3
until it has run out and you are dead; myi  can be good or bad.  It can not be seen or evaluated3
except by evidence of a person’s life, by their success or failure.  A person’s myi  can only be3
gauged by what happens to him or her in their life, but with evidence of failure of harvest, for
instance, people in society can re-evaluate a person’s myi .  On the other hand, it is possible to3
have greater or lesser amounts of do .  You can have do , but have bad myi , and so have no5 5 3
success in your undertakings.  If you can finish your tasks, do not cheat others, do what you say
you can do, fulfill social obligations, feed visitors, reciprocate feasts, make good marriage
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payments, then you have do  and therefore you must have myi .  But in addition, repute comes5 3
from observance of relations of authority and respect, rights and obligations toward kin, displaying
appropriate behavior.  That is, myi -do  is exemplified both in individual enterprise that expresses3 5
individual autonomy; but also in adherence to standards of respect that are hierarchical within the
household.  
The opposite of do  is sha -taw  or shame.  If you can not offer hospitality to visitors, if you5 1 3
have to ask for a loan, if worse yet you are not granted that loan, if your clothes are shabby, if you
claim to be good at something and then do it poorly, then you have sha -taw  (Durrenberger1 3
1989:22). sha -taw   is the inability to fulfill social expectations.  This behavior can also be speech1 3
– to talk badly about someone brings the gossiper shame and a loss of repute.  Behavior is an
important element of myi -do  and sha -taw .  3 5 1 3
As Hutheesing (1990a:97-101) discusses, the two concepts are differentially gender-
linked.  She translates sha -taw   as shyness in relation to women.  A good woman should “know1 3
about” shame and behave respectfully in order to have repute.  Practicing respect and avoidance
behavior among in-laws based on relative age and generation is a matter of myi -do ; and to3 5
behave inappropriately causes sha -taw .  But according to Hutheesing, for women, to act with a1 3
sense of shame is good – it is a constraint of behavior in the presence of relatives for whom one
must show respect.  On the other hand, a woman who leaves her husband for no good reason
has sha -taw  and does not have myi -do , by no means a good thing.  For women, myi -do1 3 3 5 3 5
largely resided in avoidance of shameful acts: not getting pregnant out of wedlock, not showing
evidence of sexual activity with one’s husband, not telling off-color stories in front of one’s
husband’s older brother, not gossiping or slandering others, and in fact not speaking much at all. 
In other contexts, it also included positive acts such as getting up early to husk rice, fix food, and
go to the fields and came back to sew clothes late into the night.  That is, women faced more
restrictive rules on their behavior that reflected hierarchies of gender and generation.  
Hutheesing and Durrenberger make rather different statements about the relationship
between myi -do  and economic status.  In Durrenberger’s discussions, myi -do  is intertwined3 5 3 5
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with economic status of the individuals because only economic wealth can demonstrate myi -do3 5
(or, more accurately in Durrenberger’s terms, display of wealth demonstrates myi ).  Hutheesing,3
on the other hand, focuses on myi -do  as adherence to social mores or etiquette, behaving3 5
properly, and says that it is not about power or economic status.  Durrenberger was more
interested in the concept of myi -do  in relation to spirits and did not discuss social regulation and3 5
cultural evaluation of behavior; Hutheesing was oriented toward understanding the ways in which
women’s status in Lisu society was formed by these social evaluations.  Durrenberger’s
discussion of myi -do  is more suitable for men taking action to achieve wealth, and Hutheesing’s3 5
is of women’s roles in the family.  
In both cases, social evaluations of myi -do  are inherently fluid as they can only be based3 5
on observed results and behavior – they can change in an instant, or from situation to situation.  It
does not appear to be unitary for each person, either; there are no clearly demarcated ranks of
myi -do  and it was rare for one person or household to be consistently evaluated as having3 5
repute across all domains of economic and social life.  Myi -do  was spoken of as something that3 5
people have diffusely, in each social interaction.  However, that behavior was often contingent on
economic status; clearly, someone who had suffered failure of their crops was in no position to
demonstrate myi -do  and when they could not host guests or fund a marriage for a son, that3 5
engendered sha -taw .  Those who were evaluated as having myi -do  also tended to be older,1 3 3 5
heads of prosperous households, parents with many children who behaved well and worked hard. 
Hutheesing thinks of this phenomenon as a matter of age and more settled behavior, quoting a
Lisu woman “The young men have no repute.  They quarrel with their wives all the time”
(Hutheesing 1990a:99).  But in the context of the household developmental cycle in the opium
economy (see Chapter 4) those with myi -do  were likely to be wealthy, and the wealthy were3 5
likely to have mature households with many laborers.  Therefore, myi -do  cannot be divorced3 5
from economic status and as a result, cultural standards were predisposed toward validation of
the behavior of elders – but then, not all elders had myi -do .  It was an indirect marker of the3 5
prosperity of the household, a way that cultural standards were upheld without looking at their
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basis or questioning why some were more likely to have myi -do  than others.  The possibilities for3 5
myi -do  had changed greatly from the 1970s to the 1990s.  3 5
Dessaint argued that a pivotal element in Lisu social organization was their latitude to
migrate to avoid disputes or feuds and ineffective or authoritarian headmen (1971a, 1972a).  Also,
as pioneer swiddeners, the Lisu had to move periodically to find cultivable land.  Durrenberger
also recognized the importance of migration in dispute negotiation, but attributed Lisu
egalitarianism to income from opium growing and the availability of wage laborers that enabled an
economic egalitarianism reinforced by the ideological and social structure of the Lisu.  That is,
autonomy was enabled and heightened by the opium economy (Durrenberger 1976a;
Durrenberger 1976b; Durrenberger 1983b).  The significance of the lack of land ownership and
inheritable fixed capital for social relations among Lisu was not considered in these analyses, but
these are key to understanding transformations in Lisu social structure in the 1990s.  
Political egalitarianism, the lack of overarching, stable, continuous political institutions,
was a key feature of who the Lisu are.  In Durrenberger (1971), this was the trait that set Lisu
society apart from other ethnic groups of the uplands, but especially from the Chinese and the
Chinese state.  This egalitarianism in part explains the salience of the concept of myi -do  or3 5
repute in the social life of Lisu men (Durrenberger 1983b).  In an egalitarian society, a man’s
repute had to be jealously guarded, so that even slight attempts to assert control over others had
the potential to become a major point of contention. 
Despite the reported egalitarianism of Lisu society, my observations and reading of the
literature indicated that egalitarianism was located in egalitarian relationships among households
and was of ideological significance in the formation of new households, rather than individual
freedom.  There was, in fact, a pronounced gender and age hierarchy within the household and
among kin so that relations between any two people were ranked.  And while there were no
specific ideologies of female subordination, Lisu gender ideology and practices contributed to a
situation of male dominance (Hutheesing 1990a).  The age/generational rankings were a source
of tension in the household, dramatically illustrated by six reported cases of a son killing his father
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between 1958 and 1966 (Lewis and Lewis 1984) and mothers’ reports of sons’ desire to kill an
abusive father (Hutheesing 1990a).  These tensions point to the structure of intra-household
dynamics, discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Dessaint, Durrenberger, and (more recently) Hutheesing discounted the significance of
the village and patrilineage in social action.  Rather, they noted clusterings of individual
households that regularly cooperated in economic and ritual activities, supported each other in
disputes, and were potential co-migrators when a village split up.  Dessaint termed these
"allegiance groups" (1972a).  Durrenberger noted that these allegiance groups were based on
groups of sisters, and so cross-cut patrilineages (1976b).  However, “patriclans” and patrilineages
were consistently mentioned.  Older sources emphasized “patriclans” in Lisu society (Fraser
1922).  The Tribal Research Institute declared that patrilineal clans "provide a cohesive force to
Lisu society ... in a way that differentiates them from other tribes" (Tribal Research Institute
1989:30).  Another researcher told me that Lisu social organization was strongly patrilineal as
opposed to village-based but that this was masked by kin groups’ inability to find sufficient land
together (Prof. Uraiwan Tan-Kim-Yong, pers. comm, 1989.).  The question becomes, then, when
and where were patrilineal and patriclan structures significant in Lisu life?  I discuss this in
Chapter 5, but here I will say that patrilineages were active in ritual performances, particularly
within households; in shamanic performance; and in the hierarchies of seniority of birth (older
sons over younger sons, for instance) with consequences for seniority of branches of
patrilineages.  Patrilineages were significant for Lisu in social relations in establishing villages as
well.  
Reports also varied on the significance of the village.  The village was a ritually
meaningful unit for the Lisu (Hutheesing 1990a).  Similarly, a Lisu proverb cited by Dessaint
indicates ambivalence about migration versus sedentarism (1972a).  But in Thailand at the height
of the opium economy, the village was not a politically cohesive unit over time.  It was and
remains, however, a ritually significant unit, expressed particularly in New Year rituals to bring
productivity and repute to the entire village.  More recently, Thai policy has encouraged sedentism
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and cohesion of villages for purposes of legal settlement, citizenship, local conflict resolution, and
natural resource management, as a result of which the significance of the village as a unit of
organization increased.  As I will discuss in Chapter 2, villages have historically been significant in
some Lisu societies.  However, I do not discuss the ritual and symbolic significance of the villager
here, or the ways the village was becoming an increasingly salient political unit for Lisu following
upon sedentism and as they united to face the Thai state here.  I have discussed it in Gillogly
2000.  
This dissertation is an account of continuity and transformation in Lisu society from the
height of the opium economy in the highlands of Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s to the economic
disintegration of the 1980s and 1990s.  This strand of continuity arose out of the continued
existence of ideologies of kinship relations.  Household and kinship forms in both the opium and
post-opium economies revolved around a core script in which household survival was the central
goal; as such the household remained the key decision-making unit.  This core script also
valorized patrilineality and patrilocality as ideal forms.  As economic and political conditions have
changed so radically in the past 150 years, households took actions aimed to ensure their
success, by Lisu standards, that militated against the fixing of patrilineality as the dominant social
form in the opium economy; when conditions changed again, patrilineality emerged in practice as
well as in ancestor ritual and ideal social forms in the post-opium economy. This is discussed in
Chapter 5.  
Ethnic Relations and “Lisu” as Ethnicity
It is an axiom in mainland Southeast Asian studies that upland societies can not be
understood outside of their relationships with their neighbors, especially with lowland or valley
mountain valley kingdoms.  This is still how we understand the marginal or peripheral nature of
upland societies.  The Lisu are a trans-regional people who have been tied into the web of political
systems in northern mainland Southeast Asia as much as were the Kachin or Shan.  Long-term
historical interactions have resulted in commonalities in conceptions of symbolic power, as
20
pointed out by the founding ancestor of Southeast Asian anthropology, Edmund Leach (1965
[1954]) and by subsequent authors (e.g., Lehman 1963; Moerman 1965; Kirsch 1973).  W hile
ethnic identity is by no means the focus of this dissertation, it must be briefly discussed to
understand the cultural frames through which the Lisu lived and my theoretical perspective in
understanding the Lisu space in this web of relations. 
The Lisu differed greatly from populations such as the Chin, Kachin, and Lue for which
Leach’s paradigm was fruitfully applied in that there was no hierarchical political (outside of the
household) organization in the Lisu society of Thailand; unlike the gumsa Kachin vis-à-vis the
Shan, the Lisu vis-à-vis the Thai and Chinese pointed to their fundamental difference, evidenced
by their historical mythology of fleeing from the obligations of hierarchical polities.  Even when, in
the early 1990s, Lisu spoke of themselves in terms of subservience to encompassing powers –
loss of opium, growing and marketing new crops, lacking land and valuables – there was little of
political imitation or admiration; their identity was as people on the periphery, always seeking to
avoid incorporation by the Chinese, the Shan, the Burmese, the Thai.  In the late 1960s/early
1970s, the Lisu had lived “...as a frontier minority in relation to the lowland [Northern Thai], with
whom they attempt[ed] to maintain minimal non-tributary relations free of conflict” (Dessaint
1972a).  And if any one cultural value was an ethnic marker for Lisu, it was the importance put on
and social practice based in ideas of autonomy once made possible by the production of opium
for regional markets.  
Defined by the Thai state as one of the “hill tribes” (Thai: chaaw khaw), the Lisu are
marked by linguistic and cultural difference from the Thai majority and seen as dangerous
outsiders.  As such, they were neither citizens of Thailand nor legal holders of land within the
borders of the Thai nation (Gillogly 2004).  It is objectively true that the Lisu are migrants, that they
came from someplace else – a someplace else that does not even exist in that form anymore –
and that they were and mostly still are people who live peripherally to states.  The Lisu agreed;
they often identified themselves to me as people on the margins and their explanations of their
This was particularly remarkable as the Lisu had a long-standing reputation for drinking and2
drunkenness at wedding feasts and New Year festivities. 
 Northern Thailand was once a separate kingdom that dominated this region of mainland3
Southeast Asia; it was incorporated into what is now the kingdom of Thailand over the course of
many decades starting in the early 20  century.  The Northern Thai language, Kammueang, andth
Central/Standard Thai are not mutually understandable.  D. Haigh Roop, one of my Thai language
teachers at the University of Hawaii, described the relationship among Kammueang, Lao
(Northeastern Thai) and Central Thai as that among Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian.  
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name as meaning people at loose ends, moving about, who had lost out, who had come down, as
outlaws or rebels bespoke this, as did their plaintive songs of being people who had no home.  
More frequently, in defining “Lisu-ness” they did so in relation to the people who politically
encompassed them and these self-definitions shifted with social context, a pattern typical of
upland-lowland relations in northern mainland Southeast Asia (Leach 1965 [1954]).  That is, their
explanations of themselves often took the form of an oppositional identity and became a left-
handed valorization of Lisu-ness in relation to the often more powerful people with whom they had
had contact over the course of their migration history.  For instance, they defined themselves as
“not Chinese” in that they did not smoke opium (Conrad 1989:216) and more recently as not Thai
in that they did not get drunk  or “play with girls,” both observed characteristics of Thai men. 2
Other points of discourse were that they did not engage in wage labor, unlike the Lahu and
Chinese (especially addicts) or Shan refugees from Burma, or in petty trade, as did Chinese,
Shan, or Northern Thai.  The Lisu marked themselves by their work ethic (“If we don’t work, we
don’t eat”), in contrast to Lahu, stigmatized as lazy, and Chinese, stereotyped as too smart to
work hard.  But for all of these oppositional or relational identity-makings, they had incorporated
ritual practice and spirit members into the Lisu cosmology from the Chinese, Shan, Kachin,
Northern Thai (Yuan or Khon Mueang)  and recently Thai (Durrenberger 1989; Hutheesing 1990b;3
Tooker 1996).  References to Chinese were dominant.  For instance, at the New Year rituals, Lisu
men sat me down to point out what elements of the ritual were allegedly Chinese; this was a point
of pride, just as the fact that they did not smoke opium was a point of pride – in this they
constructed themselves as a “model minority,” doing it better than the originators.  Is this
capitulation and assimilation, rituals of dispersion from an exemplary center, rituals of aggregation
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or incorporation that recognize the protective power and status of the “center” (Tooker 1996;
Tambiah 1985), or a demonstration of civilization as the result of “civilizing projects” (Harrell
1995)?  I can not say here but at different times and places the Lisu had been in such
relationships to various more powerful regional polities with specific consequences for Lisu social
and political organization.  These included the Nakhi of Lijiang (Rock 1947) and other kingdoms in
eastern Tibet (Samuel 1993; see Chapter 2).  
By the 1990s in Thailand Lisu ethnic identity and its expression were in the midst of
transformation as they were incorporated into a modern nation-state with a civilizing mission
enacted by the Project.  Myi -do  was the generative principle of Lisu society, but this brought3 5
them in conflict as “anarchic” individuals with the Thai state and its representatives.  Project staff
denigrated the Lisu emphasis on “show” or status-display and argued that Lisu could continue to
live in the mountain forests only if they gave up the pursuit of materialism and consumerism.  Yet
display was so fundamental to Lisu culture that Lisu would not be Lisu anymore if they adhered to
Project philosophy.  In fact, for all that the Thai state considered the ethnic Chinese a security risk
so that they had great difficulty getting identity cards, local level development workers considered
the Yunnanese Chinese to be model farmers and frequently stated that if only everyone were as
careful and industrious as the Chinese then the Project would really progress.  
In the end, the Lisu were increasingly defined by their relation with the Thai state in the
form of the Project, particularly in their egalitarianism and concern with myi -do .  Many of the3 5
features they claimed as Chinese in origin in fact seemed to originate from their ancestral region
and relationships with Tibetan and Nakhi – the dancing and dress, for instance – but what was
important for Lisu in emphasizing Chinese traits in Lisu society was that they had an tradition that
was as old and honorable as anyone else’s, particularly vis-à-vis the Project.  It allowed them to
claim their legitimacy and equality to the Thai, and they did this in part by associating themselves
with Chinese civilization. 
These relational complexities were a part of the discursive practice (Giddens 1984) of
Lisu, but should not be seen as the dominant part of their construction of self.  Other traits were
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less discursively marked but of far deeper significance in daily life, such as the generational and
in-law food taboos (a daughter-in-law does not eat with her father-in-law or with the older brothers
of their husband).  W omen in Revealed River were shocked and astounded that I had no such
taboos and, therefore, so little means of showing respect to household members and
demonstrating myi -do .  Thus, there were simultaneous creations of being Lisu, one set oriented3 5
toward external societies and the other internal, assumptions about the nature of relationships and
practice.  This dissertation focuses on the latter.  
The Thai State in Revealed River: The Sam Muen Highland Development Project 
This is a study of a community encompassed by and embedded in a changing global
system.  It is impossible to understand Lisu in northern Thailand outside of the context of their
history of dependence on world markets, e.g., opium, and their current relationship to that world
through opium or its lack.  The circumstances in which Lisu lived were undergoing such change
that we must look at their connections outside of their community and depict the nature of those
connections over time in order to understand Lisu society and culture today.  The main interface
by which uplanders experienced the changing world was a development projects.  For the Lisu of
Revealed River, this was the Sam-Muen Highland Development Project, which both brought about
radical socioeconomic change due to forestry protection and the end of opium cultivation, and
buffered some of the effects of this policy in the upland village of Revealed River.
The emerging Thai nation-state had passively ignored the hinterlands north of Chiang Mai
until after W ord W ar II, when the confluence of the rise of Communist China, the war in Indochina,
peasant unrest in Thailand, and international pressure to end the royal opium monopoly made the
hinterlands and the people there a matter of national importance.  These can be seen as
problematizations, the ways that normative concepts defined the problems, the solution, and the
means to solution.  These problematizations progressed from security to drugs to watersheds. All
of these discourses were expressions of the same underlying development strategy, occurring
within the same discursive space (Escobar 1995:42) of creating the Thai nation as a unified body
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(W inichakul 1994).  Each problematization further elaborated Thai control of the mountains and of
the people in them, validated as for the progress of the nation (Thai: phuea kaan phatannaa
chaat; Gillogly 2004).  The result on the ground for Lisu people was the interdiction of opium, their
main cash crop, and the massive enclosure of the uplands as land was taken by the state for
national parks and reserves. 
From the early 1970s, opium control was the main focus of state and international
projects in the highlands in the form of eradication carried out by various police and military
forces, such as the Third Army Battalion and the Border Patrol Police.  This strategy proved
unworkable, not the least because of violent conflict as the livelihood of upland peoples was
destroyed.  Severe poverty and starvation often resulted from ending opium cultivation without
alternatives (as can be seen today in Burma, e.g., Jagan 2005; Kramer 2005), and humanitarian
concerns gave rise to opium replacement programs to find cash crops that could be planted
instead of opium.  As it became clear that there no simple one-to-one replacement was possible,
the programs were increasingly elaborated to research and development to find crops appropriate
to the ecological conditions of northern Thailand, road-building to facilitate access to markets
(opium buyers had gone to the villages themselves to buy the high-value crop, but with new
commercial crops farmers had to get their own goods to market in a timely manner), and provision
of inputs such as seeds, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers for the new crops.  By the 1980s, the
Thai state had penetrated the northern uplands on its borders.  In the most “successful” cases of
agricultural change, swathes of commercial crops in semi-permanent fields overtook mountain
slopes.  These fields, the chemical inputs, and the roads all resulted in spectacular environmental
destruction in parts of northern Thailand due to facilitation of illegal logging when roads opened up
previously inaccessible mountains, erosion from the fields and roads, and downstream pollution
from upland commercial monocropping (Ziegler et al. 2004).  This has given rise to intense
upland-lowland conflict over control of natural resources (e.g., Pungprasert 1989; Kaeothep,
Sewatamara and Vichitporn 1991; Ganjanapan 1998; Laungaramsri 1998; Lohmann 1999;
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Bangkok Post 2000b; Rajah 2005; Siriphon 2006).  The successive problematization of uplands
peoples shifted to environmental destruction, which corresponded with the international
environmental movement.  In the mid-1980s, the Thai state established the watershed
classification system for all of Thailand’s land resources, thereby effectively alienating all
uplanders from living on and using the mountain lands of northern Thailand.  This was the
culmination of a process of institutionalization begun in the 1940s based on Thai models of
rulership that made all land in the kingdom the king’s land.  These formalized laws excluded
people in favor of logging concessions that generated income for the government.  It made it
impossible for many rural people to gain legal title to the land they worked, and set punishments
of 1-7 years of imprisonment and fines of 5 to 5,000 baht for cutting forest that were ruinous for
small-scale farmers (Cooper 1984:260; Ganjanaphan 1987; W un'Gaeo 1992:14, 19).  W atershed
classifications marked the importance of each piece of land in the watershed on the basis of
slope, elevation, and vegetation cover; all land above 1000 meters was classified as 1A
watershed land on which no human use or habitation was allowed.  These laws brought most of
the north under the control of the Royal Forest Department (RFD) and forest reserves and
national parks were established throughout the north.  The north was both mountainous and the
main repository of forest in Thailand, thus a significant watershed for the Central Plains where the
most rice was grown, the single most important export in the Thai economy.  In addition, the
capital city Bangkok, its largest city, a regional financial center and currently the world’s 32nd
largest city, had great need of electricity generated by hydropower.  Protecting watersheds
therefore also protected urban development.  The consequence of these land policies fell
disproportionately on northern farmers, and in the case of the “hill tribes” their vulnerability was
exacerbated by their status as cultural and political outsiders.  All upland peoples became illegal
settlers, vulnerable to police brutality and eviction (Eudey 1989; Pungprasert 1989).  W hile it was
recognized that it was impossible to relocate all upland peoples, the state (through the RFD)
W hen I arrived in Revealed River, teachers and UN workers pointed out several points on the4
surrounding hills where there were supposed to be heroin labs and paths by which drugs were
transported and, indeed, late at night lights could be seen moving on ridges where there were no
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attempted to end swiddening, associated with opium and forest destruction, and long considered
a security concern because it enabled the mobility of swiddening peoples.  
In the 1980s, the Highland Development Master Plan organized the plethora of projects
run by different arms of the Thai government with various forms of bilateral and multilateral
funding active in northern Thailand.  The Sam Muen Highland Development Project (SMHDP,
hereafter the Project) was initiated as an integrated highland development project to coordinate
local development projects and also in reaction to the punitive and piecemeal intervention typical
of earlier projects.  The main purpose of the Project was to end swiddening and opium cultivation,
and in this it had been successful.  Thirty Thousand had once been the most productive poppy-
growing area in the north, which was why it was made a “key village” cluster in the new integrated
approach to drug control and deforestation.  Activities included Mountain Schools for literacy in the
Thai language, registration of households and granting of legal residency or citizenship to upland
minority peoples, forest and wildlife conservation, as well as agricultural development for opium
replacement.  The Project was under the control of the Royal Forest Department (RFD) Division
of W atershed Development coordinating projects by the United Nations International Drug Control
Programme (opium eradication), US-AID (Mountain Schools) and various other government
agencies (e.g., the Ministries of the Interior, Education, Health, different divisions of the RFD, and
departments of the Ministry of Agriculture).  All villages were also under the authority of the Thai
Third Army Battalion, which made periodic sweeps through the area to control illegal activities
from distilling rice whiskey to cultivating opium and to arrest “traffickers” (local farmers
transporting opium, often their own crop); until shortly before I settled in Revealed River, soldiers
were posted in the village for anti-opium security.  They also took “addicts” off to Army boot camps
to rehabilitate them.  By the early 1990s, while drug trafficking was still considered to be a
problem  – Thirty Thousand was part of the territory of the notorious drug lord Khun Sa  and there4 5
villages.  One village in the cluster and another at the entrance to the protected area in which the
cluster was located were particular villages in which households were involved in the drug trade. 
Most of the opium was produced in Burma, but it was refined into heroin in mobile labs all along
the border with Burma, as heroin was easier to transport.  Drugs were transported from other
countries, particularly Burma, through Thailand due to its superior infrastructure and international
connections. 
One February, the elder men Revealed River complained that they were expected to go to Burma5
to pay honor to Khun Sa and attend a New Year ceremony at the Forestry Center at the same
time.  The headman sent a family member in his stead.  In the early 1990s, Khun Sa was still too
powerful to ignore.   
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were several shoot-outs between the Army or the Border Patrol Police and drug caravans during
my stay – opium had largely been eradicated within the borders of the Project and forest cover
increased.  The Project was considered highly successful because of decrease in population
mobility; decrease in opium cultivation; decrease in area under cultivation; and clear involvement
of and responsibility by upland villagers in devising and maintaining land use plans for their
community.  The Project personnel also proudly pointed to higher rates of blue cards (identity
cards for resident aliens), household registration, and citizenship among uplanders in the Project
area, although it had been unsuccessful in gaining formal land rights for minority villagers. 
Given the success of the Project in reducing opium and increasing forest in Thirty
Thousand, Revealed River became a model village, frequently hosting officials from Bangkok to
observe the Project’s successes so that forestry officials could lobby for continued funding and
extension of their control of northern territories.  One of the few English terms I taught both Lisu
and Thai was “dog and pony show,” to talk about the constant meetings to display their adherence
to national goals, a performance of their model citizen behavior in a nation that denied them
citizenship.  The individualistic and independent Lisu were praised for their ‘self-sacrifice’ (Thai:
sia sala) for the good of the Thai nation.  The Project was so perfectly an expression of Thai state
policy that shortly after I arrived at site in 1991, the Project was made the model for all upland
watershed conservation projects in northern Thailand as the Accelerated W atershed
Reforestation Project (Gillogly 2002; Gillogly 2004; see also Pugnier 2002 a; Pugnier 2002 b).  
28
The Project was unique in that it was underpinned by an integrated, consistent Buddhist
philosophy.  The head of the Project, Khun Pakorn, was a forester.  He attempted to end conflict
between foresters and the Lisu by introducing cut flowers as a new cash crop that would allow the
Lisu farmers better return on less land.  W hen that failed due to market forces, farmers increased
their acreage of cash crops to make up in quantity for the high prices lost.  Forest was being
destroyed again and farmers were unable to satisfy their needs.  W ith this, the Head experienced
an epiphany.  A devout Buddhist, he redefined the problem in the hills as a desire for material
things.  The head devised a diverse mix of annual and perennial crops that would provide steady
income the year round on a limited amount of land carefully selected to conserve particular local
watersheds and discourage most monocropping and contract agriculture.  His essential
philosophy was simple needs simply fulfilled for security and sustainability.  He knew that Lisu
farmers depended on the income from cash crops such as opium to buy rice (Durrenberger
1983a; Cooper 1984), but focused rather on their status display at marriage, feasts, and of silver
jewelry.  He resolved to turn people from accumulation (spoken of as profit) and display to
subsistence, self-reliance, and moderation.  This was congruent with Thai Buddhist middle-class
interpretations of the “middle path,” of moderation through reducing desire, and with romanticized
views of rural communities as inward looking and economically self-sufficient (e.g., Khonkhai
1982; Ekachai 1990; Nartsupha 1991; Nartsupha 1999; Singh 1998); it undoubtedly appealed
greatly to the policymakers who adopted this program for regional implementation.  It was also
highly assimilationist. 
A philosophy less congruent with the Lisu worldview can hardly be imagined, living as
members of a culture grounded in kin relations and status displays through marriage prestations
and ancestor worship ceremonies.  In a cultural world as aggressively egalitarian as that of the
Lisu, every person’s repute (myi -do ) had to be jealously guarded and constantly demonstrated3 5
through status display (Durrenberger 1983b).  A key locus of demonstration of myi -do  was3 5
marriage payments, and these required accumulation of surplus.  Under the paternalistic regime
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of the Project, this was redefined as mere greed and vanity.  There was a pervasive current of
resentment among the Lisu of Revealed River against Project philosophy, while at the same time
public accord with Project practices.  
W hy then did the Lisu of Revealed River cooperate?  There were a number of reasons for
compliance, some voluntary and intentional, and some compelled.  One was that people saw
worse alternatives.  In everyday conversations, people spoke of the poverty of other Lisu villages
– the loss of land; soil erosion and drying up of streams; debt due to contract cropping; young
men involved as mules in the drug trade, lost to jail or addiction; young women involved in the sex
trade, lost to discos or AIDS; and the constant insecurities about today and tomorrow.  In this
context, villagers in the Project, although they felt poor by their own standards, felt relatively
secure.  
Another element was that the Project implemented a participatory approach to forest
protection as a response to the pervasive antagonism between foresters and upland farmers. A
Cornell-trained anthropologist, Dr. Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong, developed a methodology called
Participatory Land-Use Planning (PLP) as a mechanism to develop collaboration among local
farmers, agricultural extension agents, and foresters in identifying the specific needs of each
locality (Tan-Kim-Yong 1992; Tan-Kim-Yong, Limchoowong and Gillogly 1994).  This was
decentralized planning, as opposed to the watershed classification system created in the capital
that had removed the entire uplands of northern Thailand from productive use on the basis of
large scale maps.  Looked at in detail and with local knowledge of hydrology, many upland valleys
were clearly appropriate for cultivation.  The characteristics of PLP were that community
development workers lived in villages for a year or more so that farmers could build personal
relationships with them and the workers could learn about local farmers’ environmental and
agricultural knowledge.  This was followed by a process of jointly building 3-D land use maps that
allowed foresters and villagers to construct the vocabulary and social relationships necessary to
facilitate communication and understanding of each others’ ideas.  Finally a mutually agreed upon
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land use plan was formulated, rather than a plan that foresters imposed on villagers.  W hile the
Project and other government agents had more power in this relationship, PLP was designed to
negate standard power relations by making the voice of the villagers equal to that of state officials. 
At least it ensured that the participants knew each other and were bound in ties of reciprocity,
creating social webs, rather than preserving polarized positions born of linguistic and cultural
difference.  
Inherent in this was the Project’s commitment that if villagers enforced watershed
protection themselves, they would be able to stay on their land.  In fact, extension workers often
told Revealed River villagers that this was the case and pointed to recent examples of military
violence against local people in Thailand as evidence of the Project’s role in protecting them.  The
implied promise and threat was that Lisu adherence would decrease government interference in
their daily subsistence decisions.  This had been proven to them when Revealed River declared
itself an opium-free village, sending the “addicts” (elderly smokers who used opium to alleviate the
pains of arthritis and other ills of old age) out of the village; in response, the Project convinced the
Third Army to pull its soldiers out of Revealed River.  In their public allegiance to the Project, Lisu
villagers of Revealed River sought to reclaim place and autonomy, rather than oppose outside
domination (cf. Steinberg and Clark 1999).  They recognized that the marginality that they valued
as a key part of their self-identify made them vulnerable and they made use of the Project as a
resource in their right to survive.  In some ways the Project offered solutions to problems they
faced as a result of the interdiction of opium and swiddening, but they had been enveloped into
Thai structures of incorporation through their cooperation with unintended consequences.
The state was experienced most directly in Revealed River through the policies and
practices of the Project.  W hile cultural assimilation was a de facto activity of the Project, in this
dissertation I focus on the elements of opium control and swidden cessation and their
consequences for household and kinship organization.  Opium interdiction had gutted the
economic basis of Lisu society in northern Thailand, all the more significant in that their social
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structure was historically formed by opium growing.  I discuss how this came about in Chapter 2. 
Opium interdiction brought about constriction of economic resources and the need to adapt, on
the household level, to the requirements of the post-opium economy, discussed in Chapter 4. 
The loss of land due to RFD control of the uplands had specific consequences for Lisu social
structure as it made land a scarce resource, something that was valuable and inheritable, and this
had specific consequences for kinship and marriage practices.  I discuss this in Chapter 5.  Lisu
cultural principles supported both unstable villages and highly independent households, and stable
villages and cohesive kin organization, in this case, localized patrilineages.  W hich sort of
organization predominated depended on economic and political conditions; current conditions of
increasing resource scarcity supported strong localized lineages.  
Methods
I carried out this research from January 1991 to May of 1994.  I spent the first six weeks
in Thailand carrying out archival research in the library of Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok), the
main research library in Thailand and repository of much ‘grey’ literature (unpublished field
reports, for instance).  I also carried out archival research at the Resources Management and
Development office, location of the Upland Social Forestry Project Pilot Project that had
developed Participatory Land-Use Planning, in the Social Sciences Faculty, as well as the library
of the Hill Tribes Research Institute of Chiang Mai University.  At the same time, I carried out the
usual meetings with local experts to discuss possible field sites and visited potential sites.  I was
aware that development and forestry projects were everyplace in the mountains of northern
Thailand.  I sought, therefore, to find an interesting development project to study as well as an
interesting Lisu village.  The Sam Muen Highland Development Project was one of the most
significant projects in northern Thailand.  However, I was not allowed to choose my own research
site within the Project’s territory.  The uplands forestry projects were politically sensitive at that
time, in part because of social protest against forestry projects in other regions of Thailand and in
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part because of massive protests against a military coup and resultant massacre that had taken
place shortly after I arrived in Thailand.  In addition, authorities were concerned about possible on-
going drug trafficking; clearly, having an American woman walk into a dangerous situation would
have been embarrassing for the Project and the Thai government.  I was sent to Revealed River
as a “model” village that would show the Project at its best, not the least because Revealed River
had recently declared itself opium free.  
Revealed River was part of a cluster of Lisu villages, the largest being Thirty Thousand
itself, the “key village” in this first and largest of highland development projects.  Thirty Thousand
was a large and chaotic village, and I rarely visited except for weddings and funerals.  The main
focus of my research was Revealed River, with frequent visits to its small satellite village Resting
House River; the village some Revealed River founders had come from, Spring Village, and its
two satellite villages.  I also visited single household settlements in the forests where expelled
elderly opium addicts lived.  However, I was also obligated to spend a certain amount of time at
the forestry center, and so I studied the culture and personnel of the Project as well, although I
write little about that here.  
In early 1994, I spent a several months carrying out an evaluation of Participatory Land-
Use Planning for the Project Coordinating Office of the United Nations Drug Control
Programme/Northern Thailand with Dr. Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong of Chiang Mai University and the
Upland Social Forestry Pilot Project and Samer Limcheewong, head of the Sam Muen Highland
Development Project.  For that, we  visited the W iang Pha Highland Development Project and Doi
Luang National Park as well as sites within the territory of the Sam Muen Highland Development
Project.  This gave me interesting comparative information on the nature of change in northern
Thailand and the ways in which different projects, with their organizational cultures, stimulated
different types of change than I had observed in the SMHDP.  
Other important sources and contacts were a group of ‘hill tribe’ youth who were attending
or had attended Chiang Mai University or Payap University who had established an NGO called
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the Inter Mountain Peoples Education and Culture in Thailand Association (IMPECT), an offshoot
of the Southeast Asian Mountain Peoples, Culture and Development Programs (SEAMP).  I
visited several upland villages in Chiang Rai with them.  One of these was “See the Tiger” Village
in Chiang Rai, the site of Otome Klein Hutheesing’s research.  I also worked with various
colleagues in the Faculty of Agriculture’s Multiple Cropping Center, many of whom I had worked
with for years through the interdisciplinary Southeast Asian Universities Agroecosystems Network. 
Finally, in early 1994 I travelled to Lijiang, Yunnan, China with Dr. Uraivan for preliminary research
for a study of ecotourism she was planning.  
As I was studying long term change and continuity in Lisu social structure from the opium
to the post-opium economies, I studied the published work and field notes of Paul Durrenberger,
Alain Dessaint, and Otome Klein Hutheesing.  Paul Durrenberger kindly gave me access to his
fieldnotes.  Otome Hutheesing visited Revealed River with me; and several years later, I visited
See The Tiger with her for New Year.  I have benefitted much from her enthusiasm and deep
knowledge of the Lisu.   These sources provided a significant portion of the historical comparisons
as Paul Durrenberger and Alain Dessaint studied Lisu at the apex of the opium economy and
Hutheesing studied the disintegration of Lisu society and culture as opium was replaced by
contract commercial farming and heroin trafficking.  In 2003 and 2004, I carried out archival
research based on English and French sources into the history of Lisu in Yunnan and Burma in an
effort to understand the prior text of Lisu society before opium and their social organization in
relation to other Tibeto-Burman societies.  This ballooned into a massive historical chapter of 300
pages which eventually became Chapter 2.  All of this might appear to be “too” archival, a mere
survey of preceding literature.  However, Evans-Pritchard is reported to have said that all
anthropology turns into social history so I feel justified in turning historical documents into sources
for anthropology.  More importantly, I believe that it is essential that we incorporate the
documentary information already available to us rather than reinventing ourselves each decade.  
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W hile I have studied continuity and change in Lisu social structure, I have not in fact
actually observed these changes myself over a long period of time.  As Dwyer and Minnegal have
pointed out, tales of sequential change are vulnerable to error due to the “fallacy of the primal
exemplar and the fallacy of the preconceived end point” (Dwyer and Minnegal 1999:379).  In fact,
Revealed River, and the other villages of Thirty Thousand were in the midst of change when I
observed them.  There was a never-ending flux of strategies, possibilities, options, opinions, risks,
failures, and successes.  I compared villages in different times and places, with little connecting
point among them except the commonality of changes in the mountains.  W hat I do have is
several sources of information from different periods of Lisu life that point towards these emergent
patterns.  
This is not a quantitative study.  There were severe political problems with counting of
households and fields.  As one Lisu college-educated woman said to me, “W e Lisu don’t count. 
Just don’t ask about numbers.  W e don’t count, so we don’t know.  But everyone thinks we’re
liars.”  More significantly, the collection of quantitative data was politically loaded in Revealed
River.  The United Nations, US-AID, the Thai government, and the Sam Muen Highland
Development Project had all counted the Lisu in this area for some time, and the people of
Revealed River perceived this counting as a means of control over them.  For those who want it,
there was an abundance of statistical data of varying reliability.  But what I tried to understand
were the mechanisms of change, its internal dynamics, and people’s strategies in conditions of
change, rather than statistical trajectories.  Statistical work can show the correlation of types of
kinship and intensity of land use (e.g., Frechione and Scaglion 1981), but can not show
mechanisms.  I looked, rather, at the interplay of units of action, here the household, the lineage,
and state policies.  Specifically, this research examined the consequences of economic change
for household relationships and kin networks, and the role of social structure in adaptation to new
agricultural conditions. 
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Conclusion
This is a study of political ecology and globalization.  Lisu have been embedded in global
capitalism almost since the inception of global capitalism, if we see the profits from the opium
trade as the beginning of modern capitalism (Trocki 1999).  Chapter 2 is about how northern
Thailand Lisu society was historically constructed, focusing on how Lisu society took different
forms under different political economic conditions, particularly with the introduction of opium as a
cash crop.  Opium had enmeshed the Lisu into a global economy.  They were small-scale
producers, therefore at the lowest and most dependent level in the global economic system.  They
provided raw materials to colonial powers and purchased a small amount of manufactured goods
(cash from opium was used to buy rice to feed the household as much as to buy cloth and
household supplies).  The Lisu did not openly experience their dependency, the disequilibrium and
shattering of integrity, associated with their structural position in globalization.  In fact, opium
enabled Lisu to maintain their autonomy.  This was in part because they generally did not
consume their main cash crop (and not consuming opium was an important marker of their ethnic
identity, so it can be seen as related to their defining trait of independence).  According to
Dessaint, it was due to the importance of cash as a medium of exchange, the convertibility of their
prestige goods (silver), and the fact that they depended on the Chinese as commercial
intermediaries (Dessaint 1972a:186-89).  The inherent illegality of opium as a cash crop was also
congruent with their history of marginality to regional polities, enabling them to maintain the
‘outsiderness’ that was at the base of their independence.  International narcotics policy and Thai
implementation of that policy in keeping with the state agenda of incorporating the northern
hinterlands fundamentally changed the ways in which Lisu interacted with local polities and
peoples.  The social structure of the Lisu, despite their ‘isolation’ and ‘independence,’ was
historically constructed through involvement in global economic systems, but as growers of
narcotics, narcotics ultimately served as the reason and the means for the envelopment of Lisu in
to the Thai state.  This was the irony of their autonomy.  
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As the Lisu were integrated into the global polity and economy through the filter of Thai
national economy and policy, pre-existing Lisu social structures motivated people to choose
certain strategies over others when faced with the end of the opium economy and involvement in
global markets through other means.  This research had two objectives.  One was a theoretical
problem, to explain both social transformations and continuity over time.  The other was to fill an
empirical gap in the literature on the relationship between social and economic change,
particularly to discover the locus of adaptation to global forces.  This research is significant in its
attempt to unite research in current social theory with agricultural development issues. 
Development projects and ideology pervade northern Thailand.  No villager or "hill tribe" can carry
out their life outside of this context of development projects.  W e need to understand the agency
of the people who experience globalization locally.  
Research in this project area provided information on the specific social and cultural
effects of a project that was not only the dominant model for development in the whole of northern
Thailand, but was being disseminated to other Asian countries.  Thus, it adds the body of
anthropological knowledge of learning to make our knowledge relevant to the very real problems
of environmental degradation and social disintegration consequent upon rapid economic change
throughout the world.  Study of the Project became a necessary element in this research. 
Although I have written very little about it here, it was a driving force in the lived experience of the
Lisu of Revealed River.  
The Lisu have experienced globalization through their involvement in global markets for
over 150 years.  This has had profound consequences for their social structure.  This social
structure has revolved around key structural principles so that Lisu appear to have maintain a
sense of coherent social structure despite considerable political and economic change.  Social
change occurred along particular fault lines – they were always answering the same questions,
even if with different resources and answers, resulting in unintended consequences.  But their
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main concern seemed always to be their family and household relations, and that is the focus of
what follows.  
38
CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LISU SOCIETY
The Problem Regarding Lisu Regional Ethnography
Historical accounts of Lisu in western Yunnan vary considerably in how the Lisu are
characterized.  They are labeled as allegiant warriors, barbarous mercenaries, and craven
cowards; they had chiefs, they were so egalitarian they murdered anyone with pretensions to
dominate them, they had slaves.  The question arises – which of these are the “true” Lisu?  The
paradox continues.  On a trip to the Naxi town of Lijiang in northwestern Yunnan Province in 1994,
Naxi villagers showed their New Year’s circle dances, and I recognized the melodies and the
steps.  The tempo was faster, the steps more complex, but music and dance were unmistakably
the same as Lisu New Year’s dances.  That which marked the Lisu in Thailand as conspicuously
different and out-of-place people was part and parcel of regional cultural patterns in western
Yunnan.  Even stranger was that over 150 years’ time and 500 miles’ migration, through different
political regimes and profound economic transformations, over the roughest of terrains that
militated against continued contact with previous populations, ran this thread of cultural continuity. 
Given the marked relational character of ethnicity in Southeast Asia, how have the Lisu
remained “Lisu” despite comprehensive changes in the encompassing political and economic
systems in which they lived?  Despite the contingent nature of social relations, something
remained constant in how people lived their lives.  Social transformation is not absolute; people
are not automatons, cogs in the wheel of the world system changing to suit conditions.  It is
necessary to delineate what remains when other things change in order to discover the
commonality; societies have their own structure, a fixed compass point around which they
oscillate.  However, the structure is not a coherent, integrated whole; there are inherent
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contradictions within the structure of each society and it is along these fault lines that change is
most likely to occur.  In fact, there were multiple compass points.  
Lisu social forms were kaleidoscopic and each way I turned the pattern shifted, although
the same elements made up the patterns.  The situation of Lisu in Northern Mainland Southeast
Asia provides an excellent landscape for the study of change and continuity in Lisu society given
the profound transformations in political economy in the twentieth century.  To situate these
processes, I will explicate a prior text from which Lisu living in Thailand have worked, a text written
into Lisu culture from the practices and adaptations to the conditions of those who preceded them,
those who taught their children and grandchildren what to do to survive as Lisu people in a
constantly shattering and tumultuous world.  A key element to understanding this prior text is to
understand the power relations of the place from which their forebears came, Yunnan and Burma,
where they lived before moving to Thailand, the ways in which power was understood in a specific
cultural framework, and how people acted within that in order to live.  
The society of Lisu populations has been flexible and adaptive throughout its history in
Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Before their migration southwards to northern Thailand, Lisu
were a people found primarily in the far west of Yunnan and the east of northern Burma.  This was
an extensive region marked by environmental and political diversity.  The Lisu were a non-state
people but their relations with states were salient in the forms of their social and political structure. 
Sociopolitical forms and ethnic expression – the means by which they marked social position and
boundaries – altered in different contexts.  Modes of production varied depending on the
environmental conditions of the places in which they lived and the economic resources to which
they had access.  Identity as “Black” or “W hite” Lisu, marked by dress and political organization,
were related to relations to Chinese or Tibetan cultural and political models.  Lisu related to local
states (or the local arms of more distant empires) as brigands or mercenaries, as independent
and “wild” or peaceful and “civilized.” 
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W ith the transformation of regional trade and political power in western Yunnan in the
W estern colonial period, Lisu populations imbricated in these structures underwent a
transformation.  The main means of this was the introduction of opium as a cash crop.  Opium
introduced a resource that altered the dynamics of Lisu society, shifting toward household
autonomy and migration as key elements of social structure.  In these conditions, other social
structures such as localized patrilineages and village institutions attenuated.  Lisu peoples’
strategies in late twentieth century northern Thailand arose in part from prior structures of
inequality from which they sought escape and redress; they pursued answers to existing problems
using the strategies at their disposal throughout shifting conditions. 
My goal in this chapter is to situate the Lisu in terms of historical political and economic
relations that have created the structures and practices by which they met state and global
intervention in Thailand in the 1990s.  W ho the Lisu are in Thailand arises out of who they were in
western Yunnan and northern Burma.  This is “centering the periphery”; I am examining Lisu
people as part of an active cultural and geographic region rather than simply as outsiders and
objects of Thai state development problematizations.  
Locations and Geographical Groupings
Distribution
People called or self-identified as Lisu (with awareness that this ethnolinguistic category
has been historically constructed) live from the Upper Salween in northwestern Yunnan bordering
Tibet in the north down to northern Thailand in the south, to Putao (Nam Tamai, Upper Burma)
bordering India in the west and W uding, Yunnan in the east.  They were most commonly found
along the Yunnan-Burma frontier in from W eixi down to Simao and in Burma followed the same
line from Putao/Nam Tamai down to the Southern Shan States (Fraser 1922:v; Leach 1965:309). 
By the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth centuries, the core area of Lisu settlement
was in the Upper Salween (Nu River) between roughly 25° 30' and 27° 30', and practically the
  In fact, Moso or Naxi (Bradley, p.c., February 2005). 6
  Bhâmo and Myitkyina were part of the Kachin State after the British took over (Leach7
1965:44).  
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whole population of the Salween Valley between 26° and 27° 30' was Lisu.  There were also
significant Lisu populations on the upper slopes of the Salween-Mekong Divide and the Mekong-
Yangtze Divide in W eixi County; straddling the boundary between southern Sichuan and
northwestern Yunnan; and on the Nmai Hka (an eastern branch of the Irrawaddy) in Burma
(Forrest 1908:261; Fraser 1922:iii; Davies 1909:391-2; Daniels 1994).  Populations in eastern
Burma were more recent, however.  Not all of these are equally long-standing populations.  Those
in India, for instance, migrated there in 1942.  Clearly, not all of these people dispersed widely
across the landscape could be “the same” people.  However, a shared history or past contiguity at
one time is implied by their linguistic relatedness.  W hat is interesting, therefore, is that these
were not an isolated group attached to one territory.  
Aside from the Upper Salween area, Lisu were non-contiguously settled across western
Yunnan (Rock 1947:124) and northeastern Burma.  A substantial population lived north of 28° N
on the Salween River south of Tra-mu-tang and north of W eixi, and in Kham (Eastern Tibet), just
south of or mixed with “Massa”  and Tibetan-speaking people (Baber 1882:72; Davies 1909:124;6
Kingdon-W ard 1986:196; d’Orleans 1896:302).  Another significant population was located north
and east of Tengchong (known at the time as T’eng-yuëh or Momien) and Lisu lived as far west of
the Salween as Bhâmo (Davies 1909:391).  Bradley states that Tengchong is adjacent to Nujiang
and the likely source of Lisu migration into Nujiang, moving upriver (Bradley, p.c.,  February
2005).  They were also reported in Kengtung (Shan States, Burma) (Rose and Brown 1911:258). 
Lisu were reported as far south as “Kianghung-gyee” and the mountains east of Yungchan
according to Anderson (1871:135-6). By 1900, Lisu were reported as far east as W uding (25° 33'
N, 102° 38' ?E).  By the 1920s, a small population of Lisu had moved far west to the Myitkyina
Plains on the Irrawaddy (Fraser 1922:vii).   The population in Thailand is the southernmost one. 7
One Lisu informant claimed his village was first established 150 years ago, but the earliest
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verifiable date is that villages were established by Lisu in the 1890s (Hanks and Hanks 2001:78,
80), although Bradley puts the date as 1918 (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005). 
Geographical Groupings: North, Central, and South
Lisu lived in villages scattered over a wide area, exhibiting a pattern in which groups of
Lisu with distinct linguistic and political features were clustered over the landscape while,
characteristically for Northern Mainland Southeast Asia, surrounded by other non-state upland
peoples and by lowland peoples who were part of a local state or an empire.  In northwestern
Yunnan, Lisu were surrounded by Tibetan and Naxi lowlanders; in the central region, their
neighbors to the east were Chinese, Yi, and Bai; and toward the southern part of their distribution
in Yunnan, their neighbors were Lalo, Lahu, W a, Kachin, and Shan (Davies 1909:307).  The
Tibetans, Naxi, Chinese, and Shan were lowland state societies of greatly varying levels of
complexity, but all in position to militarily, politically, and culturally control or dominate uplanders
such as the Lisu.  
Their relations with neighboring groups structured economic, political and ritual practices,
and expression of ethnicity.  In addition, naming and categorization were projects of empire.  State
interactions with people on the fringes of the state were ruled through categorization that allowed
territories to be claimed and peoples to ruled effectively in keeping with their “character.”  As such,
inter-ethnic relations organized knowledge and the use of ethnonyms.  W hat we know of Lisu and
other non-state peoples historically comes through the documentation of agents of the states –
Tibetan, Chinese, and colonial (in this case British) commentators – who described them through
their own frames of knowledge by which people on the fringes were assessed as to their degree
of civilization.  The extent to which Lisu societies actually adhered to these frames of governance
and civilization varied.  I will discuss these frames and naming in a later section.  For now, I
summarize the ways in which Lisu societies differed from place to place in terms of geographic
location and their contiguity to and involvement with neighboring states.  Given limits in
Eric Mueggler (personal communication, September 15, 2006) points out that Forrest traveled8
with a British officer whose remit was to make a case for British control of the region and thus
was predisposed to find evidence of lack of functional political authority and resultant chaos.
These were tusi domains in the W eixi Prefecture of Yunnan (Gros 1996; Gros 2001) (Yezhi being9
at approximately 27° 50' and 29°).  
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understanding of the cultural and political construction of ethnonyms, there were three broad
populations of Lisu – North, Central, and South – marked by local variations in language, dress,
political organization, and types of agriculture. 
North Lisu
Explorers such as Desgodins remarked the independent character of Lisu they met south
of Tibet (Baber 1882:72), where they were in their “natural, primitive state” in the Salween Valley
north of 26° 30'.  These were the Black Lisu.  The Black Lisu were marked by not speaking
Chinese, wearing hempen clothes, frequent feuding among villages, and often not having a village
headman (Forrest 1908:250, 254)  as well as exhibiting “Tibetan” characteristics (Kingdon-W ard8
1986:176).  They, along with Tibetans and Independent Lolos of western Sichuan, W a, and rural
Naxi, were noted as maintaining their dress, language, and customs in the face of Chinese
assimilatory forces (Davies 1909:368, 391-2).  These features were particularly true of Lisu living
on the west bank of the Salween, on the Irrawaddy divide (Forrest 1908:252-54).  However, in the
eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries a significant population of fiercely independent Lisu lived to
the south of Kangpu and Yezhi .  9
To the east, the Lisu along the Mekong River between 27° and 29° were described as
timid (d’Orleans 1896:136).  Lisu on the east of the Salween toward the Mekong were considered
more peaceable and prosperous even when not under Chinese rule; the land in which they lived
there was also less severe and more fertile (Forrest 1908:252-254).  They were under the
protection of other polities.  They may have been a more assimilated population; influenced by
Chinese frames, European explorers’ assessments of degrees of timidity and fierceness were
often congruent with degrees of assimilation to Chinese culture.  These populations of Lisu were
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susceptible to raids by the independent Lisu to their west.  These were W hite Lisu.  The
categorical opposition between peaceful, civilized W hite Lisu and warlike, independent Black Lisu
was highly marked (Ch’en 1947:258).  
There was a small eastward population of Lisu in Sanyingpan (26°, 102° 30') or Yong-bei
Ting (26° 45', 100° 45') (Davies 1909:392), which was east of Lijiang.  This is the region noted in
Daniels’ (1994) report of a Lisu uprising in 1821.  However, Bradley points out that these may in
fact have been the linguistically closely related Lipo, a group called ‘Eastern Lisu’ by Fraser and
other missionaries, who were heavily Sinicized (2005).  This is just south of Shigu, a Naxi area
north of Lijiang at an oxbow in the Yangtze River, and thus was a population more exposed to
Chinese immigration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The furthest eastern points were
eastern settlements at Yuanma (approximately 25° 40', 101° 50') (Enriquez 1921:74), Sanyingpan
(approximately 26°, 102°) and W uding (25° 30' N, 102° 20') (Rose and Brown 1911:257).  These,
too, were Lipo, a distinct but closely related language to Lisu and very sinicized (Bradley, p.c., 
February 2005; Fraser 1922:xi).  Lisu were even reported as far west as the Assam-Burma border
(Rose and Brown 1911:257, citing Young 1907), in the Akyang Valley, Putao, and Nam Tamai,
directly opposite the northern core area of Lisu in Yunnan (Enriquez 1921:70, 72; Leach 1965:51-
52).  In the years following the Burmese independence and Chinese Communist control of China,
Christian Lisu took advantage of these connections to move to Arunachal Pradesh and live there
today (Maitra 1993; Hazarika 2004).  However, these populations of “Black” Lisu were more
recent migrations.  
Central Lisu
Further south, below 26° 30', Lisu were more Sinicized in clothes and forms of
governance.  More people, generally tusi and their families, spoke Chinese (Davies 1909:391-2;
Forrest 1908:244, 247).  Davies thought it probable that the upper part of the Shwe-li or Longjiang
Rivers north of Tengchong (25°, 98° 30') was once inhabited by Lisu who had “become” Chinese
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(Davies 1909:391).  Zhengjia (Chengjia or Cheng-ka) was the farthest point north where there
was any real Chinese authority through native tusi.  From 25° 50' to 26° 30', tusi were more
powerful, claimed a history of being Chinese who had “turned” Lisu, and Lisu who appeared to be
“mixed” with Chinese (Forrest 1908:244), in the discourse of racial categories of British observers.
To the west, Lisu were found scattered in small communities throughout the Kachin Hills,
east of the Irrawaddy, Upper Burma, and as far south as 23° 40' (well south of Bhâmo).  In
general, the Lisu in Burma extended directly west of the main southwest area of Lisu populations
in Yunnan, particularly across from Tengchong, which was the furthest outpost of Chinese
administration and settlement, a Chinese island in the midst of non-Han people (Rose and Brown
1911:250).  Further south, in Burma, Sinicized Lisu lived in smaller and less powerful communities
interspersed among Kachins.  Often engaged in intermarriage and political relations with the
Kachin, Lisu lineages were incorporated into Kachin kinship and clan structure so that Kachin
kinship networks were extended to embrace Lisu speakers.  In one village southeast of Bhâmo
(on the border with Yunnan, across from Tengchong), one of the eight lineages was a Lisu
lineage, the other being speakers of Jinghpaw, Gauri, Maru, Atsi, and Chinese (Leach 1965:59,
88).  Some Lisu considered themselves to be a part of Kachin (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005).
South Lisu
Still further south, there were Lisu in the Northern Shan States (south of 24° N) and, until
the colonial government created an arbitrary administrative separation, all of the people of this
linguistically polyglot territory were dependencies of one of the local Shan chiefs of saopha or
sawbwa (Leach 1965:51) (the Thai cognate is jaofaa, meaning literally lord of the sky).  Finally, in
an area of irrigated rice terraces between Mogok in the south up to the confluence of the Nam
(Tamai) and Mehkla Rivers between Sadon (25° 15' N) and Namkhan (south of 24° N), east of
Tengchong, there lived a highly Sinicized population of Lisu with roots in Tengchong (Leach
1965:52).  Lisu in the Kachin Valley wore dress that resembled that of Chinese-Shans except for
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“Lisu” features such as the bag, turban, earrings, and necklaces of the women (Anderson
1871:136).  In other respects, they were considered very Chinese – they smoked opium, kept
Chinese New Year, the men spoke Chinese, and they intermarried with the “hill Chinese” or “Haw”
traders – despite being relatively remote from Chinese territory.  This was in Möng Ka, a staging
post on the route from Sadon to Tengchong (Leach 1965:39), so again a Sinicized population with
roots in Tengchong.  These were the “Flowery” or patterned/striped Lisu.  The Lisu of northern
Thailand largely originated from this southern population.  
Summary
In summary, from north to south along the Salween, Lisu were increasingly in contact with
and influenced by Chinese markets and administration (Rose and Brown 1911:251).  In the south-
central parts of Lisu distribution, they were more directly under Chinese administration (Enriquez
1921:72).  These were the W hite Lisu, a more assimilated population.  Lisu in the far northwest
were considered the “core” population, independent or Black Lisu, although they, too, had
migrated there in about 1760 (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005 b).  They were less under Chinese
control and more imbricated in Tibetan ritual and political relations until at least the late nineteenth
century.  However, the nature of warfare and the ebb and flow of the power of various states often
meant the Northern Lisu were not effectively incorporated into the rule of Naxi or Tibetan polities,
even if partaking of the common Tibetan conceptual substratums, especially the cultural and
political framework.  Thus, they came to be labeled as independent (meaning, independent from
the Chinese empire).  Those known as Flowery Lisu appear to have originated in the Southern
part of Lisu distribution in Yunnan, around Tengchong and eventually migrated further south into
the Shan States of Burma and later into Thailand.  W hile deeply involved in the markers of
Chinese ethnicity and in Chinese dominated trade, they were politically independent.  Thus, from
north to south, there was a gradient of involvement in and assimilation to Tibetan to Chinese
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political style, and a bell curve of degrees of independence, with more “independent” populations
in the North and the South, reflecting political conditions in those regions.  
Yunnan as a Place: Fragmented Landscapes and Polities
Yunnan was a crossroads of west and east, of Southeast Asia and China.  The
northwestern region of Yunnan and eastern region of northern Burma was a meeting ground of
diverse peoples and a site of great political and cultural complexity.  Out of these conditions in this
particular time and place arose the dynamic of Lisu social structure and migration southward;
understanding this is essential to understanding the prior text of Lisu in Thailand.  
Physical Features
The geography of Yunnan is a significant factor in understanding the social relations of
the people of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  The physical conditions often isolated
populations of the region from direct control of neighboring empires, resulting in fragmented local
polities.  The people of western Yunnan were exposed to all sorts of calamities, especially flood
and fire: flash floods left deposits of sand and shingle that covered entire villages and fires that
incinerated every house, sudden landslides on mountain slopes, and severe earthquakes (Baber
1882:52).  Environmental conditions made subsistence unstable.  
Geographically, Yunnan is a place of high mountains inter-cut with rushing rivers in deep
gorges and canyons, narrow valleys, and plains basins.  The western gorges are formed by four
great rivers: the Nu (Salween); the Lancang (Mekong); and in Burma, the Nmai Hka and Mali Hka,
tributaries of the Irrawaddy.  All of these are restricted by the longitudinal ranges and cut
southward in unusually deep gorges.  Yunnan on the border with Burma is a region of “formidable”
topography and “epic” longitudinally running mountain ranges (W iens 1967:20-21).  The weather
tended to be dry, particularly on the western slopes, which were barren due to the prevailing winds
(Baber 1882:166-7; W iens 1967:26), but prone to periodic heavy rains and flooding.  It is also a
seismically volatile region.  More recently, a series of earthquakes struck 19 different locations in
The area of Tibet, Assam, and Burma is part of the Great Boundary Fault where the eastern10  
edge of the Himalayas is still growing and very unstable.  One of the worst earthquakes in
historical times up until the Sumatra earthquake of December 2004 occurred in this region.  It
lasted only four minutes but more than one million square miles of land were affected.  Mountains
fell apart, rivers were dammed, and the hydrology of the region was permanently changed. 
Survivors suffered from the effects of this earthquake for years afterwards (Rabinowitz 2001:125-
26).  For other recent earthquakes, see BBC W orld Service 2001; CNN.Com 2001; and Hewitt
2001. For recent floods and the role of a strong centralized state in ameliorating population
movement, see Agence France Presse English 2004; Xinhua News Agency 2004a; Xinhua News
Agency 2004b; and Xinhua News Agency 2004c.
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Yunnan over a period of fifteen hours early December 26th, 2004, ranging up to 5 on the Richter
scale.  Another earthquake four months previously left 126,000 people homeless (Xinhua News
Agency 2004d).   These geographical and topological features, which made travel so difficult,10
also united Yunnan with the northern part of mainland Southeast Asia as a geographic and
ecological region known as Montane Mainland Southeast Asia or the Upper Mekhong Ecoregion
(Van Keer et al. 1998:1).  This geography supported a cultural continuity in that as a discrete
geographical bloc of climatological unreliability, rugged terrain, high altitude, and poor soils, it was
resistant to Han incursion (W iens 1967:8, 20-21). 
Western Yunnan as a Place
Geographic conditions favored a patchwork of small autonomous polities, of which few
had the economic and population resources to rise as an empire in their own right (Lee 1979:48). 
Geography granted a degree of autonomy from the hegemony of Chinese imperial power; location
placed the smaller cultural groups in position to play off state powers against each other locally;
trade patterns tied the potentially isolated social groups of western Yunnan into a common cultural
substratum and provided the wealth by which they were able to survive severe physiogeographical
conditions.  
Study of overland trade routes between China and its south/southwest neighbors
illustrates the continuity of a region that has been called Northern Mainland Southeast Asia (Sun
1994; Sun 2000; Edwards 2002; see also Giersch 2001).  Given the severity of ecological
conditions, the growth of trade networks was an essential component of local adaptations and
 For instance, at a panel at the 2001 AAS about ethnic groups in Yunnan – many of whom also11
live in Burma, Thailand, and Laos – one of the presenters gave her talk in Chinese.  This in itself
was understandable and acceptable.  But no one on the panel translated the talk; questions to her
were presented in Chinese and her answers were also not translated.  
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most people participated in trade, even if indirectly (Samuel 1993:145, 566).  Even after the
desolation of the region after the Muslim Rebellions and the increased penetration of western
colonial trade in the nineteenth century distorted regional trade networks, trade relations among
China, Yunnan, Tibet, and the plethora of smaller kingdoms throughout western Yunnan, northern
Burma, and northern Thailand continued.  Especially after the Muslim Rebellions, Chinese villages
in what is now northeastern Burma were tied into a common Northern or Montane Mainland
Southeast Asian trade nexus (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I and II; Hill 1998).  
Culturally, Yunnan was not so much peripheral to China as it was central to “a web of
linguistically-related villages spanning parts of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and India“ (Davis
2001:48).  Geography, religion, politics and trade oriented this region toward Tibet to the
northwest and Burma and Thailand to the southwest (Giersch 2001:73; Gros 1996; Sun 2001) at
times far more than toward the Chinese empire.  Until recently, our understanding of the region
has been colored by views that saw lands under native chief (tusi) invested or validated by the
Chinese court as actual territories of the Chinese empire and ignored the substantial trade and
cultural exchange that occurred between Southeast Asians and Chinese via traders of many
cultural groups (Sun 2000:5, 15).  The concept of national boundaries still prevent the kind of
interdisciplinary communication necessary to understand the history, society, and economy of
these regions in their own terms rather than in presentist nationalist ones.   As Frank’s (1998)11
work “reorient”ed our perspective on world trade systems from center to periphery by
demonstrating the historically central nature of the periphery, more recent work by historians and
cultural anthropologists in southwestern Yunnan have illustrated commonalities with Northern
Montane Southeast Asian patterns of social relations: upland/lowland ritual relations, debt and
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dependency as organizing principles, methods and meanings of display of wealth and status (see
Gros 1996 and Jonsson 1996 to see contrasting discussions of such commonalities). 
Place and Shifting Populations
W hile the core area of Lisu settlement in the Upper Salween is often referred to as the
Lisu homeland, migration and shifting populations seem to have been the norm rather than the
exception.  Movements of people, both forced and voluntary, had occurred for centuries (Sun
2001).  The people of western Yunnan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lived in a place of
tumult and populations shifted in response to it.  Ancestral Lisu populations may have moved to
the Salween River Valley as a result of warfare, including warfare among the Tibetans, Tang,
Nanzhao, and Cuan in the eighth and ninth centuries, in which Lisu provided soldiers for Nanzhao;
in the seventeenth century in the far north in Bingzhongluo when Lisu fled from the Upper Mekong
to the Nu; and in the eighteenth and nineteenth century when warfare between the Naxi and
Tibetans resulted in relocations of Lisu, including migration of Lisu down the Jinsha (Yangtze)
River into north central Yunnan (Bradley 2004; Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005; CHINAdaily 2002;
Gros 2001).  
Natural disasters such as earthquakes likely prompted migration.  Migration is also
indicated by linguistic evidence.  Lisu is a Tibeto-Burman language of the Central Ngwi subgroup. 
The core original population may have been located in northwestern central Yunnan and now lives
primarily in the western part of their range.  It is closely related to Yi (Lolo).  The use of the
autonym “Ni” (also expressed as “Li”) is used by most of the groups in the Ngwi subgroups
(Matisoff 1986:72; Bradley 1997:161, 169; Bradley 2004).  
If Lisu responded then as they have in the past 175 years, one response to the endemic
natural disasters, the dangers of war, not to mention the burdens of economic and political
dependency, was to move away.  W hile there are no early references to migration on as great a
scale as in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gros states that Lisu settled in the
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upper Salween as a result of fighting between Tibetans and Chinese in the 1760s (Gros 2001b). 
In short, Lisu people were not isolated and separate, but actors within a cultural continuum of
Tibetan economic and cultural influence and the extension of Chinese administration as well as, in
time, the colonial regimes in Burma.  
Shifting Borders and Multiple Spheres of Authority
Northwestern Yunnan was a site of political and cultural complexity in part because
Tibetan and Chinese influence coexisted in uneasy equilibrium while both attempted to extend
their dominance (Gros 1996; Lee 1979:35-36; W iens 1967:8).  It was a place of battles, rebellions,
banditry, and social unrest, creating an insecure social and political climate. Much research has
looked at W estern Yunnan as an external frontier, an “internal frontier” (Lee 1979:59) or “soft
border” of interaction (Mote 1999:706), in which Chinese and indigenous cultures and forms of
rulership intertwined in a kind of cultural duality.  But Northwest Yunnan was a theater of
unceasing contestation with its own dynamics (Gros 1996; Gros 2001).  To look at Yunnan simply
as a Sino-Tibetan frontier contributes little to understanding the internal dynamics of the place. 
These helped to form the dynamics of adaptive strategies of Lisu in Thailand as people who had
not been isolated tribal peoples either economically or politically.  
Tibetan influence in northwestern Yunnan was strong and not substantially challenged
until the Qing Dynasty in the eighteenth century extended administration and delineated areas of
influence, particularly control over people and resources (Giersch 2001:71; Gros 1996; Lee
1979:35, 56-57; Mote 1999:936-7; W iens 1967:8).  A period of peace and Chinese economic
expansion ensued, along with a huge influx of Han immigrants into Yunnan, during which industry
and most arable land were alienated away from local indigenous people (Daniels 1994; Frank
1998; Giersch 2001:67, 75, 83-84; Kang Yunhai 1993; Lee 1979:44, 49, 51; Lee 1982a; Lee
1982b; Mote 1999:705, 715, 903, 941-3, 953; Spence 1990:94-5; W iens 1967:198-9, 246, 253). 
However by the mid-nineteenth century a series of Chinese civil conflicts, particularly the Muslim
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Rebellions, arose in which competition between immigrant Chinese and local populations played a
part.  The cost was devastating.  Millions were killed and Yunnan’s economy was left on the verge
of ruin; the population suffered poverty and epidemic disease; much of the overland trade was
destroyed; banditry was endemic; many of the Hui (Muslim Chinese) traders fled south to Burma
and Thailand.  Given weakened central Chinese administration, competing interests (local polities,
Tibet, aggressive W estern colonial states) attempted to establish political and economic control
(Anderson 1871:136; Baber 1882:53-59; Feuerwerker 1975; Hill 1998:15; Lee 1979:59-61; Lee
1982a; Lee 1982b:284, 302; Samuel 1993:69, 77, 542; Spence 1990:114; Turrell 1988:148; W ang
1966:15; W ang Jiangping 1996:211-212, 235-237, 242-243, 246, 249, 250-1, 254-260; 257-258).  
The Qing attempted to tighten control over “parts of Tibet in China” (northwest Yunnan
and Sichuan) in 1905-1911, but extension of Chinese administration merely exacerbated unrest
and resulted in uprisings (Davies 1909:387; Lee 1979:35; Samuel 1993:70-1; Teichman
1922:195, 198; W iens 1967:237).  Even where militarily successful, the Chinese were unable to
establish either borders or hegemony and government proved to be only a facade on a
fundamentally Tibetan structures of power.  Populations remained firmly culturally and politically
Tibetan.  Northwestern Yunnan was significant in the religious dynamics of Central Tibet, and
many populations were politically oriented toward Tibetan-style kings or directly subject to
Buddhist monasteries (Davies 1909:386; Gros 1996; Lee 1979:55, 60; Mote 1999:847; Samuel
1993:69, 320-322, 533-537; Teichman 1922:2).  W estern observers described a pattern in which
Chinese subjugated Tibetan and other local populations; local garrison joined with natives in a
revolt; lamas and local people expelled the Chinese; the Chinese re-subjugated them; and the
cycle started again (Teichman 1922:197).  W hen the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911, there was a
general uprising against the Chinese.  In the words of the British consular official who had
negotiated a border agreement between Tibet and China in 1918, “the whole edifice of Chinese
control was ... but a hastily constructed framework, imposed on an unwilling people taken by
surprise, and the greater part of it collapsed completely when put to the test at the time of the
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[Republican] revolution ...” (Teichman 1922:33).  This autonomy and – from the point of view of
empires, instability – continued well into the twentieth century.  
Competing Models of Rule in Western Yunnan
Despite expanding Chinese administration, most of the people of northwestern Yunnan
were imbricated in Tibetan culture.  In every place in northwestern Yunnan, Lisu were minority
populations surrounded by Tibetans, Naxi, Pumi, Nu, Yi, and Bai – all involved in Tibetan
structures of power and Tibetanized to varying degrees.  Tibet’s power was not in the form of  a
centralized theocratized state ruling from Lhasa.  Rather, it was based on a common social and
cultural framework reinforced by trade, religion, ritual, and political alliances.  Tibetan models of
ritual and power were pervasive throughout the region (Samuel 1993, 39, 41, 69, 85, 543).  This
was in contrast to the Chinese empire’s process of assimilation of territory and bringing people
under administrative control.  The contrast between a common Tibetan conceptual substratum
and Chinese administrative control was marked (Lee 1979:46, 48-49).  For most of their history,
most Lisu would been more involved in Tibetan than Chinese models of rule, but for the historical
period relevant for understanding Lisu forms through migration, the Chinese empire had begun to
extend into western Yunnan.  
Chinese models of rule.
The main mechanism of Chinese control was a form of indirect rule through indigenous
leaders appointed as tusi by the Chinese government.  It was a means by which sources of
disorder and danger could be either held off or coopted by integration into Chinese military
administration and was to be a transitional stage that was to ultimately lead to incorporation into
the Chinese civilization.  Tusi served as proxies to rule, suppress, or hold off other powers in the
region.  Their main purpose in the Chinese system was to suppress violence and facilitate trade. 
They were validated by regalia and certification of office.  As such, tusi were to model appropriate
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Chinese governance and increase Chinese “political legitimacy and cultural prestige” (Herman
1997:48).  Over time, the nature of tusi varied as to degree of Sinicization (through literacy and
examinations) and control by counterpart Chinese administrators.  Tusi, however, were often too
locally powerful and too spatially distant from the central government to be controlled.  One of the
consequences of this indirect rule was that local people had little direct contact with the Chinese
except at times of war or in the area around garrisons/trading entrepôts, which were little more
than towns with inns for traders and some soldiers for protection.  The tribal peoples living in the
interstices of Chinese occupation of the valley bottoms and plains were not loyal to the Chinese
administration; the constricted and isolated Chinese settlements were fair prey to ‘tribal’ raiders
whenever the authority of the imperial government showed signs of weakness.  W ith economic
expansion and the influx of Chinese settlers into Yunnan, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries the Qing replaced tusi with imperial officers, while in northwest Yunnan they established
tusi for the first time (Baber 1882:59-60; Chao 1995:45; Feuerwerker 1975; Giersch 2001:67-68;
Gros 1996; Gros 2001b; Herman 1997; Kingdon-W ard 1986; Lee 1979:47-57; Lee 1982a:728-
730; Lee 1982b; Mote 1999:703-711, 715-717, 902-903, 936-937; Rock 1947:296, 310n, 320;
Samuel 1993:70-71; Sun 2001; Turrell 1988:145, 147, 161; W alker 1991:9; W iens 1967:232-233,
240, 244-246, 249-250).  
Tusi were middlemen or brokers (cf. W olf 1956).  The position itself was one of cultural
duality.  They were point men for Chinese administration and cultural assimilation and yet
simultaneously local actors strategizing within the context of intertwined indigenous and Tibetan
cultures.  They negotiated between the demands of the Chinese empire and more immediate
powers.  Chinese validation could strengthen local rulers, but they did not for that reason strictly
adhere to Chinese interests as to act against local interests could undercut their power.  Rather,
they strategically drew on multiple repertoires of identity and roles (Sturgeon 2004).  In one
instance, a tusi on the Yunnan/northern Burma border refused to punish Kachin bandits of a
Chinese opium caravan because the Kachin were their neighbors and their interests lay with them
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(Davies 1909:38-39).  In fact, it appears that the Chinese were often rather more dependent on
tusi than otherwise.  Throughout the early twentieth century, when tusi in western Yunnan were
eliminated, banditry and uprisings increased, and even when tusi were eliminated the tusi families
maintained great local power through their armies and as landlords (Herman 1997; Rock
1947:417; Samuel 1993:70-71; Teichman 1922:197-198).
Tibetan cultural frameworks.
Central Tibet was not a state or empire in the Chinese sense.  Tibetan expansion
occurred through Tibetanization, the spread of a common cultural framework through trade and
religious influence, and did not always entail total cultural absorption.  The process was an
essential part of Tibetan cultural incorporation of fringe populations and was based on a religious
missionary view of the ‘wild’ people on the fringes of Central Tibet.  It was facilitated by trade
networks and reinforced by political alliances.  As a consequence, there were a wide variety of
people identified as ‘Tibetan’ who exhibited a range of dialects, languages, forms of dress, and
religious expression.  Lisu were specifically mentioned in Tibetan historical texts as a group to be
counteracted and converted (Davies 1909:387; Kingdon-W ard 1986; Samuel 1993:81, 84-85,
147-149 533-537).  Lisu social organization shows many commonalities with greater Tibetan
social structure, both through contact directly with Tibetans and indirectly through “Tibetanized
peoples.”  As importantly, Lisu is a Tibeto-Burman language, thus sharing that linguistic
metaphorical substratum (Matisoff 1991:484-485).  Certainly the Lisu were a part of the ritual and
political language of power found throughout this region; it is possible that Lisu shamanic
practices were related to pre-Buddhist Tibetan practices.  Other regional similarities in ritual have
been noted by Chao, suggesting that a single group’s distinctive religious tradition may actually be
a form of religious practice common to an entire region (Chao 1995).  
Samuel states that religious incorporation was the initial stage in Tibetanization and that
cultural absorption did not always follow (Samuel 1993:147).  However, highland peoples such as
 Similar processes took place among other Northern Montane Southeast Asian peoples such12
as the Lahu (Walker 1995; Boonkamyeung 2001; Walker 2003). 
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the Lisu were exposed to Buddhism but adopted it to a limited degree as part of a largely non-
Buddhist religious system, if at all (Samuel 1993:554), and I have found no references whatsoever
to Buddhist Lisu populations.  It may be that, as in lower Southeast Asia, conversion to a state
religion also entailed change of ethnic identity.  It may have been that local leaders took on the
role of chiefs and practiced, at least nominally, Tibetan forms of worship, a strategy that would
have been an attempt to assert the kind of dominance that superior access to religious power
brought.    However, the shamanic elements of Tibetan Buddhism would generally have been12
more congruent with the Lisu social and political structures than the clerical, textual traditions. 
Shamanic Buddhism comes out of and is congruent with de-centralized state-less societies.  If the
essence of shamanism is the manipulation and harmonizing of people’s souls, power, and a
myriad of local spirits, deities and ancestors (as Samuel holds), then Shamanic Buddhism could
have been adopted in these societies because it was believed to provide a superior set of
techniques for exercising those powers (Samuel 1993:562-64).  This religious complex was
associated with a rich and powerful set of states with access to trade, the ability to suppress other
groups with its armies, and demonstrable ritual power.  A chief manipulating these forces with
these techniques allied himself, then, with even more powerful forces than local ones.  Buddhist
lamas and monasteries could have become important in a chief’s alliances to maintain and extend
power – through contacts in the real and spiritual worlds – and through providing a common
language of ritual and power with neighboring subjects and allies (cf. Gros 1996 and Leach 1964). 
Finally, we can not forget the agency of highland peoples, consciously choosing to at least
superficially adopt Buddhism and thereby demonstrate their ‘civilized’ or ‘tamed’ status in order to
gain benefits, access to trade, validation of political position, a more extensive network of allies,
and protection against violence in a strife-torn and unstable region.  Tibetan Buddhism was well-
suited to such needs, due to its many diverse modes of religious thought and practice (Samuel
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1993:560-61).  Nevertheless, the power of Tibet was often founded on specific material
dominance; Gros documents cases in which a Tibetan monastery took territory for a monastery,
removed all of the local people, and replaced them with Tibetan servants to the monastery.  Lhasa
and other Tibetan states also enforced a kind of corvee, the ula, in which local people were
compelled to work as porters for Tibetan rulers (kings, princes, and lamas), often in harsh
conditions (Teichman 1922:223-224).  
Ritual and control of mystical forces were important in the display and establishment of
power.  W hen the Chinese established W eixi Prefecture in northwestern Yunnan in 1729, the tusi
they appointed built Buddhist temples throughout their sphere of influence, expressing Tibetan
Buddhist concepts of power.  In the late nineteenth century, a sectarian conflict between Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries and their patrons gave rise to a battle in which bands of Lisu burned down
villages under protection of an opposing temple and took slaves who were later redeemed by the
French Catholic Mission.  The French demonstrated power within local frameworks by this action. 
Displays of wealth through patronage of dependents and feasting, ritual acts of authority over the
land through local shamans and territorial spirits, prowess at battle, and healing all demonstrated
the right to rule within a conceptual substratum linking ritual and power that was common
throughout the region (Gros 1996; Gros 2001). 
An example of this was the annual new year feast held by the ruler of Yezhi that his more
peripheral subjects, in this case Lisu and Nu, were obliged to attend.  Every three years, the ruler
feasted them for three days; he distributed a piece of beef and some pennies and they brought
him two pounds of mushrooms (an item gathered in forested areas) (Gros 1996, quoting
Desgodins 1872).  This is similar to a ritual described for Lao kings of Luang Prabang and upland
peoples by which the upland peoples’ presentations to the king exemplified the king’s assumption
of the supernatural power of the indigenes over the land (Archaimbault 1973).  Such rituals
confirmed chiefs’ and kings’ prestige, status, and political power throughout Northern Mainland
Southeast Asia.  The leader’s prestige was enhanced as he displayed his generosity, both
  Lisu in northern Thailand notably refused such centralized ritual practice as they did political13
control.  Ritual occurred in the household first and foremost and generational hierarchy was
observable there.  There were village-level communal rituals.  No group had privileged access to
spiritual powers; they were not hierarchical, except in that the servitor of the “Old Grandfather”
shrine organized ritual and prestations.   Under Thai state coercion to form politically cohesive
villages, rituals honoring the “Old Grandfather” spirit of the village have become increasingly
important, although even here most of the ritual was carried out within or by individual households. 
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materially and ritually, and this underlay political centralization as a sacrifice could only be
performed on behalf of the people for their well being by a chief who served as intermediary with
the local spirits (Gros 1996).   13
In short, while Tibetan influence was not homogenous, it was part of common, cohesive
structure of northwest Yunnan.  The Lisu people would have, for much of their history, been in far
closer contact with Tibetan peoples than with Chinese.  This is not to negate the role of Chinese
political institutions in the constitution of local societies, however.  At the very least, the Chinese
empire had strong interests in Yunnan because of trade with and through Yunnan to polities
further south and west such as Tibet and Burma.  Chinese power served as a counterpoint to
Tibetan power and a curb upon local warfare.  
Multiple Spheres of Influence
For the people of Yunnan at this time including Lisu, shifting alliances were the norm. 
Yunnan and the actions of the people living there can not be understood in simple “border” terms. 
The political system of northwestern Yunnan was a complex one in which Chinese and Tibetan
power were encased locally (Gros 1996; Lee 1979:41, 46; Samuel 1993:41, 69, 85, 543). 
Furthermore, we can look at the kind of relationship that existed between the rulers of chiefdoms
or small states and peripheral peoples.  State efforts to control the people, resources, and
territories of the peripheries contributed to the rise of small border chiefs, locally influential men
who controlled local resource access and positioned themselves as border guardians for the state
(Sturgeon 2004).  Both Tibet and China were powerful empires with specific economic and
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political interests in western Yunnan.  Their ability to control the people of these regions depended
on historical conditions such as their own internal strengths and dynamics as well as relative
power of rivals.  Both models of rule provided important forms of validation and legitimation for
local rulers. Adherence to the social mores of those empires were “markers of social standing that
cemented the authority of local ... rulers over their subordinate subjects” and implied a specific
relationship of entitlement (Chao 1990:36-7).  Tibeto-Burman peoples were “sandwiched”
between the expanding Tibetan and Chinese states, each competing for dominance over the
people in-between; furthermore, in the southern reaches of this region, Tai and Burmese states
exerted their own influence on the people of this region.  Tibeto-Burman peoples here, therefore,
lived in at least a “double periphery” (McKhann 1999:201).  Here, I discuss the general patterns;
the specifics of Lisu political economic forms in this context is discussed in the next section,
“Different Kinds of Lisu.”  
W ars between these two powers – or through proxy local chiefs – rarely resulted in clear
and permanent demarcation of boundaries.  Few demarcated political boundaries existed until the
1890s and what borders there were overlapped (Giersch 2001:71; Mote 1999:706, 709; cf.
W inichakul 1994).  Boundaries shifted and intertwined and overlapped and in practice multiple,
non-border-bounded allegiances remained the pattern for rulers and their dependents in western
Yunnan.  Local rulers were under the (often nominal) suzerainty of different powers.  Loyalties and
tributary relationships also shifted over time, and local rulers were not necessarily loyal to just one
court.  They sometimes declared loyalty to more than one power at the same time in order to
advance their own interests and reconciled each power as necessary.  
Conflicts among masters put local populations in onerous conditions, obligated to
Chinese officials, Naxi tusi, indigenous leaders, Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, and rulers from
Central Tibet (Baber 1882:126; Samuel 1993:69, 72; Teichman 1922:8; cf. Mote 1999:178,
Samuel quoting Migot and Guibaut).  In one case, a group of Nu in W eixi Prefecture paid annual
tribute to China, via the lama; tribute to a Tibetan official nearby, called alms; free transportation of
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salt loads for both entities and a rich merchant; and were then forced to buy that salt at an inflated
price (Gros 1996; Gros 2001).  Such obligations increasingly led to indebtedness, debt slavery,
and the alienation of land; observers almost universally commented on the ubiquity of slavery
(best understood as a form of dependency) in the region in the nineteenth century (Anderson
1871; Baber 1882; Gros 1996; Giersch 2001).  As a result, people moved.  Similarly, social and
political conflict and the power of centralized empires became in themselves reasons to avoid
government obligations by migrating out of that realm of control.  
One survival strategy was to seek the protection of whichever polity appeared more fair or
less demanding.  Leaders and communities played these powers against each other.  In this
context, the tribal peoples tended to choose the governance of whomsoever they found to their
advantage.  Chinese rule sometimes presented an attractive alternative to Tibetan rule.  In 1720
when a Chinese garrison conquered the salt marshes of Yangjin, south of Tibetan Tsarong, local
Nu paid tribute of animal skins, medicinal plants, and hemp cloth to the Chinese to ensure their
protection against Tibetans and Lisu, and to receive land tenure rights (Gros 1996).  The rise of
colonial powers in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia – the French Mission in Kham, the British in
Burma – gave local powers and people another patron to cultivate.  In one case (the Pianma
Frontier Incident), two headmen in a tusi domain who were both Han but had been brought up in
Kachin society complained of the tusi to Chinese authorities.  W hen their case failed, they
petitioned the British authorities to recognize Pianma as being under British jurisdiction.  The
British accepted and sent troops to protect the village.  In winter of 1910, 2000 British troops
occupied the territory and stationed garrisons in all the important villages (W iens 1967:256).  Such
strategies were possible in the context of the multiple spheres of authority in the region, and
indigenes’ strategies continued within that framework even in the face of European colonialism
and expanding Chinese hegemony.  
In the interstices of political control, local populations were at times able to negotiate a
degree of autonomy.  Independent groups, such as many of the Lisu in the Upper Salween Valley,
61
may have avoided the worst of debt, dependency, and alienation of land, but they were no less
involved in these state relations as tributaries, representatives, or mercenaries for indigenous
chiefs, Tibetan rulers, and Chinese military.  In W eixi, the Naxi tusi delegated part of their
authority to other, smaller chiefs to represent them in regions distant from their fiefs.  Influential
Lisu were among them (Gros 1996; Gros 2001; Rock 1947; Gros, personal communication June
08 2001).  Leaders allied themselves with greater powers to consolidate their positions; local
people switched ethnic identity depending on political and cultural power.  This is a pattern of
upland/lowland relations also found in mainland Southeast Asia up until W orld W ar II (Jonsson
1996a). 
But in the nineteenth century, Chinese administration was extended to more of Yunnan,
population pressure resulted from Chinese immigration, and trade patterns changed with the
appearance of W estern mercantilism.  As a result, many Lisu and other uplanders came under
the direct influence of Chinese administration.  This was far more true in the southwest of Yunnan
than in the northwest, and Lisu political organization reflects this as they adapted to these
conditions. 
Different Kinds of Lisu
Variety in the range of economic strategies of Lisu populations demonstrate the flexibility
in modes of production in the context of opportunities and adaptation to local political, economic,
and ecological conditions.  These were by no means isolated peoples.  
Economies
Production
Little of substance was documented of Lisu subsistence in the nineteenth century.  State
views of the Lisu typically denigrated their production systems as uncivilized and primitive.  The
following is typical of state views of swiddening people:
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The people are also exceedingly lazy; in the spring they do a few days’ work in
scraping a patch of soil, just large enough to yield subsistence, and in planting
their maize; then in early October they put in a few days’ more work, getting in
their crop and cutting their hemp, or looking after their tobacco patch.  All the rest
of their lives is spent in eating, sleeping, and squatting round the hearth, varied by
a rare expedition to get wood for a crossbow, poison for their arrows, or a stock of
salt or wild honey.  Under these conditions it is not surprising that, in spite of the
sparseness of the population and the great extent of land suitable for maize and
other cultivation, famine is of frequent occurrence (Forrest 1908:262).  
Chinese chronicles similarly mentioned Lisu as a “primitive” tribal people living high in the
mountains and subsisting by hunting, gathering, and “crude” subsistence agriculture (Lee
1979:48).  One hundred years later, the official Chinese position was that Lisu were too poor to
have participated in trade and it was not until Bai and Han, with their superior agricultural methods
and higher productivity, that some primitive markets began to appear.  “They had to make up for
their scanty agricultural output by collecting fruits and wild vegetables and hunting” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2000).  This is, of course, in keeping with both the Marx/Engels understanding of
social evolution and the civilizing project of the expanding state.  Usefully, it also ignores Tibetan
trade and influence.  Similar discourses also occurred in Southeast Asian states.  
Lisu tended to live in small villages in the high mountains, usually near the sources of
streams (Davies 1909:392; Forrest 1908:244, 248, 254, 262; Fraser 1922:iii; Kingdon-W ard
1986:196, 203; Rose and Brown 1911:251).  Housing styles varied from the Nujiang style in non-
Sinicized villages of houses made of logs and raised on piles, with a stone hearth in the center
and a verandah, to the Chinese style further south, on a floor of beaten earth and with a porch
supported on stone plinths (Fraser 1922:v-vi; Forrest 1908:248, 262; Rose and Brown 1911:260). 
Both styles were found among the Lisu of northern Thailand in the late twentieth century. 
Lisu primarily practiced swidden agriculture.  W estern explorers commented on how
heavily cleared many of their slopes were and on the extensive grasslands, which they blamed on
swiddening but may have been due to cattle herding and local climatological conditions of great
dryness (cf. Sherman 1980).  W est in Burma, with much greater rainfall, monsoon forest
swiddening was the norm (Anderson 1871:364; Davies 1909:36; Leach 1965:22-23; Rock
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1947:335, 349), as it was later in northern Thailand.  Swiddening was not the only cultivation
technique in the Lisu repertoire, however.  In those places where they lived low enough on slopes
and terrain and hydrology permitted, Lisu constructed terraces for wet rice cultivation, specifically
in area just north of 26° 30' on the Salween in Yunnan and below 26° 15' in Burma (Forrest
1908:253; Harris and Ma 1997:171; Leach 1965:22-23).  Some villages also had fenced house
gardens (Forrest 1908:254; Kingdon-W ard 1986:195-199, 214).  The crops grown also varied with
latitude and location on slopes.  Rice was not a staple crop, particularly in the north; even where
rice was more common in the southern reaches of Lisu distribution, it could not support the local
population as they lived at altitudes too cold for rice.  There were a variety of other grain crops,
including different kinds of millet, buckwheat, barley, wheat, sorghum, Job’s tears, and corn after
the sixteenth century (Anderson 1871:83; Bradley 1997:162-163; Davies 1909:36, 386; Forrest
1908:244, 250, 253, 262; Harris and Ma 1997:171; Kingdon-W ard 1986:195-199, 205; Rose and
Brown 1911:256, 265).  Supplementary crops included pumpkins, beans, taro, Chinese peaches,
quinces, oranges and tobacco (Kingdon-W ard 1986:186, 205, 214; Rose and Brown 1911:265). 
Further southwest in the Kachin Hills, supplementary crops included potatoes, sesame, hemp,
indigo, and opium (Anderson 1871:83), a selection similar to that of Lisu in northern Thailand
decades later.  Despite assumptions that Lisu were strictly poor, lazy subsistence farmers, these
crops indicate that there was some production for the market because they were frequently sold in
local markets.  Potatoes, for instance, for planted for sale to a British Garrison in Upper Burma
(George 1915:44-45). 
Little specific information is available on land tenure in the Upper Salween because of
changing demographic and land ownership conditions in which indigenous land ownership
systems were not treated as valid by the Chinese or British colonial states (Giersch 2001).  For
instance, Han were encouraged in their acquisition of land by Chinese officials (Rose and Brown
1911:264).  Also, the land tenure system was considerably different from the Chinese system of
land ownership; where there were tusi or native chiefs, land ownership was vested in the hands of
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native rulers (Lee 1979:49).  Lisu land tenure was based on use; land was “owned” by local spirits,
although reportedly each family also had the right to preserve and maintain a tract of mountain
land for their use only (Dessaint and Dessaint 1992; Fraser 1922:vi; Gros 1996; Rose and Brown
1911:264).  In stark contrast to the pattern in northern Thailand in the twentieth century, it appears
that their form of swiddening was rotational rather than pioneer, so that land was planted for up to
two years then fallowed for up to thirty years before being used again.  However, with increased
population, the fallow shortened to as little as three years; with the land being worked out more
quickly, the Lisu then migrated to less densely populated forested areas (Fraser 1922:vi; Harris
and Ma 1997:171). Land use in northern Thailand will be discussed in a later chapter, but the ideal
rotational pattern was not followed in the twentieth century there, either.  Household property,
owned by the father, was said to be inherited equally by the sons (Rose and Brown 1911:265),
although there is not enough detail to support this and I believe this to be a misstatement of trans-
generational transfers.  Both land tenure and inheritance can be related to the encompassing
political economy in which they existed, and so these practices changed depending on the amount
of land available, the degree to which states or citizens of states claimed control of land, and, of
course, migration would also have affected land use and distribution.  This will be a topic in
Chapter 4.  
Lisu were characterized as avid hunters; even in modern northern Thailand, where little
game is left, young men rarely travel without nets, traps, snares, and guns with which to hunt.  In
Yunnan, game included the large and small, gentle and dangerous – panther, porcupine,
pheasant, bear, barking deer – to protect crops, to provide meat, and for adventure, often taking
week long trips to hunt big game.  Yet it was always secondary to agriculture.  Hunting and
foraging were primarily for subsistence – Lisu in fact refused to sell meat to travelers – but by the
mid-twentieth century Lisu were hunting heavily for Chinese markets (Anderson 1871:363; Daniels
1994; Fraser 1922:vi; Harris and Ma 1997:171; Rabinowitz 2001; Rose and Brown 1911:251-252;
Stevenson 1981:39).  Lisu also foraged in the forest for items such as mushrooms.  W ild honey
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was a very significant food item (Daniels 1994; Forrest 1908:248, 262; Rose and Brown 1911:256,
265).  Some foraged items were sold.  They fished where they lived on rivers or large streams by
line or by traps (Kingdon-W ard 1986:194, 220-221).  In the north, cattle were a significant
domestic animal, especially for regional trade.  Herding cattle required access to grazing land in
many regions.  Frequent feuds erupted over cattle theft.  Aside from cattle, Lisu husbanded
sheep, goats, pigs, and chickens; they rarely kept mules or ponies for transport (Daniels 1994;
Forrest 1908:242; Fraser 1922:vii; Harris and Ma 1997:171; Kingdon-W ard 1986:199, 222, 224;
Rock 1947:335).  
Reportedly, Lisu were heavy drinkers of liquor fermented from local grains, a judgment
made of many upland ethnic minority peoples (Fraser 1922:v; Anderson 1871:355; Dick 1987:36;
Forrest 1908:264; Kingdon-W ard 1986:204).  Again, this is one of those judgements that perhaps
says more of observers’ categories.  Nevertheless, alcohol was an essential part of many social
and ritual events and   my experience in Southeast Asia is that getting visitors drunk was
safeguard against outsiders finding out too much about them.  
Trade
Views of Lisu as an isolated, uncivilized tribe are challenged by historical evidence of Lisu
contacts.  Lisu were involved in trade, perhaps as an integral part of their adaptation to the
unstable ecological conditions in which they lived as well as a historical contingency of their
relationship with Tibetan peoples.  Living along the trade routes between China and Tibet,
incorporated into the spheres of these polities and economies, they participated in at least the
edges of this economy based on trade, as robbers, porters, guards of passes, leviers of tolls, and
in all cases eager to trade with outsiders.  In these roles, Lisu and other uplanders were
comfortable with a range of people and languages (cf. Samuel 1993:145-6; d’Orleans 1896:306;
Hertz 1912:83).  They actively sought trade opportunities and carried products to lowland markets
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for sale.  Even independent Lisu living in small, feuding, egalitarian, autonomous villages, with no
knowledge of Chinese – the model of the primitive village – were eager to trade.   
In western Yunnan, Lisu most frequently sought silver, salt, cotton, and cloth in their
trades.  Local trade for salt was brisk and people would even sell grain crops to get it; goiter was
prevalent in the northern regions, and trade was the only way to get salt, but cloth was perhaps
more desired (Forrest 1908:250, 256, 257; Goullart 1955:71; Kingdon-W ard 1986:23, 183, 185;
Rock 1947:399-400).  Items for trade included domestic agriculture products such as rice, corn,
vegetables, chickens and goats.  But forest products seem to have been more trade prevalent for
items Lisu used in trade – firewood, large wooden planks, lac, beeswax, and a little gold dust. 
There was also mention of traders bringing in opium and Lisu selling “some drugs.”  Further south
and in Burma, where agriculture was more productive and political conditions more settled,
regular trade of small quantities was possible.  Lisu supplemented their subsistence by selling
firewood, timber, vegetables, incense, and hempen cord to Chinese living near their markets
(Fraser 1922:vi).  Trade between Burma and Yunnan flourished.  Caravans of hundreds of mules
passed through carrying a wide range of local products such as smoked ham, pigs’ bristles,
persimmons, and walnuts in exchange for silk and cotton thread, salt, needles, and inexpensive
jewelry.  Of far more value was smuggling – opium from Yunnan to Burma and jade from Burma
to Yunnan (Anderson 1871:135, 297, 300, 318, 358, 363, 378;  Forrest 1908:250, 254; Fraser
1922:vi; Kingdon-W ard 1986:23).  Much trade was through narrow and difficult passes that
outsiders thought impossible routes, but there is substantial evidence of extensive trade ebbing
and flowing along these passes depending on economic and political conditions.  The passes
provided alternate routes to avoid Chinese frontier stations where they would be expected to pay
customs duties; on the other hand, the passes were usually claimed by local populations such as
the Lisu, each demanding a toll for their use.  Much of this trade was unregulated and therefore by
definition smuggling.  Trade was risky, due to feuding and the lack of overarching administration
to prevent separate taxation at every pass.  The risks were ameliorated by networks of allies,
 A viss is an old eastern Indian and Burmese measure, equally 3.65 pounds.14
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friends, and long-term trading partners on whom one could depend.  In one case in Nam Tamai
(far north Upper Burma, adjacent to the Upper Salween of Yunnan), a series of transactions
between a Chinese trader and a Lisu man consisted of: a goat; a piece of cotton cloth; a jar of
liquor; a cow; six viss  of numrin (the root of Coptis teeta used in Chinese medicine); another14
seven viss of numrin; six rupees of cash; and a quill of gold dust.  It took a day of arbitration to
figure equivalencies (Leach 1965:146).  This bespeaks a long-term trading relationship in which
there was a great deal of trust, and was embedded in a net of social relationships.  Such trading
friendships were also a bulwark of Tibetan trading (Forrest 1908:254,  260, 264; Giersch 2001;
Samuel 1993:94, 123-125; Stevenson 1981:36).  
Notes on Political Organization
W hat descriptions there are of Lisu social and political structures were made with an eye
toward governance and control of trade.  Most of the information available concerned issues of
interest for trade and political control.  From these we can see variations in the degree of political
organization from egalitarian forms labeled anarchic, to the presence of and degree of control
exercised by headmen or tusi.  Forrest wrote that the Lisu: 
... on the upper Salwin north of Hsia-ku-dé were utter savages.  Up to and
including Cheng-ka in lat. 26° 12' N., the Lissoo who are nominally controlled by
Chinese chiefs are quiet and friendly enough.  Then there is the Hsia-ku-dé group
of villages under their headman, but not recognizing any Chinese authority, and
resisting any attempt of the Chinese chiefs to exercise it.  From Yako northwards
up to the limits of Lissoo country [Black Lisu], about 27° 35', there is no sort of
government or control of any sort of kind, by any Chinese or other chief.  Most of
the villages have not even a regular headman; nearly every village, too, speaks a
[different] dialect ... There are also a number of tribal subdivisions, a source of
constant feuds.  The Chinese official theory that the country belongs to the
hereditary Minchia [Bai] chief Lo, who resides at Tu-wo, lat.  26° 8' N. on the
Mekong, has no foundation whatever; in fact, on the contrary, no sort of official
person would dare to go anywhere near the country (Forrest 1908:261).  
Similarly, Rose and Brown noted that Lisu north of 26° 15' were independent and often
without chiefs; towards the Mekong tended to be allied with chiefs; under Lisu tusi further south;
 As will be seen later, British and Chinese government sources repeatedly claimed that this15
feuding (which we can see as fairly regularized relations of dominance) disrupted trade. 
However, the British in particular were attempting to justify their incursions in the region by
claiming to bring peace that would allow trade. 
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and under direct Chinese administration around Tengchong (1911:255).  Even accounting for
Forrest’s predisposition to find ungoverned people ripe for British guidance and government, the
independence of these Lisu populations from Chinese administration was widely noted.  15
Feuding and slavery were both elements of Lisu society.  Both are best understood as
part of a legal and economic system of debt, obligation and reciprocity, and an element in the
negotiation of compensation and settlement.  The accounts of local warfare or feuding available to
me sound much like tribal warfare in depicted in “Dead Birds”  –  but we can never forget the
profoundly different context of upland/lowland relations and state penetration in which even
"isolated" Lisu lived.  Lisu also played a role in the state polities' foreign relations, as soldiers and
inhabitants of buffer zones.  
Feuding among Lisu villages up to the 1910s was frequent at times and could hinder
travel and communications, especially in the region around and north of 26° 30'.  Most villages
and ‘tribal subdivisions’ (localized patrilineages or, according to Bradley, p.c., February 2005,
patriclans) appeared to feud; Forrest claimed that feuding killed so many adult males that there
were too few men to work and famine resulted; many people had never been more than a day’s
journey from their own villages; roads were not maintained; and it was almost impossible to get a
guide and accurate information about routes.  At one point, Forrest’s party found themselves in
the middle of a Lisu feud over rights to ferry them across the Salween.  The people on the west
side of the Salween protested when someone on the east side offered to escort them from the
west side to the east; the right to escort people from the west to the east was, apparently, that of
the Lisu on the west.  In defense of their privilege, the west bank Lisu brought out their crossbows
and “poisoned arrows” and fired, which Forrest met with a show of British weaponry.  Other
causes of feuding were the theft of cattle and even maize (Forrest 1908:248, 252-254, 257, 258,
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261).  Although most offences could be settled by arbitration and mediation, a certain class of
offenses involving marriage and sexual transgressions were called by the same term as for feuds
and justified violent reprisals.  The goal of a feud was not so much to kill people as to make life so
unpleasant for enemies that they would agree to pay compensation (Leach 1965:90, 92).  
Feuds among villages, as recounted by Forrest, had a ceremonial quality.  He described
the gathering of a corps of fifty warriors, decorated in silver, deers’ horns, pebbles, and cowries
and their faces blackened.  They carried crossbows five feet long, swords five feet long, and
broad ox-hide shields five feet high.  W hile the warriors made an impressive display, the warfare
consisted only of display, oratory, and making a show of stringing bows.  By afternoon, they had
dispersed.  Killings were said to take place more by ambush and murder.  Forrest took this as
evidence of Lisu cowardice, although Black Lisu were feared throughout the Upper Salween for
their murderous ways and fighting off all Chinese penetration (if not intrepid British explorers) with
their huge cross bows that could shoot arrows a remarkable 125-150 feet (38-48 meters), made
more dangerous by the use of tips poisoned with aconite; Chinese garrisons had stories of annual
battles with the Lisu, who were said to hide in the jungle and shoot poisoned arrows at them.  The
Chinese hated and feared the Lisu; in turn the Chinese were hated and despised by local people
for their banditry and oppression (Bradley, p.c., February 2005; Forrest 1908:255, 262-264;
Kingdon-W ard 1986:222, 224, 228, 240-1, 253; Rose and Brown 1911:255-256, 258).  
In general, this level of feuding indicates the weak level of administration at this place and
point in history, however, and by no means a constant condition.  Perceptions of levels of feuding
were heightened by the fact that westerners tended to mount expeditions in the winter months
after harvest (from December to May, according to Leach 1965:91), a time given to feuding. 
Furthermore, Chinese destruction of local polities and their subsequent inability to administer the
region following the weakening of administration in the mid-nineteenth century likely led to an
 The Ming Dynasty trade with its southern neighbors had included trade of superior Chinese16
weaponry (Sun 2001).  It would be interesting to find out the effects of such trade on levels of
warfare and feuding.  
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increase in feuding in the face of the lack of extra-village institutions to mediate.   In short, while16
feuding may well have been a feature of Lisu tribal society, the levels of feuding at this time
bespeak political conditions rather than an inherently warlike quality of Lisu people.  Despite the
disruption of trade, travel, and subsistence by feuding, villages often had alliances with Lisu
villages not in their immediate neighborhood (Forrest 1908:246, 249, 250, 251).  They planted
cash crops and traded.  This indicates that these people were not as isolated and oppressed by
constant feuding as British explorers and Chinese officials claimed.  In contrast, the W hite Lisu
under control of Chinese chiefs in the central reaches of distribution, and Flowery or W hite Lisu in
later decades under Pax Britannica in the southern reaches of their distribution, were described in
quite different terms as quiet, friendly, docile, peaceful, mild in disposition, and amenable to
civilization.  By the 1920s, they were said not to engage in warfare or raiding and suffered injustice
quietly (Enriquez 1921:70; Forrest 1908:261; Fraser 1922:iv, xi; Stevenson 1981:346). 
W arfare entailed slavery.  The Independent (Black) Lisu raided many neighboring ethnic
groups such as the Nu, the Dulong, and the W hite Lisu (all relatively Sinicized) for prisoners to be
ransomed, and those not ransomed were enslaved.  Hostages were also taken in compensation
for unpaid debt, although sometimes that debt was concocted by a chief.  Conditions were not
onerous for slaves.  They carried out the same work as their Lisu captors; they could marry; their
children were not enslaved; and their status was progressively ameliorated.  However, as political
conditions changed, slavery disappeared as had feuding; in the southern parts of Lisu distribution
and by the early twentieth century, slavery was virtually unknown.  Slavery was based on concepts
of debt and dependency, principles fundamental to political relations in much of Northern
Mainland Southeast Asia.  It was likely exacerbated and distorted as these debt relationships were
used by Chinese in alienating indigenous peoples’ land.  There were multiple spheres of
obligations, tribute, and taxes imposed upon farmers.  A creditor made a large part of the
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population economically and ritually dependent and through these debt relations arose a relation
of political dependency and obligation.  Later, this system that tied people together politically
recombined to create conditions of indebtedness for indigenous peoples and made them
susceptible to accepting usurious loans; the labor and production of the local population was
alienated, and slavery became sharecropping and landlessness (Dessaint and Ngwawa 1994:61-
2; Gros 1996; Gros 2001; Gros 1996, citing Dubernard and Desgodins 1875; Fraser 1922:xi;
Giersch 2001:83-84; Leach 1965:299-303; Rose and Brown 1911:265).  But as Lisu migrated
southwards toward Burma, they became free of these relations of debt and dependency and
moved toward autonomy.  I believe that the “anarchic” character of Lisu social structure noted in
Thailand reflects release from the political and economic conditions that had brought
indebtedness and patronage about.
Lisu as Brigands and Mercenaries
Reports of Lisu oscillated between being categorized as brigands to be suppressed or as
troops coopted into the imperial project.  Banditry and its suppression were a major factor in the
economy of the region.  In this way, they participated in regional trade, and the relationship of Lisu
to states as brigands or soldiers reflects continuing changes in political relations as the relative
power of Tibetan and Chinese states ebbed and flowed.  The ways in which they were
documented was in keeping with the interests of the state for which such documents were written. 
However, these limited allusions hinted at a significant aspect of how Lisu related to the polities of
northwestern Yunnan and thus their political organization and economic adaptations.  It was part
and parcel of Lisu adaptations to environmental, economic, and political conditions.  
 In the north, Lisu attacks on Chinese trade caravans and government salt supplies were
frequently recorded from 1592 (the late Ming Dynasty) to the early twentieth century.  Suppression
of bandits was a major responsibility of tusi, demonstrating their alliance with the Chinese civilizing
project.  For instance, the Naxi tusi of Lijiang reported his responsibility for suppressing these
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robbers, in the early case decapitating 83 of the perpetrators (Baber 1882:59-60, 160; Dick
1987:8; Rock 1947:124, 296, 310n, 321; Rose and Brown 1911:255, 265).  W here Lisu lived near
high mountain passes that joined valleys, they could in essence control cross-country trade and
levy tolls on caravans.  This was particularly true in the north, of Black Lisu.  For instance, north of
Tengchong, where a high range separated the watersheds of the Shweli and Salween Rivers, Lisu
preyed on caravans that had to traverse the Mamianguan Pass (Davies 1909:127).  In these
contexts, Lisu were categorized as dangerous and barbaric, given to violence and attacking
legitimate trade.  Official documents of the time lumped together all who were “untamed natives,”
“bandits,” and “resistors of imperial taxes,” reflecting outrage at the upending of order rather than
precise legal categories (Chao 1995:140; Mote 1999:758; Samuel 1993:71; W ing Jiangping
1996:250).  
The key factor is who was perceived as an illegitimate attacker.  The Black/Independent
Lisu in Eastern Tibet and W eixi frequently attacked Nu villages (Rock 1947:330, 334-5; Gros
1996).  In the early twentieth century, Kingdon-W ard expressed surprise that the Lisu had not
driven the “peaceful” Nu out of the fertile section of the valley between Bangda and Jianadun.  He
attributed this to the Nu being part-Tibetan and able to withstand incursion of the more “primitive”
Lisu (Kingdon-W ard 1986:197), a typically British racialist explanation, but it was more likely a
matter of the Nu being dependents of Tibetan and Naxi chiefs who protected them.  The “timid”
Lisu of the Mekong were constantly raided by the independent Lisu of the upper Salween “who
[were] dangerous brigands,” taking cattle and hostages who would be made slaves if not
ransomed (d’Orleans 1896:301).  This must all be understood in the context of political relations of
dependence and independence.  Uplanders, inaccessible to the administration of the Chinese
empire, were able to maintain independence from the rule of law imposed by kingdoms and
empires.  It was seen as a form of parasitism, in which people of the uplands, poor and living in
insecure environments, preyed on those in better conditions.  It was also a form of resistance to
  For instance, when the French Mission to Tibet arrived in Yunnan in 1854, the French were17
soon seen as rivals for the Tibetans for allegiance, in terms of both wealth and ritual power.  The
local population, Nung or Nu (closely related to Lisu) were greatly exploited by their multiple
allegiances and resultant debt slavery.  To them, the missionaries became a way to escape the
burdens of multiple masters (Gros 1996, 2001). 
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state hegemony.  They themselves saw it as a form of reverse taxation.  As one Yi told a captured
French missionary dressed as Chinese:
Do you know who we are? … W e know you Chinese call us thieves and robbers,
but it is you who are the robbers.  All this country once belonged to our fathers;
they had always been its masters and peaceable possessors until the Chinese
came and unjustly expelled them.  W e were the weaker, and had to yield; our
country was neither sold nor given away; we come to collect the rent.  If you retire
to your own territory you will find that we shall not follow you (quoted in (Baber
1882:107).  
“Banditry” was also linked to rights over the people of certain areas.  Naxi tusi of the
region delegated a part of their authority to subordinate chiefs who were influential Lisu and in the
nineteenth century they levied a tax on the Nu along with the tusi of Yezhi (Gros 1996).  W here
the Lisu predated on Nu, the relationship was not so much of one group driving the other out as of
one dominating the other (through militarism, trade, and tribute), and interpretations of the nature
of that relationship changed, even for participants.  In one case, a Nu community organized a
small revolution to lower their numerous and varied taxes to the lamaseries, Tibetan officials, and
merchants in the mid-nineteenth century.  Chinese and a Lisu regiment of troops assisted them in
this (Gross 1996; Gros 2001).   This is in keeping with the multiple spheres of authority present in17
northwestern Yunnan in which shifting alliances were the norm.  Incidents of brigandage or revolt
increased when central administration was weak, for instance at the time of the Panthay (Muslim)
Rebellions after local political relationships had been displaced by the extension of Chinese
administration in the early nineteenth century (Anderson 1871:117, 136; Baber 1882:183; Turrell
1988:148).  
Conversely, “barbarians” were actors in the process of imperial pacification and
expansion.  Lisu tell of being conscripted as soldiers by the Chinese and others such as the
Tibetans and Naxi (Bradley, p.c., February 2005).  Under the control of tusi loyal to the Chinese
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empire, co-opted into the imperial endeavor under civilizing leadership, they were considered
powerful and effective troops.  According to the chronicles of the Naxi tusi of Lijiang, they were
prevailed upon to aid in suppressing the rebellion of W u Sangui with the promise of rewards of
rice, official seals, and letters patent.  These “wild” Lisu and other upland peoples first deceived
and led astray then ambushed the rebel forces.  The Lijiang campaign was bloody and successful
due to the ambushes by the Lisu in the “wild jungle.”  Lisu troops were cited again for their
contribution to a military undertaking in an 1871 chronicle.  Alternations between Lisu as
robbers/Lisu as troops continued; in the 1920s, Rock observed or heard of both Lisu robbers at
the Lidiping divide west of Lijiang down to W eixi and Lisu guards against Lolo robbers at Yuowabu
Pass and Yonging (Rock 1947:139-141, 301, 307n, 393, and plate 231).  
Lisu men were also reported to have served as troops for other Tibetanized or partially-
Tibetanized groups; Dubernard and Desgodins (875) reported that Lisu were used by “Black Lolo”
(Nosu) to fight feuds on their behalf (cited in Hutheesing 1990a:34).  W hen Naxi chiefs invaded
the upper Mekong Valley, settled in W eixi, Kangpu, Yezhi, Adunzi, and seized Qizong, Lapu, and
Benzilan in the Yangzi Valley, they did so with the aid of Lisu regiments (Gros 1996).  Lisu were, in
this sense, coopted into Naxi expansion of their realms.  Lisu in Burma were hired by Shan nobility
as mercenaries (Leach 1965:39-40) and later served in the forces of the British Empire (Enriquez
1921:70).  
In this, it is not clear whether these are the same populations oscillating in their relations
to lowland powers, or geographically different populations of Lisu moving successively into and
out of the orbit of lowland control.  It is just as likely that these were the same populations over
time, both in the pattern of incorporating rebels into the imperial system, what Feuerwerker calls
the transformation from heterodox to orthodox military leadership (1975:43).  For instance, at the
Yunnan/Burma border at Tengchong, the Lisu headman or tusi’s ancestor had been invested as a
reward for conquering the Lisu for the Chinese (Davies 1909:36).  Incorporation of people into the
tusi system implied a specific relationship to the Chinese empire.  Those tribal groups with tusi
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were practically imperial subjects and those without were ‘bandits’ or ‘barbarians’ and therefore
legitimate targets of imperial pacification.  Such ethnic markers were actually markers of state
control and prestige, indicating one’s place as a subject of the Chinese Empire.  The scale of
‘civilization’ corresponded to degrees of state control (Chao 1995:37, 42-3).  
Nevertheless, the element of economic adaptation and dependence on trade are
significant elements of Lisu strategies.  They lived at high altitudes, on mountain tops and,
especially on the Upper Salween, conditions did not allow either a significant surplus or reliable
subsistence.  Mountain peoples could also exploit the fact that they controlled cross-country
communications through mountain passes that joined valleys and levy tolls on caravans and gave
them a chance to profit from regional trade (Leach 1965:21-22).  This appears to have been the
case for Lisu on the Upper Salween.  As such, they could either be classified as robbers by the
state or given legitimacy to collect tolls by being officially appointed by the state.  Such political
and economic adaptations enabled groups like the Lisu to gain control of greater resources that
allowed them to support more stable subsistence as well as status displays.  In some conditions,
these adaptations also supported chiefs, albeit briefly.  Leach summarized some of the ways in
which uplanders supported more complex sociopolitical systems.  One was to establish a political
and economic alliance with more prosperous plains or valley peoples.  They could establish
themselves as overlords to whom valley peoples paid rent, as occurred with the Kachin and Shan
in the HuKawng Valley, Burma, prior to 1926.  Another way, according to Leach, was for
uplanders to extort lowlanders who would pay uplanders to prevent them raiding their crops
(Leach 1965:21-22).  The difference between these is perceptions of legitimacy, the difference
between tribute and extortion; gifts and raids were two sides of the same coin.  An example of this
in the Lisu case was raids by Lisu of the Upper Salween on the “peaceful” Nu and W hite Lisu on
the Mekong.  These were generally considered illegitimate in the context of a centralizing state
and so condemned as raiding, but clearly the Nu at times asked for Lisu help in overthrowing
greedy lords – a form of debt consolidation.  In smaller numbers, Lisu appear to have taken a
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dependent relationship to the locally dominant group.  In Burma, Lisu and Kachin were
interspersed, Kachin predominating in the west and Lisu in the east.  Kachin considered Lisu
inferior and in some localities extracted tribute from them (Anderson 1871:118), presumably for
allowing them to settle in Kachin territory (Bradley, p.c., February 2005).  In light of the multiple
spheres of influence and dependency/patronage relationships in Northern Mainland Southeast
Asia, exacting tribute would be in keeping with those political relations of dependency.  Finally,
valley chiefs sometimes engaged uplanders as mercenaries (Leach 1965:22), as occurred with
Lisu and Shan or Naxi.  In Yezhi and W eixi, Lisu chiefs were incorporated into Naxi polities,
delegated the collection of tribute by Naxi chiefs.  
In short, Lisu took advantage of political and economic conditions to assert their own
place in the multiple spheres of authority and their political forms varied with their degree of
incorporation into local polities and the relative power of those polities.  
Black, White, Striped: Lisu Ethnic Categorizations and Political Relations
Lisu throughout their distribution were categorized as Black (Hei), W hite (Pe), and
Flowery or Striped (Hua, Hwa).  These designations are to this day are commonly said to refer to
the color of people’s clothing (Dick 1987:80; Bian n.d.; Enriquez 1921:72; Zhao 1999; Zhengyou
2000; USA-China Nujiang River Expedition 1999; and for a picture of men in long white coats see
Sinohost 1999).  The Black Lisu of the Upper Salween were (mistakenly) assumed to be the core,
original group.  W hile these distinctions have been essentialized in ethnographic literature, there
were in fact a Chinese categories constructed about ethnic minorities such as the Lisu on the
basis of their relations with adjoining states and regional trade.  
Looking at the population of Lisu ranging from south to north along the Salween, there is
a progression in types of Lisu from Black Lisu in the northern and western regions of Lisu
distribution to W hite Lisu around Tengchong and Chinese administered territories in the north and
east, and Flowery Lisu in the South.  That is, from north to south along the Salween, Lisu were
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increasingly in contact with and influenced by Chinese markets and administration (Rose and
Brown 1911:251) and in the southern and eastern parts were more directly under Chinese
influence (Enriquez 1921:72).  The categories appear to have been based on the extent to which
they were Sinicized or Tibetanized (Kingdon-W ard 1986:176).  The W hite and Flowery Lisu were
more Sinicized, W hite being incorporated into the Chinese empire (or at least the tusi system)
while Flowery relationship with both the Chinese and Tibetan empires was more attenuated.  The
Black Lisu were neither Sinicized nor consistently incorporated into the Chinese empire.  Rather,
they lived in polities ruled by Naxi, Tibetans, or themselves, and were relatively free of centralized
authority.  Culturally, they were partially-Tibetanized (Kingdon-W ard 1986:176; Rose and Brown
1911:255).  These differences led to the creation of ethnic sub-classifications rooted in territorial
location, political structure and relations, and economic organization.  
Categories were based on clothing, language, and political organization.  In the region of
Zhengjia (about 26° 10') and south, Lisu men dressed in Chinese style clothes; women retained
Lisu jewelry and adopted Chinese cotton cloth for clothing in the Lisu style.  The women’s dress
was said to be pretty and colorful.  These were generally Flowery (“Striped” or “Patterned”) Lisu
(Enriquez 1921:72; Forrest 1908:244, 246, 248, 254).  Between Zhengjia and Tengchong, Lisu
were often under direct Chinese administration.  Village headmen were paid a small annual
subsidy, in return for which they were responsible for protecting travelers and caravans passing
through their territory (Rose and Brown 1911:264). The tusi and their families spoke Chinese, and
many claimed to be part Chinese.  There was little feuding or robbery, but Lisu did have the
obligation to pay tax or tribute to the tusi who collected this on behalf of the Chinese authorities.  A
Chinese clerk assisted the tusi in collecting taxes, but otherwise the village regulated its own
affairs and Chinese officials did not intervene.  They also had to cut and clear local roads
annually.  These were the populations referred to as W hite Lisu, although some were Flowery
Lisu.  They themselves referred to this as Chinese territory (“Han-di”) and the people referred to
themselves as Chinese.  The Lisu on the Upper Mekong were peaceful W hite Lisu under Chinese
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control.  On the Upper Salween, there were non-Sinicized Lisu populations.  Tibetan or Naxi tusi
held authority, but for significant parts of the region, tusi control was nominal.  No one spoke
Chinese, they wore hempen clothes, villages were small and isolated from each there, there was
frequent lineage-based feuding among villages, and many villages did not have a headman.  They
were often referred to as “wild.”  These were the Black Lisu.  The distinction between Black and
W hite was highly culturally marked.  There was much resentment between the Black and W hite
Lisu, the barbarian and the civilized (Forrest 1908:244, 246, 248, 250, 254, 261; Ch’en 1947:258;
Rose and Brown 1911:204).  
The distinction between Black and W hite extended to other Tibeto-Burman peoples such
as the Yi and Nosu as well.  A Nosu told Baber that he was “Black-bone,” a freeman or noble to
the Nosu, but to the Chinese meaning independent.  “W hite-bones” were commoners in his
distinction.  The Nosu went on to claim “I serve nobody.  I receive the Great Emperor’s pay, and
keep the peace.”  These Nosu also spoke of their wealth and security (Baber 1882:64).  This
indicates the existence of tusi, a great deal of autonomy, and chiefs with a large number of
dependents and/or slaves on the model of which Gros writes.  Black-bone Nosu, however, were
blamed by the Chinese for carrying out banditry.  Although declaring his innocence, this Black-
bone Nosu chief made payments to the Chinese to prevent punishment by them (Baber
1882:106).  Thus, “Black” groups were not so much completely outside of Chinese control as they
were on its margins, maintaining autonomy through a degree of accommodation to their role as
buffers for the Chinese against foreign polities. 
European observers reinterpreted this system of categories in terms of their own racial
assumptions about descent and purity.  Black Yi, Nosu, Lahu, and Lisu were described as nobility;
racially pure, never having intermarried with Chinese; handsome, tall, and strong; assertive,
forthright, and energetic; good fighters and independent; and generally admirable if uncooperative
with British explorers.  W hite Yi, Nosu, and Lisu were denigrated for intermarrying with Chinese
and adopting Chinese customs; wretched, timid, and cowardly; of inferior physique; and shy,
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passively retreating into the mountains when the Chinese took their land (Goullart 1955:82, 114-
115; Johnston 2001:120; Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)613-614, Scott quoting nineteenth century
European explorers).  Fraser’s missionary work among the W hite and Flowery Lisu shows them
having actively sought allegiance with westerners for education, medical care, and protection
against corrupt officials, that is, in the model of shifting spheres of authority, seeking more
powerful and less taxing patrons.  I suspect that more detailed local history would show an
oscillation between W hite and Black and transformations in the meanings of these categories
over time as Chinese and Tibetan hegemony waxed and waned. 
Naming and categorization were of great interest to representatives of empire as a means
of ruling most effectively through appropriate knowledge and classification, but the terms of those
categories varied.  In China, the emphasis was on the Confucian project of naming (Shin 1999;
Shin 2001).  British categories, the European system of most interest vis-à-vis the Lisu, were
based on language, territory, and political organization, ultimately as a gauge of evolutionary
status (Leach 1965:43-44).  The two systems were congruent as attempts to measure levels of
civilization.  British were far more interested in the relatedness of peoples in order to understand
origins and historical migrations.  For instance, when the Lisu language was categorized as
similar to Burmese, British explorers hoped to learn about Burman prehistory through comparison
with contemporary Lisu (Anderson 1871:118, 136; Davies 1909:366; Forrest 1908:239, 258, 269;
Harris and Ma 1997:71; Rose and Brown 1911:251, 267).  The “ethnogeographic boundaries” of
linguistic groups was important as support for colonial plans to establish political boundaries by
defining legitimate territorial rights on the basis of “homelands;” ethnic categorization served the
mission of mapping and boundary making.  
In addition, these categories allowed colonial classifiers to ignore indigenous concepts of
power and the ways in which that power was based on exploitation of local resources, further
justifying British claims to the need for their special entrepreneurial spirit (Baber 1882:87, 159
184-5; Colquhoun 1970:49; 2, 200, 203-4; Davies 1909:121-2, 192-3; Kingdon-W ard 1986;
80
Manchester Guardian 1886a; Manchester Guardian 1886b; Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2)462-5,
527).  For instance, in discussion of Kachin/Lisu relations, they ignored Kachin domination of
mountain trade routes and mines and ways in which Kachin who shifted to Shan, or Lisu who
shifted to Kachin modes of production, also shifted their dress and ethnic identity (Leach 1965;
Friedman 1979; Maran 1967; Nugent 1982).  
These systems contrast with the practices of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia polities,
in which were based particular upland/lowland relations and ways of making a living, rather than
types, and therefore as mutable as the social relations themselves.  For instance, “Kachin” was a
Burmese term for all “barbarians” of the northeastern frontier, an area which was linguistically and
politically polyglot, and included upland groups such as Jinghpaw and Lisu.  Similarly, many Tai
polities used the term khaa (slave) to refer to uplanders, which later became an ethnonym. 
Another Burmese category referred to barbarians of a particular territory (Leach 1965:41). 
Southeast Asian categories were often congruent with ethnic zonation (cf. SUAN Secretariat
1990:15, 37) and in this recognized that people’s identity shifted with how they made a living. 
Both names for other people and ethnonyms were territorially specific.  For instance, Maru and
Lashi people in Burma called the Lisu Lasi or Leur-seur.  The Kachins called them Yawyin, and it
was under this name they first became known in British colonial literature.  The term Yawyin was
supposedly a name given to the Kachin by the Chinese (Ye-Jen or Ye-Ren), meaning savages;
the Kachin in turn used this term for Lisu people (Enriquez 1921:72; Kingdon-W ard 1986:201). 
The Shan called Lisu Li-hsaw or Cheli (Davies 1909:391).  Chinese called them Lisaw, except in
the eastern and central parts of Yunnan, where they called them Lisu (Enriquez 1921:72; Fraser
1922:1).  
In recognizing that “language groups are not therefore hereditarily established, nor are
they stable through time” (Leach 1965:49), Leach recognized the mutable, ephemeral nature of
ethnicity in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Specific ethnic identity at a given point in time is
  As Chao points out, incorporation into the Chinese state was a gendered process in which18
men became more identified with civilization and literacy, and women identified with local
traditional culture (Chao 1995:130).  
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closely associated with relations with neighboring peoples and polities (Jonsson 1996a; Jonsson
1996b; Moerman 1965). 
Clothing, frequently used by westerners to classify branches of racial stock, was more
likely to signal peoples’ linkages to political economy, access to cotton cloth or thread and bright
dyes, and degree of ‘civilization’ or submission to Chinese authorities.  Dress is also of little help in
ethnic classification because Lisu men adapted much of the style of the people around them,
changing rapidly as their social environment changed.  W omen’s dress varied by locale and
lineage (Fraser 1922:iv), except for the women’s turbans and jewelry, generally consisting of huge
quantities of necklaces of beads, large ornamented turbans, and a profusion of cowries.   Lisu18
further north or where in less contact with Chinese or their markets wore hempen clothes
consisting of a long coat, pants, and gaiters.  Those more in contact with the east wore shorter,
brighter coats made of cotton likely to have been manufactured elsewhere; the women’s clothes
were often elaborately parti-colored on a blue background, decorated with narrow strips of
embroidery (Rose and Brown 1911:258-9).  The dress of the women on the China-Burma frontier
near Sadon and Hta-gaw was exceptionally ornate (Fraser 1922:iv), perhaps indicating wealth and
status, and, except for the use of cowries as decoration, seems similar to the dress of Lisu
women in Thailand today.  The Flowery Lisu do, indeed, wear brighter clothes, but this indicates
access to different types of material for clothing and decorations and money to buy that material,
thus economic conditions as much as conscious self-presentation (in comparison, see Mueggler
1998).  Today in northern Thailand, Lisu from Burma are marked by women’s dress of much more
muted tone and simpler design than that of Thailand, and these do indeed mark difference, but in
access to markets rather than named ethnic categorizations.  
And yet, the color designations have taken on a sort of life of their own in the literature
and according to Chinese accounts for visitors, Lisu in China today dress accordingly, as if these
Similar processes were occurring in Thailand in the late twentieth century as upland ethnic19
minority peoples of different groups took on the Thai lowland designation of them as a single
group and acted in accordance with it, as with the NGO, the Inter Mountain Peoples Education
and Culture in Thailand Association. 
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are primordial ethnic markers.  W hite Lisu on Chinese tourism web sites are depicted in beautiful
pure white jackets, tunics, and pants.  I find this suspect – how often would farmers in the
mountains wear pure white outfits?  However, Lisu also marked social and personal
characteristics according to this designation. W hite Lisu told a Chinese researcher in 1946 that
they had divided themselves into ‘Black’ and ‘W hite’ groups when members became too
numerous and those who liked fighting separated to become the ‘Black’ group (Ch’en 1947:258). 
Put into place, ethnic categorizations developed their own dynamic, a means by which people
themselves made statements about who they were in the political context in which they lived.  19
The focus of observers on superficial features such as dress, housing, and practice of
warfare ignored the contingent nature of categories of Black, W hite and Flowery as markers of
ethnic identity arising out of adaptation to political relationships and economic conditions.  Rather
than fixed ethnicity, we see the flexibility of Lisu sociopolitical forms as adaptation to the political
economies that enveloped them.  Conversely, the focus on dress/housing/warfare highlighted
difference among and within ethnic groups in southwest China to the exclusion of understanding
continuities in social relations.  For instance, essentially the same language was spoken from
north to south, with observable gradations in dialect and practice.  It seems to me that there was
common ritual practice as well.  This continuity is interesting considering the geographic spread of
the Lisu population and is understandable as working from a prior text.  Even those Lisu who
moved beyond the Tibetan and Chinese spheres of influence worked from a common prior text of
meanings in which experience was organized and understood by previous experience.  People
adapt to their immediate conditions on the basis of existing relations and meanings, but these
arose out of past adaptations to what had once been immediate conditions, their history.  This is
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the element of historical contingency in social/cultural dynamics, a sort of double helix of
adaptation and history.  
Summary
W e can consider these poles of variation in the social and political structure of Lisu:
< Egalitarian vs. hierarchical: Hierarchical societies occurred where chiefs arose, usually
under the auspices or patronage of Naxi chiefs, or perhaps Tibetan rulers, and/or when
they controlled a valuable trade route.  However, there were not long-standing, permanent
structures; structure oscillated between permanent and temporary depending on the
political economy that existed.  W here Lisu were more peripherally associated with
Tibetan or Chinese states as in the far northwest, their societies were more egalitarian. 
As I will show in the next section, Lisu societies further south tended toward a
predominantly egalitarian pattern supported by lineal segmentation, migration and opium,
except where Lisu were tied into Kachin or Shan structures of hierarchy.  In more central
areas, they had closer relationships with Naxi, Tibetan, or Chinese states and there is
more evidence of hierarchical social structure through engagement in relations of
patronage and dependency as well as the shared upland/lowland rituals illustrated in Gros
(1996).  
< Temporary or short-term vs. permanent or long-term: Even where Lisu society
had chiefs – hierarchical, with dependents or slaves – the structure tended not to
be long-term or permanent.  Temporary or short-term hierarchical structures
could be so because of the influence of another power forcing them into a
subordinate status without chiefs, such as the southern Lisu who were more fully
incorporated into the Chinese empire and under direct Chinese imperial
administration.  In the intermediate conditions, imperial officials invested local
leaders as tusi with quite a bit of autonomy as long as there were no uprisings
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and the tusi provided safe transit for trade caravans, soldiers for protection of the
state, and paid taxes or tribute.  This would be an example of more permanent or
long-term chieftainships in existence because of the support of a powerful state. 
Other leaders could arise for some period of time but fail to create a permanent
structure of chieftaincy because they were unable to control the resources
necessary to maintain such a structure.  Examples of this might be ephemeral
control of a mountain pass critical to trade.  Maintaining wealth based on this
would have depended on a number of factors: the value of the items typically
traded along that route; the ebb and flow in use of different routes depending on
safety, warfare, or ability to maintain exclusive control.  One way to gain wealth
and power was to prey upon on trade caravans; thus the reputation of Black Lisu
for being robbers and brigands.  Another way for a leader to maintain relations of
debt and dependency was to acquire slaves through warfare, and another was to
work as mercenaries for Naxi, Tibetans, and Chinese. Gros also points out that a
chief’s ritual role, acts of authority over the land and control of local spiritual
power, underlay political centralization (1996, 2001).  Chiefs required exclusive
control of resources in order to maintain relations of debt and dependency and
make displays of wealth and generosity but Lisu were rarely wealthy enough to
maintain long-term chieftainships or in a position to maintain control of such
resources (Gros 1996).  There is a continuum here between degree of
permanency and the influence of external states as it was generally only through
state influence that a “permanent” chieftainship could come about.
< Sinification or Tibetan influence: Those who are non-Sinicized were often
heavily influenced by Tibetan and indigenous ideologies of ritual power (I
find it impossible to distinguish between the two given the material
available).  Examples are the northern Black Lisu villages who reportedly
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did not have headmen and who appear to have been radically egalitarian
with a high degree of feuding as opposed to the Black Lisu chiefs
occasionally cited.  This idea of Black Lisu chiefs needs to be explored,
as does the idea of there being no headmen.  It is not clear to me that
these ever existed outside of a context of subordination to Naxi leaders
who practiced leadership on indigenous and Tibetan models.  As we
have seen, these positions were increasingly supported by investment as
tusi in the Chinese system.  Lisu terms for headman varied from place to
place, a marker of local relationships not indigenous to Lisu (Bradley,
p.c., February 2005).  There were other factors in Lisu culture that
militated against debt and dependency and towards egalitarianism,
closely tied in with migration and opium, which will be discussed in a later
section.  W here the Lisu population was acculturated to Chinese imperial
culture, as in the southern part, they were loyal to tusi or local headmen,
were reported as “docile” people, and there was no banditry or feuding. 
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In summary, Lisu social structure throughout its distribution could be either hierarchical or
egalitarian depending on a leader’s access to slaves and dependents, made possible by the
access to the wealth available through trade (or brigandage), control of mines, work as
mercenaries, or patronage by external states, and his perceived ability to control ritual forces
through feasting.  Thus, we see tendencies in transformations in Lisu society over a wide
geographical and temporal range due to the range of political and economic conditions under
which each particular population lived, which then appeared oscillatory. 
Figure 2.1: Poles of Variation in Lisu Social and Political Structure
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Lisu Migration
Migration was a central element in Lisu land use, economy, and social organization in
northern Thailand until the late 1970s.  Reading the colonial and traveler reports that comment on
the wide distribution of Lisu and their southward migration, it appears that migration has been an
integral element of parts of Lisu society for over a century.  To understand Lisu migration
southwards into Burma and Thailand, we must consider where, how, and why.  “W here” is
relatively easily answered due to British concerns to control populations under their administration. 
“W hy” and “how” are much more difficult.  “How” is virtually unanswered, and I can only indicate
through ethnographic analogy the likely methods of migration.  Historical examples are, however,
congruent with the details available for recent Lisu migration.  “W hy” can only be induced from
reports and historical conditions.  Understanding Lisu society and the political economic structure
in which it occurred can shine light on individuals’ agency at that time. Nevertheless, there are
suggestions of the facts of and pressures toward migration in these documents.  The main
question I address here is why a population of Lisu moved south so quickly at this particular point
in time.  
The migration of Lisu was not unique to the colonial period; earlier populations moved as
well.  Population movements appear to have been the default condition rather than the deviation
to be explained.  Lisu tradition is that they moved southwards from Sichuan around the end of the
seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries (Harris and Ma 1997:171 citing Yang,
et al. 1990).  Other historical research corroborates this; the Lisu settled in the Upper Salween as
a result of fighting between the Tibetans and Chinese in the 1760s (Gros 2001; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2000).  Land transfer from local minority populations occurred with shifts in political
balance as victors gave land to their subjects.  For instance, land was transferred from the local
population in W eixi to Tibetan families (Gros 1996).  Daniels writes that Lisu began migrating in
the late seventeenth century, from the Upper Salween to the far northern Burmese borderlands in
the face of incursions from Chinese (Daniels 1994).  Sometimes land transfer was less direct,
  There are such sources in Chinese (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005), but I do not read Chinese. 20
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alienated through commerce, debt, or corruption (see Giersch 2001:83-84).  By the early 1800s,
the Lipo, a closely related eastern Lisu group, were losing land to Han immigrants and
environmental degradation from over-use, resulting in rebellion (Daniels 1994). 
Many observers recognized that a large number of Lisu and other non-Han peoples
migrated in the mid/late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Nevertheless, there are few
specific recorded cases of Lisu migration in Yunnan in English, and certainly none at the
household or village level.   None of the above accounts give specific examples of Lisu migration20
within Yunnan or of emigration out of Yunnan in the nineteenth century.  However, it is possible to
understand migration through records of Lisu immigrating into northern Burma.  Also, knowledge
of Lisu society in Yunnan can help us to question and refine the dominant explanations given for
Lisu migration.
Lisu as Refugees?
Common explanations of why Lisu migrated share a view of being people without a home,
refugees swept before the maelstrom of the “Han march toward the tropics”' and the bedlam of
rebellion, banditry and corrupt government, to be finally spit out of the whirlpool on the fringes of
China, Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Lisu have been depicted as weak, a dying race
occupying the mountains from necessity rather than choice because that was all that was left to
them by their more powerful neighbors (Davies 1909:392; Goullart 1955:114; Rose and Brown
1911:250; W iens 1967).  More recent researchers have spoken of the Lisu as fleeing southward
to avoid government and high taxes as well as banditry and social disorder (Dessaint 1972a:13-
14; Du 1999:26, 28, 35, 40; Stevenson 1981:346).  Such views of Lisu as a displaced people are
upheld by a self-image of refugee status.  Dessaint gives the translation of their name as "those
who have come down" and some of his informants said "lisu" meant "outlaw" or "rebel"
  Bradley, the leading scholar on the linguistics of this branch of Tibeto-Burman, puts it as li =21
forest, jungle and su = people.  Curiously, some elder males in Revealed River Village also
called a the Khalij pheasant lisu, and compared the swaying ‘tails’ of Lisu women’s dress to the
beautiful tail of this local mountain pheasant.  
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(1971a:71), an ethnonym that indicates their status vis-à-vis the state and seems more a state
designation than a self-appellation. Hutheesing cites an educated Lisu man that "lisu" means
people who always moved, who lost out (1990a:35).  In present day Yunnan, “lisu” is said to mean
“disperse” (Chen et al. 2003:5).   I have heard it conjectured by academics that the population of21
Lisu who eventually settled in Thailand were the losers, the poor and weak driven up into the
mountains and south before the sweep of by more powerful groups, as compared to the
population that remained in Yunnan.  Others have claimed that the Lisu of Thailand are only
peripherally related to the Lisu population living in Yunnan due to Chinese admixture.  The
problem with such accounts is that they consider only population purity and large scale
movements; they obviate consideration of Lisu agency.
Lisu Accounts of Migration
Most Lisu in northern Thailand were uninterested in the specifics of their origins and
migration history.  W hen asked, people responded with information about places they had lived as
children, or where their father or grandfathers had lived before coming into the area of their
current village.  Lisu in northern Thailand have a few stories of their origins and migration.  Some
of the songs sung at weddings in Thailand were sagas of migration, a listing of places they had
been.  These songs, sung only at important events, were in archaic language (Hutheesing
1990a:35).  
Hutheesing collected and translated songs and some stories about Lisu origins.  Their
origin stories are not unlike stories found throughout the region, of a brother and sister being
brought to life, their incestuous marriage after a period of trials, and eventual allocation of land to
all of the peoples of the region (Hutheesing 1990a:2; cf. Proschan 2001 for the ubiquity of such
  Despite such charter myths, it appears that few populations lived anywhere from time22
immemorial.  The myths have more to do with ethnic identity and relations, probably in the
context of neighboring states (Proschan 2001).
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tales in the upland regions to the southwest of Lisu territory).   Other stories served as a sort of22
mythological charter legitimating peoples’ rights to territory, especially poignant in light of loss of
land to Han immigrants.  One account tells of the marriage of the daughter of the Lisu king to the
son of the Chinese king.  Antipathy between Lisu and Chinese arose from the failure of that
marriage because the Chinese groom was infertile, unfaithful, a drinker, a gambler, and an opium
smoker (reflecting complaints made by Lisu women of Lisu men in northern Thailand in the late
twentieth century).  After that, the Chinese succeeded in conquering them.  “After the Lisu king
had been killed, the Lisu people did not have a place to stay.  Even when they killed and fought
the Chinese, it was not possible.  They fled everywhere, went in all directions.  Since then the Lisu
have no country …” (Hutheesing 1990a:25).  In this account, the tellers claim to have originated in
“Lai country, Ti [northern Yunnan] country, where the Huang He river (the Yellow River) is, about
4000 years ago” (Hutheesing 1990a:25).  Another type of story is what Hutheesing called
“memorized migrations,” recounting specific incidents of warfare or conflict with the Chinese,
Burmese, “Khala” (W a), Black Lahu, and bandits before migrating further south to W a territory in
Burma  (Hutheesing 1990a:25-26).  These stories imply a number of points about Lisu identity and
ethnic relations.  For instance, such ritual chants laying out paths to the tribal “homeland” are said
to be common among Tibeto-Burman peoples (Blackburn 2003/2004).  But they tell us little about
the historical specifics of migration itself.  
Understanding Lisu Migration
Lisu migration is typically attributed to two forces.  One is warfare or Chinese pacification
of upland peoples, especially those who refused to submit to the Chinese government
(Hutheesing 1990a:34-35; Dessaint 1972a:13).  The other is the influx of Han immigrants to the
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southwest of China (W iens 1967).  That is, the Lisu were weak, they fled; or they migrated
because of “their persistent desire for an independent lifestyle” (Daniels 1994; see also Lewis and
Lewis 1984 for desire for autonomy as a dominant Lisu social characteristic).  Yet, it is clear that
Lisu as a whole were not weak and passive, nor were they primordially freedom-loving – they had
chiefs and slaves in particular times and places, in some cases they rebelled against Chinese
domination. 
A main factor was the demographic transformation of Yunnan and the resultant
competition as Han and non-Han forms of land management conflicted (cf. Daniels 1994; Lee
1979; Rose and Brown 1911:24).  One feasible response was to migrate in search of new land. 
These were not isolated peoples with little knowledge of the outside world.  They were often
multilingual, they traded and traveled.  Many did migrate, and migrated before the extensive and
far-flung migration that carried Lisu populations to northern Thailand beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century and culminating in the mid-twentieth century.  Yet, we must also take account
of the fact that most Lisu and other mountain minorities did not leave Yunnan; many people
stayed and assimilated or maintained a precarious autonomy in far northwestern Yunnan until the
1950s.  Others rebelled (Daniel 1994; Gros 1996).  And even when assimilation occurred, it did
not guarantee that people would stay.  It appears that the main population that migrated from the
southern and central groups of Lisu was primarily Flowery Lisu.  The irony is that those
‘independence-loving’ Lisu who moved south were in fact the most Sinicized of the Lisu
populations, considered more “civilized” and “sophisticated” than the Black Lisu (Hanks and
Hanks 2001:78).  
Nevertheless, these explanations of Lisu migration in the mid-nineteenth century are
unsatisfactory on several points.  One is that it leaves a key point unexplained.  Attributing the
southward migration to warfare in Yunnan is an incomplete explanation as it was a region of
warfare and violence before the mid-nineteenth century.  Another is that such statements do
nothing to explain the mechanisms, specific strategies, and hoped-for goals of Lisu who migrated. 
  Tai chronicles demonstrate similar segmentation and territorial expansion (Wyatt 1982:9).23
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These explanations are based on forces external to Lisu society with no consideration of the
internal dynamics of migration.  W hat is lacking in these “explanations” of Lisu and other Tibeto-
Burman speaking peoples’ migration is twofold: why so far and at this time, and the mechanisms
of migration, what enabled people to migrate at this time so rapidly?  Explaining Lisu migration
would ideally explain which populations moved and why.  Migration is linked with the process of
segmentation through ultimogeniture and definitely linked with territorial expansion (Gros 2001b),
as older sons move out to establish households.   This is in keeping with what we know of Lisu23
social structure in the post-W W II period.  W e also need to consider why Lisu populations moved
south rather than elsewhere.  Thus, we can see how both external and internal demographic
processes were involved in migration.  Two factors facilitated and pulled Lisu migration.  The first
and most significant was opium.  The other was the attraction of a more secure life under the
British in Burma and then in northern Thailand, where state control was weak.  
Chinese migration pressure did drive non-Han peoples’ to seek out new places to live; the
rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century did cause people to flee.  However, it would be more
accurate to attribute Lisu migration out of the Chinese sphere of influence at this time not to just
being pushed out by Han immigration, unrest, or pacification, but to increasing state interference
(Du 1999:26, 35, 28, 40) combined with weakened central administration (Bello 2005).  The
unsettled political conditions in Yunnan and the attractions of a more secure life under the British
in Burma were both a push and a pull toward migration southward.  This encompasses the
consequences to upland minorities of the demographic transformation of Yunnan; the problems of
warfare, unrest, and corrupt functionaries; and the concept of Lisu as seeking autonomy – an
emphasis on freedom from obligations best understood in the context of debt, dependency, and
rulership in the Upper Salween and Chinese alienation of land through indebtedness (Giersch
2001; Gros 1996; Gros 2001) – in a way that more accurately summarizes the political economic
conditions of the time and opens up a way to talk about Lisu agency in this migration.  It was a
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confluence of factors that led to some Lisu peoples’ decision to move southwards.  Burma and
northern Thailand were places-in-between with little effective government control, particularly of
opium cultivation (Maule 2002; Tagliacozzo 2004).  Dessaint states that Lisu migrated to avoid
high taxes and banditry, but also in search of good opium lands (1972a:13-14).  The introduction
of opium as a cash crop transformed the economy of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  It
transformed internal dynamics, one result of which I believe to have been an increase in
population, and subsidized and impelled Lisu migration.  This explains to some extent why a
significant population of Lisu migrated as far south and as quickly as they did in the mid to late
nineteenth century without resort to an explanation that depends entirely on external forces, as if
Lisu people were flotsam before the storm.  Thus, opium became a stimulus for migration as
significant as the political economic conditions were a stimulus against staying.  
To argue for understanding Lisu agency is not to say that rebellions and banditry,
warlords and state penetration, were not factors in their migration.  Peoples acted within the nexus
of this particular political economy, but to discuss migration only in these terms is incomplete, to
view Lisu as mere automatons in the machinery of circumstances controlled by others or
intentionalized forces.  Therefore, the specific facts of the southward migration must be traced as
much as is possible given the limitations on data available.  The best information available is
colonial accounts of Lisu migrations into Burma
Lisu Migration into British Burma
Lisu migration became marked and documented when they migrated into Burma.  This
corresponded with the demarcation of political boundaries in the 1890s out of the complex array of
smaller, relatively autonomous polities of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  It was not that these
border/frontier relations had never been considered by Chinese authorities, but that Chinese
interests had been based on very different categories (Giersch 2001).  And so, Lisu cross
international borders and became trans-boundary people defined by their central subsistence
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strategies, swiddening and growing opium as a cash crop.  They were labeled and defined as a
problem on the world stage.  The migration of Lisu households into Burma corresponded with
British colonial control and clashed with British plans for revenue production through control of the
natural resources of Upper Burma.  Despite being chased out by colonial authorities, Lisu
remained in Upper Burma and continued to immigrate on a household by household basis
because of the relatively peaceful and ordered conditions in Upper Burma under Shan princes
and British colonial authorities, compared to Yunnan at that time.  Thailand, in turn, was attractive
for similar reasons and because of the availability of open lands.  Lisu households took advantage
of market opportunities but sought to isolate themselves from government interference by living in
more remote areas, a strategy born out of the contingent past in Yunnan. 
It is in British colonial documents that we first find what became common assumptions
about the nature of Lisu society and economy formed.  The perception of westerners in the late
nineteenth and twentieth century was that Tibeto-Burman speakers always moved southward
(Davies 1909:391; Enriquez 1921:72).  Not only migration, but its direction, was essentialized as a
racial characteristic.  The Lisu, Davies observed, were particularly enterprising and avid emigrants
(Davies 1909:391).  Such characterization of Lisu people and culture occurred well into the late
twentieth century and is not uncommon in Thai and international development reports today.  The
British colonial government attempted to forestall this immigration.  From the British point of view,
there was insufficient land for them and they considered the Lisu to be non-productive destroyers
of forest – swiddeners who would not contribute to the development of the colony.  These
expanding pioneering migratory patterns were considered to be due to the increasing population
of Lisu in Yunnan (Hertz 1912:73; Fraser 1922:vi; Renard 1996:35 quoting Butterfield 1920:77-
81), which could not be supported on the type of high mountains on which they settled.  They
“devastated” the forest, apparently did not have enough land to allow rotating swiddening, and
moved on.  Lisu migrants were the despair of the British government, although Enriquez thought
the habit of clearing around their villages was a “healthy” one (Enriquez 1921:70).  Thus Lisu were
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early categorized as a southwards-migrating group who lived in “high cold and barren spot[s]” and
destroyed the surrounding forest for miles around by swiddening until they moved on to new
forests (Enriquez 1921:72).  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were several migrations into
Burmese territory.  The Lisu population was large enough that the British feared they might
eventually rival the Kachin in numbers (Kingdon-W ard 1986:201, 210, 304), although they never
did.  By 1900, 1,454 Lisu were reported as living in the Shan States (Census of India Burma
Reports, Pt. 2, table 10, cited in Hanks and Hanks 2001:78), including households established in
Möng Tum and Möng Hsat in Kengtung, Southern Shan States, near to the border with northern
Thailand (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)588; Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(2)366, 486).  In the
Kachin Hills, Lisu lived chiefly in the neighborhood of Sadôn (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)388). 
They were found scattered in small villages throughout the Northern Shan States and Möng Mit
(Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)388), in North Hsen W i, where there were about 1,000 people in
20 villages, with similar numbers in Tawng Pen Loi Long and Möng Mit (Momeik) (Scott and
Hardiman 1983 I:(1)587).  Lisu immigrated into villages around Mogok, Bhâmo, Sima, Sadon,
and, further north, Panwa (Enriquez 1921:70).  These resulted in four villages in Bhâmo, five (105
households) in Sima, twenty villages in Sadon, and five or six villages in Panwa (Enriquez
1921:70).  From 1907-1909, an “extraordinary wave” of Lisu immigration swept into Bernardmyo
and Mong Mit in the Shan States, at approximately 23°, 96° 30' (George 1915:45).  Most of these
were further southwest than any previous immigration, beyond Kachin territory (see Leach
1965:23, Map 2).  
These two migrations are noteworthy on two points.  First, the mass of population was
unusual; more recent ethnographic evidence is that Lisu tended to move on a household by
household basis, not as entire villages (Hanks and Hanks 2001:78-76; Dessaint 1972a).  Second,
the “wave” corresponded to a significantly successful anti-opium campaign that was one of the
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last edicts of the Qing government (Meyer and Parssinen 1998:2, 46; Trocki 1999:129; W . W alker
1991:14-16).  
The immigration into Bernardmyo/Mogok was well documented by the district
commissioner.  The territory was a part of the Ruby Mines District, of great value to the British and
the key element in their annexation of Upper Burma (Turrell 1988).  It was administered as a Shan
State (George 1915:1).  The Lisu came in “large bodies” and established themselves on
prominent positions between Mogok and Möng Mit.  The colonial government considered them to
be “unauthorized intruders” of no economic value and absolutely useless as a revenue-producing
community.  This was especially so because the region had increasingly come under irrigated rice
terrace cultivation and (apparently) cash cropping, and thus was progressively economically
profitable to the government, as well as evidence of development of a peaceful and prosperous
society (cf. Hertz 1912; News of the W orld 1886), part of the charter mythology of British
colonialism.  The British were eventually able to “dislodge” them, but only with difficulty because
Lisu lived in isolated and inaccessible spots.  W here they went from here is not clear.  In British
eyes, they had caused considerable damage to the forest in a very short period of time, in part
because they had been too isolated to be under direct British control (Enriquez 1921:70).  But
eventually they returned; there are about 15,000 Lisu in and around Mogok today (Bradley, p.c., 
February 2005).  
A smaller population of Lisu who had settled in the area before annexation was allowed to
remain on the Bernardmyo Plateau.  This was a settlement of seven villages with a total
population of 1,350 people (about 193 people per village).  This group was still considered a
problem due to their agricultural practices.  
According to their usual custom, they selected the highest summits for their
wasteful energies and, before their activities were stopped by the formation of
Forest Reserves, they had cleared a large portion of the Bernardmyo valley of
virgin forest and left it a mere treeless savannah of coarse grass.  During the last
ten years they have been forced by restrictions on their [swidden] cutting to adopt
other means of livelihood, and have embarked on the cultivation of potatoes,
which was first introduced when a British Cantonment was established at
Bernardmyo (George 1915:44-45).  
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W ith some degree of security and the appropriate environmental conditions, and under
regulatory pressure from the British, the Lisu who migrated to Bernardmyo were capable of
building terraces for irrigated rice and did so.  Even more importantly, the establishment of a
British military station gave them an opportunity to plant a cash crop, potatoes.  W hile government
administrators universally accused Lisu of seeking isolation, in fact most Lisu settlements are
chosen for both privacy from administrative control and accessibility to trade opportunities. Note
that they took advantage of the cash crop opportunities created by the presence of British troops.  
These conditions would have proven an incentive to the second group of Lisu to move to
this area; wherever the living was good, others followed.  The pattern here appears to be one that
was common in northern Thailand until migration was prohibited in the late twentieth century. 
That is, a small group of Lisu found an area for settlement based on its availability, suitability for
swiddening, and cash cropping opportunities, cleared it, and then sent for family members to join
them.  W e shall see this pattern again in discussing the establishment of the Thirty Thousand
cluster of villages.  This pattern of chain migration is related to ultimogeniture and lineage
segmentation (Gros 2001b), in which as each son matures he must make his own way, seeking
and opening new land to cultivate.
In looking for new forests to settle, Lisu moved southwards.  W hy?  It appears in part to
have been the path of least resistance.  Significant parts of Upper Burma had become
depopulated in the decades between 1876 and the mid-1920s, the population having moved south
for reasons mentioned but unexplained by Stevenson (1981:39-40).  Scott and Hardiman note,
however, the civil wars in the Shan States and disturbances following annexation led to
depopulation in many districts of Upper Burma.  There was a plague in the 1850s and war had
resulted much of the population of Kengtung being moved to Chiang Rai (Bradley, p.c.,  February
2005).  Hsen W i was depopulated by warfare from 1867-1897; after the end of hostilities, in a
period of nine years, the number of villages increased six times.  This was one of the places into
which Lisu migrated (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(2) 205).  Möng Hsat, Kengtung, was
  Another population of Lisu settled in Doi Chang in 1918, located outside of the Hanks’s study24
area (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005).  
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depopulated due to warfare with Fang (northern Thailand) before Lisu moved in (Scott and
Hardiman II:(2) 366).  Thailand similarly suffered from emptying of lands by warfare in the past;
the people of Chiang Mai and other northern city states had mostly been removed in 1777 by the
Burmese to towns in the Shan States (Colquhoun 1970:117).  Furthermore, after Pax Britannicus
was established, these areas were relatively safe and untroubled.  By the mid-1920s, Public
W orks houses were built every 12 miles or so along the road to Putao (Fort Hertz, north of
Myitkyina), and it was traveled by British hunters, civil officers, and military policemen who
prevented feuding and banditry.  There were no attempts to ‘improve’ or ‘develop’ the local
population.  The goal was only to pacify, not to provide any social services (Stevenson 1981:37). 
Decades later, upland peoples remembered the time in the Shan States as one of peace and
prosperity (Hanks and Hanks 2001:24, 283).  
A number of Lisu households also migrated into territory that is now northern Thailand.  In
the far north, around Chiang Rai, Lisu households began to appear in 1896, with two more
populations moving there in 1900 and 1920 (Hanks and Hanks 2001:34-35, 39, 41-43, 49, 54).  24
Here, there was a great deal of vacant land due to battles among Tai principalities (müang).  The
goal of pre-modern warfare was not to gain territory but people, who would be removed as
prisoners-of-war and established in new villages in the conquering prince’s müang or möng
(Nimmanhaeminda 1965; W yatt 1982).  As a result, many parts of northern Thailand were
sparsely populated.  There are no records available of this time because the wild, uncultivated
peripheries were of little interest to local principalities except as sources of valuable forest
products and buffers against invasions by other principalities (Jonsson 1996a; Jonsson 1996b), so
that we have no clear sense of numbers of immigrants, locations of settlements, type of
agriculture, or how long they stayed.  Later in the mid-twentieth century, larger populations of Lisu
migrated into Thailand because of political conditions.  Groups moved from Burma to northern
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Thailand during W orld W ar II to avoid the fighting between the Japanese and British, much of
which took place in the Kachin States.  After the communist victory in China, Christian Lisu moved
to northern Burma and on to northeastern India.  Others moved to Thailand from Burma and
Yunnan in the 1950s, some recruited by certain Thai officials as part of their control of the opium
trade, others as part of the Kuo Min Tang (Nationalist Chinese) (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005; W .
W alker 1991:208).  Finally, many came to Thailand starting in the 1960s as the Burmese political
situation fell apart, particularly in the Shan States (Hanks and Hanks 2001:24, 225).  Cross-border
travel and agriculture were still common and necessary in the 1990s; I met one middle-aged
widow from Burma who had married a local widower and relocated to Thailand (bringing with her
a sack of opium poppy seeds that could no longer be used in this part of northern Thailand).  
In questioning why Lisu moved south, we can also consider the political conditions
discussed previously.  Lisu and others leaving Yunnan did so in part because of the political and
economic conditions: rapacious landlords, corrupt government officials, and wandering bandit
gangs; they had faced landlords, indicating that they had become dependents of a powerful tusi or
landlord, or that their land had been alienated.  The move into Burma was likely motivated by the
desire to find land that they could cultivate for ‘free,’ that is, without relations of dependency.  The
Lisu cultural emphasis on freedom resonates in the historical context of the political significance of
relations of debt and dependency in the Tibetan borderlands, and of government penetration, Han
immigration, and land alienation starting in the mid-nineteenth century.  Lisu and other upland
immigrants also sought the right to make a living without the multiple taxes, prohibitions, and
confiscation of their opium crop that had come to typify Yunnan in the warlord period (W . W alker
1991:36).  This is a strategy of over-taxed peasantry.  As was common in Northern Mainland
Southeast Asia, subjects could “vote with their feet” if the conditions of their dependency were too
onerous.  
  May would have been the beginning of the planting season.  Fields are usually cleared and25
burned in April, then planted in May when there is some slight rain to soften the soil.  Crops need
to germinate before the downpours start later in the month (although here I speak from
experience in Thailand; this being further north, farmers might have been only just clearing fields). 
At any rate, this would have been a very busy time in the agricultural year and an unusual time to
start political activity unless people had lost their land and their livelihood.
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A Period of Unrest
The pressures of Han immigration to Yunnan, the extension of Chinese administration
and then its disintegration in the mid-nineteenth century, and decreased opportunities for trade, all
brought about many incidents of unrest.  For the British, this was an opportunity to demonstrate
their superior administration and extend more outright control over areas they wanted allocated to
their territory in Burma; as a result, these were carefully recorded.  One account by District
Commissioner Townsend is of a Lisu armed rebellion in Chinese territory in 1901 that threatened
to spill over to British Burma territory.  
The uprising took the form of a revitalization movement provoked by the increased
penetration of Chinese control.  About May,  a Lisu near Paknoi Prang announced that he had25
been visited by a spirit in a vision who taught him the art of writing.  His writings were in characters
resembling Chinese that he said were messages from heaven calling on Lisu to assemble and
resist any action that might be taken against him by the Chinese.  By November, he had a
following of 200 men.  These writings were widely distributed throughout the uplands and copies
of these letters were sent to the Lisu headmen on the British Burma side, who passed them on to
the British colonial authorities in order to find out whether the British would join the Lisu in a move
against the Chinese.  They planned to mine precious metals and were afraid that the Chinese
would interfere (Hertz 1912:72-3).  Despite the millennial elements of this movement, the goal of
mining seems feasible given economic strategies common in the region.  Their fear of Chinese
interference also seems realistic given the contemporary history in Yunnan of conflict between
Han immigrants and indigenous miners, which had in part precipitated the Panthay Rebellions. 
The Panthay Rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century had resulted in enormous physical
 They demanded and received a fine from the Chinese for the outrage against British26
sovereignty, not because of atrocities committed against the Lisu, and had the Chinese abolish
taxes on the main trade route between Bhâmo (Burma) and Tengchong (China) that the British
considered illegal.  The British had used the incident to effectively advance their economic and
political interests.  
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destruction, breakdown of local administrative, security, and fiscal institutions, and a “palpable
decline in popular morale,” had decimated the population of Yunnan, urban areas were left empty
shells.  Most significantly for this discussion, it destroyed trade for decades following, in part
because the main traders were the Muslim Yunnanese who had rebelled (Anderson 1871:117,
136; Baber 1882:167, 172, 174,183; Feuerwerker 1975;  Hill 1998:15; Lee 1982b:302; Turrell
1988:148; W ang Jiangping 1996:211-2).  
D.C. Townsend, however, feared that the Lisu were really looking for land their population
in Yunnan had increased and there was no room for expansion, or that they sought to recover
land from which they had been ousted by Chinese immigrants and that their leader sought to raise
“the whole of his tribe” against the Chinese in an attempt to gain it back.  Either way, they
presented a danger of unrest.  By January of 1902, the uprising at Puyapa numbered 400-500
men.  The leader collected tribute and supplies.  The constant passing of armed Lisu back and
forth caused unrest among other groups on either side of the Burma/Yunnan border.  On
February 13, 1902, a quarrel resulted in a fight between some local Chinese and trans-Paknoi
Kachins, and the Lisu joined in on the side of the Kachins.  The trans-Paknoi Kachins, who had
approached British officials to ask for advice, refrained from attacking the Chinese.  The Lisu fled
and their settlement was burned down (Hertz 1912:72-73).  The Lisu continued to attack Chinese
posts, in one case successfully, but the Chinese eventually suppressed this uprising, in part by
burning local villages and killing the inhabitants, both on the Yunnan and the Burmese side of the
border.  This, of course, provided an opportunity for the British to assert their control over the
unadministered territories of Northern Burma and delineate what they considered proper Chinese
administration (Hertz 1912:73-74).   26
  Forrest writes: The “... object  in making the journey was both political and geographical: first, to27
discover whether the Salwin and Irawadi dividing range formed a distinct geographical and
ethnographical boundary between north-west Yunnan and Upper Burma – a fact which the local
Chinese authorities, with direct knowledge, and for their own purposes, denied ...” (Forrest
1908:239).  
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In another case in October of 1905, British travelers exploring the Salween met a group of
Lisu warriors with huge cross bows north of Chengjia, a town nearly 100 kilometers north of
Tengchong.  They were led by a local ni pa (the Lisu term for the guardian of the “Old
Grandfather” shrine, but the British again translated this as “prophet”).  The leader carried a piece
of paper covered with Chinese style characters; he said it was instructions from heaven to go and
kill the headman of Chengjia.  They requested the help of the British, who refused.  W eeks later,
the British heard rumors of a slaughter of huge numbers of Lisu by Chinese troops from Chengjia. 
The Lisu people fled north; the Chengjia people (many of whom might also have been Lisu) fled
south (Forrest 1908:248).  The precipitating incident was rooted in contestation of the Lao-wa
tusi’s control of the region north of Chengjia.  In general, the Lisu people refused to recognize the
tusi’s authority but when he attempted to levy double tribute from these villages, one of the
headmen rustled twelve of the tusi’s cattle; in return, the Lao-wo tusi kidnaped the headman’s son
and seized his salt.  This particular uprising followed a severe famine (1904-1905), when people
expected a proportionate lifting of taxes (Forrest 1908:244, 248-249, 258).  
In keeping with patterns of disputes over spheres of authority, Lisu and other local
headmen made ceremonial offerings to the British traveling party, explained their grievances
against the tusi and requested their patronage (Forrest 1908:248-249).  Aside from the fact that
the British undertook this exploration to establish their territorial claims both topographically and
ethnographically (Forrest 1908:239),  and thus may have been biased to see their own rule27
recognized as superior, it is not unlikely that local people actively sought to put themselves under
British rule.  In another case, Kachin/Lashi villages complained of the Chinese officials of
Tengchong seizing their cattle and young women as tribute.  They requested that the British
government take over the territory “and provide means for settling disputes, suppressing feuds,
  It is possible that these offerings were part of a welcoming ritual common through much of28
Northern Mainland Southeast Asia in which eggs and rice are offered to guests.  Eggs and rice
are also offered in certain healing and divination ceremonies.  Other Lisu headman gave them
presents of eggs and honey, or a fowl, or trays of rice, eggs, and vegetables, and other items,
which the elders presented to the British on their knees (see Forrest 1908:254).  
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and regulating taxation” (Forrest 1908:241-2).  On his trip north of Chengjia, a British expedition
was ceremonially offered gifts of rice, eggs, and/or honey by village deputations (Forrest
1908:244, 247, 248-249, 254, 262).    28
On the more millennial/religious movement end of the continuum of uprisings was trouble
that occurred in the early 1920s among a village of Flowery Lisu in Upper Burma.  A spirit calling
itself “Jesus” revealed itself to a village and imposed laws similar to those of Christianity –
forbidding the worship of other spirits, bearing false witness, drinking of wine, for instance – but
also decreed that the villagers should not work.  The Jesus spirit promised wealth and great herds
of livestock if the villagers would follow its laws.  Among its edicts was one to abandon cultivation
and wait for it at a mountain top, or be burned alive.  Unsurprisingly, the spirit did not appear and
the villagers went hungry; this went on for several years until in 1934, representatives of the
village sought out Protestant missionaries in the Upper Salween/Mekong to find out more about
this Jesus spirit.  They were among Isobel Kuhn’s early converts (Dick 1987:80-84).  There were
also stories of a Lisu king who would come and return them to their rightful place (Fraser 1922:xi).
The British had become players on the stage of Northern Mainland Southeast Asian
politics.  At this point, they were viewed as but one among many in the scene of multiple spheres
of authority but apparently an attractive alternative to some people.  British rule appeared of
pragmatic utility to people accustomed to seek out the best deal in rulership, the most fair, the
most potent and efficacious authority to which to attach themselves.  The extension of the
Chinese state further into western Yunnan while it simultaneously suffered the weakening of
central administration and consequent corruption made the British in Burma look like a good
alternative authority.  In the British, people sought patrons similar to others they knew – Tibetan,
Chinese, Naxi – but in so doing submitted themselves not to a somewhat autonomous tributary
  Profit seems to have been an organizing principle of the culture of Victorian England’s29
governing class; profit and value are frequent themes throughout these administrative and colonial
exploration reports.  One account from a London newspaper told of a chaplain who had received
the Victoria Cross for his role in a battle in India.  He rescued a wounded man in the heat of battle,
and in doing so, lost his charger, “Unfortunately, the mare, a very valuable animal, broke loose
and was never seen again” (Daily News (London) 1900).  It seems to me that having your horse
abandon you in the middle of a fight would have been of far more concern than its monetary
value.  
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relationship based on shifting alliances and control of people through demonstration of ritual
potency, but to a permanent subject status based on control of territory.  The British colonial
government sought to maintain a status quo and prevent uprisings and population movements
that would upset their district budgets, resource allocations, and commerce.  Lisu 'prophets' were
seen as a threat to prosperity, or as an opportunity to assert rights over the Chinese.  Their goals
were to maintain the Pax Britannica for the purposes of expansion of trade; the prospect of
economic gain overrode other considerations, as in the case of the opium trade.   29
Population Pressure
The migration of Flowery Lisu, the southern Lisu population in Yunnan, came shortly after
the spread of opium as a cash crop.  Population pressure was part of what pulled people south. 
One side of this was population pressure due to alienation of land by Han immigrants.  Another
element was an increase in population among the Lisu.  There were reports of increasing
population among southern Lisu by observers in the 20th century (Hertz 1912:73; Renard
1996:35, quoting Butterfield 1920:77-81; Fraser 1922:vi).  The meaning and significance of
population pressure are necessary to understanding why opium was significant in Lisu migration. 
Population pressure is not an easily measured and marked object; it is, rather, a process
understood on the basis of several assumptions.  The first assumption is that an ecosystem
contains its own limits to growth, in essence a function of carrying capacity (Hardesty 1977:210;
Hawley 1986:54).  Carrying capacity has been defined as the theoretical limit to which a
population can grow and still be sustainably supported by its environment (Hardesty 1977:286;
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Sutton and Harmon 1973:279), the maximum population that an environment can support
indefinitely without leading to degradation (Ellen 1982:41); or a point around which population
varies (Sutton and Harmon 1973:155).  The utility of the concept of carrying capacity is debatable
for humans because there are so many social and cultural factors involved (Hawley 1986:53), but
it remains useful in that it contains within it the concept of limiting factors (Hardesty 1977:196). 
The limits, however, can change.  Therefore, carrying capacity is dynamic, changing with a
multitude of factors (Hardesty 1977:195-206).  This is important for understanding the variable
nature of population pressure – what the limits are and when a population reaches them and how
the limits can be altered by human adaptations.  The key question, then, is what the limiting
factors were on carrying capacity that led to the experience of population pressure (cf. Ellen
1982:47-48).  I use carrying capacity here as a useful short hand for discussing the intersection of
several limiting factors and when population pressure occurs.  The long-term security of any
population is not based on its average production and consumption, but on the way it is able to
weather periods of scarcity (Netting 1977:33).  
Carrying capacity can be expanded – and population pressure alleviated – by
technological advances (Sutton and Harmon 1973:73, 216).  Thus, a limiting factor can be
negated.  But with humans – keeping in mind that it is populations that adapt, not cultures (Ellen
1982:244) – very much more than technology must be taken into account, such as culturally
constructed consumption levels; the intensity of use of land; pests on crops; human working
capacity; and land tenure systems (Ellen 1982:42; Hardesty 1977:204-206).  Therefore,
understanding population pressure requires consideration of institutional arrangements such as
kinship organization and the nature and efficiency of political and administrative control (Hardesty
1977:205-206: Ellen 1982:44).  Finally, we need to consider system boundaries and integration of
local economies into regional, national, and global systems (Ellen 1982:45; Hardesty 1977:205). 
But the goal of this is not to determine which variables constrain or determine; the problem for the
anthropologist is to assess the degree and character of the variable’s flexibility.  The effects of the
  To this day in northern Thailand, the Lisu are held up as an example of a relatively healthy30
population because of their practice of preserving vegetables in brine, which allows them to eat a
more balanced diet in the hot, dry season when no greens are otherwise available.  
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environment are mediated by social relations and the cultural meanings attributed to them in a
community.  These are products of a contingent historical sequence (Ellen 1982:50-51). 
Population pressure and how populations or local communities deal with it must be studied in the
framework of concrete historical processes (Bennett 1976:199).  The case of the Irish Potato
Famine, for instance, demonstrates the intersection of ideology, political economy, and
agricultural biology (or mycology, in this case) (Zuckerman 1998).  W ith humans, there are no
simple biological processes.  But there are discernable significant factors, and their consequences
for populations, environment, and human adaptations can be delineated. 
Political, geological and climatological instability resulted in great precariousness from
year to year in food production and in consumption in western Yunnan.  These were the main
limiting factors in this ecosystem.  In addition, salt was a significant limiting factor.  W ithout salt,
people suffer goiters and thyroid disease.  Salt is also an important preservative, enabling people
to keep vegetables through annual periods of scarcity.   Commercial activities were oriented30
toward buying salt as well as food grains.  Even today, salt remains so significant that in northern
Burma, Alan Rabinowitz found Lisu hunters who sold the parts of exotic animals to China in order
to buy salt.  He therefore devised a scheme of subsidizing salt imports in return for their
commitment to stop hunting (Rabinowitz 2001).  
Opium eliminated a number of these limiting factors or made it possible to alleviate their
effects, creating a dynamic of both population increase within Lisu communities and opening a
path to a new way to adapt to the dangers of life in Yunnan.  Opium expanded the household
portfolio for upland farmers by opening up new niches, both ecologically and economically.  This
facilitated and drove population increase and migration, which had specific consequences for Lisu
social structure.  
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Ecological and demographic consequences also resulted from the introduction of
American crops such as maize and potatoes (Frank 1998).  However, most American food plants
arrived in the southwest of China as early as the mid-sixteenth century, before the Lisu migration I
am discussing here.  The sweet potato was introduced in the 1570s and spread quickly in China
between 1700-1800, becoming the third most important source of food in the country after rice
and wheat; maize, potatoes, peanuts, and tobacco brought about change in the early Qing
Dynasty as well.  There is some debate as to the demographic effects of these new crops.  Mote,
for instance, points out that techniques of increased food production (techniques of irrigation, early
ripening rise) existed in Yunnan well before the rise in population in the eighteenth century (Mote
1999:903, 942), and Lee says that Chinese adopted these ‘catch’ crops only after population
increased (Lee 1982b), in keeping with Boserup’s thesis (Boserup 1965).  However, the effects of
these crops on upland populations were probably rather different.  Corn and sweet potatoes,
considered mountain food, actually increased the opportunity of poor Han settlers to colonize the
mountains (Lee 1982b:298), to the disadvantage of the upland indigenes.  From 1800 on, the
Chinese expanded the mountain arable land and replaced traditional low-yield upland crops such
as barley, oats, and buckwheat, with higher-yielding New W orld crops such as sweet potato, white
potato, and maize (Lee 1982b:296-298; Lee 1982:740-1; Kang Yunhai 1993; Daniels 1994; Mote
1999:705-715).
Opium Cultivation in Northern Burma
The introduction of opium as a cash crop occurred in the early 1800s.  Some sources
state that opium was planted in the sixteenth century and after the Ming Dynasty by upland
peoples of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia; if so, it was a known and familiar crop. 
Consequent upon the decriminalization of the opium trade after the Opium W ars, opium was far
less profitable for smugglers.  But even earlier, by 1820, opium production for the markets
occurred particularly in Yunnan and Sichuan, in the parts of these provinces largely independent
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of the authority of the central government of China.  The nascent opium production system in
western Yunnan and northeastern Burma expanded rapidly and dramatically as the quality and
quantity of domestic opium increased rapidly throughout the nineteenth century (Anderson
1871:93, 124, 133-4, 221, 183-4; Anderson 1993:116; Baber 1882:4, 44-45, 71-72, 79, 87, 166,
171, 174, 183-184; Bello 2005; Booth 1996:147-148, 158-160, 183-184; Davies 1909:147; Hall
1974:2-4, 8, 17; Hill 2001:137-39; Kingdon-W ard 1986:61; Meyer and Parssinen 1998:2, 40,
45-47; Trocki 1999:21, 96, 119-121, 123-126,128-129, 132-133, 142, 171; W . W alker 1991:5,
14-15; 23, 26, 30-35, 48; W ang 1996:231).  Opium was suitable to the region, politically,
economically, and ecologically.  W ithin a decade of legalization, one British explorer in western
Yunnan commented that as far as he saw, opium was the sole agricultural export for the people of
the far west of Sichuan and Yunnan.  He wrote: 
...wherever cultivation existed we found numerous fields of poppy.  Even the
sandy banks were often planted with it down to the water’s edge; but it was not
until we began our land journey in Yunnan that we fairly realised the enormous
extent of its production (Baber 1882:183).
He continued:
W e walked some hundreds of miles through poppies; we breakfasted among
poppies; we shot wild ducks in the poppies.  Even wretched little hovels in the
mountains were generally attended by a poppy patch (Baber 1882:184).  
One of the ‘natural curiosities’ in this region were the opium ducks, wild ducks that fed on
the poppy plants and so were languid and soporific from the narcotic (ibid.).  
Burma was as ecologically well-suited to opium growing as was southwestern Yunnan.  In
fact, this geographical region – Northern Mainland Southeast Asia – had shared common
ecological traits, cultural and linguistic similarities, and mutual trade for centuries.  It is therefore
more than likely that people in Burma learned to plant opium as quickly as those in western
Yunnan.  Opium from Yunnan had been traded to Burma since the early nineteenth century.  It
would be more surprising if opium cultivation had stopped at the shifting, porous border between
“Burma” and “Yunnan.”  Opium was cultivated in western Yunnan in an area later claimed as
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Burma as early as the1820s (Anderson 1871:70-71).  In 1837, McLeod noted that uplanders in
Burma cultivated poppies (1869:70, cited in Hanks and Hanks 2001:54).  Opium was again noted
as far west as the Shan valleys and Kachin hills by 1868 (Anderson 1871:70-71).  W hen the
British incorporated Upper Burma in 1868, opium was being grown throughout the Shan States
(McCoy 1972:70).  In the 1870s, in an area of western Yunnan later disputed as Burmese territory,
opium was cultivated (Colquhoun 1885:(1) 357; (2) 89).  By the early 1890s, the opium poppy was
being cultivated throughout northern Burma, usually on upland slopes in parcels ranging from
small garden plots to hundreds of acres of hillsides covered in the white, single stem poppies. 
Opium was grown by the Chinese and by groups such as the Lahu, Akha, Palaung, Lisu and
some Kachin, always above 4000 feet.  As of 1891, Bhâmo Kachins all grew opium wherever the
soil would support it for sale to the laborers at the Jade Mines.  It was rare for lowland peoples to
grow opium except where market conditions were very good or where ecological conditions were
very bad  (Anderson 1871:266; Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 358-359; Scott and Hardiman 1983
II:(1) 44, 51, 243).  
Opium especially dominated agriculture and trade in Kokang, a Chinese-Shan state
Burma east of the Salween River.  In 1892, it was estimated that 1000 acres were planted to
poppy and that it comprised two-thirds of cultivation in Kokang and the W a States, with modest
amounts of rice for household consumption or corn for liquor.  It was planted by the Chinese and
Chinese-Shan in the valleys, the Palaung on the middle slopes, and the Lisu on the mountain tops
(Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 360; !Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 464-65).  
W hole stretches of hillside are covered with the poppy and the total area cannot
be very far short of ten thousand acres.  The average return per acre is a viss
and a third, so that the amount of crude opium produced annually must reach
something like forty thousand pounds. ... It is gathered in the usual way by slitting
the poppy head...  The labour spent in cultivating the fields is enormous.  Some of
these [fields] are several miles from the villages, often several thousand feet
above or below them (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 466). 
Opium is the chief crop in Kokang and the W a States to this day (Renard 2003).  Little
else would grow there or was tradeable.  After the Kokang and W a States ended poppy
 While it might appear that maize, potatoes, and other crops introduced from the New World31
can be expected to have the demographic consequences discussed here, these crops were
introduced much earlier than opium without resulting in this rapid southward migration.  Opium
better fits the time line of Lisu migration.  
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production two years ago, the United Nations had to mount an emergency food program in the
area, which continues today with the help of a few international aid agencies (Jagan 2005). 
Opium was a crop suited to risky environments, allowing people to live where they had little else
on which to depend.  
 Small plantings of opium were cultivated for trade as well as personal consumption,
along with a number of other crops and produce.  Anderson provides the most detailed
description I was able to find on an early upland agricultural system with opium.  The ‘Kakhyen’
hills (Hotha Valley) were within 30-35 miles of the Chinese border, a border that was closer before
the Panthay Rebellions loosened Chinese imperial control over parts of what is now Burma. 
Crops were planted in different econiches.   The rich black loam in the mountain valleys was31
devoted to rice; the poorer soils of the red spurs of the mountain ridges were used for a
miscellany of catch crops such as tobacco and vegetables, among them, apparently, opium.  The
staple crops of the valley, where Shan people lived, were rice, tobacco, and a little opium.  The
poorer upland soils were cultivated primarily by the Kachin and Lisu on the neighboring hills, and
they cultivated maize as well as upland rice, tobacco, vegetables, and opium (Anderson 1871:83,
136).  The poppy seed was planted in November, sprouted in January, flowered in February, and
the sap collected in March or April (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 359).  In the Momien Valley
(which was referred to by Anderson as W estern Yunnan), upland farmers grew potatoes as well
as a range of other vegetables, fruits, and nuts, much of which was sold, “... but opium is
extensively grown all over the province, and sells in the bazaar at Rs. 10 to Rs. 12 for 3½ lbs.”
(1871:93).  At Bhâmo, Kachin took crops, silver, and animals to valley markets to sell to the Shan,
and among their produce was opium (Anderson 1871:221). 
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The Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States provides information on Lisu
cultivation of opium by the 1890s.  I present this information by district, from north to south.  In the
Myitkyina District, on the border of the Kachin States, Lisu lived interspersed with Kachin villages. 
Some opium was grown in two villages and grown extensively in another, out of six Lisu villages
reported (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(2) 296, 518, 718; II(3) 119, 130, 194).  Thus, opium was
not a central part of their agricultural strategy.  In North Hsen W i (Kokang), there were only 250
Lisu and the population was primarily Chinese and Kachin who grew a lot of opium that was
exported to the Shans on the west and China on the east (1983 II:(1) 94).  In South Hsen W i,
there were again very few Lisu interspersed among the Chinese, Burmese, Shan, W a, La and
Lahu in 1897 (1983 II:(1)201), most having moved in during the previous nine years following
depopulation of the area due to warfare (1983 II:(2)205).  The Lahu, however, extensively
cultivated opium and systematically hunted (1983 II:(1)153).  In Kokang, all of the Lisu villages
grew opium, although whether it was the dominant crop or a catch crop varied (1983 II:(1) 195,
209, 458, 467; (2) 50; (3) 215).   
Another place in which opium was grown was Mang Lôn (or Long) W est, a Northern Shan
State (1983 II:(2) 206).  Mang Lôn was just south of Kokang.  There had been a lot of population
movement here due to the “disturbances” prior to annexation in 1885-1886 (1983 II:(1)202).  This
was a “wretchedly poor” area (1983 II:(2)72-73).  The Lisu population, totaling five different
villages or village groups, were clustered around a high mountain and connected ridge paralleling
the Salween called Loi Lan.  Other Lisu villages were found on the other dominating ridges, Loi Sa
or Loi Se (1983 II:(2) 72-3, 167-9, 588-9, 590, 611, 743).  Some of these Lisu had been settled in
the area for “a long time,” having come from South Hsen W i (1983 II:(2) 588-9, 611, 743).  In the
southern part of Mang Lôn known as Kawn Taü, some Lisu lived lower down on the mountains,
having settled here “a long time ago” as well (1983 II:(2)168).  Almost all the Lisu in Mang Lôn
grew huge quantities of opium and a little corn for feeding pigs and making liquor.  Some grew hill
rice, but not many.  The colonial report stated that, in general, “They grow opium or rice as they
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perceive the demand” (1983 II:(1) 202).  The markets were chiefly devoted to the bartering of
opium for necessities such as rice and salt (1983 II:(2) 169).  
Kengtung, a lively regional trade center in the Southern Shan States, adjacent to northern
Thai kingdoms of Fang and Chiang Mai, had an ethnically diverse population, but far more Lahu
and Akha than Lisu.  Again, warfare had emptied the territory of population in 1886 (1983 II:(1)
443-4, (2) 365-6).  The production of opium in Kengtung had “always been considerable.”  For
many years, large quantities of opium were exported to northern Thailand and Upper Laos, but
when the French took over Upper Laos and made opium a government monopoly in 1896, prices
fell greatly (1983 II:(1) 414), although apparently cultivation did not decrease.  The Kingdom of
Siam also had established a royal monopoly on opium in 1852, but because their prices were
high, steady stream of cheaper Burmese and Yunnan opium was transported into northern
Thailand and the royal monopoly’s prices were determined by that of smuggled opium (McCoy
1972:64, 67).  Opium was primarily carried by Kengtung traders on foot and some by Chinese
caravans (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 423).  
The Lisu, although not prominent here, were noted for growing a lot of opium and for
being “very Chinese.”  They celebrated Chinese New Year and intermarried with Chinese (Scott
and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)588).  The Lisu lived in the north and northwest of Kengtung and in the
hills to the south of Möng Hsat (Müang Sat) (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 420, (2) 366), in the
hills north of Nam Lwe, south of the Kengtung Valley, in Möng Tum at the headwaters of the Mae
Sai (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(2) 486), and in other southern districts of Kengtung (II:(1) 422),
therefore on the northwestern border of Thailand.  They “always” settled in the higher parts of the
mountains of Kengtung and “invariably [grew] opium as their main crop” (I:(1):588; II:(1)422). This
information dates from the mid-1890s.  All of this population has since moved to Thailand
(Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005).  
In Möng Sit in the Eastern Division of the Southern Shan States, there was a very small
population of Lisu, about 40 out of 8,613 people.  There was a “recently settled” village of Lisu as
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of 1898, but Scott and Hardiman also state that the Lisu had been growing poppy since 1896
(II:(2)480).  Finally, in W an Yin (Banyin), Eastern Division of the Southern Shan States, there were
about 66 Lisu.  They lived near the peak of Loi Maw, the highest peak in the district (II:(3)342). 
The poppy cultivated by the Lisu was “still in the experimental stage” (II:(3)343); yet they state
earlier that Loi Maw was the only place west of the Salween in W an Yin where opium was
systematically grown for profit (I:(2)360).  The Chinese planted it for profit, and uplanders such as
the Kachin, Palaung, Lahu, Akha, and Lisu planted plots from the size of a pig-stye to that of “the
ordinary country church yard” for their own use or sale in the neighborhood (I:(2)361).  These are
now a large Lisu cluster, not far from Taungyi (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005).  Opium cultivation
was the norm by the early twentieth century among the Lisu in southwest Yunnan and northern
Burma; “Poppy cultivation is well-nigh universal among the Lisu – at least in districts where its
growth is permitted” (Fraser 1922:v).  The Iu Mien (Yao) and Hmong (Meo) were also recorded
growing opium as a significant part of their agricultural system by 1913 (Jonsson 1996b:159-160). 
Opium had become a standard subsistence strategy in Burma, and the Lisu who migrated to the
far north of Thailand by 1896 grew opium (Hanks and Hanks 2001:78). 
These reports show that Lisu living further northwest grew little if any opium.  This may
have been for ecological reasons (too cold? too short a growing season?) or because there was
no economic need for such a crop, for instance, if involvement in trade fulfilled needs for
supplementary income.  For example, Lisu traders transported lead that they dug in the Chinese
state of Sansi to Burma on a trade route through Myitkyina; the lead was sold for salt (Scott and
Hardiman 1983 II:(3) 207).  If these are Black Lisu from the adjacent Black Lisu areas of Yunnan,
their economic repertoire probably included hunting, banditry, and working as mercenaries.  In
fact, the use of the enormous crossbow typical of Black Lisu is mentioned only for these northern
populations in Burma.  Southwards, there was cash cropping, but not always of opium; in the case
of the Lisu around Bernardmyo (also towards the north), they grew potatoes for sale to the British
cantonment.  As we move further south, opium becomes a more central part of Lisu adaptive
  In contrast, the social dangers of opium cultivation are related to a number of factors.  These32
were: the extent of cultivation throughout the region and whether that significantly reduced grain
cultivation; whether opium cultivation took place on lands suitable for food crops or simply opened
up a new niche; the political environment, that is, whether warlords or local elites were
monopolizing opium production or distribution; economic dependency and extraction; whether
there were plantations in which capitalists or warlords monopolized production or small scale
producers making their own agricultural decisions; whether rulers used the profits of opium to buy
guns to enable them to carry out warfare; the degree of control of the central government and
whether it had banned opium or not, as interdiction often increased the value of the crop,
especially to those just outside of the reach of the entity that banned it and greatly increased the
value to traffickers; and the frequency with which laws and implementation changed, leaving
peasants susceptible to confiscation of the crop, incarceration, or execution.  As Tullis has pointed
out: “Most of the benefits and liabilities associated with production and trade of illegal drugs
ultimately derive from illegality itself ...” (1995:138; see also Alai 2002; Booth 1996:148, 159-160;
Hall 1974:4, 7-8, 17, 26-27; Hill 2001:138-9; Meyer and Parssinen 1998:40; Rock 1947:417n; W .
W alker 1991:5, 15, 23-24, 34, 45; Trocki 1999:123-126, 132-133; Tullis 1995:99; Kemp 1921
quoted in Booth 1996:160.  
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strategy.  A higher percentage of Lisu planted opium; planted it on a larger scale; and planted it to
the exclusion both of other cash crops and subsistence crops.  There is far less mention, as well,
of alternative economic strategies such as hunting (which can be very profitable in trade of animal
parts for traditional medicines), trading, mining, soldiering, or of other cash crops.  Opium had
come to dominate this local economy.  In that, it sounds similar to the situation in China, but it is
not.  In this case, these were mountain peasants who controlled their land; chose what to grow;
and when, where, and how to sell it, at least within the structure of the existing markets and
political conditions.  It was smallholder cultivation, and often merely for local use with the excess
sometimes sold in the nearest market.32
Clearly trade was an element in opium production in Burma.  In the southeast of the Shan
States, especially in Kokang, opium was cultivated specifically for the long distance trade to
Thailand, Laos, and Yunnan, even when that trade was made illegal by the monopolies in
Thailand and Laos.  Yunnan and Burma were source of cheaper opium for addicts in Thailand
and Indochina.  Chinese opium was imported into Burma in large quantities for many years until
after W orld W ar II (Anderson 1871:266; Hertz 1912:102; Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 360; Scott
and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 4, 120, 263, 466, (2) 565-566, 568, 578; Stevenson 1981:36). 
Nevertheless, in 1892 almost all of the opium grown in Kokang and the W a States went to China
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(Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 360) and by 1901, much Burmese opium went east to Thailand
and Laos, but also west to local Upper Burma markets and sometimes into Yunnan (McCoy
1972:64).  Opium control campaigns had contradictory effects on farm-gate prices.  W hen the
French took over Upper Laos and made the opium trade a government monopoly in 1896, export
of opium from Kengtung decreased greatly and prices fell (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(1) 414). 
On the other hand, a campaign to suppress opium cultivation in Yunnan starting in 1937
stimulated a dramatic rise in the price of opium and the smuggling of opium from Burma into
China two years later (Maule 2002).  This was a complex regional market.  Levels and end places
of trade varied depending on market demands and prices, the distribution networks (numbers and
routes of pedlars or caravans), and the politics of drug control, especially in China where policy
was inconsistent.    Levels of production varied with these market conditions as well as with
growing conditions in micro-regions – depending on slope, exposure to sun, amount of rain and
other meteorological conditions.  Upland farmers appear to have responded to all of these
conditions.  They grew opium where there was a market for it, as in Kokang, Hsen W i, and
Kengtung.  They grew less were there was less demand, as in Myitkyina, or grew different cash
crops, as in Bernardmyo where they grew potatoes.  Upland farmers evaluated their needs and
planted a mix of crops accordingly.  This was also typical of Lisu in northern Thailand in the
1970s, although their economic repertoire was a narrower one of corn, rice, and opium.  
Poppy, while it grows well on degraded soils and can support populations in areas that
would otherwise barely support a population, is not a risk-free crop.  Its harvest is very labor
intensive and can be undertaken only where there is sufficient labor for that one time of year, said
to be March or April in Upper Burma.  The seasons in Upper Burma were irregular and rainfall
capricious.  The poppy was susceptible to damage by wind, hail, or unseasonable rain, or even
insect damage.  Thus, production levels were irregular from season to season, from field to field,
and from neighbor to neighbor: “one farmer’s crop may fail and the other’s make him wealthy”
(Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 337, 359).  Therefore, farmers had to balance their risks as well
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as plant particular crops based on their perceptions of the markets.  They were, in short, upland
peasants tied into large regional markets affected by global political conditions.  
Colonial authorities in Burma were deeply concerned about the uplanders growing opium
as they feared it would cut into their monopolies; so, too, with the Royal Thai government.  The
Daily News (London) of May 21, 1886, noted the opium trafficking problem in Upper Burma and
the government’s plan to suppress that trade (Daily News (London) 1886).  The “hill tribes” were
blamed for importing opium from Yunnan (Hertz 1912:102), although I can think of no reason why
they would have been more deeply involved in the trade than Muslim and Yunnanese Chinese
traders.  Ultimately, this was related to government concerns to control the potential flood of
cheap Yunnanese opium into Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, thus undercutting their
monopolies.  There were two particular problems noted by British Burmese officials.  These were
that local upland production would make smuggling worse because it would have been too difficult
to distinguish between smuggled Yunnanese and that “legitimately” grown by their own “hill tribes.” 
The other problem was that they feared these upland minority peoples would divert their opium to
smuggling rather than sell it legitimately to government monopolies (McCoy 1972:66; Tagliacozzo
2004).  Accordingly, opium control issues arose with the integration and securing of the colonial
state in Burma and with the creation of the nation-state in Thailand.  
In the 1920s, the British authorities attempted to commence a systematic campaign to
control opium production in northern Burma, but opium cultivation was never fully eradicated by
the British in the Shan States.  They had granted internal autonomy to the Shan sawbwas, who
gained an important part of their personal income from upland minority people’s opium cultivation,
which they sold to Thailand and Lower Burma.  The authorities failed to find an adequate
replacement crop, without which farmers would have been left destitute (Maule 2002; McCoy
1972:71-72).  Opium cultivation could not be eliminated without bringing about rebellion of those
on whom the British depended to rule on their behalf.  Their attempts were hindered not only by
the potential loss of revenue to themselves and the Shan sawbwa, but by the fact that their bans
  The Golden Triangle is the opium-growing region of southwestern Yunnan, northern Burma,33
northern Thailand, and northwestern Laos.  It is a modern term with its roots in western nations’
drug policy.  It first appeared in print in the Far Eastern Economic Review in July 1971 in an
interview with a United States Assistant Secretary of State (Lintner 2003).  
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were geographically piecemeal and they believed opium to be irreplaceable, so that ideas of
alternative crops were uninspired (McCoy 1972:66; Renard 1996:36-38; Maule 2002).  A former
Federated Shan States Commissioner, John S. Calgue, described conditions in the late 1920s: 
the real point about opium in the W a States and Kokang ... is that opium ... is the
only thing produced which will pay for transport to a market where it can be sold. 
To suppress opium in Kokang and the W a States without replacing it by a crop
relatively valuable to its bulk, so that it would pay for transport, would be to reduce
the people to the level of mere subsistence on what they could produce for food
and wear themselves or force them to migrate (Maule 1992:36 quoted in Renard
1996:37-38). 
Major Butterfield, Superintendent, North Shan States, Lashio, wrote that: 
the ... great increase of population that is going on and the failure hitherto to find
a substitute for, or modification of, taungya [swidden] cultivation in the hills has
made forest preservation the most vital necessity of these States, next to opium
suppression (1920:77-81, quoted in Renard 1996:35).  
Here is a beginning of the discourse about opium and upland ethnic minorities in the
Golden Triangle , one that continued until the 1970s and continues even to some extent today in33
Thailand.  Opium took a central role in upland agricultural and economic systems.  It became the
nexus of adaptation and survival in the uplands of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Its
existence and use enabled migration, egalitarian social relations, and a population increase, but
also became the main way by which uplanders were defined as a problem to modern nation-
states. 
Burma was attractive in part because upland farmers could plant – or not plant – opium
poppies as they desired.  British authorities never succeeded in enforcing international drug
regulations in northern Burma, particularly the Shan States (Maule 2002).  The Shan States and,
after it northern Thailand, were particularly attractive because they were familiar as places-in-
between, as western Yunnan had been.  Upper Burma was administered by indirect rule through
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local chiefs and princes, who played the role of political middlemen/cultural brokers, not unlike the
Tibetan chiefs and Chinese tusi of western Yunnan.   In Burma and, eventually, Thailand, most
cultivators were upland ethnic minority people, very loosely tied into the politics and oppression of
a state government.  That this was primarily a cash crop, planted for regional sale rather than for
local consumption, is made clear by the fact that there are no reports of addiction on anywhere as
large a scale as in China.  Few Lisu smoked opium, and those men who did never did so in
excess; villages where opium was smoked had at most one regular smoker; and young men
“played with” opium but did not become addicted (Anderson 1871:124, 133, 134; Fraser 1922:v;
Rose and Brown 1911:265).  Large scale production in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia did not
start until after W orld W ar II, especially after the new Chinese government drove out the opium
traffickers and KMT, who immediately went into business in northern Thailand and Burma (McCoy
1972:65; Trocki 1999:171; Tullis 1995:108).  As carried out in Southeast Asia until then, opium
provided a reliable, if small, income for upland farmers in Burma. 
Opium in Lisu Migration
The Lisu moved south in large part due to opium.  Opium increased carrying capacity of
specific types of marginal lands at the same time that Han movement was decreasing the land
available to Lisu and other tribal peoples.  In contrast to the usual arguments “explaining” tribal
migration that find causes in factors external to the dynamics of Lisu society, I postulate a specific
mechanism related to particular historical conditions in which Lisu were active agents.  I also
explain questions left unanswered by previous explanations, such as why the population moved
so far, so fast, at this particular time.  The answer lies in opium. 
Opium played a central and transformative role in a number of ways.  It is a highly
valuable cash crop.  It can be grown on any type of poor and degraded soils, opening up new
econiches for upland peoples on marginal lands who were being pushed into more marginal areas
by Han immigrants, such as the Lisu.  In fact, it allowed uplanders to live on lands that once could
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support few people, increasing population density in heretofore barren lands.  The consequences
were profound.  For instance, in 1891, J.G. Scott stated that “without its opium Ko Kang would be
no better than the thinly inhabited and poverty stricken hills usually inhabited by the Kachins “ (in
“Revenue Inspection Reports, Northern Shan States, Season 1891-2,” quoted in Maule 2002). 
The cash received or the barter value of opium allowed people to buy more grain than they would
have been able to produce on thin soils with erratic weather conditions.  It allowed people to buy
essential goods that were only available through trade, such as salt.  Opium is also bankable –
unlike food crops, opium can be stored for a long period of time with little deterioration or loss to
pests.  The silver received for it was also bankable, usually in the form of silver jewelry worn by
women and young men in courting rituals.  This meant that farmers had a means to ride out the
social and natural disasters endemic to western Yunnan and northern Burma: they had movable
wealth, something other than their labor, the land they had worked, domestic animals, and crops. 
Thus, opium proved an eminently suitable crop for the peoples of Northern Mainland Southeast
Asia.  
In a world being changed by colonialism, opium allowed uplanders to survive by tying
them into global markets.  This reliance on regional and global markets in fact expanded carrying
capacity beyond local limits; an econiche-specific cash crop, traded, gave people the resources to
make barren lands habitable at a higher population level than otherwise possible.  Dependence on
trade was a long-standing survival strategy for Tibetan and Tibetanized peoples.  British control of
Burma changed the balance of power in this region and colonialism re-oriented overland trade
toward western dominated sea ports.  For instance, cotton had once been a significant cash crop
in Yunnan and northern Burma, especially in the Shan States.  The raw cotton was largely
obtained from hill villages; in Kengtung, cotton was grown exclusively by the hill tribes.  Shan, Tai,
and uplands women wove their own material and sold the excess cotton to local markets and
Shan caravans.   But by the 1890s, villages on the main roads had begun to buy cotton goods,
imported calico from Manchester, and cotton yarn, and these had overcome locally produced
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products.  The imported cloths and yarns were less durable, but brighter and finer in appearance,
and it became a sign of status to wear these (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(2) 366, 466).  Thus, the
dislocation of trade patterns undercut local cash cropping.  Fortunately, an alternative cash crop
was available in opium; it replaced former cash crops, the utility of which had changed under new
world colonial economic conditions.  Opium fit into existing Lisu agroecosystems and trade
networks; it was remarkably congruent with the specific problems and contradictions faced by Lisu
at that time and place.  Opium was at the core of an intersection of structures.  It solved an
intensification of historical contradictions – while, of course, creating new ones  – and  its
introduction and acceptance were almost overdetermined.
Opium allowed Lisu populations to overcome the specific limiting factors – the
consequences of natural disasters, warfare, social unrest, corrupt officials, loss of agricultural land
to Chinese immigrants, irregular seasons and rainfall, poor lands, lack of salt – inherent in their
political and natural environments.  It allowed them to weather periods of scarcity because opium
was such a consistently valuable, non-perishable cash crop that it gave them the means to
survive even when their crops were destroyed, inadequate, or they were forced to move by
political conflicts.  It allowed them to save so that they had resources to draw on in times of need
created by both the natural and social environments.  The profits of opium allowed people to buy
grain, in many years more grain than they would have been able to produce on the marginal lands
on which they lived.  It allowed them to avoid dependency on wealthy landlords, monasteries,
chiefs, and tusi.
I believe that opium created some of the push towards migration in that it supported a
population increase among the Lisu.  It is impossible to conclusively prove this, but colonial and
missionary sources claimed that Lisu were experiencing population increase.  In DC Townsend’s
account of the Puyapa Rebellion in 1902, he stated that he feared that the Lisu were looking for
land because the population of Lisu had increased greatly and had no room for expansion in
Yunnan (Hertz 1912:73).  Fraser wrote that he believed the Lisu were experiencing an increase in
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population (Fraser 1922:vi).  Butterfield wrote of a “great increase of population that is going on...”
(1920:77-8 quoted in Renard 1996:35).  British records of the time indicate an influx of Lisu, and
their figures are grossly underestimated (Bradley, p.c.,  February 2005), so it appears that even
more Lisu moved southwards into Burma than the British understood.   W hat does this mean?  It
could refer to population pressure due to the loss of land under the demographic pressure of Han
migration.  However, the dates for those statements are much later than the demographic
transformation of Yunnan in the early to mid-nineteenth century, and the Muslim Rebellions had
resulted in immense loss of life and reduction of population (Anderson 1871; Baber 1882:182). 
Thus, this population pressure may indeed have been due in part to population increase among
some Lisu.  W hy would this be?  I answer this in part by analogy to processes underway among
the Lisu of northern Thailand
Opium allowed accumulation of wealth.  Increase in income and upward social mobility is
a common socioeconomic effect of illegal drug production around the world (Tullis 1995:137, 142,
157, 167).  This enabled status displays, a key element in the kind of tribal societies typical of
Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Among the Lisu, there was no competitive feasting or
specified graded status as was found among many other upland groups of Southeast Asia (Kirsch
1973).  For Lisu, the most important means of status display was marriage and payment of
bridewealth.  W hen a family lacks wealth (particularly in the form of silver or local currencies), they
delay the marriage of their sons; when they have wealth, their sons marry earlier.  Because many
families will face similar conditions, this means that daughters’ age at marriage would also
increase with lack of resources.  Thus, an influx of wealth into society resulted in earlier age at
first marriage.  Earlier marriage meant more opportunity for births.  A more stable subsistence
allowed more children to be raised to adulthood and in turn have children themselves.  This would
have resulted in a demographic increase, similar to that among the Tamang of Nepal when
potatoes were introduced (Fricke 1994).  Furthermore, an increase in the number of children who
survived to adolescence would have increased a family’s labor force and their ability to increase
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the size of fields and, potentially, wealth.  It would also have meant more young adults going off in
search of land when they established autonomous households, as was the practice among Lisu in
northern Thailand.  I believe that the introduction of opium served as a stimulus to migration
through population increase among those populations of Lisu who grew it.  The Lisu populations
that grew opium, those in the southern reaches of their range in Yunnan (W . W alker 1991:33,
Map 2, Opium cultivation in China, 1920), were those that migrated.  They were also the most
Sinicized.
The introduction of opium as a cash crop by the mid- to late nineteenth century was, in
fact, apt and timely from the point of view of upland farmers.  Faced with, first, the influx of Han
(peaking in the early to mid-nineteenth century) and, then, changes in trade patterns after the
Muslim Rebellions (1850s) and during the age of colonialism, migration became an increasingly
likely response to loss of land and trade opportunities that had once allowed them to survive in a
precarious social and physical environment.  Political changes, unrest, and land alienation were
particularly marked in southwestern Yunnan.  That migration became a significant response, in
addition to rebellion or assimilation, was made possible because of the introduction of a cash crop
as lucrative and bankable as opium.  Opium funded migration. 
Migration can be an expensive process.  The migrating people have to sell much of their
household goods, move whatever they can on what pack animals they have or can hire, and
somehow find food until they are able to plant and harvest new crops.  The labor they put into
developing land is lost.  Grains are too heavy, bulky, and easily ruined by water to be transported
in sufficient quantity to support a group.  Even if earlier Lisu migrants followed patterns similar to
Lisu in northern Thailand – where young men scouted out new territory and prepared it, to be
followed by the rest of the family once fields were established – migration still presented economic
risk and burden.  For instance, there would have been insufficient labor to open more than a
minimal amount of land.  In addition, this pattern of establishing a new village would not work
where migration occurred over long distances of weeks’ travel.  Opium, however, could be
 Bridewealth for Lisu in the opium economy of northern Thailand was about equal or higher34
bridewealth being paid than in the previous generation.  Lisu did not see themselves as having
any ongoing debt toward wife-givers; there was no ritual in which the wife’s fertility was
guaranteed or granted by her brothers/patrilineage.  Payment of bridewealth was a matter of the
repute of the household or local patrilineage.  This will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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transported; it could be converted to silver; both silver and opium could be sold to buy food and
labor at the new location.  It provided movable wealth.  Thus, opium enabled migration over longer
distances at a more rapid pace. 
It also supported the egalitarian society typical of Lisu in northern Thailand in the mid-
twentieth century.  No one need be dependent on another.  All a young couple had to do was
open new land, plant opium, hire labor if necessary, harvest and sell.  Independence and
autonomy was within the reach of every household.  Indeed, the picture of Lisu society in Burma is
of a relatively egalitarian society in that households were largely independent from each other. 
Ritual was carried out on a household basis; there is no evidence that a single clan or household
was in charge of or had privileged access to ancestor spirits for the community in a significantly
powerful way.  Thus there was less ideological basis for chiefdoms than among hierarchical
Kachin (Rose and Brown 1911).  Marriage was to some extent based on equal exchange of
women over generations, and thus did not serve as a basis for hierarchical relations, either,
although marriage feasting was an important venue for the display of status relations.   But status34
was ephemeral, probably linked to household demography.  The so-called clans appear not to
have been significant for social relations except insofar as marriage was forbidden among those
of the same clan regardless of known kinship distance.  Clans in fact appear to have been
localized patrilineages, given the great variation among lineage names among different places
(Fraser 1922; Rose and Brown 1911).  Again, this supports a picture of egalitarian social relations
based on individual households. 
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Summary
The variable and fluctuating nature of social forms in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia
was a point of comment by researchers looking for rigid, reified categories even before Leach
wrote about it.  It is one of the highlights of many mainland Southeast Asian societies and,
apparently, of western Yunnan upland societies.  Early colonial observers took such
transformations as evidence of pollution, contact, or racial inter-mixing; Chinese imperial
observers as evidence of developing civilization or reversion to barbarism; Tibetans rulers in
terms of being wild or tamed.  Leach theorized it in terms of an inherent instability, oscillating
between egalitarian and hierarchical societies (gumlao/gumsa), but again saw it as a matter of
acculturation toward a more developed or sophisticated society, that of the Shan princes.  Others
such as Maran (1967), Friedman (1979), and Nugent (Nugent 1982) countered with discussions
of the ways in which British colonial tribal policy and new economic relations created chiefs in
society, rigidly separating groups according to what had previously been flexible sociopolitical
forms.  Looking at the historical material from western Yunnan expands the points to be
considered, the poles of difference.  It also expands the cultural influences to be considered; not
only the model of Shan chiefdoms, but those of Naxi chiefdoms and Tibetan states; not only
British but Chinese colonial policies and extension of administrative control.  Based on the
previous historical ethnographic information, I argue that we must consider the following
elements: the short-term vs. the long-term nature of political relations; the role of debt and
dependency; Sinification vs. non-assimilation or Tibetan influence; and control of natural
resources.  British colonial hegemony is, of course, significant, but it occurred as an overlay upon
already existing tendencies and relationships.  
Lisu society exhibited much of the inherent flexibility that characterizes upland societies in
Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  This allowed adaptive shifts in response to political economic
conditions.  Ironically, continuity arises out of this flexibility, because change had been an inherent
part of the conditions in which these social structures had previously existed.  Lisu showed a wide
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range of political forms that are best understood as a construct of relations with neighbors and
adaptation to insecure economic conditions.  
Despite a long history of Chinese political and administrative interest in what is now the
southwest of China, Chinese influence had been incorporated into existing political, cultural, and
ritual frameworks.  However, with the demographic transformation from the eighteenth century to
the middle of the nineteenth century the composition and dynamics of Yunnan changed more
deeply and broadly.  W ith the influx of Han Chinese, not only into garrisons and large towns but
also into more isolated rural areas, indigenous peoples were affected even more than they had
been by the battles and conquests of the Chinese state in preceding centuries.  In this, they
increasingly carried forward the plans of the Chinese state.  This influx opened up a space for the
state.  The consequences were significant for social dynamics.  It appears that there was an
increase in debt servitude, loss of land, and assimilation among indigenous peoples.  It is at about
this time that many of the indigenous peoples became ethnic minorities and some, in turn,
migrated to the mountains or south.  
Opium and migration removed Lisu from the multiple spheres of authority, of multiple
taxes, tribute, and obligations imposed upon farmers.  Debt, land alienation, and political
ascendancy were linked.  A creditor could make a large part of the population economically
dependent and through these debt relations arose a relation of political dependency.  As western
Yunnan was increasingly incorporated into the Chinese empire, land was appropriated through
debt relations.  Chinese soldiers, merchants, and officials, Tibetan rulers and indigenous chiefs all
used this process to alienate the production and labor of the local population, who progressively
became sharecroppers or were forced to take refuge in out-of-the-way places.  This also provided
the institutional framework for the extension of slavery , an institution commented upon by almost
all W estern observers at the time. 
The Panthay or Muslim Rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in enormous
physical destruction, breakdown of institutions and had decimated the population of Yunnan.  It
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destroyed trade for decades following, in part because the main traders were the Muslim
Yunnanese who had rebelled.  This opened up the possibilities for British colonial trade and
administration to fill the gap.  
 Clearly Lisu and other peoples had migrated and undergone ethnic transformation in the
past, given their non-contiguous territorial distribution.  W hy did they migrate southwards at this
time rather than elsewhere?  One answer is deceptively simple: because they could.  They had
the contacts, knowledge, and experience to travel and find new places to live.  British Burma
offered a reasonably safe alternative place to live, and this switching of allegiances and locations
certainly seems in keeping with pre-existing social and political forms and strategies.  Finally, they
had access to a new crop, opium, that set new internal population dynamics into motion and gave
them the wealth to support the expenses of migration: opium.
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CHAPTER 3
HOUSEHOLDS IN REVEALED RIVER VILLAGE
The ‘classic’ Lisu village described in the ethnographic literature was one in which the
household was so primary, so fundamental, that other social forms such as the village and the
lineage appeared to have no practical importance at all.  The Lisu village appeared nearly
anarchic.  Twenty years later, the Lisu village of Revealed River presented very different social
forms.   W here Durrenberger and Dessaint observed the prominence of individual households as
autonomous social and economic units with little coherent overarching social structure such as
lineage or village, Revealed River and its neighbors exhibited significant patrilineage and village
forms.  How did this emerge?  
Historical Lisu social structure had been variable, adapted to the range of political,
economic, and environmental conditions in which each community lived.  Lisu communities
observed in the late 1960s and early 1970s were at the height of an agricultural economy rooted
in opium.  The Lisu had been noted for their marked individualism, competitiveness, and ideology
of egalitarianism (Scott 1981; Dessaint 1972a; Durrenberger 1976b; Lewis and Lewis 1984;
Hanks and Hanks 1987; Tribal Research Institute 1989).  As the Lisu proverb said, “All men are of
equal height at the knees” (Chaipigusit 1989:177).  Households were autonomous, only minimally
bound together by patrilineal and village structures.  Each household made its own production and
migration decisions largely independently of other households.  Clusterings of households
regularly cooperated in economic and ritual activities, supported each other in disputes.  Dessaint
termed these "allegiance groups" (Dessaint 1972a:148).  They were formed by post-marital
residence that was as likely to be uxorilocal as patrilocal (Durrenberger 1976b).  Neither were
villages significant social structures, as evidenced by the frequent fission of villages, segregation
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of factions, rejection (or even assassination) of domineering headmen, and inter-personal
competition in displays of wealth as displays of "honor," "potency," or "repute," that is, myi -do3 5
(Durrenberger 1983a; Lewis and Lewis 1984; Hutheesing 1990a; Hutheesing 1999).  The critical
factor was opium, which enabled an economic egalitarianism that was put in place and reinforced
by Lisu ideological and social structure (Durrenberger 1976b; Durrenberger 1976c).  Furthermore,
a pivotal element was latitude to migrate to avoid disputes, feuds, or authoritarian headmen
(Dessaint 1971a; Dessaint 1972a).  Opium as a cash crop allowed each household to gain wealth
relatively quickly, break ties of obligation, and move away.  
By the 1990s, the opium economy was fading and the state had effectively implemented
policy against swiddening.  Household dynamics had been fundamentally altered by increasing
resource scarcity.  The household was still the primary social and economic unit.  W hat had
changed was its relationship to the patrilineage, allegiance groups, and the village. The essential
difference was the end of opium as the main cash crop and land scarcity, with consequences for
household wealth and autonomy; the key mechanisms in shifts in patrilineage and allegiance
group relations were labor allocation and the formation of new households.  Under these
conditions, patrilineages as potential landholding units had risen and allegiance groups based on
sororal or affinal ties had decreased in importance.  At the same time, the village became more
important in people’s lives due particularly to the restriction of household migration under recent
political economic conditions and the Thai state’s emphasis on working through village level
structures to control the population and land use.  And yet, changes in economic and political
conditions had not brought about some radical transformation in Lisu social structure.  The
elements of patrilineality and village as community were there 30 years ago, but unimportant in
people’s lived experience.  The “prior texts” of village and patrilineage had been re-emphasized
with the end of the opium economy.  The Lisu household remained primary in part because it was
a structure that was adaptable in its relations to the wider structure and so could remain
structurally similar across a range of political and economic conditions.  This chapter and the next
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trace the form of these differences and relates them to both economic and political changes in the
northern Thai highlands.
Revealed River Village
Village Statistics
Revealed River Village was predominantly Lisu, with some Yunnanese Chinese.  It was a
fairly large village of 38-41 households over the 2 year period of my fieldwork.  Some Shan (Tai
Yai) laborers lived in the village at times and there were some regular Lahu laborers, usually
opium addicts who were not resident in the village.  Other part-time residents were the “Mountain
Teachers,” Thai teachers hired in a specialized education program for ethnic minority children and
adults, who lived an average of two weeks of every month in the village.  Finally, Thai forestry
officials visited the village about four times a week, often in the company of UN-financed Thai
officers or government officials from Bangkok, and the Third Army Battalion made semi-regular
visits to the village to check for illegal activity.  A dirt road had been built ten years previously to
facilitate government visits and legal trade out of the village.  The primary form of subsistence was
farming, although the nature of farming activities had changed greatly in the past ten to fifteen
years.  Revealed River was part of a cluster of seven predominantly Lisu villages (and one poor
Lahu village on the fringes), the largest of which, Thirty Thousand, was the founding  village.  
In parameters of population and settlement location, Revealed River was similar to Lisu
villages of 25 years previously.  A survey of 60 villages in the late 1960s found an average of 25.8
household/village, with a range of 13-35 households/village.  About 50% of Lisu villages had some
Chinese present and 13% had Lahu present (Dessaint 1972b:202-203).  Ban Lum, the site of
Durrenberger’s research, was located in the vicinity of four other Lisu villages and one Karen
village; the Lisu villages ranged from five to upwards of eighty households (Durrenberger
1971:20).  Sixty-three percent of Lisu villages were less than two hours’ walk from another Lisu
village.  The majority of villages, 67%, were located so that markets were accessible but not too
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close, that is, three to nine hours of travel time (Dessaint 1972b:202-203).  Ban Lum was about a
three hour walk from the small Thai town of Pa Pae (Durrenberger 1971:20).  The big difference
in the 1990s, of course, was that the pack pony caravans were gone; people traveled by private
pickup, or even by a public Chiang Mai-Mae Hong Son bus.  More recent figures from a census
taken of upland ethnic minorities in 20 northern provinces in 1997 showed an average village size
of 35 households per village (Highland Economic and Social Development Promotion Office
2000).  
Evil Peaks had been in existence 12-14 years when Dessaint did his fieldwork in 1968-
1970, and it broke up near the end of his fieldwork (Dessaint 1972a:32).  In 1970, only 13% of
Lisu villages had been established for 20 years or longer, and even these had changing
populations as residents moved in and out.  It was more common for villages to be in existence
for 5-10 years (30%) or 0-5 years (20%) (Dessaint 1972b:202-203).  Revealed River had been in
existence much longer than most Lisu villages at Dessaint’s time with less turnover in personnel.  
The Founding of the Village
The founding of Revealed River was traditional, if Lisu life in Thailand of the 1960s is
taken as the benchmark of traditional Lisu life; it followed typical patterns of founding of villages at
the time.  Revealed River Village was named in Thai after a local creek.  It was founded in the
mid-1960s by Lisu settlers who had left Thirty Thousand Village due to arguments with other
villagers there.  Thirty Thousand had been an exceptionally large village of up to two hundred
households.  Its size was supported by exceptionally fertile opium fields; as I was frequently told,
“the opium fields spread from horizon to horizon.”  As such, Thirty Thousand was a key village in
the narcotics trade and was made a key village for anti-opium development projects.  Shortly after
Durrenberger completed his research, Thirty Thousand Village began to disintegrate following a
  Such disintegration is often assumed to have occurred following over-use of local resources as35
a decrease in available fertile land lead to feuds.  Dessaint noted that some villages grew very
quickly when first established but that this often resulted in great land pressure or disputes
between factions of the village with rival headmen, with the usual outcome of emigration (Dessaint
1972b:199).  However, Robert Cooper’s study of resource scarcity among the Hmong indicated
that village disintegration resulted from political competition and could not be correlated with land
scarcity (Cooper 1984).  Furthermore, Durrenberger noted that resource scarcity and competition
rarely resulted in direct conflict (personal communication, 1975).  I personally doubt that social
dynamics and resource competition can be that clearly separated.  However, ethnic differences
have exacerbated such conflict of late.  Starting in the 1990s, there has been increased conflict
between lowland Thai farmers and upland ethnic minority farmers at places such as Chomthong
and Doi Inthanon over scarce resources, in this case water and runoff from pesticide use.  The
lowland farmers have attempted to have the upland farmers banned and relocated from their
farmlands (Lohmann 1999; Atthakor 2000; Bangkok Post 2000a; Bangkok Post 2000b; Ritchie
2000; Bangkok Post 2001a; Bangkok Post 2001b; Hongthong 2002; Samabuddhi 2002;
Samabuddhi 2003).  This conflict has occurred in the context of state intervention and
problematization of uplanders as not-Thai and destructive to the state (Gillogly 2004).  
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series of disputes between the founding  and other lineages.   It had grown very rapidly to35
unmanageable proportions as word spread of the excellent opium production that could be
achieved there; in fact, its disintegration was mentioned by Durrenberger as an example of a large
village dwindling as fertility decreased (Durrenberger 1970b:14).  Dessaint’s survey of Lisu
villages in northern Thailand showed that the rate of segmentation or fission of villages varied.  In
the first few years of founding a village, there would be a rapid population increase, followed by a
gradual decline ending either in abandonment of the site or a lower but more stable population,
although the specific members of the population changed (Dessaint 1972a:21).  In a sense, the
Thirty Thousand cluster reflected a freezing of fissioning tendencies some time in the 1980s. 
W ithin the cluster, Thirty Thousand was still the largest village, with well over 75 households in the
mid-1990s; Spring Village the next; then Revealed River; followed by the four smaller, satellite
villages I was told were somewhat younger and to which a few people migrated in the course of
my research.  
In recounting what they knew of the history of their area, Lisu villagers emphasized that it
has been settled and cultivated for many decades – up to “100 years” – and that opium had
“always” been the main crop in the area, bringing wealth and security to those who cultivated it.
The Lisu founders had been preceded first by Hmong and then by Lahu, and to this day the upper
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part of the village was haunted by a Lahu ghost of a girl suicide.  Dessaint noted that some Lisu
preferred to settle areas pioneered by Lahu; Lahu had had a broader economic base, including
hunting and variety of crops, while the Lisu tended to specialize in opium and dry rice (Dessaint
1972b:200).  In recounting village history to me, the elders of Revealed River tended to focus on
personal histories of migration and these indicated that older adults (45 or older) had lived in 10-
15 different places over the course of their lifetime.  
There were three main factions in Revealed River Village.  The main organizing factors
were kinship, affinal relations, and ethnicity.  The three factions were two Lisu lineages and their
allegiance groups, and the Yunnanese Chinese community.  Additionally, a third Lisu group was
tied to the two main lineages by marriage and other alliances, but loosely.  These latter
households were not cohesive enough to form a consistent faction and some appeared to have
previously been associated with one of the other two Lisu factions.  There was a slow attrition of
these loosely affiliated households through the years of my research.  
The founders of Revealed River, the Yipha lineage (a subset of the Biapha or ‘Bee’
lineage, said to be the one unadulterated Lisu clan (Hutheesing 1990a:158)), had come from near
Fang, on Thailand’s far northern border with Burma.  The oldest member of the lineage
remembered Burma but could not remember where in Burma he had lived.  After living in Thirty
Thousand for a year or two, they settled in Revealed River, the elderly lineage head said, due to
lack of good land in Thirty Thousand.  This lineage and its allegiance group lived in the upper part
of the village, closest to the shrine of ‘Old Grandfather,’ (a -pa -mo ) the village guardian spirit,3 3 5
and provided the maw mong or mc mc, servitor to that shrine; I never heard of this role going to
anyone in the second lineage faction.  Thus, there was an association between the senior shaman
of the founding lineage and the servitor to the village guardian spirit.  W hen one servitor migrated
out of the village, there was very little jockeying for position; the head shaman of the next senior
line in the Yipha lineage took over those duties, although this had to be confirmed by divination.
  W hile it appears that the son had inherited his father’s position, the Thai officials in the village36
spoke of him as appropriate for the job because of his fluency in Thai and modern style.  They
had, in essence, appointed him.  These traits, of course, were related to his father’s wealth and
connections.  Another factor, I believe, relates to an inherent duality in the political structure of this
Lisu village, whereby one kin group controlled the ritual position of servitor of the Village Guardian
Spirit shrine and the other dominated political positions and dealt with outside forces.  Similar
diarchic structure has been noted by for the Akha (Tooker 1996) and for Tibetan and partially-
Tibetanized societies.  Samuel describes this structure as an emphasis on horizontal linkages that
avoided giving all power to a single individual (Samuel 1993:152).  
133
The second faction was composed mostly of people of the Laoyipha lineage and its
allegiance group and lived in the lower part of the village.  This lineage was said to be a “Lahu”
lineage; only a few lineages were said to be “pure” Lisu, the others being “Chinese” or “Lahu”
(Hutheesing, personal communication, 1993).  They had entered some years after the first group. 
They, too, had lived in Thirty Thousand Village but left due to feuds; they settled in another village
in the cluster and after conflicts in that second village, they settled in Revealed River Village.  The
head of this lineage at the time had been a wealthy, powerful, and notorious leader.  On his death,
his son became the headman.  36
The other significant faction in the village were the Chinese.  About half of the Lisu
villages in Thailand had Chinese residents (Dessaint 1972b:199).  They were not related to each
other except by marriage.  Some had been intermarried with Lisu for two generations; in terms of
actual ancestors, they were more Lisu than Chinese, but completely identified as Chinese in
language, dress, ritual, and agricultural practices.  Others of the Chinese were the descendants of
the remnants of the Kuomingtang armies that fled China after the Revolution.  In recent years, the
Chinese role as a separate faction had decreased.  In the early 1990s, only two intact families still
lived in the village year-round, aside from ‘households’ of itinerant laborers supported by one of
the Chinese families.  Several other Chinese families had used their superior access to capital
and lineage ties to other Chinese to move down to Chiang Mai to pursue commercial interests and
education for their children.  Nevertheless, they maintained homes and returned at New Year,
sponsoring dam hua rituals (Tai, a ritual of blessing by water which was also an occasion for
feasting sponsored by the richest and most powerful village members).  They were an important
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cultural influence, as a legitimating cultural model, a point of comparison for talk about the
economic failures of Lisu, and a negative example because many Chinese young men had
become addicted to opium, something very rare among Lisu until recently.  The leader of this
faction had come to the area from further northeast some twenty years ago because he had heard
about a project in the area at that time and wanted to take advantage of its help in starting an
enterprise.  His grandfather had entered Thailand as a trader in the Chiang Mai area and his
mother had been Lisu.  His wife was also the descendant of a Chinese trader and his Lisu wife. 
The early to mid-1990s were a time of political and economic transformation.  The opium
was gone.  Villagers depended on an ever-changing mix of replacement cash crops, hoping to
find a set of crops that might replicate the wealth achievable with opium.  They experienced
insecurity, greater risk, and constant worry about the future – whether there would be sufficient
land for their children and whether they would be allowed to maintain their village in territory that
had been appropriated by the Thai state.  They dealt with the constant interventions of Thai
officials and Thai teachers; they traveled regularly to the lowlands in trucks in search of markets
for their new crops; their children were away most of the year at lowland Thai schools as boarders
but their children and young adults had been residents of this one village nearly their entire lives
and could remember no other.  The Lisu world in Thailand was greatly changed.  
Change was taking place in village level relations and organization in Revealed River
Village in adaptation to the changing economic base and growing contact with the Thai state.  I
will write here about how Lisu cultural principles supported both unstable villages and highly
independent households, stable villages and cohesive kin organization, in this case localized
patrilineages.  W hich sort of organization predominated depended on economic and political
conditions.  Current conditions supported stable villages due to Thai and Project policy toward
villages, and strong localized lineages due to increasing resource scarcity.  I will trace out the
significant units of social organization in Revealed River Village. 
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Lisu Social Organization: The Household
The basic social unit for ritual, exchange, production, and social relations was the
household (h’i ).  The household was enacted as the primary social unit through rituals to a single4
set of ancestors, joint production decisions and consumption, and the construction of social
relations through avoidance taboos.  The household was defined through practice, enacted
through daily activities.  This is a processual definition of the household (Netting, W ilk and Arnould
1984).  Nevertheless, co-residence is an essential characteristic of the household; as Laslett
points out, this characteristic is not simply epiphenomenal to marriage, kinship, and economics
(Laslett 1983).  In essence, households are significant because they are significant to the Lisu
themselves; they see the household as the primary social unit.  In this, we can accept their
definition rather than working from theoretical assumptions (Yanagisako 1979).  Nevertheless,
there was no Lisu word for household separate from the family; people referred to the house, h’i ,4
usually interchangeable with resident family, meaning those who regularly ate and slept in the
house.  
One of the key mechanisms of household structure was resource allocation through the
idiom of kinship.  The impact of changes in the political and economic context had altered
production and consumption practice.  Household relationships can be seen as the relations of
production cloaked in a belief system of kinship that made them compelling, the social
relationships of a particular mode of managing resources that was culturally and historically
specific (Siskind 1978:869; Cooper 1983).  It was not so much the division of labor by gender that
was the basis of production and livelihood (Siskind 1978; Marburg 1984:10) as the household,
and thus kinship – the idiom by which the household was culturally constructed – and marriage, by
which new households were formed and alliances with other households produced.  The Lisu of
Revealed River Village also enacted their households through shared ritual and economic activity,
which, for them, were part of the same universe (Durrenberger 1983b; Durrenberger 1989).  
  Immigrating households presented a bottle of liquor to the headman to request permission to37
live in the village, participated in a village-wide sacrifice to the Village Guardian spirit, and built his
house, with the village helping in the roof-raising.  The household then sacrificed a pig and called
the ancestors of the male household head to the house; they then held a feast to which everyone
in the village was invited (Dessaint 1972a:31).  
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The Household as Demarcated by Ritual
Rituals were one of the ways that households and factions were demarcated.  Religious
practice among Lisu in northern Burma, for instance, was mostly a household affair (Rose and
Brown 1911:266), and this held for Lisu of northern Thailand as well.  The sociological units
involved in the most common rituals demonstrate that most ceremonies were private household
events, or occurred at most within the localized lineage.  Blessings invoked at the ancestor altar
for First Fruits or New Year, the opening of swidden fields, soul-calling, and disposal of evil spirits,
all took place for the benefit of the household and its members.  W hen a married couple moved
out of their parents’ house, they carried out these rituals themselves.  In short, the household can
be defined as a ritual unit with one set of lineage ancestors, and the household was considered to
be the residence of these spirits (Durrenberger 1970a:17-18; Dessaint 1972a:25, 253).  These
rituals were performed in the household by a patrilineage member.  New households set up their
own ancestor shrine and carried out their rituals separately (Durrenberger 1970b:17-18; Dessaint
1972a:25).   Similarly, Mien households as be defined as ritual units with a single set of37
ancestors – although the actual composition of the household transmuted in different political
economic conditions far more dramatically than was true for Lisu (Jonsson 1999, 2001a, 2001b). 
The household’s role as the fundamental unit was also demonstrated in village ceremonies,
village assessments, and village labor allocations (Dessaint 1972a:114). 
Two rituals were carried out annually through which village structure was enacted.  These
were New Year and First Fruit.  However, significant portions of the rituals were carried out within
the household.  For instance, the First Fruit ceremony was carried out by individual households,
albeit by all of the households of the village at the same time.  The entire household was blessed
by the elder male of the house.  This included prayers and the tying of strings around the wrists of
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family members for blessing (gheu -swi ).  I was asked to perform this on occasion in order to5 3
convey my blessing, my wealth and success; they felt it was more effective if I spoke in English. 
The gist of such prayers were calls for wealth, for gold, silver, rice, cattle, pigs, chickens, for good
health, for success in every endeavor, for fruitfulness and bounty, always expressed in couplets
(“bring gold, bring silver”) (see Durrenberger 1989; Hutheesing 1990a for examples).  Such
blessing rituals were also carried out for the bride and groom in a wedding ceremony, in which all
who contributed to the marital prestations blessed the new couple.  On the other hand, the New
Year ceremony required that everyone in the village participate in elements of the ceremony. 
Some New Year rituals were performed in and for the household; offerings to the Old Grandfather
Spirit were made by each household at the village shrine on the same morning (with the date
having been agreed to by the village elders under the advice of the servitor).  Yet, each household
made an offering to the maw mong (servitor to the Old Grandfather Spirit) and to the headman,
and dances were performed in front of each household to bring it blessing for the coming year. 
The circle dancing at New Year celebrations also served a ritual purpose in extending blessing to
each household.  Girls, dressed in turbans and wearing the family silver, were loudly praised as
their dress displayed the myi -do  of the girls’ families, the economic success of their families. 3 5
Anyone’s absence was noted.  In all of these community rituals, the orientation was toward
household blessing.  
In terms of everyday ritual, curing was the most common.  Most Lisu curing took place
exclusively and privately in the household, unlike the more public rituals for blessing.  There were
two levels of ritual curing.  One was traditional medicine, mostly herbal, practiced by older women
who passed it on to close female relatives, particularly daughters.  Knowledge was localized and
idiosyncratic to family groups.  A woman rarely treated a person outside the lineage with which
she lived (Hutheesing 1990a).  Both women’s herbal medicine and ancestral/shamanistic ritual
were oriented toward practical results (Durrenberger 1989:39), and any curing ritual was
replaceable by use of technological (W estern) medicine in the Thai health system.  
  In retrospect, I think that another dynamic was involved.  People told me that this shaman was38
laughable because he was not a ‘real’ shaman.  In reviewing Durrenberger’s work on shamanism
and curing, I suspect that in fact the problem was that he did not have lineage spirits to possess
him as the junior lineage spirit had to be three generations back.  The Laoyipha lineage was a
“Lahu” lineage, meaning that the founding male was a Lahu married to a Lisu woman who created
a Lisu lineage, established by the shaman’s grandfather.  Durrenberger recounts that these
shallow lineages could not have shamans; but in one case where the evidence that a man was
being possessed was irrefutable, his lineage depth was recalculated upward to make his FF his
FFF, thus granting him a junior lineage spirit.  See later discussion on shamans and lineage spirits
in Chapter 5.  
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Shamans, always men, dealt with illness believed to be caused by evil spirits or by soul
loss (Durrenberger 1971; Durrenberger 1989).  A shaman could be called in to diagnose and cure
an illness at any time.  Only the older lineage of the village, the Yipha lineage, ordered such
curings with any frequency.  In the lower half of the village, the Laoyipha shaman carried out
curings and ceremonies for his own household, but he was not often called on by his relatives. 
Although I lived next to this lineage, I rarely heard the call of the shaman as he went into trance.  It
seemed that the Laoyipha, demographically younger and somewhat Thai-ized, rejected much of
shamanism and in fact mocked their shaman.  They made a point of buying household medical
supplies when in town (aspirin, antibiotics, bandages, etc.).   38
Getting rid of an evil spirit was the most common household ritual performed.  Any male
head of household could perform the ceremony if he knew the proper spells and procedure.  The
point was to carry the evil spirit out of human habitation on old clothes from the household.  Often
an outsider, such as a Lahu laborer, was employed to carry the items to the border of the village;
the upper path was littered with old clothes that had been abandoned as part of this ritual.  The
evil spirit was evidenced by someone’s snappiness or general dissatisfaction, perhaps being
argumentative.  I saw this performed most often for teenagers, who were young adults in terms of
Lisu work expectations but socially still children as unmarried.  Expected to behave responsibly
and obediently, their dissatisfaction with work or love or obedience seemed often to be interpreted
as the presence of an evil spirit.  The ritual was always household specific. 
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A soul-calling ceremony was a more serious affair and the associated rituals more
elaborate and expensive.  This also depended on the service of the shaman of the patrilineage. 
The ceremony was usually carried out in conjunction with New Year or other annual festivals
where there was an opportunity for status display. People resorted to this only after a long or
troublesome illness that could not be attributed to physical reasons.  In the context of the
hierarchy of resort in a 1990s Lisu village, soul-calling was used to counteract what we might think
of as emotional or psychological problems, or intractable, chronic illness.  Again, I saw these
mostly performed on behalf of teenage or young adult children.  In one memorable case, however,
it was carried out for a new bride who was dissatisfied with her groom.  It did not help; she left him
shortly thereafter.  The abandoned groom’s father, the Laoyipha shaman, then carried out another
soul calling for his son.  The son was embarrassed and claimed that his illness was merely
malaria from sleeping in the garden hut and working too hard.  But this ceremony appeared to
have been successful, by the shaman’s account, as the young man’s mood lifted shortly
thereafter; on the other hand, it may have been related to his parents finally arranging a
successful marriage for him.  
Aside from this, a group shamanistic ritual took place on the first night of New Year to
rectify problems before the beginning of the New Year.  These ceremonies were attended by
patrilineal kin and resident affines, but sometimes a visitor, kin to one of the in-marrying women of
the lineage, attended as well.  In the course of the ceremony, the entranced shaman walked
among the crowd and selected certain people to diagnose and bless.  Most of participants were
married women with children; they laughed at me, a single woman, for attending.  W hen it was
over and the shaman awoke from his trance, he would ask what had occurred and the whole
group would discuss what the spirits had made known to them.  A senior male lineage member
was often key in interpreting the performance.  In this sense, diagnosis and treatment were
community affairs revolving around the patrilineage. 
  And, in fact, I argue elsewhere that the New Year ritual in Revealed River has more recently39
been elaborated as a ritual for the blessing of the village as a whole.  Such elaboration was not
typical of villages in Chiang Rai (Hutheesing), nor did Dessaint or Durrenberger note this role
(Gillogly 2000), but was in keeping with practices in Tibetan and Tibetanized agricultural societies
where rituals were performed on behalf of the village comprising an annual cycle of ritual devoted
to local spirits and to ensure the prosperity of village fields (Samuel 1993:130).  
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Rituals oriented toward swiddening had the purpose of asking for or ensuring productivity
for the household and its members.  Such ceremonies might be presided over by a shaman, but
any knowledgeable male family member could perform them.  These once included the offerings
to the forest spirit at the opening of a field, but this ritual was quite rare in Revealed River, as new
fields were not often opened anymore.  Durrenberger says this was a village ritual (Durrenberger
1989), but if it did occur in Revealed River in the early 1990s, it was kept secret because no one
wanted to mark the opening of forest lest the Project find out.  
The social units involved show that most rituals were oriented toward the productivity of
the household, sometimes extending out to the lineage in the case of New Year shamanistic
rituals.   Blessings invoked at the ancestor altar at First Fruits, in the dancing in front of each
house at New Year, opening of the swidden fields, soul-calling, and disposal of the evil spirit – all
took place for the benefit of the household.  W hen a married couple moved out of the parents’
house, they then carried out these rituals themselves.  That is, shamanistic and ancestral rituals
were markers of significant social units, in this case household or local lineage.  
The object of the ritual was household level productivity.  Anything with productive
capacity, including a political unit, had a spirit; each political domain, each econiche, had a spirit
(Durrenberger 1989:30).    Ritual emphasis was a matter of practice, so that the ritual focus had
the potential to shift from one domain to another.   The  dynamics of ritual were different between39
egalitarian and chiefly societies.  For instance, in northern Burma ritual was under the jurisdiction
of each household and Lisu households made offerings only to more recently dead, rather than
distant clan ancestors.  This was evidence of their egalitarian social organization in comparison to
groups such as the gumsa Kachin in which the chief’s rule was ideologically validated by his
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privileged access to a lineage of founding ancestors (Rose and Brown 1911:266-267).  An
example of transformation within one community is found among the Mien of Phulangka (Chiang
Rai).  In the twentieth century, relationships with the spirits were revised  from hierarchically
oriented rituals towards relations with spirits largely revolving around household prosperity,
correlating with changes in the political economy (Jonsson 2001a:636). 
Household Structure and Composition Under the Opium Economy
The household was not only marked ritually, it was also the basic economic unit for
production and consumption, domains that were mutually reinforcing for the Lisu (Durrenberger
1983b; Durrenberger 1989).  The household was the locus of production decisions, labor
allocation, and distribution of resources.  In this sense, it was the gateway for the relationship
between the people and their physical environment and economy.  As the agricultural economy
was transformed from one in which opium was the economic mainstay to one in which a range of
crops had to be planted, tested, and marketed, and as the social environment to which people had
to adapt shifted to incorporation into the Thai state, the household was the front line of adaptation. 
Resources are made use of through human labor; in Revealed River, the household was the
means by which labor was organized; and over time, the household had become the unit by which
land was held.  All of this was shaped within the frame of household repute, the expression of
household autonomy through production.  
At the time that Durrenberger and Dessaint carried out their respective research
(Durrenberger from February 1969 to July 1970; Dessaint from August 1968 to August 1970),
opium was the mainstay of farming for Lisu and many other high mountain ethnic minority peoples
such as the Hmong and Mien.  Their studies described the Lisu household before the collapse of
the opium economy.  This is key for understanding Lisu social structure and its transformations. 
Hutheesing’s work was based on research starting in 1982 in See the Tiger Village in Chiang Rai
and examined cultural and social transformations during a time in which the opium economy was
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disintegrating, with the result of waning “repute” of men and women unable to fulfill their culturally-
constructed roles (Hutheesing 1990a:5). 
Lisu social structure was based on independent household units of nuclear or stem
families.  The household was the unit of labor recruitment; production and consumption occurred
within the household.  Each household had its own fields, claimed by labor rather than ownership
of the land itself.  The household was the locus for decision-making about production and
allocation of resources and labor.  The senior male head of the household managed the
household and set daily work tasks, according to 83% of married women in See the Tiger Village,
although the women were emphatic that they did not always obey (Hutheesing 1990a:155).  W hat
this meant in practice is that people in one household worked fields they opened each year
together under the direction of the head of the household.  Labor exchange occurred between
households in the neighborhood, that is, with the allegiance group (which I will discuss later) and
labor was hired from other ethnic groups (Durrenberger 1970b:17; Dessaint 1972a:126; Dessaint
and Dessaint 1992:163, 173).  
In Ban Lum and its neighbor villages, the average household size was about 6
residents/household (Durrenberger 1971:16).  The size of the household rarely exceeded five
times the number of its productive members.  Each household consisted of only a small number
of workers, 2.3 workers/household, out of 5.9 members/household (Dessaint and Dessaint
1992:163, 173).  Hutheesing noted an average of 5.2 people/household (Hutheesing 1990a:11). 
Population figures collected by the Tribal Research Centre from the late 1960s and early 1970s
showed the Lisu with an average of 6.33 people/household.  For upland ethnic minority peoples
as a whole, the size of households ranged from a high of 7.98 and 7.41 for Hmong and Mien
(opium growers), respectively, to a low of 5.66 and 5.18 persons per household among Lua and
Karen, indigenous people who practiced a subsistence-oriented agriculture of mixed swiddening
and paddy growing along with forest conservation.  Among different ethnic groups, heavier
dependence on cash cropping was associated with larger households (Kunstadter 1983:16, 19). 
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Household size had been considerably reduced in the post-opium economy for most of these
groups, but those who were opium growers still tended to have slightly higher household size than
non-opium growers (see Highland Economic and Social Development Promotion Office 2000).  
Fundamentally, Lisu households were composed of a husband, wife and their children. 
The male head of household was the h’iya -si -pha  and the female head of household (his wife)4 3 5
the h’iya -si -ma .   A married son and his wife might live with his parents or a married daughter4 3 3
with her husband live with her parents, depending on the conditions of marriage exchange
negotiated, and uxorilocality was more common than patrilocality.  Some households included an
elderly parent who was usually the widow of the household head, but sometimes the father who
had abdicated his position as household head.  It was also common for unmarried younger
siblings, nieces, or nephews of the husband or wife to live with them if their parents had died
(Durrenberger 1971:17-18; Dessaint and Dessaint 1992:163).  The predominant household form
in Evil Peaks was the nuclear household, which was 64% (27) of households; 23% (10) of
households included some relatives of the husband (19%), the wife (2%), or both (2%); three
households were composed of patrilineal extended families (7%); and one household was
composed of two widowed sisters and the children of one (Dessaint 1972a:108).  That is, the Lisu
household cycled between a stem household with parents, unmarried children, and one married
child and spouse and grandchildren; to a nuclear household with only one married couple and
their children; and back to a stem household when the children achieved the age of marriage (i.e.,
stem –> nuclear –> stem).  In this way, the household permutations had continuity in a regularized
way (Fortes 1958).  The demographic/developmental cycle of  the Lisu household was the key
constraint in levels of productivity per household.  
The household was the unit of consumption.  Rice was consumed by the members of the
household that had produced it (Durrenberger 1976c:636).  Most income from the fields, including
cash from the sale of opium, belonged to the household; any member had a claim on that money. 
Nevertheless, husbands and wives could own cash and other items separately and bring legal
  As will be seen, this is a shallowly materialist explanation of marriage.  If it were simply a matter40
of exchange of male products for female products, men could rely on sisters and mothers, and
women could rely on fathers and brothers.  People marry for other reasons, and those are
culturally constructed in specific ways in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  A common myth
across the region is of the world having been founded by a brother and sister, having survived
flood in a gourd, discovering through many rites of divination that they must marry as there are no
other people left in the world (Proschan 2001).  This myth expresses and encodes the importance
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cases against each other, as could fathers and sons (Durrenberger 1970b:17-18; Dessaint
1972a:108).  Similarly, the household was the basic unit for hospitality and reciprocity; households
kept track of visiting so that return hospitality would be equal to that received.  Most importantly,
the head of the household was responsible for reciprocating any feasts that had been attended by
members of his household, in order to maintain his individual and his household’s repute
(Durrenberger 1976c:637).  The male head stood for the household publicly.  
The household was also defined in part by space.  There were male and female spaces
within the household.  The area of the ancestral shrine, opposite the main doorway, was a male
space (Durrenberger 1971:17-19).  The woman married to the senior man of the household slept
in the male wing.  The private room of the married couple who headed the household was,
therefore, located between the kitchen and the ancestor shrines, adjoining the public space where
guests were hosted.  The female-oriented space was to the right of the altar from the door
(Hutheesing 1990a:69).  W omen, restricted from visiting throughout the village by standards of
shyness and shame, tended to congregate against the wall of the house or on a platform
immediately outside of the house, where they could work and watch people coming in and out of
the village (Hutheesing 1990a:71). 
Lisu society was markedly egalitarian.  To Durrenberger, there appeared a low degree of
gender-based division of labor and an extension of egalitarianism into the household
(Durrenberger 1970b:16).  Dessaint noted more of a division of labor in that men cleared and
burned fields while women tended to weed and harvest.  He stated that these complementary
chores made marriage a necessity, which he believed explained the high rate of marriage among
adult Lisu (Dessaint 1972a:106; Dessaint and Dessaint 1992:165).    A wife generally controlled40
of cross-gender relationships.  In particular, there appears to be a common ritual discourse that
constructed marriage as necessary to becoming an adult, essential to personhood.  Such views
were very highly developed by Lahu in Yunnan (Du 1999).  But the importance of pairs heading
households was also emphasized in Tai kingdoms in which the cao (lord) allocated land among
the members of the community and would not allocate it to a household that did not have a pair at
its head.  Therefore, widows, widowers, and the divorced had to find another partner as soon as
possible in order to keep their land allocation.  This occurred in a very different political economic
situation (plowing, irrigated lowland rice, a kingdom) in which there was a gendered division of
labor but which was by no means highly marked (observers, especially those who had worked
with Chinese peasants, were flabbergasted by the porousness of Tai gender divisions (cf. Potter
1976; Potter 1977).  
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finances and food distribution in the household (Dessaint 1972a:25, 105; Hutheesing 1990a:197). 
She had her  own money which was not her husband’s and if he borrowed money without paying
her back she could make her dispute public and bring it for negotiation by a local leader
(Durrenberger 1971).  Social relationships tended to be treated as contractual, even marriage.  
However, Hutheesing focused directly on the nature of gender inequality in Lisu
households and found a pronounced hierarchy within the household (Hutheesing 1990a).  The
household was demarcated particularly by the daily life of the women, whose movements were
restricted to the domain of the household.  This was not a “physical block to which women were
tied” so much as the labor of women sharing the duties of the household together around the
house and in their fields (Hutheesing 1990a:70, 72).  As such, women’s daily movements traced
the boundaries of household and allegiance groups.  W omen’s movements were restricted to the
extent that women “had blank spots on their cognitive maps” regarding other households in the
village (Hutheesing 1990a:5-6).  This was still very true in Revealed River in the 1990s.  Even
school girls knew nothing of their school mate neighbors in the village.  Back in the village on
vacations, they asked me who was in the village and who was returning to school and when.
Hierarchically informed relationships within the household marked it as a separate unit.  A
seniority principle prevailed within the household and extended family (Hutheesing 1990a:124). 
For instance, names were based on gender and birth order, which meant that everyone in the
village had the same names.  Rules of propriety forbade certain kin from talking about intimate
matters with or in front of a range of kin of the opposite sex, e.g., with parents, spouse’s parents,
146
siblings, oB of H for a wife/yZ of W  for a husband, parallel cousins of either mother’s or father’s
lineage, children and their spouses, the Bs of the wife’s parents and the Zs of the husband’s
parents.  Such avoidance behavior was especially marked within the household between men and
their daughters or daughters-in-law.  Avoidance taboos and respect behavior were an important
building block out of which a network of relationships were built and maintained; they provided the
kin framework that embodied order in Lisu daily life (Hutheesing 1990a:103-4, 107).  These were
the idioms by which people made claims on their fellow householders.  
Household Structure and Composition in Revealed River
The structure of the household had in many ways not substantially changed in the 1990s. 
The household was constituted by its social relationships and shared labor; they bound
themselves to each other through expectations of behavior, such as avoidance taboos.  In terms
of composition, a large household was the desired ideal for household structure – people spoke of
the fun of having lots of people around, of the liveliness and having others to share chores with. 
This was the stated reason for newly fissioned households setting up next to the parental
household in which they had started married life, although as I will argue later, I believe other
factors were in force.  Most of the households in Revealed River were composed of married
couples with their children.  The exceptions were young widows and their children, in which case
they lived near her parents, and there was one elderly widow living in a separate house although
cared for by kin (not her children) in a neighboring house.  Older married couples with adult
children generally had a younger married couple living with them (this was fluid, but about 10% of
households) and a smaller percentage had on elderly parent living with them in Revealed River. 
Several key changes in household composition had occurred.  First, there were reportedly
fewer elderly in the village due to an expulsion of “opium addicts.”  Second, there were a small
number of households in which the husbands had left due to their opium addiction or having been
jailed by the Thai authorities for opium trafficking or production.  Third, most of the children over
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the age of 7 or 8 up to about 15 were sent to lowland boarding schools.  As a result of children
attending school out of the village, there were nearly as many producers as consumers in most
households at any given time.  
Removal of Elderly Opium Smokers
Opium abuse was once uncommon among Lisu.  Its use occurred in specific contexts.  
Young men, not yet married, sometimes “played with the pipe” for a short period of time before
getting married and taking on the responsibilities of adulthood.  Opium was also used medicinally. 
To the extent that there were any regular users, these were elderly people who smoked daily to
relieve arthritis pain and other discomforts of old age.  These users remained contributing
members of society.   
In 1991, shortly before I arrived, the village decided that no opium addicts were to be
allowed to live within the village.    Astoundingly, Thai and western labeling of users of opium as
addicts and abusers was extended even to the elderly who used medicinally.  This step was taken
in part with the encouragement of Project officers, but the initiative was a village strategy to
remove Thai soldiers who had been stationed in the village for interdiction.  The soldiers caused a
lot of problems in the village through drunkenness and importunate behavior toward Lisu women. 
I was told that one or two families had moved away as a result of that policy and, in fact, three
households had left the village that year.  Some people, of course, continued to secretly supply
their aged mother or father with opium (or, more likely in the 1990s anti-opium environment,
heroin, which had become easier to get) at great risk to themselves.  Some sent their parents to
live with siblings in other villages.   
In other villages of the Thirty Thousand cluster that eventually followed Revealed River’s
example, some chose to move their parents outside of the boundaries of the village, building them
a house in the forest and taking food and opium to them every couple of days.  In one case, the
elderly parents were put in charge of watching over the village’s cattle herd; they lived in a shack
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out in the middle of a pine forest.  W hen I visited, it was very pleasant, but they were very old and
likely lonely.  No one I spoke to ever admitted to expelling their elders in this fashion; I heard only
of what “they” did to “their” parents.  
In such cases, households lost the labor of elderly parents in child care.  One of the
changes in See the Tiger village was that fields were much further away than they had been in the
past and those fields were often open, dry, and unprotected, making them unsafe for young
children.  It had become more difficult for women to care for their children and carry out field work
as the female domain became more dispersed.  Baby-sitting had become a separate task located
in the home (Hutheesing 1990a:136).  As a result, elderly parents’ role in watching the house and
children while their adult children worked in the fields was increasingly important. W omen in
Revealed River similarly complained of the distance of their fields and the baby-sitting role of
grandmothers was important, but I was unable to determine of it had become more important than
in the past and whether expelling elderly opium smokers had affected their patterns of child care. 
It was impossible to determine the accurate ages of older people, but there were very few village-
bound elderly people and only one possible opium user. 
  
“Widows” of Opium Smokers and the Incarcerated
Another ‘new’ household type was that of women who were in effect widowed because
their husbands had been arrested for involvement with opium or in the heroin trade.  In one case,
the couple and their children had been living with the wife’s parents.  He was an opium user and
possibly trafficked; he was jailed in Bangkok.  His wife continued on in a small, separate house
attached to that of her parents.  Each year, she and another woman waited for the list of prisoners
granted amnesty from the King of Thailand in celebration of his birthday; their husbands’ names
were never on these lists.  The husband of one other young woman left the village due to his
opium addiction.  In time, she returned to her natal family in another village with their two small
children.  All of these female-headed households, even when living with their parents, were very
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poor since they did not have their husband’s labor and had a couple of young children to care for. 
They faced a lifetime of poverty, as their households would be barely able to produce subsistence,
much less surplus, given the lack of adult labor available.  
Children to Lowland Boarding Schools
The practice of sending children out of the village to school was in striking contrast to
practices 30 years ago.  Lisu parents did not want their children to go to these schools as they
feared losing control over their children, and so they moved away from government schools
(Dessaint 1972a:174).  On the contrary, in Revealed River it was rare to see children between the
ages of 7 and 15 in the village except on school breaks.  By my calculations, 61% of Revealed
River children below the age of 15 were in lowland schools; another 29% of children, generally
very young or from very poor families, were in the Mountain School. In total, 90% of village
children attended some sort of Thai school.  Those not registered were infants and toddlers.  This
was an increasingly common strategy, spoken of as a chance to improve their children’s future
(cf. Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992:181).  
W hen possible, the children were sent to the Department of Public W elfare boarding
school on the outskirts of Chiang Mai.  Not all children could get into this school, although
Thailand mandated universal education.  Few went beyond 6  or 7  grade, one reason being thatth th
parents could not afford the school fees.  I observed one woman attempt to get a certificate of
poverty to enable her daughter to continue school without fees, an incident that infuriated the
teachers posted in the Mountain School as they considered her well-to-do.  She was the sister of
one of the faction leaders in the village and lived in a ‘handicrafts village’ near the market town of
Mae Malae. These residents had even less legal standing to live in their village than did the
residents of Revealed River to live in theirs.  In addition, they had no agricultural land so they
subsisted by hosting tourists and selling handicrafts.  They may have been cash rich, but it was
barely enough to provide secure subsistence.
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If the child lacked the necessary household registration papers, was too young or
crippled, parents sent their male children to Thai Buddhist temple boarding schools, which were
free, where they were often ordained as novices.  The reputation of temple schools varied,
however.  Some parents complained that their children were beaten and, most of all, underfed –
possibly the children were compelled to follow the daily fasting practices of the Buddhist monks.  It
was considered a very poor alternative to the government run boarding schools, especially if the
temple was far from Revealed River and the parents could not travel there easily to pick up their
children.  One opium widow, desperate for help, made the trip with me to Chiang Mai to try to find
a temple school to take her 6 year old son, a eye-opening experience for both us because the
conditions at some of these schools were harsh by Lisu standards.  Some sent their children to
government schools in small towns far enough away from Revealed River to require the children
to live there.  W ealthy families, that is, Yunnanese Chinese/Lisu families with commercial
enterprises, were able to send their children to private schools in the city of Chiang Mai. 
The Mountain School was supposed to be run for three weeks out of every four, but the
teachers were rarely present for more than two weeks at a time.  The school was rudimentary and
the Lisu villagers did not think much of it nor of the teachers.  However, as noted, almost every
child over five spent much of the day at the school.  The teachers complained that the parents
treated them like baby-sitters, and in fact they probably did.  On the other hand, the parents also
understood that this would prepare their children for entry into lowland schools when they were old
enough.  
The teachers in the Revealed River Village “Mountain School” and adherents of the self-
sufficiency philosophy of the Project were bitterly cynical about the practice of Lisu villagers
sending their children to government boarding schools rather than keeping them in the village and
supporting the school.  In their view (that of people doing good who did not feel appreciated,
despite the gulf between their conceptions of good and the conceptions of those receiving the
good), Lisu villagers only sent their children to boarding schools to get the government to feed
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them.  They were too lazy to feed their own children, the Thai teachers said.  This, of course, did
not acknowledge the deep concerns and fears parents had for their children’s future in the
changing political economy of Thailand and their strategies for survival.  It also did not recognize
the very real difficulties some households faced in caring for young children given the contraction
of the agricultural economy.  Most households faced rice shortages for part of the year – by the
time of the First Fruits ceremony in August, we all ate far more corn and cucumbers than was
satisfying because rice was in short supply.  In Durrenberger’s terms, a household that sent its
children to a boarding school achieved a more favorable consumer/worker ratio; it reduced
drudgery and increased household productivity.  In fact, the practice essentially eliminated the
main non-producing consumers at critical points of the year.  The children returned home annually
for the school break after the harvest, but were away from the village for the period of rice
shortage in the agricultural cycle.  They completed school and returned to the village at about the
age of 15, the time when they were physically ready to start contributing to household production.  
Analysis of Changes in Household Structure
Lisu villagers carried out specific strategies to achieve culturally constructed goals of
maintaining autonomy and household repute.  The adjustments they made to the exigent
conditions of life in northern Thailand in the 1990s were in keeping with their prior text, but they
potentially had different consequences from those intended.  W hile a new type of household had
not been created, certain tensions arose in the relationships among household members.  
Changes in Household Composition
The decision to move opium smokers out of village was a startling strategy, but
comprehensible in the context of the culturally formed desire for autonomy.  As part of national
drug interdiction policy, two to three soldiers had been posted in the village to prevent illegal
activities.  But as young Thai men, and soldiers, isolated, lonely, armed, and with the power of the
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state behind them, they caused a lot of problems in the village.  Told me repeatedly that the
soldiers drank heavily and threatened people with their weapons; they expected female
companionship, holding many of the Thai stereotypes about the promiscuity of hill tribe girls, and
treated the women rudely; they disrupted the evening classes at the Mountain School, which were
adult learning classes geared toward the married women of the village.  (I heard of similar and
more specific incidents from a nearby village that had soldiers posted in it while I was living in the
area, in one case resulting in the soldiers targeting a young man who attempted to protect his
wife)  The people of Revealed River village found it onerous to be watched over; they spoke of
their loss of freedom; it was a constant theme when Lisu discussed the government in their
village.  Thus, they took group action, with the Project’s support, that resulted in the soldiers being
removed from the village.  Most people were reluctant to talk about the decision-making directly,
but over time it became clear that they felt compelled to do this by Project officials because it was
the only way to have the soldiers removed and regain everyday autonomy away from the daily
gaze of representatives of the state.  In expelling opium addicts, they had demonstrated their
trustworthiness and good citizenship in the terms dictated by the project.  W hile this returned a
certain degree of autonomy to their daily lives, it came at the cost of adhering even more closely
to Thai national goals of modernization.  
Schooling and Transformation: Tensions in Relations between Parents and Children
Lisu parents sent their children to school as a specific strategy with two purposes.  One
was to expand the household skills ‘portfolio’ through diversification, equipping members of the
household to adapt to the encompassing dominance of Thai society in their lives.  The other
reason was more immediate – sending children away reduced the burden on productive adults in
the household, despite any costs associated with school fees.  The practice also ensured their
children had reliable food at times of food scarcity in the mountain agricultural cycle.  However,
these responses to local, shifting conditions, with the goal of maintaining household autonomy
  Middle-aged and older men, and some women, tended to speak Northern Thai.  Classified as a41
‘dialect’ (e.g., a language without an army), Northern Thai was not understood by speakers of
Central Thai.  Central Thai was the national language; Northern Thai was considered ‘country.’  In
the 1930s, nation-building policies not only discouraged the use of Northern Thai, its script and
books in it were banned.  Northern Thai histories kept in the northern temples were burned. 
Despite a recent resurgence in Northern Pride, Central Thai was far more widespread than ever
before, due to the influence of national media and the national educational system, the main
means of creating the imagined community of the nation.  
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and increasing household repute, had the potential to exacerbate generational tensions inherent
in household relations.  These were unintended consequences.  Children could not be
encouraged to attend lowland Thai schools and return fully socialized as Lisu.  I saw this tension
in several interactions between teenage children and their less worldly parents as their immediate
interests diverged.  And yet, children saw their own interests as wrapped up on their parents’ and
household’s interests, so such tensions did not lead them to abandon their household and family
obligations.  
The position of Lisu parents toward Thai education indicated their insecurities about their
children’s future.  Their conception of the future for their children was based in part on their own
experience; to survive meant to be able to deal with economic agents (buyers in the market,
middlemen with whom they signed contracts to produce crops) and Thai government officials who
had a great deal of control over the production decisions of households in the village.  They
needed to learn to speak Central Thai, read and write, and know arithmetic.  Lowland education
gave them connections outside the village considered necessary for the survival of the household,
especially in terms of the viability of the children’s future household.  I never heard a Lisu parent
express an interest in or belief that their child would be able to compete with the Thai or become
wealthy by Thai standards, but I was told that Lisu was a dying language and that everyone
needed to be able to speak Thai.  
Older parents with less facility in Central Thai  in the upper village neighborhood relied on41
their children for dealing with the lowland marketers to whom they sold their crops.  In the days
following one New Year, a mother and her teenage son argued vehemently because he wanted to
154
go to a dance (a dam hua) at the Forestry Center and meet girls, and his mother insisted he come
with her to translate on a trip by truck to a neighboring valley to trade and to visit a married
daughter.  She won, and he came with us, begrudgingly, grumbling and sulky.  Many parents had
come to rely on their children to read Project announcements such as edicts regarding land use. 
Some of the new crops were planted and sold under contractual agreement with corporations
such as United Fruit and Boonrawd Brewery (makers of Singha beer).  The Project personnel
played a paternalistic role in monitoring these contracts, forbidding those that they considered
ecologically unsustainable or disadvantageous to the farmers.  The Lisu resented this; they did not
trust the Project personnel to make these decisions for them and suspected them of lining their
own pockets or at least making decisions against the interests of the Lisu households.  They had
a profound objection to loss of control over their household decisions, which they experienced as
a lack of freedom or autonomy.  As a household strategy for future productivity and autonomy,
sending their children to Thai schools was in keeping with culturally constructed goals.  They
hoped it would ultimately  re-focus key decision-making to the household.  
Among the consequences to this strategy was the partial exclusion of school-age children
from the domain of household ritual.  If performance of rituals was a conduit by which family
members were bound together in recognized, ordered roles, Lisu children were cut off from that
experience and from living in cultural knowledge incorporated through the metaphors expressed
in the practice of ritual.  Lisu parents recognized this and attempted to compensate by finding
venues in which to instill Lisu culture in their children.  One of these was the New Year
celebrations.  Students found it very difficult to get away from school at New Year because it
coincided with school activities from which the students could not be excused, such as exams. 
Many schools would not release their students as a matter of principle, even though a high
proportion of the Thai middle-class were of Chinese descent and celebrated Chinese New Year at
  In fact, the Head of the W atershed Development Unit in which the Thirty Thousand cluster was42
located never celebrated Lisu New Year because he, as a Chinese-Thai, was obligated to return
to visit his parents each year at the same time.  Chinese-Thai were well aware of the ritual
importance of returning to visit parents at this time – and they currently have the power in Thailand
to practice their own family rituals.
  The Thai teachers did not even like a stranger bringing the students back to school if they had43
managed to leave for a weekend.  Foreigners were particularly suspected of having designs on
sexually exploiting hill tribe children, as Thai middle class discourse is that the problems of
modern day immorality, including the flourishing sex trade, are the result of the extreme sexual
freedom of the Other, W esterners.  
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the same time.   Teachers, especially those at the DPW  hill tribe boarding school, set themselves42
as guides and mentors (literally, older brothers and older sisters, phiî in Thai) for  hill tribe
children.  They saw themselves as having a special responsibility for inculcating the Thai way of
life, and its particular rituals and calendar, on “tribal” children.  Many Thai considered Lisu New
Year a drunken, licentious bacchanal and failed to understand its cultural and ritual import.  They
considered it to be “fun” (Thai: sanuk sanam) rather than significant.  Finally, many schools,
justifiably wary of the dangers of exploitation of children, would not let them leave school except in
the company of a recognized adult relative.  Therefore, unless a school child’s parent had the time
to go to town to fetch them, many students were unable to attend.  Male students sometimes ran
away for the weekend closest to New Year, but to the best of my knowledge no girl ever did this;
female roles for Lisu precluded them traveling without the protection of male kin, and both their
parents and teachers had impressed upon them the dangers of being kidnaped into the sex trade. 
On the occasions when New Year coincided with a weekend, I was pressed into hurriedly driving
students back to school for classes.  43
One ritual consequence of children’s schooling out of the village was the increased
importance of Little New Year (euyipha) in the village.  Little New Year, also known as male New
Year because it was a time for young men to visit other villages for courtship, was celebrated in
the lunar month following Big New Year (tsï-pae-khaw).  In the past, it had not been a large
celebration and not all Lisu had celebrated it (Hutheesing 1990a:158).  In Revealed River, it had
become increasingly important in the village calendar because of the calendar of lowland schools. 
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Children and teenagers swarmed the village at this time.  It was their chance to celebrate New
Year, the culmination of Lisu custom, to dress beautifully, display their household’s repute, and
practice the dances that were such an important part of Lisu ‘custom’ and all of which a girl had to
learn before she was ready to marry (Gillogly 2000). 
Much ritual had been centered in the household, a private domain relatively under the
control of the elders of the household and as such it played a significant role in cultural
reproduction.  Even as new spirits were added into the cosmology of the Lisu world (Durrenberger
1989; Hutheesing 1990a), relationships of household members with ancestral spirits remained
consistent.  W ith the increased control of the Thai state in Lisu villages, households began to lose
control over household ritual.  One striking case was the time when the Lisu New Corn or First
Fruits ceremony occurred on the same day as the Thai Mother’s Day (August 12, the birthday of
the Queen of Thailand).  The Project held a ceremony at the W atershed Development Center in
honor of the Queen and all mothers and expected a substantial number of the villagers to attend. 
But this was a day meant to be devoted to household ritual.  Teenagers, however, were anxious to
attend the festivities, where there would be food, music, and a chance to flirt.  As one young
teenage girl hopped into the back of a pick-up truck to go to the W atershed Center, her father
followed her and a fight ensued.  She should not be leaving, he said; she saw no point in sitting
around watching ritual being performed.  At that point, one of the Mountain Teachers stepped in,
saying they needed to honor and pay respect to the Queen.  There was an implicit threat that the
Lisu would not be considered properly Thai if they did not participate, which was part of the
discourse of trying to maintain the right to continue to live on their land.  The daughter left – the
state had won over the authority of the head of the household.  
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Autonomy and Hierarchy in Lisu Social Structure
Autonomy and hierarchy were significant and conflicting principles in Lisu social relations. 
Hierarchy was based on gender and age (both birth order and generation).  Gender difference
was fixed by cosmological conceptions (Durrenberger 1989), although not in outright power
relations in daily interactions.  These were enacted in peoples’ lives various ways, through the
layout of the house, restriction of women’s domains (“W omen may not wander”), and standards of
shyness and shame (Hutheesing 1990a:53-54, 61, 89).  The seniority principle permeated
household relations, enforced through customs of naming and avoidance taboos.  Although not
cosmologically fixed as were gender differences, the seniority principle was embedded in daily
practice. Children were named by birth order as well as gender, e.g., First Son, Amipha or
Abépha; First Daughter, Amima; Second Son, Alépha; Second Daughter, Aléma; Third Son,
Ascpha; Third Daughter, Ascma; and so on.  Children were expected to marry by birth order,
although a fine in the bride price of a girl married out of order “washed the face” of the elder
unmarried daughter to alleviate her shame.  (Boys would rarely marry out of order because they
were dependent on their parents’ support in paying bride price; it would have caused extreme
shame to an older son for his parents to buy a bride for a younger son before him.)  The
avoidance and respect taboos that maintained this order were spoken of in terms of repute,
shyness, and shame, not superiority or greater power.  In terms of intergenerational relationships,
children, even as adults, were expected to be obedient to the head of the household, to follow his
bidding.  These social rules constructed the household and lineage as a set of idealized social
relations.  
Yet this existed in a strikingly egalitarian social context, as noted by Dessaint,
Durrenberger, Chaipigusit, and others.  Even though Durrenberger meticulously documented the
hierarchy in Lisu ritual and cosmology, he concluded that “...outside the ritual sphere, hierarchy is
  Part of the reason for the discrepancy between the findings of Durrenberger and Dessaint, and44
those of Hutheesing was difference in focus.  Hutheesing studied gender relationships, specifically
women and the domestic domain.  This was outside the purview of the earlier researchers, who
had been more concerned with the egalitarianism between households and men, that is, the lack
of political hierarchy. 
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not important” (Durrenberger 1989:34).   And Lisu society was, indeed, characterized by a high44
degree of egalitarianism, both on the household and individual level.  The frame for this in Lisu
was myi -do , or repute (which Lewis and Lewis (1984) interestingly glossed as “desire for3 5
primacy”).  W ealth is the only indication of good myi ; it must constantly be proven.  Each3
household and individual sought repute, demonstrable only through productivity and display of
status.  Therefore, repute had to be constantly demonstrated and defended; any slight was
detrimental and apparently small offenses could become causes for major social rifts.  “In an
egalitarian system, the amount of prestige is ambiguous, and people must constantly prove they
have as much as anyone else.  There is, therefore, consumerism and a work ethic” (Durrenberger
1989:24).  The inverse of repute was shame.  It could be brought about by inability to fulfill one’s
obligations, for instance, to be unable to reciprocate feasting, and also by slights from others.  In
this way, concepts of self and household status were integrated with economic behavior.  
Hierarchy and egalitarianism were worked out within the household in the potentially
contradictory modes of respect/avoidance and repute.  Lisu children were encouraged to be
assertive, to express themselves, and to be independent (Chaipigusit 1989:180; Hutheesing
1990a:120).  Most disputes in the village were settled through negotiation.  The strength of one’s
household, lineage, and allegiance group could affect the outcome of negotiations, but key was
the ability to speak well, to carry one’s point in argument (Durrenberger 1976b).  In a case
described by Dessaint, when the headman’s younger brother died, his eldest son was only 20
years old but negotiated to keep all of his father’s inheritance against his father’s brothers
because he was a more aggressive speaker (Dessaint 1972a:131).  I observed this repeatedly but
did not realize how important it was until I was yelled at by a farmer for disturbing his work by
telling him that the W atershed Unit teachers were looking for him to buy plums.  I yelled back
  Another point of tension was between older and younger brothers as they competed for45
household resources such as wealth for bride price.  This tension has been exacerbated in recent
years, for reasons I will discuss in the next chapter.  
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saying I had only carried the message and I thought he wanted to sell his darned plums.  W e got
along much better afterwards.  In an illustrative case, I watched one father, Headman Red, sit with
his young son and discuss a cut Red had gotten.  Headman Red was domineering and largely
feared around the village.  First he told his son he had gotten the cut one way, when in fact the
boy knew he had not.  He encouraged the boy to assert what he knew.  Then they discussed the
different ways to heal the cut.  The father’s daughter, about 12 years old, who went to the Thai
government boarding school and had hopes of continuing her education, then stepped in and told
her father the way she thought he should take care of the wound, specifying what they had taught
her in the school.  Her father disagreed, she disputed back.  This was a bantering rather than an
antagonistic interaction, but it was very clear that the children were encouraged to assert
themselves.  W hile shyness and modesty were highly valued, especially among young women,
young women encouraged each other in being more self-assertive.  On another occasion, I
watched several female patrilineal cousins try to convince another cousin to be more assertive in
her interactions with a group of young men because they knew she hoped to marry – “If you don’t
open your mouth, you won’t get any food!” they laughed.  
This is not to say that lines of hierarchy in household relations did not exist.  A particular
point of tension existed between fathers and sons.   Lisu were reported as having a high rate of45
homicide; in particular, six patricides were reported between 1958 and 1966 (Lewis and Lewis
1984:258).  Hutheesing recounts an interview with an older woman who said “My sons want to kill
their father.  In the other village, two fathers were killed by their sons” (Hutheesing 1990a:130),
and another tale in which a father and son argued over who would hunt with the household rifle,
which ended with the mother committing suicide (Hutheesing 1990a:105).  In Pang Khum, a
Lisu/Karen village several miles east/southeast of Revealed River Village, the eldest son (married,
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living with his wife in his father’s house) chafed greatly at his father’s authority, although he
ultimately submitted to it (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992:183).  
Tensions between fathers and sons were exacerbated by the nebulous character of
achieving manhood for young men.  Productivity was marked by labor.  Young men did little
productive work until older than young women, and were not obligated to work hard until they
hoped to marry and after marriage, when they lived with either a father or father-in-law, under their
control for a considerable period of time.  In See the Tiger village, the decreased ability of men to
perform their economic roles, particularly as hunters and profitable farmers, and gain repute, led
to their “infantilization” (Hutheesing 1990a:120-121).  Conditions in Revealed River Village were
very different; economic and ecological deterioration were nowhere near as severe as in See the
Tiger, and men still had a respected and productive role in their society at the very least politically
through their ongoing negotiation of Lisu rights in the Project.  However, there were marked
tensions among men in the household, particularly over young men not working.  In one dramatic
afternoon, a father sent his son to the Army’s ‘boot camp’ for addicts because the son had been
smoking opium.  It was not unusual for young men to “play with the pipe” before marriage and
adulthood.  Young men seemed often to be idling, waiting for marriage and adulthood.  But this
young man had continued to smoke opium to the neglect of his household obligations.
In most cases, however, disputes were far more muted.  Like the wives who told
Hutheesing they would agree with their husbands but then do as they wished, this was a far more
likely tactic among sons, as well.  In the earlier example, Red encouraged his daughter to argue
with him and was very pleased at how well she was doing in school, but when decisions were
made she obeyed him and he did not extend this freedom to disagree to his wife.  
Young people wanted to do things that fit their conceptions of autonomy, which, for them,
was constructed in terms of an imagined modernity informed by the Thai middle-class standards
of their teachers and images conveyed in the Thai media.  Parents’ dependence on their children
as resources for dealing with the Thai state and economy were also sources of tension.  So far,
  Girls expressed the most ambivalence about Lisu dress.  Many of the girls who had recently left46
school did not want to dress in full regalia for New Year dancing.  Some of this was shyness,
since it was a public statement of one’s marriageability; for one young woman, she hoped to not
discourage her suitor, who was from a poor family.  But the discourse was more along the lines of
being embarrassed by their traditional clothes.  For many, a different kind of shame had been
inculcated by being compelled to perform at the lowland boarding schools, turning Lisu custom
into a show for Thai tourists.  Similarly, Lisu dress had become a performance for foreign tourists;
there are endless postcards of elaborately dress Lisu girls all over Chiang Mai and pictures on the
W eb.  
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young people’s different interests lay in perceptions of others’ freedom to do as they liked, to have
a good time, to dress well, to make money without working so hard and getting burned by the sun,
in short, by their perceptions of modernity.  This was further implanted by the fact that there was
actually a TV in the village (run by solar power and justified by the need to study Thai).  46
Lisu parents were aware of their children’s desire for more autonomy; it was within the
parameters of Lisu cognitive frames and behavior.  It resulted in certain tensions.  Not all children
were deferential all the time and there sometimes were loud public disputes.  I observed children
(between the ages of 12-16) arguing with their parents.  But these tensions were not so much
greater than previously as much as occurring on slightly different terms and contexts.  It
sometimes surprised me that more teenagers and young adults did not leave.  The road was near
by; they knew Thai; they could have left, as so many young Lisu did in other villages in the 1990s. 
In fact, they did not.  The interests of parents and children were still significantly congruent. 
One evening in a Lisu household in the upper village faction, a male Mountain Teacher
castigated a young man who had recently returned from school.  He had achieved a slightly higher
level of education than most children but still had not made it to high school.  The family was
involved in opening a new swidden field, which was forbidden in the Project and which Thai
believed to be a rapacious and destructive form of agriculture.  The teacher turned to the boy and
yelled at him, “You know better!  You’ve learned better ways, why don’t you tell your father to stay
in the same field and stop moving around!”  They boy looked embarrassed and defended himself
in a low voice, glancing over at his father, “He’s my father, I have to do what he decides.” 
Ultimately, young men sought independence by heading their own household; as long as this was
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a reasonable expectation, their interests lay in fulfilling their social roles as good sons.  There
were constraints on how far these tensions went.  Parents told me they were aware of the
consequences of fighting with their children – running away to town, drug addiction, suicide – and
this limited how far parents would exert their authority.  There were generational differences in
attitudes, but not to the extent that their interests diverged significantly.  I believe that this was
related in large part to marriage and the possibility of establishing one’s own household, the
ultimate goal of adulthood.  The other factor was the possibility of gaining land to cultivate.  
  Labor as the main constraint was especially noticeable in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia for47
much of its history because of the low population densities there, with the notable exception of
northern Vietnam.  That is, much land was available, all that was needed was the labor to work it. 
Pre-colonial political processes were based on acquiring or attracting labor to work open lands.  At
times, people were appropriated, for instance, as prisoners of war resettled in the victor’s lands
(Nimmanhaeminda 1965).  
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CHAPTER 4
THE HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION
Labor is fundamental to the constitution of the household.  Shared ritual performance, the
rights and duties of kinship, and shared labor, all create a layer of obligations that increases the
density and significance of shared activities.  Fundamental to this is shared agricultural labor, as is
true in many smallholder economies (Netting 1993:64).  As Lisu repeatedly told me, “If we don’t
work, we don’t eat!”  The household is the means by which labor is organized and the locus for
distribution of the fruits of labor.  As such, it is the point of intersection with the environment, food
production and social organization, particularly culturally constructed social obligations for
consumption and cooperative labor.  The household is the main source of labor and its
composition determines the possibilities for production of any given household; the composition of
the household is the main constraint on available labor (Heald 1991).   47
This, then, was the fundamental problem for any Lisu household and it is critical for
understanding Lisu social organization.  In this context, the household developmental cycle
becomes very important because it has a great deal to do with how much labor is available in the
household.  Among the Lisu, this led to marked variations in the wealth of a household, depending
on where along the stage of the developmental cycle it was.  Lisu social organization under the
regime of the opium economy was highly egalitarian because opium supported access to wealth
  These are the official figures.  Among people who work in northern Thailand, they are suspect. 48
First, the initial figures for production are believed to have been inflated; several U.N. experts told
me that these had been inflated both by methodology and by the Thai government’s desire to
make the reductions in future years look more dramatic.  Second, the figures for current
production are probably underestimated.  Farmers such as the Lisu of Revealed River had
adjusted their opium cultivation techniques to avoid detection.  This will be discussed later in this
chapter.  However, it was clear that opium was by no means the base of the agricultural economy
that it once had been.  
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to everyone.  Everyone held the means to production and the only limit or constraint on this was
the labor available to the household, which could be ameliorated by hiring labor; neither land nor
seed were significant constraints.  Given the relationship between modes of production and the
social organization of labor, changes in household relations as a result of the end of the opium
can be expected.  However, the precise nature of such changes depended on the nature of the
existing household structure, such as social obligations as formed through the idiom of kinship
and gender.  
One of the most conspicuous differences between Revealed River in the 1990s and the
villages described by Dessaint and Durrenberger 25 years previously is that there was no opium. 
I lived in that village and traveled around the northwestern mountains of Thailand for two and a
half years, and the only poppies I saw were in front of a Chinese drug lord’s shack, planted for the
edification of the foreign tourists, and in one Revealed River woman’s home garden, where she
asserted it was necessary to make her mustard greens grow well (she pulled them up before they
attracted the notice of officials).  I have seen more poppies in front of U.S. Midwestern
farmhouses.  This was a far cry from the days of “opium poppies from horizon to horizon.”  In the
area controlled by the Project, opium cultivation area was reduced by 50% from 1984 to 1991
(Tan-Kim-Yong, Limchoowong and Gillogly 1994).  The ONCB (Office of Narcotics Control Board)
claims even more success: area devoted to opium cultivation in Thailand was reduced by 97%
from 1961 to 1991 and production by kilograms by 94% (because productivity per unit of land
increased as a result of interdiction) (Renard 2001:36).    The interdiction of opium production48
had brought about a shift in agricultural strategies; like a geological fracture, a deep and
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fundamental shift brought about a re-structuring on the surface that did not precisely match the
deep shifts.  W hat, then, are Lisu farmers doing to survive?  W hat have the consequences been
for Lisu households?  
Agricultural Economy and Resource Allocation
Previously, the agricultural resource base had been rice/corn/opium, pigs and chickens as
livestock, some pack horses, and use of forest resources by hunting by young men and gathering
by women.  Under recent political economic conditions, opium cultivation had been greatly
reduced and farmers had sought a variety of replacements for it.  The popular view is that opium
has resulted in less diverse fields, leaving fields unprotected from erosion and loss of fertility, and
resulting in heavy chemical inputs that have negative environmental consequences for those
downstream.  W hat I found was that Lisu farmers were putting a great deal of effort into
experimenting with new crops in order to find a replacement for opium.  In fact, the agricultural
resource base had become much more diverse, so that farmers were faced with that much more
complexity and risk in the agricultural system.  This put strains on the management of household
production.  None of the replacement crops fulfilled the same niche as opium for both ecological
and environmental reasons, and the end of the opium economy has engendered greater risks and
insecurities for Lisu households.
One misty winter evening late in 1993, I caught a ride to Chiang Mai with Headman Red’s
younger brother.  He was the truck driver of their lineage and was transporting produce to the
market for sale.  I sat in the bed of the truck with several Lisu men and a few women surrounded
by burlap sacks of mushrooms and some odds and ends of vegetables.  It was too cold and windy
to talk much.  Proud of his truck, quite the confident young man about town in the village, he
became increasingly nervous as we approached the town.  W e stopped at the larger “traditional”
market at the edge of the university, on the north side of Chiang Mai City, pulling in among the
other mud and dust-covered trucks of produce farmers.  It was there he approached me, diffident
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and unsure, and asked me where I was going next, and where should he go?  Despite being the
truck driver, the sophisticated one who served as the liaison between village farmers and the
markets, he had very little knowledge of where to go and what to do.  Here was this large and
vibrant market in which urbanites could buy all of the rural foods from their childhood, but there
was no clear wholesaler to sell to.  All he knew was that mushrooms were highly valued, as forest
products often were, and that they sold for much more in the market than his family had been
getting from local middlemen in Pai.  He could not go to each of the marketers and offer his
produce, or stand with his mushrooms and sell them from the back of his truck.  Either strategy
left him exposed to the attentions of police, soldiers, and officials of the market, as he was not
licensed; and as an upland minority man with, at best, a “blue card,” (akin to the green card of the
United States), he was particularly vulnerable to harassment.  He had granted my request for a
ride because he hoped to use my connections to find a better buyer.  Unfortunately, I knew
nothing of the complexities of buying and selling in the market.  I did the next best thing – I took
him to a woman from whom I rented a room in Chiang Mai, who bought and sold things as a sort
of hobby.  She bought a small amount of mushrooms and sent him to another location.  
In the course of this evening, he also confidentially asked me not to tell anyone about the
mushrooms.  They were forbidden by the Project as being environmentally unsound.  Growing
mushrooms entailed cutting down trees in the forest and planting the mushroom spoor on the
rotting log.  It was an unsustainable practice as new trees had to be cut down periodically.  It was
the cultivation of mushrooms in Yongbei Ting and Dayao in northwestern Yunnan in the early 19th
century that had resulted in environmental destruction within ten years, alienation of Lipo from
their land there, and a multi-ethnic revolt against the Chinese, ultimately unsuccessful (Daniels
1994).  Ironically, the market made this a Lisu practice a century and a half later.  Red’s brother
also did not want anyone to know of his new crop, for fear that others would follow suit and thus
lower the price.  This had happened repeatedly in the uplands in the search for new crops (see
“New cash crops, new production limits”).  
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New Crops, New Subsistence, New markets
Mushrooms were only the most recent attempt to develop a reliable cash crop.  Each
year, it seemed, a new next great crop was being tried out.  Crops in Revealed River included
taro, coffee, red beans, white potatoes, barley, cut flowers, and fruit trees such as plum, lychee,
longan, mango, and Chinese peach.  Other crops either attempted by Thirty Thousand farmers or
planted elsewhere in the mountains of northern Thailand as a replacement for opium as a cash
crop included carrots, cabbage, tomatoes, and strawberries.  Livestock had been supplemented
with herds of cattle grazed just outside the boundaries of the Project protected forest; some had
only 3-4 head of cattle, but others were reported to have 30-40 head.  A Chinese farmer and a few
others in Revealed River had attempted fish ponds as part of an integrated house garden system,
but civit cats and a type of otter had decimated the fish population because the pond was too
shallow.  Aside from these cash crops, farmers grew rice, corn (some for themselves and much of
it for livestock), cucumbers, mustard greens, peppers, a sort of pumpkin, and onions as food
crops; some of these, such as peppers, could be sold as cash crops as well.  Men hunted
assiduously if with little result; the occasional pig was highly valued as meat and small birds were
sometimes eaten, but often sold.  W omen gathered items such as bamboo shoots, which they
preserved for the hot and dry season when there were no vegetables in the fields; these were a
welcome addition to the diet, and were reported to reduce signs of malnutrition among Lisu
children. 
Rice Insufficiency
A key point is that enough rice for subsistence could not be grown in these mountains at
these population densities (Durrenberger 1976c:636).  Upland rice appears to be very sensitive to
a wide range of environmental stresses, including soil-borne pests, weeds, drought, erosion, and
the physical and chemical limitations of the soil (Salzer 1993:84).  W hile in some cases in
Southeast Asia upland rice swiddening could be almost as productive as irrigated rice in
  Other factors must be considered as sources of this strain as well.  Between 1962 and 1977,49
the area planted to upland food crops around the country had increased by 500 percent. The
value of upland food crops such as maize, peanuts, soya beans, and mung beans increased by
800 percent in the same time period.  W ith the value of upland crops increasing, the value of the
land to lowland peasants without access to land on which to plant these crops also increased
(Meer 1981:63) and many landless peasants moved into the hills to find land.  Throughout the
post-W W II period, the amount of commercial timber cut increased steadily, as did the foreign
exchange it brought in (see Cooper 1984: 11 for the period of 1968-1973).  The “quantum cut” of
timber from concessions (putative legally cut timber) rose from 2.6 to 3.1 million cubic meters in
Thailand as a whole in 1979, although the government reduced the number of logging
concessions (W un'Gaeo 1992:19).  Furthermore, logging for sale in the high mountains was not
feasible until it was possible to transport logs out of the area – large-scale timbering depended on
the building of roads, which did not enter full-scale development until about 1977 and probably
peaked in the mid- to late 1980s (Tapp 1979:xii).  Upland villagers did not log exported timber. 
However, they have suffered the consequences of environmental destruction, removal of land
from cultivation, and national condemnation for their perceived damage to national watersheds.
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conditions of very low population density, as was found in northern Burma in the years
immediately preceding W orld W ar II or the Central Highlands of Vietnam before the 1975 (Leach
1965 [1954]:24; Cooper 1984:151), in many cases, it was far less productive per unit of land,
yielding as little as 30-40% of irrigated land yields (Kunstadter and Chapman 1978:16). 
Swiddening systems depended on short cultivation/long fallows (e.g., 1-2 years of cropping and 7-
20 years of fallow) to maintain system fertility (Kunstadter and Chapman 1978; Rambo 2001). 
Swiddening was an ecologically suitable agricultural strategy in conditions of low population
density (Rambo 1983).  Lisu in northern Thailand had been long fallow swiddeners, usually
pioneer, but pioneer swiddening was not the only agricultural method in the Lisu repertoire, as
discussed in Chapter 2.  The cultivation techniques of swiddening tended to protect against
erosion because unburnt trees and brush were left lying on the fields and only dibble sticks were
used so that soil was only minimally disturbed.  Damage only occurs when such systems are
intensified (Dove 1983).  
By the mid-1970s, some researchers considered upland rice to be moving into a
“terminal” phase.  Hill Tribe Research Center researchers noted the great strain being placed on
montane resources.  Among the Hmong of Tak Province, rice production was below the national49
average and production was insufficient to supply local consumption in most seasons (Keen
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1968).  In the total Mae Sa watershed in 1974, swidden accounted for 30.1% of total land under
rice production, but only 18.7% of total rice (Cooper 1984:151).  A survey in Nam Long, Mae Hong
Son showed that 40% of upland farming households produced insufficient rice to feed
themselves.  A few years later, Salzer found that the great majority of farmers were living below
bare subsistence levels (Salzer 1993:37, 79-81).  
This was due in large part to increases in population densities in swidden agriculture
villages in northern Thailand from the late 1960s to 1983 (Fox et al. 1995).  The increase in
population density in the northern Thai uplands (due to natural population increase, immigration of
ethnic minority peoples from Burma and Laos, and migration of Thai farmers and loggers into the
mountains) as well as changes in crop patterns further strained the agroecological system to the
point of failure.  At the same time, conversion of subsistence-oriented swidden systems to
permanent agriculture, human settlements, mining and dam building caused severe loss of forest
cover and decrease in the biodiversity, especially that variety unique to succession in fallow plots
(Fox 2000).  Between 1976-1983, due to government intervention to prevent cutting of closed-
canopy forest cover, swiddeners began to rely more heavily on the use of fallow lands, including
sparse forest, for their crops.  In short, farmers began to re-use lands without an adequate fallow
period (Fox et al. 1995).  
Tropical mountain soils tend to have poor to medium nutrient content and be shallow and
erodable on slopes; they are unable to support long-term cultivation without long periods of fallow
or considerable inputs (terracing, irrigation, composting, recycling, fertilizer) in order to replenish
soil organic matter because the nutrients lie in the vegetation (Van Keer et al. 1998:7, 26, 38, 41,
67).  In a swidden system, burning the vegetation releases the nutrients in ash.  Burning improved
soil chemical status through ash and heat and reduced a wide range of crop pests (Van Keer et
al. 1998:57-61).  It was a fast, low labor, and effective way to make plant nutrients available and to
control pests as the energy expenditure of fire did the labor for humans (Rambo 1984).  The
fertility of the field only lasts a few years, however; typically, yields decreased dramatically if
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upland rice was grown for more than two years on the same plot (Salzer 1993:84; Van Keer et al.
1998:115). The sustainability of such systems was also dependent on the nature of the soil and
slope, as well as community institutions to ensure undisturbed fallow.  The introduction of
permanent agriculture resulted in decreasing organic matter in the soil and  the consumption of
limited plant nutrients, and the system experienced decreased soil fertility (Rerkasam and
Rerkasam 1999).  As a result, upland rice has increasingly unstable productivity (Salzer 1993:84).
Swiddening was a viable strategy for household survival in northern Thailand given the
right crop mix – opium had made all of the difference in the viability of local economies and the
uplands could never have supported a population of this size without a significant cash crop such
as opium.  Lisu subsistence depended on growing opium, the proceeds of which were used to buy
rice (Dessaint 1972a; Durrenberger 1976c; Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992:37; Salzer
1993:126-127).  The anti-opium campaigns changed this mix and brought about increased strain
on land resources in the uplands. 
Opium
Opium was a subsistence-oriented cash crop.  In the case of upland opium-growers such
as Lisu, less fertile soils were still usable for opium.  As discussed previously, its introduction
opened up a new econiche in the mountains that obviated the existing constraints on carrying
capacity.  Opium could be grown in conditions where rice could not; in particular, it could be grown
for up to 10 years on one plot.  Furthermore, as a saleable item, its profits were used to buy rice to
feed the household.  Commercial farming was the means to a continued independent existence
as independent farmers in their own villages.  Dependence on global markets provided for
household autonomy.  
In northern Thailand, there was a ready market for opium; a purchaser could always be
found for the crop (Durrenberger 1976c:636), unlike the more recent cash crops.  Opium is very
high value per weight, thus easy to transport.  It is storable, it does not spoil, so that farmers could
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hold on to at least some of their harvest for sale at a later time when prices were good.  Finally,
buyers came to them.  Opium caravans once wended their way through the mountains of northern
Thailand buying directly from the farmers after the harvest; an enterprising farmer could choose to
take his opium to a lowland town himself if he so chose, providing he had connections and
patience, but it was not necessary (Durrenberger 1976c:636; Durrenberger 1983a:90).  It was
these characteristics that had made opium so transformative in Lisu society over 100 years ago.  
Lisu farmers’ production strategies indicate that there was a dynamic relationship
between the cultivation of rice and opium.  The household goal was to provide enough
subsistence for rice, preferably by cultivation or, barring that, by opium produced and sold for cash
to buy rice.  Households could not concentrate on both rice and opium because they competed for
labor at the same times of the annual agricultural cycle.  A decision had to be made to emphasize
one crop or the other in each particular case (Dessaint 1972a:122).  If there was sufficient rice for
household consumption needs, surplus opium profits could be allocated to things such as
household supplies or invested in the status system through New Year display, soul-calling
ceremonies and marriages.  If insufficient rice was produced, opium profits were used to buy rice
for household consumption (Durrenberger 1983a:94; Durrenberger 1976c:634-5).  The more
fertile the land, the more a household concentrated on rice production rather than opium, the
likelihood of this increasing with the numbers of consumers to support.  As people stayed in the
same area and grew rice for several years in succession, the soil fertility of the place was
exhausted.  At that point, their choices were to migrate to more fertile lands or to emphasize
poppy production as the more profitable and ecologically feasible cash crop and then use the
profits to buy rice (Durrenberger 1976c:636).  This was the situation of Evil Peaks when Dessaint
studied it.  The more fertile the land and the more consumers there were in relation to producers,
the more effort was expended on rice growing to fulfill household subsistence needs.  Most
villages practiced a mixed strategy of both opium and rice production (along with corn, mostly to
feed pigs).  They spent more than half (62%) of their labor growing opium, 28% on growing rice,
  Under more recent market conditions, the resource bases of households can be more complex50
and their strategies reflected this.  In an Akha village in Chiang Rai, households could be
categorized on the basis of rice sufficiency, existing wealth and engagement in cash farming. 
Those with the least rice and lowest prosperity did not grow cabbage (the main local cash crop);
the most prosperous did (Van Keer et al. 1998:20).  In Nam Long, Mae Hong Son, the poorest
households were the most likely to grow opium as it was the only way for them to achieve
minimum household subsistence (Salzer 1993:123-124).  
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and 9% on growing corn (Durrenberger 1983b:221-222).  But these percentages do not reflect the
differences among households in quality of land and the ratio of productive laborers to non-
productive consumers.  Based on 1969 mean prices of rice and opium, the value received from
one day of labor spent in opium cultivation was almost twice as valuable as a day of labor spent in
rice cultivation (Dessaint 1972a:122).  In the 1980s in Mae Hong Son, the return to labor of opium
amounted to 109/baht a day, far more than could be earned with any other crop (Salzer 1993:73). 
The average optimum portfolio at Evil Peaks in 1969 was less than 75% of a household’s labor in
opium (and maize) and more than 25% in rice (Dessaint 1972a:126). 
W hy, then, did Lisu farmers bother to grow rice at all?  Because rice was the major
component of the subsistence system, and the primary goal was to feed the household
(Durrenberger 1976c:636).  Another reason was that the prices of rice and opium fluctuated;
growing at least a minimum of rice ensured a degree of security in subsistence.  The risk of
planting opium was greater, especially as Thai and international authorities began to extend
effective interdiction into the northern hills; but the profits were significantly greater, especially
because the price of opium increased by over 1000% with interdiction ($43/kg to $500/kg)
(Renard 2001:36).  In short, at the household level, production strategies were calculated in such
a way as to balance risk against expected return (Dessaint 1972a:126).  The variation in
production strategies among Lisu villages in the 1960s, that is, emphasis on rice or opium, were a
sign of the status of the productive capabilities of the land on which they depended, the amount of
labor available to a household, and each household’s assessment of the risks.  Upland ethnic
minority farming households were by no means homogeneous.  Among Lisu, strategies at this
time were related to the household developmental cycle and the available mix of crops.  50
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New Cash Crops, New Production Problems
Lisu in Revealed River Village were even more dependent on cash cropping than had
been farmers in the previous decades.  Land had become a scarce resource.  W ith shortened
fallow, limited rotation, and restricted access to new fields, rice production levels plummeted.  I
was unable to get specific amounts because rice sufficiency was a point of repute for Lisu
households and so they were reluctant to admit the extent to which they bought rice (and because
the Project philosophy position was that rice was not a necessary staple), but every single
household in Revealed River bought rice.  The rice fields I saw provided only enough for three
months of the year for the households that had worked them.  Rice insufficiency was a point about
which every household head expressed concerned, with the notable exception of the Chinese
agricultural leader, who held that it was not necessary to eat rice with every meal (his wife
disagreed, bitterly, but submitted to his authority on this).  In See the Tiger Village, rice fields were
also yielding less.  People could not open new fields without being arrested by RFD officials
(Hutheesing 1990a:169-70).  In fact, many projects advocated abandoning rice cultivation in favor
of agroforestry and annual cash crops; models showed that optimal cropping patterns would bring
high cash returns and allow farmers to buy as much rice as they needed (e.g., Salzer
1993:118-123).  However, such models did not take into account the fluctuating returns and
market competition of any cash crop that looked promising, nor the culturally constructed goal of
providing basic subsistence dependence first and dependence on the market as only secondary.  
The problem of producing rice in the uplands was also a point of concern to many
projects in the uplands.  To that end, beans and nitrogen-fixing trees and new tilling techniques
had been introduced to upland farmers around northern Thailand.  The Lisu I knew said that the
techniques failed in part because of the weeding problem; my interviews with agriculture officers
in other parts of northern Thailand showed this to be a common problem (see also Salzer
1993:66-73; Van Keer et al. 1998:103).  In agro-ecological systems pushed to the limits, one of
the main constraints on the expansion of ecologically sound production was household labor to
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weed cultivated plots and weeding requirements increase as fallow time decreases (Perz and
W alker 2002:1013).  For instance, in the 1950s, Izikowitz reported fallow periods of 12-15 years
and 1-2 weedings per season among the Lamet , an upland people of Laos; but average weeding
requirements have now increased to between 3.9 weedings per season (Roder, Phengchanh and
Keobulapha 1997).  The way upland farmers experienced depleted soil was as fields in which the
weeding burdens became increasingly onerous; the weeds were grasses, hard to pull out, and
each field required twice or three times as many weedings as previously.  W omen, to whom this
back-breaking chore fell, complained of days of work devoted to weeding and physical
exhaustion.  W omen’s field work had increased tremendously.  In the face of this constraint,
farmers turned more to herbicides or mechanical means of weeding that disturbed the thin
mountain soils and lead to increased erosion.  
 The new crops required far more in the way of capital inputs than had the previous
system of rice/corn/opium.  Farmers had to buy seeds or cuttings.  The Revealed River farmers
were fortunate in that the Project supplied many planting materials, particularly fruit trees.  But the
farmers often wanted to try crops that the Project did not support and that required acquiring
planting material some other way.  Many got seeds and cuttings from relatives in other areas. 
Lisu farmers were largely willing to experiment compared to farmers of other ethnic groups
(Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992), and there were constant attempts to gain information on
the latest crop.  Two crops planted by Revealed River farmers had been planted under contract
with a large corporation.  One was barley for Boonrawd Breweries (makers of Singha Beer), and
the other was potatoes for United Fruit.  In such cases, the Project oversaw the contracts to
ensure environmental soundness and to prevent the farmers from being taken advantage of. 
They refused to share the specifics of such contracts with me; villagers widely believed that some
lower-level, local Project officials received kickbacks for making the land available since this was,
legally, land on which no cultivation was to take place at all under the provisions of the W atershed
Classifications.  I was told by a United Nations official that United Fruit had also attempted to
  This information comes from interviews in 1992-1994  with the Project director, Khun Pakorn. 51
By 1994, he had been promoted to Bangkok and his assistant become the Project director.  
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contract with local farmers to grow strawberries but had been blocked by the Project because it
would have required the farmers to pay too much for planting material each year, including boxes
in which to plant the strawberries in a special planting medium and requiring heavy fertilizer
inputs.  Thus, the Project restricted some new crops in order to prevent both environmental
destruction, with downstream effects, and heavy indebtedness of the farmers.  Despite the usually
good intentions of Project officials, Lisu perceived these actions as controlling and a loss of their
valued autonomy.  
Temperate zone crops such as flowers, potatoes, cabbages, and so on, were prone to
pests and disease in the tropical mountains.  In an attempt to boost productivity, farmers had
started using pesticides, including fungicides, on their crops.  The Project discouraged this
practice, but almost every farmer found a way to get the chemicals and apply them to their fields. 
The chemicals were both very expensive and very dangerous; some farmers, recognizing the
danger, hired Lahu laborers to apply pesticides for them.  By 1992, potatoes were no longer being
grown under contract because of a fungus.  Once in the soil, the fungus was very difficult to
eradicate.  Revealed River farmers continued to grow potatoes anyway and market them on their
own.  The fungus continued to be a problem.  Farmers used ever larger quantities of fungicides. 
They also attempted to compensate for the decrease in productivity by planting more potatoes,
closer together, which a United Nations official told me in fact increased the risk of fungus.  
In other parts of northern Thailand, the transition to new cash crops had resulted in
severe environmental consequences and alienation of land due to the vagaries of the markets. 
One example came from Thung Joh, the training center for the Project near Pa Pai (the Lisu
village Ban Lum was adjacent to Thung Joh, although none of the residents from Durrenberger’s
day remained).  In an attempt to end opium cultivation, the director of the Project introduced cut
flowers as a cash crop.   Cut flowers did magnificently the first year.  The farmers made a good51
  Such a strategy is not unusual for farming households, see Hanks 1972 for how Thai farmers52
expanded rice production through intensification in the midst of the worldwide economic
depression of the 1930s in an attempt to keep household income at stable levels.  
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profit, opium cultivation in the area stopped and rates of deforestation leveled out.  But by the
second year, upland minority farmers in other areas (mostly Hmong) had discovered the
profitability of flowers and soon controlled the market due to their greater proximity to the lowland
towns where fresh cut flowers were in demand.  The Thung Joh farmers responded by both
returning to limited opium cultivation and planting more flowers in order to make up the lost
income.  This resulted in expansion of fields and increased deforestation.   Of See the Tiger52
Village, Hutheesing wrote: “In the course of four years I have seen the hill environment become
more denuded: stretches which formerly used to be jungly are so no longer.  More patches along
the road are blackened and used for swidden agriculture...” (1990a:135).  Throughout northern
Thailand, upland farmers have planted cabbages as a replacement crop for opium.  W hile
profitable, the environmental outcomes are claimed to be very severe – drying up of water
sources as watershed forests were cut; increased erosion and silting up of lowland farmers’
dams; and runoff of chemicals, especially pesticides, killing off fish and poisoning downstream
communities (Kaye 1990; Renard 1994; Lohmann 1999; Hutheesing 1999).  Upland-lowland
conflict over resources have become a severe social problem in northern Thailand, especially as it
is tinged with Thai prejudice against uplanders as outsiders, not part of the body of the Thai nation
through not being ethnically Thai, not speaking Thai, not being Buddhist (Gillogly 2004).  
Land alienation had become another feature of upland societies.  In Pang Khum, both
Lisu and Khon Mueang (ethnic Northern Thai) farmers have appropriated or bought Karen land
(Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992).  The Lisu were subject to such forces as well.  In 1985,
after an opium raid caused great economic hardship in See the Tiger Village, five Lisu households
planted tomatoes.  This crop sold well, in part because they had pre-existing trade connections
with lowland dealers.  Other Lisu households soon followed suit.  Those best positioned to try the
new crop were the older, wealthier households; they had sufficient labor, silver jewelry to pawn
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and cash from previous opium crops to undertake the costs and risks of tomato growing.  They
did fairly well, invested in trucks and more land, and continued to expand cultivation.  At the same
time, wealthier and well-connected (links to influential Thai, for instance) Lisu moved to the area,
attracted by the initial profitability of tomatoes.  The village doubled in size.  Poorer farming
households did not do as well.  They lost their land, selling it despite not having land deeds, to pay
debts from the failure of their tomato crops, and they were reduced to working as laborers on the
wealthier farmers’ tomato crops or at a coffee plantation set up by a Thai entrepreneur.  Land has
become a commodity (Hutheesing 1990a:172-173; Hutheesing 1999).  In Nam Long, Mae Hong
Son, a survey in 1982 indicated that 41% of farm households were in debt to private money-
lenders or merchants, usually in the form of cash credit against a portion of  the upcoming harvest
with crop price and quantity fixed in advance (Salzer 1993:25).  For all of the Project’s paternalistic
attitude toward the Lisu of Thirty Thousand, Lisu households there had at least been protected
from this profound economic disintegration.
One day I came across Susati, the Chinese agricultural leader, in his beautiful, multi-
storied, home garden – the pride of the Project – tearing up coffee bushes.  He told me had
decided, at last, that they were a waste of space, but they might make good firewood.  Others in
the village soon followed suit.  The first opium replacement crop introduced to the uplands was
coffee, in the 1970s, by a UN official named Richard Mann.  At that time, the goal was to find one
crop that could completely replace opium (Gillogly 2004); coffee was selling for a high price, it was
ecologically suitable, and so it was introduced throughout the opium-growing highlands. 
Unfortunately, it seems that every other Third W orld country on the globe decided to plant coffee
as well.  By the time the coffee plants bore fruit, a period of five years, coffee prices had
plummeted and upland farmers in Thailand never got a good profit from it.  There were also
problems with processing and shipping that reduced the quality of the coffee produced.  Every
crop tried had the potential to turn out a failure depending on the ecological suitability of the crop
to the mountains of northern Thailand and the complexities of world markets.  The instability of
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prices made household planning particularly difficult. Tomatoes, for instance, varied from 2-15
baht/kilo in one season.  Coffee was selling for the equivalent 0.02 USD/pound.  Mangoes,
potatoes, mushrooms – all varied from high to very low prices, dependent upon the season, thus
the ripeness and quantity of the item in the market.  Produce, unlike opium, could not be saved for
sale later.  At times, a disconsolate farmer came back with a truckload of mangoes or potatoes
that he couldn’t sell, at least not for any price that made sense to him, and he brought his produce
back rather than sell it at such a severe loss.    
The conditions of selling cash crops had changed considerably.  Farmers had to develop
contacts with lowland Thai middlemen and take their crops to market themselves.  I occasionally
saw middlemen come to the village, but their trips did not always coincide with the harvests or
household needs.  To get a better price and take their crops to market expeditiously, farmers had
to depend on trucks to take the crops themselves and to buy rice and other household supplies
when needed.  The means of production had come to include trucks to transport produce and
motorcycles to get to far away fields, and this required a significant allocation of household
resources to achieve.  Kowboi’s faction’s (the Yipha lineage, of which Kowboi was the head) used
truck cost 120,000 baht ($4,800 USD in the exchange rate in the early 1990s); it took several
years to pay off.  Trucks and motorcycles also required gasoline and regular maintenance,
especially given the dust and mud on the poorly maintained roads; payments and maintenance for
one truck and one motorcycle could come to 100,000 baht ($4,000 USD) annually (Ramitanondh
and Somsawasdi 1992:177), thus about half as much as buying the vehicle itself.  Poor
households who did not have trucks were dependent on wealthier ones to transport their goods,
which meant increased cost in getting goods to market (a fee of about 1 baht/kilo), not having
control over getting perishable produce to market expeditiously, and the fact of being dependent
on others.  There were two to three trucks in Revealed River Village; each Lisu faction owned its
own.  Aside from the risks inherent in vehicle ownership (maintenance, accidents), Lisu villagers
were also at risk of having their trucks confiscated if they were found to be carrying contraband,
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such as opium.  A truck owned by a Mae Salaa villager (a satellite village to Revealed River) was
confiscated within a year of its purchase due to opium being found on a passenger in the truck. 
As upland ethnic minority people, they were subject to frequent checks by authorities. Clearly
trucks were risky investments, but they were perceived by the Lisu of Revealed River as
necessary to avoid creating dependencies on other households or allegiance groups, or paying
too high a percentage of the crop’s market value to truck owners.  Owning a truck was key to
maintaining a degree of autonomy in keeping with Lisu practice.  
 Other potential costs to production included irrigation.  Studies in other areas indicate
that transition from the opium economy required water storage and supply systems (Salzer
1993:200), and in other parts of the mountains I observed elaborate, even mechanized, irrigation
systems, which doubtless added considerably to the capital inputs required for irrigation.  The
practice favored households with both the cash to build such a system and connections with
influential Thai to prevent alienation of the land by the state or claim jumpers.  Irrigation on any
large scale was rare in Revealed River, due to forestry restrictions, but many farmers did attempt
to grow crops on small fields just below water sources by running ordinary irrigation hoses into
their fields. 
Farming in Revealed River in the 1990s required considerable managerial skill and wide
knowledge to know what to plant when and where.  Management skills were, in fact, the highest
predictor of farming success in a nearby upland village cluster (Salzer 1993:490-43); the skills of a
mature household head with sufficient managerial experience and knowledge were often essential
to the economic viability of a household (Cain 1978:427).  The risks were great.  Lisu farmers
experienced great insecurity and increased dependency on the leadership of a senior farmer. 
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Temporal and Spatial Constraints of the New Agricultural Cycle
In addition to the new knowledge and increased risks of opium replacement, Lisu
households also faced problems with allocation of labor due to changes in the agricultural cycle
and cropping patterns.  These were both temporal and spatial.  
Temporal Patterns, Old and New
Opium had been congruent with other elements of agriculture.  For instance, at Evil
Peaks in 1969-1970 (Dessaint 1972a:64-76), the pattern was:
< Clearing of fields began in February and burning occurred in the dry months of March and
April.  
< Corn was planted from late March to early May.
< Rice was planted somewhat later in May and June, when the rains had begun.  
< Corn was harvested in July through September, starting with sweet corn for human
consumption and followed by ‘Indian’ corn for livestock, particularly pigs.
< Corn and rice were weeded only once, June and July for corn and July and August for
rice.  
< Opium was planted in the corn fields after the corn had been harvested, starting in
September.  The corn stalks helped to protect the tiny poppy seedlings from washing
away until they were established.  
< Rice was harvested and threshed in October and November.
< Opium was harvested in from mid-December to mid-February.
< W hile harvest periods did not coincide, note that poppy took a lot of work, particularly in
weeding the tiny seedlings.  Opium was weeded several times throughout the growing
period.  This conflicted with the reaping and threshing of rice and represented a
bottleneck.  
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< In addition, other vegetables were planted around the edges of these fields, particularly
the corn fields or mixed with vegetables.  These vegetables included: sesame, beans,
tomatoes, mustard greens, taro, green beans, potatoes, mushrooms, cucumber,
pumpkins, red and black beans, sunflowers, gourds, yams, parsley, onions, and peas,
with harvest starting in August and peaking in February (there was a shortage of fresh
vegetables from May to June, but Lisu preserved fermented bamboo shoots and other
vegetables for these times).  Some of the vegetables might have been marketed,
depending on local demand.  As described in Chapter 2, Lisu were sensitive to local
markets in what they chose to plant, whether corn, poppy, rice, cotton, sesame, tobacco,
gourds, cotton, and even potatoes for a British garrison (Scott and Hardiman 1983 II:(11)
355; George 1915).  
Theoretically, the end of opium cultivation should have meant more time and labor for
rice, but it did not.  The replacement cash crops conflicted with the planting schedule of rice far
more than opium ever had.  Note, for instance, that some of the 1990s cash crops in Revealed
River had once been catch crops in Evil Peaks in 1969-1970 – potatoes, mushrooms, beans,
which could previously have been harvested as-needed throughout the rice harvest.  Other cash
crops, such as tomatoes (at See the Tiger) or taro (at Revealed River), could be grown in the off-
season, but like so many off-season cash crops, they required irrigation from March-May.  
In certain respects, the agricultural cycle had not changed much.  However, none of the
replacement cash crops was able to supercede opium in temporal congruency with rice and corn
and no optimal cropping patterns that could compete with rice/corn/opium had been developed
(Salzer 1993:91).  Of all the cash crops, only barley filled the temporal position left by opium
cultivation.  This was especially congruent with the Lisu annual ritual cycle.  One of the
advantages of opium had been that opium immediately preceded New Year so that cash was
available to buy pigs, alcohol, and new clothes (see also Hutheesing 1990a).  In contrast, even if
the barley crop was harvested before New Year, the company and the Project (through which
 This strategy was practicable as all rituals are set by a lunar calendar.  It was inherently flexible53
and even in the remembered past there was the potential for local divergence.  Normally, all of the
senior men of the neighborhood would have agreed to the time for the New Year celebration.  In
this case, the economic exigencies of late payment served as good motive for setting an alternate
date.  That it did not coordinate with celebrations at Revealed River was of little concern, as that
village had been formed after a feud with the Laoyipha lineage (that of the headman) drove these
families out of Revealed River. The head of the new village had formerly been the servitor of the
Village Guardian Spirit and had the ritual authority to claim his interpretation of the calendar to be
legitimate.  As will be seen later, this event was also interpreted as the desire of the village to
attract as many marriageable young men as possible to their celebrations.  
  As farmers hid opium from the gaze of the state, it was also hidden from the inquiries of the54
researcher.  Evidence for opium cultivation was often indirect – it could rarely be verified, at least
not without the risk of endangering the villagers (and, quite frankly, myself).  However, indirect
information was available.  This was often in the sub rosa comments of those who wanted to get
some one else in trouble (not the best source of information) or, ideally, of those who genuinely
want to explain how things are.  In my case, it became part of an ongoing discourse of arguing for
the return of opium as the only crop that gave people any hope of security and economic stability. 
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payments were distributed) did not release the proceeds until months later.  One year, this
resulted in one of the smaller and poorer villages in the Thirty Thousand cluster to postpone New
Year by a month in hopes of receiving their payments in time to buy new clothes and put on a
reputable display.   53
Transformations of Spatial Patterns
Spatially, the system had also become more diverse and disaggregated.  Trucks and
motorcycles allowed people to maintain fields in several different districts.  There were two main
domains of activity carried out at these more distant sites: concealed opium cultivation  and54
cattle-herding.  
As is common in the interdiction of production, small holders had responded by breaking
up and extending their cultivation to smaller, hidden, and more distant sites, a sort of
“geographical substitution” (Tullis 1995:110-111).  In northern Thailand, experts referred to this as
a balloon effect, as when a partially filled balloon is squeezed between the fingers.  In Revealed
River, some farmers planted fields over the border in Burma.  There were also patches of land
north and west of the village that were not well mapped by the RFD, and a number of small opium
fields were reported to be planted there.  Until recently, Revealed River households had managed
  One rai equaled 1,500 square meters; 2.53 rai equals one acre.  55
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to plant small fields closer to the village and avoid prosecution by claiming personal use if caught,
but the presence of the soldiers and, later, the expulsion of the opium users had put an end to
that.  In Pang Khum in the 1980s, households kept distant fields in Pai district (up the road a bit
from the entrance to Thirty Thousand) (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992:203).  Ideally, a
married son and his wife were sent to work such fields.  Throughout the agricultural season in
Revealed River, young and middle-aged men would disappear for a week or more, and I was told
they had gone to look after such distant fields.  Not all distant fields were opium fields, by the way;
acquiring land in a variety of places was a means of securing future land rights against the
possibility that they would be forcibly removed from Revealed River as well as a strategy to spread
the risk of crop failure given the sometimes extreme variation in weather conditions among
different ecozones in the mountains.  
Elsewhere, levels of income provided indirect evidence of opium cultivation.  Households
in an upland village Nam Long Mae Hong Son, 1989-1990) had farm incomes below subsistence. 
Other sources indicated 600 rai  under opium cultivation.  W hen the income for this was55
included, the “new” average income level for low-yield farmers rose to a level very close to the
levels of income needed for subsistence (2,000 baht).  On average, very little opium was needed
to achieve subsistence – 0.7 rai (0.11 ha.) of opium were sufficient.  Poor households needed
1.66 rai; it was likely that poor farming households were far more likely to cultivate opium (Salzer
1993:81).  This corresponds with my observations; poorer households tended to travel much
further, even as far as Burma, to cultivate supplementary fields.  Specific size of fields were
indeterminable.  Lisu referred to their land holdings as “plots” of land without regard to size.  
The other element in centripetal tendencies in land use was in cattle raising.  W hile a few
cattle had been kept in earlier times, cattle raising had expanded considerably in Revealed River. 
Cattle served as a capital reserve, a sort of insurance substitute that could be liquidated to cover
unexpected costs.  Some farmers had as many as 40 head of cattle.  This was a point of
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contention with the RFD, however.  W hile initially suggested as a good income supplement that
was environmentally sound, the RFD soon realized that herds of cattle devastated their
reforestation projects and banned cattle herding.  A few cattle were kept in the forests around the
village, but not many.  Larger herds were kept in regions outside of the Project’s jurisdiction, such
as Pai (northwest of the village) and along the path east down to Chiang Dao.  Sometimes young
men watched over the herds, but in most cases, Lahu laborers were hired or agistment
arrangements made with a poor Lahu village just outside of the Project’s control.  In Pang Khum,
there was an agistment system between the Lisu and Karen, and sometimes between Lisu and
lowland Khon Mueang (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992).  Such herds were a sizable
investment and a potentially valuable form of capital accumulation.  Large numbers of cattle might
be sold for bridewealth for a son.  The risks were, of course, insecurity of land tenure for pasture
land, cattle disappearing due to theft or poor management, and disease.  
Summary
The main difference between the agricultural economy of 1990s Revealed River Village
and those villages observed in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the end of opium cultivation as
it had existed then in northern Thailand.  Opium had not completely disappeared, but it did not
exist as in the earlier part of the twentieth century in northern Thailand.  It could only be planted in
distant, small, hidden fields or over the border in Burma.  Despite the hopes of international drug
interdiction programs, no one replacement crop had arisen.  It is doubtful that opium is
replaceable by any other crop, no matter how high value (Salzer 1993:231).  Rather, households
experimented with a plethora of cash crops, only one of which fulfilled the time gap in the
agricultural cycle left by opium (barley) and none of which fulfilled either its economic or ecological
advantages.  All required significant capital inputs (fertilizer, pesticide, fungicide, or irrigation) for
growing.  All required capital to take advantage of markets (trucks).  All depended on good
infrastructure (roads) for transport in order to sell their crops.  All required sophisticated
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knowledge of a complex and virtually unknowable market and the skill to negotiate with Thai
middlemen.  In this context, the emphasis within households on educating their children made
sense.  The disaggregation of land holdings further increased the opportunity costs of production. 
This meant that households had to find the labor to go off to distant fields or pastures for a week
at a time.  
Crops were far more expensive to produce and the means of production were not open to
everyone due to the labor and capital investments needed.  Commercial farming systems often
seriously widened social and economic disparities among farmers because of differentials in
ability to invest capital and withstand risk.  Poorer households could not afford a failed or
unprofitable crop for even one year, especially if they took out loans to buy the seeds and
chemical inputs needed (Cuc, Gillogly and Rambo 1990; Van Keer et al. 1998:10).  That is, risks
increased due to unpredictable production and markets and the high investments required, and
these risks fell on households inequitably; wealthier households could weather poor production
and low market prices because they had enough resources to cover the costs of the high
investments for a year.  Similarly, access to labor, particularly relatively specialized labor in terms
of driving and maintaining trucks, knowing how to plant new crops, and negotiating in the markets,
was not equitably distributed across households.  Those households with enough adult or near-
adult men had a significant advantage.  
W hat land was available was over-used and could not support upland dry rice sufficient
for household subsistence.  Because subsistence was more difficult to achieve, households had
become even more dependent on markets, while at the same time they had to depend on less
ecologically and economically reliable cash crops.  The irony of this was that households had
become increasingly dependent on the market for subsistence at a time when they had to rely on
crops that were not as high-value/unit of weight as was opium.  Farmers increased production of
cash crops to make up the difference, resulting in further over-use of land in many parts of
northern Thailand.  Although over-use in Revealed River Village was limited due to Project
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restrictions, households with the means had extended their cultivation out to areas beyond the
limits of the Project. 
Land Tenure
Land had once been a free resource and the capital investment for agriculture was small. 
This underlay the profound egalitarianism of Lisu society.  Anyone who wanted to establish an
independent, autonomous household had only to work – go out and clear land, plant crops, and
harvest them.  Alternately, they could obtain fallowed or previously cleared land for use by
presenting a bottle of liquor to the “owner” of the land, the person who had cleared it.  However,
given migration patterns, it was not common to have to use fallow lands.  In such a context, there
was no dependency or inheritance of significant resources within households or kin groups.  All of
this changed with the insertion of state control into the uplands. 
Forestry Policy and Planning 
By the 1990s, the Royal Forest Department (RFD) controlled huge swathes of land
throughout the mountains of the north.  All along the roads were RFD signs declaring their control
of an area.  Since W orld W ar II, the story of forests had been one of progressive alienation of
rural land by the state. In 1941, the Forest Act declared certain forested lands to be state land
without regard for existing villages. The Land Code Act of 1954 further asserted state control over
the uplands.  For mountain villages, only paddy fields were potentially recognized as being
privately owned, but the owners had to request recognition. Two years later, the Ministry of the
Interior extended state control when it declared that land within 40 meters of the foot of a hill was
considered state land and could not be used.  In all of these cases, mountain peoples were
unaware of such laws or unable to navigate the bureaucracy for land title if they did understand,
and so most never requested recognition.  The process of land alienation proceeded further with
the Reserved Forest Act of 1964, which separated uplanders from the control of forest resources
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in favor of the state. This act gave the government control over resources that it had never
controlled before, despite the long-term management of forests by local communities
(Ganjanaphan 1987; W un'Gaeo 1992:19).  
The National Forest Reserves Act of 1964 initiated a Forest Reserves Classification
system restricting agriculture and illegal logging, but also exploitation of items collected in the
forest.  The 1968 National Reserved Forests Act detailed punishments for destruction of forest.
For instance, cutting trees on more than 25 rai or causing damage to a water source or stream
could result in imprisonment of one to seven years plus a fine of between five and fifty thousand
baht (Cooper 1984:260). The schedule of crime and punishment was devastating to a small
farmer who depended on swiddening for his livelihood.  Upland minority people have been jailed
for this crime as they have for planting opium or transporting heroin.  By 1985, the Forest
Reserves Classification (including W atershed Classifications) was completed.  Forty-two percent
of Thailand’s land area was allocated to the forest reserves class; since by 1990, nearly 70% of
Thailand’s remaining forests were in the north, due to its inaccessibility, restrictions fell heavily on
farmers there.  By 1988, the Royal Forestry Department claimed 31 wild life sanctuaries
(2,470,054 ha) and 22 parks (1,136,543.5 ha) existed, pending approval.  If the National Forestry
Policy were fully implemented, then 1,048,566 ha more would be designated as conservation
forests (W un'Gaeo 1992:14).  
The W atershed Classifications further determined restrictions on land according to slope,
land form, elevation, soil, geology and forest cover.  Land with 30% slope or over was classified
as Class 1A W atershed land, on which no settlement or exploitation of forest products whatsoever
was to take place.  In northern Thailand, in the basin of four tributary rivers, 27% of land was
classified as Class 1A W atershed.  Class 1A W atershed land is considered headwater source
land, with high elevations and steep slopes that were to be kept under permanent forest cover;
Class 1B land was a subclass for areas already partially cleared for cultivation (Royal Forest
Department 1993:182).  The effect was to further restrict land available to upland minority people
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and most upland farmers were suddenly classified as illegal settlers.  By the early 1990's it was
estimated that 10-12 million persons, equivalent to 25% of the rural population in Thailand, were
living on land that was classified as forest reserves (Phongpaichit and Baker 1999:63).  Forcible
removal had of upland ethnic minority peoples had occurred (Kammerer 1988; Eudey 1989;
Lohmann 1999).  
These were meant to protect the nation’s water supply; the northern uplands are
particularly important to agriculture in the Central Plains as the main four tributaries of the Chao
Phraya River originate there.  However, little effort was made to correlate the classification with
actual land-use or topographic characteristics (Phongpaichit and Baker 1999:62).  In particular,
the maps used were of a very broad scale, so that the entire north was classified Class 1A
W atershed without regard for the numerous gentler slopes and valleys along streams, creeks and
rivers, that could be cultivated without endangering the watershed (Horst W eyerhauser, 1993,
personal communication).  
A former director of the Hill Tribes Research Center wrote that “the principle hill tribe
problem is deforestation and Government policy rooted in this” (Bhruksasri 1981).  In fact,
deforestation was more rapid in the Northeast and other regions than it was in the North, and
much deforestation was due to illegal timbering by businesses, not swiddening by mountain
peoples (see table in Bhruksasri 1981).  Nevertheless, the director accepted the necessity of
relocation of populations in accordance with the W atershed Classifications.  Upland minority
peoples such as the Lisu continued to be blamed as the primary culprits in deforestation and
downstream flooding and siltation.  
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Consequences for Land Tenure in Revealed River Village
Projects throughout the mountains that had once focused on opium interdiction began to
focus on watershed conservation in the 1980s.  Throughout northern Thailand, upland ethnic
minorities were declared squatters as the mountains were “enclosed” by the Royal Forestry
Department.  They could not obtain title deeds for the land they cultivated and lived on; they could
not legally sell the land, although land often was sold to ‘influential persons’; and they could not
use the land as collateral for loans that would be necessary for intensifying agricultural production. 
Land was no longer free and the Lisu of the Thirty Thousand cluster were illegal residents on the
land.   
The Project itself, a Joint UN/Thai Program project, had developed unique ways of
dealing with the problems of uplanders.  It was so successful that it was taken as a model for the
Roh Foh Toh (Accelerated W atershed Forest Rehabilitation) regional comprehensive program for
watershed management.  The Project attempted to bring about substantial changes in the
adaptive strategies of the uplanders under its control, both in terms of ending opium cultivation
and by addressing the severe social and environmental problems these changes caused.  It
subsidized the agricultural transition and protected ‘their’ villagers from eviction (which had
happened over the years to other farmers in both the north and the northeast; one case is
described in Eudey 1989).  Nevertheless, the combination of destruction of the economic base of
Lisu society and the restriction of access to land had made land a scarce resource for Revealed
River and other Thirty Thousand villagers. 
The Lisu in northern Thailand had practiced a very long fallow.  This means that they
required at least eight times as much land as was actually under cultivation to maintain
sustainability and maintain rice production levels (Van Keer et al. 1998:45-49).  To give an idea of
the area of land required, the average farmer in Nam Long required more than 100-150 rai  to
accommodate a seven to ten year fallow (Salzer 1993:130), albeit with larger households.  Lisu in
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northern Thailand tended to be “pioneering” swiddeners, defined as opening new lands; but what
it meant in practice was that they did not consistently re-use their own fallow lands.  
But the first lands to be taken over by the RFD tended to be fallow fields.  In RFD terms,
this was degraded land, spoiled by the wasteful cultivation practices of the hill tribes, and they
were there to save and rehabilitate it by reforestation, most often planting pine plantations.  Lisu
farmers in the Thirty Thousand cluster complained deeply about having had fallow land reforested
to pine plantations by the RFD.  Farmers’ categories of land and those of land-use planners can
differ considerably (Perz and W alker 2002).  In this case, government land policy thwarted local
land use planning.  W hat a Lisu farmer categorized as fallow land for future use was defined by
the RFD as degraded land and thus available and appropriate for reforestation.  The conflict
contributed to overuse of land as farmers attempted to maintain control of land by working it far
past when they judged it ready to be fallowed.  This likely accounts for the sense RFD and Project
personnel had that Lisu were constitutional liars in claiming land.  This was a point of violent
conflict between farmers and RFD officials in the early days of watershed development projects in
northern Thailand (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992:213; Tan-Kim-Yong, Limchoowong and
Gillogly 1994).  
One of the great advances of the Project was to recognize that upland farmers needed
land.  As Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong has put it, conflict arose over different strategies, goals, and
forms of discourse.  Foresters prioritized trees; upland farmers saw land on which they could grow
crops to feed their families (Tan-Kim-Yong 1992).  The founder of the Project recognized the
validity of farmers’ needs and set about to help create an agricultural system that would allow
them to stay on restricted land.  One of the policies of the Project was to allocate land to each
household – they were to be allowed 15 rai, a little less than 6 acres, and learn how to live
sustainably on this amount of land by planting perennial crops.  The 15 rai lim it had not yet been
enforced at the time of my research, and some staff were hazy about the exact amount when I
questioned them about it, but the potential land limits were constantly talked about by agents of
191
the Project in meetings with villagers and they monitored villagers’ farm plots frequently, trying to
forbid villagers from opening any new land at all.  Late one afternoon, riding into the village with a
forestry/UN community organizer, we saw a small plot of trees cleared not far from the road.  The
CO was openly furious, unusual for a Thai, and as soon as we reached the village he leapt out of
the car and marched straight to the culprits’ house to yell at them.  In this case, the household had
gotten permission from another forestry official to clear that plot on the grounds that it had been
their field in the past.  But I also heard of other incidents in which a household had cleared a plot
only to be ‘discovered’ by forestry officials and forced to abandon it.  For forestry officials, it was
always about catching the Lisu villagers in a lie about their land use.  For the villagers, it was
about using land to which they believed they had a right under pre-existing Lisu tenure systems. 
There was a continuous cat-and-mouse game going on as farmers attempted to evade Project
scrutiny and establish new fields.  The issue of land holdings was so politicized that I was unable
to measure household land resources.  In addition, the scattering of household plots across the
landscape of northern Thailand made such quantification unfeasible.  However, general
information on who was land poor or land rich was frequently discussed by villagers and Project
personnel.  
W hile Project policy was to involve villagers more closely in such land use decisions, in
fact the centralized, Bangkok-focused nature of policy development meant that Lisu did not feel
that they were listened to or had any power to influence such decisions.  W ith the use of GIS, the
RFD hoped to make an end-run around the participation of upland farmers.  The goal of the RFD
was to preserve or rehabilitate watershed forests, which meant preserving or replacing forest
cover on ridges, and if a particular Lisu household tended to have their fields in such locations,
they lost the fields.  In short, rights to land access became state controlled.  The end effect, and
unintended consequence, of state land policies toward mountain forests resulted in a bias toward
founding families in Revealed River who had had a high number of productive laborers at the time
the new land tenure system was concretized from usufruct by labor to a closer approximation of
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ownership and permanence.  As Perz and W alker point out, foresters and land use planners
rarely consider the role of “household life cycle” in planning (Perz and W alker 2002).  
Lisu households in Revealed River therefore undertook a number of strategies to
increase their land holdings and keeping access to them.  Some households with sufficient labor
acquired land in other districts, outside of the Project’s boundaries and in areas in which there
were no reserved forests.  Some bought, others used kin ties.  Some had gone so far as to open
lands in Burma, although this was highly risky given the state of constant warfare that exists there. 
W hile there was no outright conflict over control of land, those wealthy in land attempted to horde
and hide it as much as possible.  This was not only because of their needs for land in the present
time, but because of their concerns about the future of their children’s households. 
Tensions arose in other ways, however.  One day a 19 year old unmarried woman,
Alema, looked down on Susati’s home garden with disgust.  “That’s our land and he took it,” she
said, “if he didn’t have it, we wouldn’t have to walk so far to our fields and we could have all those
fruit trees because of the water.”  According to her, her father had opened that land when he first
came to the village but eventually abandoned it in part because it was too close to the village and
prone to the depredations of livestock, which was still a point of much conflict. 
The model advocated by the Project was of small, permanent home gardens.  Home
gardens, common in densely-populated parts of Southeast Asia, were multi-layered plantings of
fruit trees, bushes, and herbs, watered by a pond and with pigs penned above the pond where
their feces would feed fish (Everett, Gillogly and Rambo 1990).  In mainland Southeast Asia, this
was most common in heavily Chinese influenced areas.  Susati was ethnic Chinese and perhaps
for that reason adopted this form of agriculture very quickly.  Alema’s family kept a lot of livestock,
including a large herd of cattle, some of which were kept around the village.  Alema’s family’s
pigs, cattle, and chicken, never kept penned, often broke into Susati’s garden and ate his corn,
causing much conflict between the two families.  In such matters, Susati had the upper hand
because of his superior connections with the Project – he was their model farmer whose garden
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was displayed to visitors to the Project.  But while Lisu conflict resolution practice would have
been for the owner of the culprit animals to recompense the field owner for damage, Alema’s
household was able to argue successfully that no one had seen their cattle in the garden. 
However, the argument within Alema’s family’s household was that it was their land anyhow. 
Particular types of land had become more valuable.  Land near water sources allowed
farmers to grow crops even in the dry season, particularly to keep fruit trees, for although fruit
trees were often advocated as a form of community forestry ecologically appropriate to the
mountains as they replicated the forest, the truth was that they required water throughout the year. 
In my reading of other development project reports, every ‘model farm’ mentioned was located
near a water supply (cf. data in Van Keer et al. 1998:21).  W hether a household had access to
such land has had to do with how early they settled an area and the size of their family when they
settled, as well as their agricultural practices at that time.  
Land near the bottoms of slopes with good soil were also highly valued, both for their
fertility and because the Project actively advocated farming in such low-slope valley bottoms as
being less prone to erosion.  Thus, a household that had control of such land was virtually
guaranteed that they would not lose it.  Revealed River Village was placed just above one such
micro-valley and the bottom lands were heavily farmed.  The owners tended to be the Chinese,
however, as well as some of Headman Red’s lineage.  Kowboi’s lineage did not have any such
land, and nor did Headman Red’s older brother or Headman Red himself.  Thus, their land
holdings were less secure and far more spread out.  In such cases, political connections such as
Headman Red’s became important in maintaining land rights.  
I want to note here a phenomenon particular to people’s existence under the control of a
government project.  That is, many households attempted to keep at least one ‘model farm’ close
in for display, but no matter how productive that garden they almost always kept other, far less
approved, farms in other locations.  Again, a similar example comes from a development report
on the model farm of an Akha farmer in Chiang Rai.  He had a beautiful, integrated, diversified
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field and he hosted many visitors to learn from his farm.  But he had another field on the other
side of the mountain in an area known as “the cabbage valley,” where he grew cabbages in a less
ecologically perfect but more financially rewarding fashion (Van Keer et al. 1998:21).  Susati’s
garden was also renowned and countless “development picnickers” visited it.  But the fact was
that Susati could not sustain his family on that garden.  He was stubborn in refusing to undertake
any unapproved farming practices elsewhere.  In essence, he supplemented his family’s income
by constantly going on “seminar,” attending workshops and conferences held by the RFD in which
he spoke to other farmers about his agricultural practices.  He was paid for this, and much of his
household’s food was purchased in town while he was on these trips.  
The new agroecosystem as put into place by the Project did not provide subsistence for
upland households during the time I was there.  The transition to a new form of agriculture based
on both expunging of opium and restriction of access to mountain lands was delicate and
demanding.  The Lisu of Revealed River recognized the inherent contradictions in a system
dependent on producing for the market induced by a Project whose philosophy advocated self-
subsistence.  From their point of view of everyday practical experience, they were more
dependent on markets than under the opium economy, and their household’s subsistence far
more tenuous than the “bad old days” formed by the Project’s depiction of the past.  Primary
among these concerns was, always, getting enough land – not only for themselves but for their
children’s future.  The difficulty of getting land for their children’s future households was a constant
topic of conversation even for parents with children nowhere near the age of marriage.  As Kowboi
told me, “W e have enough land for now, ajarn (professor), but there’s nothing for our children. 
How are they going to get food?  How are they going to work?”  I heard this time again from even
unmarried young adults in the village.  They saw the Project’s proposed 15 rai per household land
allocation as untenable, especially in the context of the RFD and Project personnel’s continued
failure to recognize the Lisu land tenure system, in which the ownership of an abandoned field
remained with the household that had cleared and most recently cropped it.  The Project also
195
failed to recognize the nature of the developmental cycle of the household; they shrugged off
questions about future land allocations.  All of this made household planning very difficult, and no
household could guarantee from year to year that they would have access to enough land, much
less be able to help newly-married couples set up their own household and fields.  All had to be
approved by Project personnel.
Inter-Generational Land Transfers and Intra-Household Relationships
Land constraints had made inheritance significant in household strategies and everyday
discourse.  Getting land to establish a new household took far more strategizing in 1990s
Revealed River Village.  Potential new households became more dependent on their parents’
help.  At some point in the near future, they understood, no household would be allowed to open
new land and each household would be required to provide for new households from existing
parcels.  
These uncertainties about the availability of land shifted the significance of inter-
generational wealth transfers, particularly in regard to land.  In the past, inter-generational transfer
of wealth (not inheritance) occurred at two points.  One was at marriage in the payment of
bridewealth on behalf of sons or gifts of silver jewelry to daughters.  The other was when the
married couple, with one or two young children, moved into their own house, usually when a
younger brother married.  The parents and resident siblings helped in building the house and
generally had contributed labor in developing the fields that would sustain the new household. 
This happened with each adult child in turn, but the youngest son stayed on with his parents. 
Upon the death of his father, the youngest son inherited the household’s land and whatever silver
rupees remained from previous wealth transfers to siblings in marriage prestations (Hutheesing
1990a:165); the groom’s mother would stay on in the household of her youngest son and his wife
until her death.  Due to field rotation and migration, the fields a son ‘inherited’ from his parents
were not part of an accumulated household stock; rather, the youngest son, his wife, and children,
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were likely to have opened and worked those fields themselves, even if they were considered the
fields belonging to the head of the household (the father).  Inheritance, therefore, had been
relatively insubstantial and would not have given the youngest son a significant advantage over his
siblings.  
By the 1990s, the possibility of inheritance had gained new significance.  W ith land at a
premium and people staying not only in the same village but re-using the same fields, land
became a significant source of wealth and inheriting his parents’ households’ land gave the
youngest son a significant advantage in setting up an independent household capable of fulfilling
its social obligations and establishing repute.  Specific collateral consequences for relationships
between older and younger brothers arose out of this situation.  
Lisu households were organized on an ideology of seniority, leading to a structurally
formed tension between oB and yB.  An elder brother was to be obeyed and respected, and even
stood in loco parentis when the father was away, to be obeyed in the same way as the father
(Lewis and Lewis 1984:258).  In turn, the oB was to help and care for his yB; Dessaint recounts
the great anger when a man went to his oB for help and was denied.  This precipitated the yB’s
decision to migrate out of the village (Dessaint 1972a:37).  The structure of sibling seniority was
carried over to the wives of brothers.  The wife of the yB was expected to kowtow to the wife of
the oB and speak respectfully toward her.  The wife of the youngest brother married was assigned
the dirtiest drudge-work, including washing the corpse of the mother-in-law (Hutheesing
1990a:125, 160).  The elder brother held the formal authority; but countervailing principles of this
dynamic are illustrated in a myth recounted by Maitra for Lisu in northeastern India (recent
migrants from northern Burma).  
The oB was weak, his wife gave birth every year, and he was poor.  His yB, an
expert hunter and cultivator who helped others with labor and money, often spoke
badly of his oB to everyone who would listen.  He was rebuked for this by, in turn,
the headman, an old woman, and a young man in the village.  The yB decided to
test his oB.  He invited a friend and his oB to hunt with him, but promised only the
friend some meat.  The yB hunted a bear, killed it, smeared himself with its blood,
and lay on the forest floor as if dead.  The friend came and only expressed anger
that there was nothing to eat.  His oB came and cried for him.  At this proof of his
  Some might argue that Maitra’s data are inappropriate here in because these people are56
missionized Black Lisu living in India.  However, I found his work on kinship relations in keeping
with other literature on kin relations in the household and with my own observations of
relationships between oB and yB.  Furthermore, he recounts a series of myths and stories that
illustrate kin relations more succinctly than other sources. 
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brother’s loyalty, the yB jumped up and embraced his brother, and from that time
forward they lived together peacefully and cooperatively, the yB respecting and
helping his oB in all things (Maitra 1993:68-69).  56
From the perspective taken here, the tension here arose not from competition over the
resources of the natal household, but were inherent in disjunction created by the expectations of
seniority, each person’s right to autonomy,  and the progression of the household developmental
cycle.  An older brother has the authority of age, but having started a family before his younger
brother faces the constraints of a young family with children to feed.  He can not fully meet the
expectations of repute.  The younger brother, with fewer obligations, has the resources to put into
building social relationships.  Even so, his contempt for his brother goes against Lisu social
mores.  It is a cautionary tale, for he learns that his older brother is more loyal to him than a friend,
and his learns to respect the older brother’s authority.  
The formal structure of Lisu kinship ideology and expected behavior created an inherent
conflictual tendency for those in the social positions of oB and yB, given the ideology of age
hierarchy and countervailing principle of autonomy, but under the opium economy the structural
contradictions of age hierarchy/autonomy and its expression in the interests of older and younger
brothers had had few practical consequences since brothers might well not have lived with, or
even near, each other.  Outright tension was only likely to come into play in particular cases, such
as the death of the father and the eldest son taking on the father’s role toward unmarried younger
brothers.  In such cases, younger sons were likely to complain of their older brother’s
unwillingness to take on the responsibility of providing bridewealth or otherwise helping them to
achieve their own household.  Myths and legends spoke of these dynamics, particularly the
closeness of an elder and younger brother destroyed through rivalry over a marriage (cf. Rose
and Brown 1911:253).  In fact, if the parents died before the youngest son was married, the elder
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brothers were likely to take the resources of the parental household.  Younger sons complained
about their elder brothers not looking after them properly or helping them with bridewealth in the
absence of the parents (Maitra 1988; Maitra 1993) and an older brother who was aggressive in
asserting his position could inherit the major part of the deceased household’s silver and other
wealth (Dessaint 1972a:131).  Headman Red, for instance, had a young brother, but when their
father died, Red took over the household and its resources, portioning out resources to his
younger brothers.  One of these brothers was forthrightly uninterested in power; the youngest was
too young to be married and thus to manage a household himself.  However, Red apparently
portioned out the household resources generously, as neither younger brother ever complained
and they were, in fact, close allies to him in all public and economic undertakings.
W ith changes in land tenure, the balance of power of the two positions – the ideological
power of the authority of the elder brother with relatively little power to control vs. the potential
material advantage of the youngest brother – had shifted toward the younger brother.  This was
evidenced in Revealed River by the fact that all of the young men born in to the village (i.e., not
sons-in-law) who had disappeared turned out, on examination, to be elder brothers, lost to drugs
or the heroin trade.  This can be understood in part through oB/yB dynamics.  The pressures on
oBs in setting up a new household were greater in that they did not have the advantages of
potential inheritance access to land and capital that the youngest brother did.  However, there was
an element of cyclical household developmental time here.  Older brothers were put into the
pressures of establishing an autonomous household before younger brothers.  As will be
discussed in the next section, young households faced great difficulties in providing subsistence
for their families.  Under the opium economy, households with inadequate labor were able to
compensate in part through growing opium and hiring cheap labor from opium addicts in other
ethnic groups (Durrenberger 1976c:636-640; Durrenberger 1983b:221-224).  They still faced this
impetus in the 1990s (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992; Salzer 1993:74), but faced much
greater risks of having, at the least, fields destroyed, and at worst, being arrested.  Still worse, as
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opium production in northern Thailand had decreased, heroin trafficking out of Burma had taken
its place.  Many Lisu young men became involved as transporters of heroin as an alternative to
opium production in order to supplement insufficient household income (Hutheesing 1999).  They
thus faced greater risks from addiction to heroin or incarceration for life.  In either case, they faded
away from public view, never fulfilling the cultural expectations of household repute and leaving
their wife and children far poorer than a household in which the father was the head of household. 
Younger brothers, when they did mentioned the invisible older brother, spoke of them off-
handedly, with contempt.  
The contradictions and ambiguities in the role of brothers, constituted through layers of
cultural meaning, were transformed but not changed – that is, the same initial dynamics gave rise
to different consequences.  The idea role of oB as superior to yB had not changed, but as oBs
were unable to fulfill cultural expectations, the result was conditions in which yBs had structured
advantage in access to the resources of the parental household.  This was particularly true of the
youngest brother, if he was married (by Lisu definition an adult) and lived in his father’s household
at his father’s death.  This was the effect of historical time on the cyclical time of the household
developmental cycle and the socially constructed positions of people in the household (yB, oB,
parents, children) (cf. Chelcea 2003; Heald 1991); the intersection of the cycling of people in and
out of roles was transformed by the historical forces of international drug policy and national
watershed conservation.  
Modern Children, Traditional Parents, and Continued Loyalty in Post-Opium Society
Despite the potentially disjunctive effects of schooling in relations between parents and
children, there still existed complementarity in their interests – they shared goals for subsistence
and repute, and worked together to achieve them.  The issue of access to land might have been
one of the reasons that children saw their interests as intertwined with those of their parents
despite education and higher levels of assimilation to Thai culture.  They felt dependent on their
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parents for access to land since it was increasingly unlikely they would be able to find a new place
to open land.  Migration was not an easy option not only because the RFD controlled the opening
of land throughout the north, but also because the Ministry of the Interior restricted the opening of
new villages.  There was no place else to go.  This effect fell on all sons, and therefore young
women who hoped to marry them.  
Even though a younger son might have had a slight advantage, in fact fathers attempted
to provide for of all of their sons.  In the case of a powerful father, a good manager, a good
farmer, one with land, and therefore authority, all of his sons might stay close to him.  Kowboi’s
family illustrated this.  Although his two older sons had their own households, his daughters-in-law
came to his house first on return from the fields and I frequently saw his sons take instruction from
him.  I suspect that those fathers with managerial intelligence and good resources commanded
greater loyalty from their children.  The power relations within a household with land would give
the parents leverage over the children’s behavior, especially their departure from the parental
household, and thus would give the parents more control over their children’s labor and for a
longer period of time (Cain 1978:435).  For instance, a model farmer in a Lahu village in Chiang
Mai Province had six large pieces of favorable agricultural land, three with a water supply.  All of
his adult children continued to live with him and help him in his fields, unlike the typical pattern
there (cf. data in Van Keer et al. 1998:21).  Niches sufficient to guarantee the survival of the
family, an economic position, could be inherited, and this gave parents far more control over their
offspring than those without resources worth inheriting (Fertig 2003).  Another strategy to provide
for sons was to allocate specialized roles to them.  Among Headman Red’s brothers, this was
very clear.  The oldest son, the less “successful” one, was a shaman (actually, so was Kowboi’s
oldest son).  Red was the headman; the next younger brother the store owner and middleman;
and the youngest brother the truck driver.  Similar strategies were followed in Pang Khum in
households with sufficient resources to do so (Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992).  The source
of this capital was wealth accumulated in the opium economy. 
  I can not say with certainty what will happen to households without adequate land to provide for57
their adult sons.  In Revealed River, most of the households without sufficient land were still
relatively young, that is at the beginning of the household life cycle, and so had no sons of
marriageable age.  Evidence from See-the-Tiger Village indicates that these young men became
involved in the heroin trade.  If successful, they could stay in the village and marry with much
repute; if unsuccessful, they faded away into the underworld of addiction, jail, and the drug trade
(Hutheesing 1999).  In other cases, households moved in search of better economic conditions. 
This point will be discussed further in the following chapter on marriage.  
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The parental generation’s land holdings created relationships of dependency between the
child and his parents in ways that had not held under the opium economy.  Nevertheless, the
increased strength of the household head can not be seen simply as a materialist revision of
kinship relations.  The sheer accumulation of inheritable items did not cause in increased
expression of hierarchical relations within the family, although that was the result.  That structure
was already in place even in the most egalitarian periods of Lisu society in the opium economy. 
Inter-generational hierarchy had not been part of everyday practice outside of the household
because of the nature of the opium economy, the conditions of northern Thailand as a borderland,
and global political structures.  It had been possible to resolve conflict by leaving and setting up a
self-sufficient, autonomous household (Dessaint 1972b; Durrenberger 1976b).  The expression of
contradictory dynamics of complementary roles and competition for resources within the
household varied with the economic conditions in which people in the household worked.  The
new political economy re-emphasized prior hierarchical authority structures.   The restoration of
age-based authority structures was partly a matter of adaptation to current conditions, but that this
adaptation existed at all as a possibility was because of the already existing age-based hierarchy
and relations of authority and respect, rights and obligations.  Utilitarian self-interest was involved
– sons seeking access to land – but that self-interest was enacted in frames of culturally
constructed goals such as repute, the desire to establish an autonomous household, and the lack
of other opportunities.   57
Thus historically situated material conditions interacted with the norms of behavior. 
Variations in the ways relations between brothers or fathers and sons were manifested arose out
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of existing structural contradictions in social relationships and the possibilities for resolving them;
the possibility for transformation was inherent in the structure (Kelly 1977).  The structures of
relationships were full of overlapping complexities and contradictions and in exercising agency
people made use of ambiguities in order to achieve culturally appropriate goals given the
opportunities and constraints of the economic conditions available.  People carried on in their
routine strategizing without attempting to transform the system, but change emerged.  Certainly
there was an element of contestation and manipulation of ambiguities as actors strived to position
themselves competitively, for instance, as oBs and yBs competed (albeit sub rosa) for access to
the resources of the parental household.  The possibility for this strategizing arises out of the
contradictions of kinship relations, for instance of oB to yB or F to S.  The consequences of their
strategizing has had different results in different conditions.  
People exercised agency in keeping with cultural or generative principles and historically
obtained structural realities (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1979).  Their ability to take chances or to act
in response to others’ actions and intentions or to assert agency – that is, to strategize – occurred
within the frames of power and cultural meaning as well as social relationships (Foucault 1978;
Patel 1999).  The household was a knot of interests (Laslett 1984), but not just in a pragmatic
sense.  The logic of household dynamics and kin roles were formed in terms of shared ceremony,
ritual, mutual obligations and respect.  In continuing to work together for culturally constructed
common goals, Lisu households actively reinforced those goals and their relationships to each
other.  Brothers’ and fathers’ relationships were altered, but the goals themselves, for instance
achieving myi -do , were essentially unchanged.  For instance, the relationship between brothers3 5
is laden with cultural meanings, some of which contradicted each other – a younger brother owed
an older allegiance, but each man must seek his own repute, first through establishing his own
household by which he would become independent of his older brother's authority.  This was
paralleled in the structural position of brothers to each other in terms of the order in which each
established his household and the way that the resources of the parental household devolved to
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them.  The older brother became an autonomous adult sooner than his younger brother,
reinforcing the older brother's position of authority.  W ith the changes in the local political
economy, practical power shifted toward those younger brothers who would inherit the father's
land when they took over the household at his demise or deterioration.  This made it more likely
that the younger brother would  be able to become a man of repute as he would have resources
that the older brother lacked.  So the anterior authority of the older brother was undercut.  But this
would be perceived as a lack of repute, whether because of the lack of work or just a bad fate.  It
could not be seen as a consequence of the structural positions of brothers from this cultural
frame.
Children’s adherence to parents’ rule in the household was in some sense a pragmatic
strategy for their own future self-interest.  Despite their structurally constructed different interests
and the heterogeneity of those interests within the household, children tended to publicly adhere
to common household interests by acceding to their parents’ wishes, thereby upholding household
repute.  From this point of view, the actions of individual actors served, in turn, to reinforce the
power structures of the household (Shunnaq 1997) and, as we will see, the kinship structure
(Al-Haj 1995); meaning and power inhered in the kinship structure and individuals strategized
within that.  Nevertheless, transformations occurred in elements of the kinship structure as
unintended consequences of this strategizing.  These were the effect of historical time on the
cyclical time of the household developmental cycle and the interests of people in the household
(yB, oB, parents, children) (cf. Chelcea 2003; Heald 1991); the intersection of the cycling of
people in and out of roles was transformed by the historical forces of international drug policy and
national watershed conservation.  
Labor: Household Dynamics and Agricultural Production
In the opium economy of northern Thailand, the Lisu household was the locus of
allocation of labor as well as distribution of the fruits of labor.  In this, household composition was
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an essential element of the mode of production.  The crops planted, how planted, and where,
were dependent on the people available for labor in the household.  Each household had access
to the means of production: tools, seeds, and especially land.  Labor was the main constraint on
production in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia; a household’s available labor limited productivity
of the household and the way to expand production was to increase labor inputs (Van Roy 1971;
Dessaint 1972a:92), although different ethnic groups in northern Thailand defined the household
and controlled household labor in culturally specific ways (Miles 1972a; Jonsson 2001a).  Given
the formation and composition of Lisu households, the key barrier to expansion of production in
the opium economy had been the demographic or developmental cycle of the household.  
The transformation of the agricultural production system had placed stresses on
household labor management in historically specific ways.  As crops changed, so had the labor
requirements and the ability of households to meet the demands of making a living; this had
consequences for social relationships as members of households strategized to survive, and to
survive as reputable Lisu.  Those who had been wealthy in the opium economy system at the time
of the transition in the agricultural economy in the mid- to late 1980s – mature households with
significant productive labor and opium profits – had had a considerable advantage as they had
had access to capital at a critical time in the conjunction of household development and historical
agricultural time, giving them the means to buy trucks, new seeds and inputs, and land in other
districts.  Furthermore, they had access to a surplus of household labor to accommodate the
distances traveled among opium fields, cattle herds, and local fields (cf. Ramitanondh and
Somsawasdi 1992 for Pang Khum). 
Because labor was the main constraint and most labor was household based, we need to
understand how household composition affected labor and production and understand the
permutations of household composition in regard to labor.  In order to understand the precise
nature of these changes, we must examine the household in the context of its developmental
cycle, the ways in which composition of the household changed in a regular fashion over time. 
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However, the Chayanov curve of productivity (discussed below) and drudgery has also proven
significant in understanding strategies regarding the domain of productivity. 
Household Development Cycles and the Chayanov Curve
Households are not static entities.  That there is no single form of household even within
small communities is due to the orderly, cyclical development of households over time as
individuals are born, mature, marry, establish households, have children, age, and die.  That is,
households have a time factor; they exist over a “stretch of time,” so that “the facts of physical
continuity and replacement are thus converted into the process of social reproduction” (Fortes
1958:1).  These processes are culturally formed and patterned – age at marriage, age at first
birth, when a child is considered an adult, when a new household splits off from the natal
household if at all, when goods are transferred from one household to the next.  In this process,
the individual life cycle is incorporated into the domestic and the jural domains of society (Fortes
1958:8).  As such, the developmental cycle introduces the temporal factor into analysis of
domestic groups.  It also allows us to talk about social reproduction, that households continue to
exhibit certain structural continuity despite considerable changes in personnel and in political and
economic conditions in which the households exist, and gives us the means to consider the
nature of these linkages.  The developmental cycle (or demographic cycle) has become a key
analytical concept in anthropological demography (Fortes 1958; Goody 1958; Cain 1978; Foster
1978a; Greenhalgh 1985; Heald 1991; Fricke 1994; Chelcea 2003).  
Although Fortes analytically distinguished between social reproduction and economic
production of the domestic group (Fortes 1958:9), in fact that distinction is not easily made
(Sahlins 1972; Siskind 1978).  The household developmental cycle is particularly significant to the
study of a number of domains such as production and distribution, ecological relations, kinship
and marriage.  For the Lisu, the developmental cycle was a critical element in labor availability
and therefore for household viability, resilience, wealth, resource use, and adaptation to political
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and economic conditions.  The work of Chayanov has been more widely used in economic and
ecological anthropology when looking at age structure of households in relation to production. 
Chayanov, noting patterns in household size, life cycle, and amounts of land used among Russian
peasants, suggested a consumption-needs/drudgery curve as a means of analyzing the strategies
of peasant households.  In this model, the intensity of production is related to the proportion of
working to non-working members of the household; the higher the ratio of non-working consumers
to producing members, the harder the producing members have to work to feed the household,
but when the ratio is low, the members of the household need not work as hard or are able to put
excess labor into non-subsistence activities.  Chayanov assumed little or no migration; little or no
hiring of labor; and limited agricultural inputs and markets.  He focused on productive activities
rather than distribution (Perz and W alker 2002:1012).  W hile his hypothesis has not been upheld
by data from peasant societies (Shanin 1990), it has proven useful in studies of “tribal” societies,
where access to land is flexible and labor is the main constraint on production, starting with
Sahlins’s use of it in Stone Age Economics (Sahlins 1972; Durrenberger and Tannenbaum 1992). 
The model has been particularly appealing to anthropologists as it considered peasant and later
tribal economies from “below,” as household-centered and driven by internal demographic
processes.  This has allowed researchers to take a perspective in which farmers are active
agents and the household an entity with shared economic interests and strategies.  Household
productive strategies can then be understood in terms of people’s own assessments of risks,
drudgery, and optimal returns rather than as a maximization of surplus or profit, that is, in terms of
local standards of aspirations and levels of work, risk assessment, and farming behavior in the
face of economic change (Schrauwers 1995; Armstrong 1998; Hedican 2003).  It has been useful
in ecological research in studying land use practices because a key factor in land use decisions
has been shown to be the position of households in the demographic cycle; these cyclical
changes can widen or narrow the latitude farmers have in making land use decisions (Perz and
  I think that it is potentially useful as a means of operationalizing carrying capacity.  As Bayliss-58
Smith pointed out, those living in a system are often aware of when they are approaching the
limits of their system’s capacity through their experience of drudgery, the intensity of production,
inability to produce sufficiency or increased occurrence of failure, although this can always vary
through adjustment of needs and willingness to work.  "As a result, there can be no absolute level
of output for a given soil and crop type; output is relative to the intensity of input, which itself is
culturally constrained.  Most approaches to carrying capacity fail to accommodate this fact"
(Bayliss-Smith 1980:63).  Perceptions of drudgery can also be related to demographic processes
such as occurrence of marriage and fertility rates, thereby providing a mechanism through which
population adjusts itself to carrying capacity or levels of risk (Reyna 1975) without resorting to a
functionalist explanation.  
207
W alker 2002; Hedican 2003).   Household wealth can be related to the age structure of the58
household (Greenhalgh 1985).  Chayanov’s model allows us to account for differences in
household wealth that are neither class-based and nor permanent over time.  Because such
socioeconomic differentiation does not bespeak permanent ownership of capital over generations,
its transience allows for a great deal of egalitarianism in social interactions.  
The household developmental cycle and the production/drudgery curve deal with very
different phenomena and come from very different theoretical perspectives.  Chayanov sought to
explain the limits of and strategies for production in light of household demography; Fortes
approaches household demographic processes as a means of understanding social reproduction
and its relationship to kinship and domestic domains.  Chayanov discusses different age
structures; Fortes examines the development of the person to adulthood through domestic
relations.  Chayanov’s model does not account for differences in the interests of the members of
the household based on their position in the social structure.  It also assumes a degree of
homogeneity in the encompassing structure, for instance, that they are all peasants in the state
system.  Finally, it is temporally static; it treats differences in age structure as snapshots – the
cycle is implicit but not incorporated into Chayanov’s model.  Fortes’s developmental cycle is
temporally dynamic. For instance, the cycle is a key heuristic device in explaining when and how
new households are formed (Goody 1958; Fricke 1994), although Chayanov’s model is more
capable of operationalizing the economic ramifications of the household developmental cycle, a
point ignored by Fortes.  
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The developmental cycle is more culturally grounded than Chayanov’s model.  It deals
with how a person is formed, and this is crucial to understanding the kinds of productive strategies
Chayanov discusses if we use his model in non-western contexts because those strategies are
motivated by these culturally-formed positions and goals.  Fortes’ model allows us to look at the
different interests of members of domestic groups or the household and the dynamics of
interaction in given the social structure in which it operates, for instance, kinship ideology (Goody
1958).  Both models address motivations and strategies, but one from different directions. 
Chayanov addresses “the historical and cultural conditions of replenishment“ and the gap
between consumption or satisfaction and production or replenishment (Armstrong 1998:512), but
how satisfaction is defined is historically and culturally situated, or drudgery.  Doing without “food,”
for instance, means eating less culturally valued foods; not creating a surplus means not having
the means to gain status as culturally defined.  Fortes’s model of the developmental cycle gives
better access to that. 
However, these analyses are complementary despite apparent differences in that they
both note the importance of a household’s life cycle in social and economic relations, and the
demographic processes of the household as a key mechanism in social and economic
reproduction and continuity.  Given the primacy of the household as the unit of production in Lisu
society, both analyses are useful here.  And while the developmental cycle model takes more
account of temporality, there is still a certain static quality to the concept of the developmental
cycle, in keeping with British structural-functionalism, in that it implies unchanging repetition. 
However, change in the political and economic conditions in which the developmental cycle takes
place brings about transformations.   The cycle is re-created, but with unintended consequences
when the strategies are carried out in changed conditions.  The nature of the relationship between
historical time and domestic developmental time (Heald 1991) is the point to be explored here. 
There is continuity, but what matters is that a recognized pattern existed in people’s intentions and
strategies, not in terms of psychological motivation but in planning for an imagined future.  In part
209
because of this future planning, the household in Revealed River has demonstrated continuity
despite profound changes in social and economic conditions; the household has proven a
dynamic, flexible and primary locus of adaptation.  
Labor in the Opium Economy
The amount of opium upland farmers could produce was limited only by the labor each
household could invest in growing and harvesting poppies because there was a virtually infinite
market for opium and land was free (Keen 1978:219-221).  As such, the wealth or poverty of the
household was affected by its composition.  This potentially limited the amount of wealth available
to a household and its ability to maintain equal repute with its neighbors.  The household
developmental cycle of stem –> nuclear –> stem had implications for the availability of productive
labor vis-a-vis consumption.  
The dynamics of Lisu household composition and production strategies under the opium
economy depended on the ratio of consumers to producers in the household.  The more
consumers there were in a household, the harder producers had to work to support the household
and fulfill culturally constructed obligations such as sacrifices to the ancestors, reciprocating
feasts, and paying for marriage.  This is the consumer/worker ratio (c/w ratio), in which working
adults are both consumers and producers but children and the elderly are considered to be only
consumers.  The number of consumers (all the people in the household) divided by the number of
producers gives the c/w ratio (Durrenberger 1976c:638).  A person became a full producer at
some point in early adolescence; the specific age varies cross-culturally (Foster 1978a:432), but
for Lisu this was generally at the age of 15 years.  A high c/w ratio meant that workers in a
household had to work harder in order to produce the household’s needs (although, technically, it
is a measure of drudgery) and not have been as well off (Durrenberger 1983b:221; Durrenberger
and Tannenbaum 1992).  Those with a low c/w ratio would have had surplus labor to put into
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producing beyond subsistence that could be put into activities that gained repute, such as feasts
and marriage payments (Durrenberger 1976c:636-640; Durrenberger 1983b:221-224).  
Labor constraints lay in the composition of the household.  The main determinant of
specific household composition was its stage in the developmental cycle, although Durrenberger
does not discuss this per se.  In effect, the household pursues its economic strategies differently
given its stage in the developmental cycle.  It also has consequences for household wealth.  The
household cycle has been demonstrated in other ethnographic studies to be a more important
source of economic differentiation than was social class (Greenhalgh 1985:589; Hedican 2003). 
A young household was burdened by a higher number of non-productive consumers.  Mature or
stem households were able to open more land and plant more opium, the more labor intensive
crop, thus gaining more surplus and more wealth. Dessaint found a direct positive relationship
between the age of the male head of household and household crop yields in Evil Peaks because
of multiple obligations of young husbands and wives: “A young household head is frequently
called upon to help his father, father-in-law and elder brothers.  As the household head comes into
middle age, he himself will be able to call upon the service of his children and his sons-in-law”
(Dessaint 1972a:109).  Similarly, young wives owed labor to their mother, mother-in-law, sisters,
and sisters-in-law.  A mature household drew most heavily on the labor of daughters-in-law; her
children’s marriage was often the cue for the mother of the groom to partially retire from
agricultural work (see also Hutheesing 1990a; Ramitanondh and Somsawasdi 1992).  One
advantage accrued to a young household when a mother/mother-in-law lived with them.  At the
death of a head of household of a stem family, the widow stayed with her youngest married son
and his family.  A widow’s interests were closely tied into her youngest married son’s household. 
She has known since his childhood that her final years would be spent with him; she has likely
been influential in his choice of a wife.  This was her household so that even after her husband,
the head of household, was replaced by the son, she had great management control (of
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consumption, distribution) until she became too elderly to make an active contribution, whereupon
she focused on caring for her grandchildren while their parents worked. 
In systems where hiring labor was practical and households were not tied to a system of
labor exchange, the effects of variability in household composition were greatly reduced and the
effects of access to capital were increased (Foster 1978a:436).  In Ban Lum, the c/w ratio was not
correlated with household productivity because it was possible to hire labor with opium or the
proceeds from opium.  Households with high c/w ratios hired labor to supplement household
labor, thus circumventing the labor constraints inherent in the developmental cycle and maintain
their repute and equal status with other households in the village.  Labor exchange would not
have met this need because for every unit of labor received one would have had to be given and
such households did not have it to give.  In the case of Ban Lum, Lisu hired Karen opium addicts
from a nearby village.  In fact, Lisu villages were usually established near Karen or Lahu villages,
where labor was available (Durrenberger 1976c:36-640; Durrenberger 1983b:221-225).  Such
transient opium addict laborers have famously been referred to as “nowhere men” (Cooper
1984:105-111).  It cost less to hire labor than the value of what they produced given the high value
of opium, so that the household benefitted (Durrenberger 1983b:221-224).  In fact, hired labor
was intertwined with the opium economy to the extent that Cooper could find no means or reason
for hired labor before the expansion of opium production in northern Thailand in the 1930's
(Cooper 1984:102).  Opium made the capital available to households to allow the hiring of labor. 
In this, Durrenberger made an important expansion to the Chayanov model, which originally
assumed no hiring of outside labor (Perz and W alker 2002).  
Under these social and economic conditions, differences in wealth among households
were transient over time, linked to the household developmental cycle but frequently alleviated by
hired labor.  Any young household could achieve higher status as it matured and, conversely, any
wealthy household could dwindle away over time as the young married couples moved out.  But
the ability to hire labor allowed individual households to circumvent the inegalitarian effects of the
  Although, as Ray Kelly (personal communication, April 2006) points out, the Karen opium59
addicts were not equal to Lisu.  In that sense, inequality was externalized.  
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developmental cycle of the household, making even young households remarkably independent. 
This was made possible by access to cash through opium.  All households had equal access to
the means of production, particularly land, and the labor constraint was surmountable and
transient.  The opium economy supported the egalitarianism of the social and political structures
of Lisu villages.   59
Revealed River, 1992-1994
I argued in Chapter 2 that the introduction of opium as a cash crop put into place internal
dynamics that resulted in Lisu status displays, early marriage, and migration.  The end of the
opium economy put into place a different set of trends that altered social and productive relations. 
The social structural dynamics of opium cultivation can be explicated by a consideration of
Chayanovian and developmental cycle models to understand the specific consequences for social
structure of the end of opium cultivation in northern Thailand.  Spatial disaggregation, the loss of
opium, and increased dependence on cash crops and fluctuating markets resulted in greater need
for hired labor and less cash to hire it.  Thus, the inequalities inherent in the household
developmental cycle could no longer be ameliorated or externalized as effectively as in the opium
economy.    
As described in the section on agricultural production, the requirements for labor had
changed in Revealed River, including new tasks such as marketing, negotiating, and transport, as
well as attending regular meetings at the Forestry Development Center of the Project.  This put
strains on the ability of households to meet their labor needs.  Those households that had the
cash available depended on hired labor.  Another strategy was specialization, such as assigning a
specific role (truck driver) to an adult son (and also noted in Pang Khum by Ramitanondh and
Somsawasdi 1992).  Yet another was to reduce the c/w ratio; the strategy of sending children to
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school was in part a response to the increased burdens of providing food for them, albeit at the
cost of paying for uniforms and school books.  But in many cases, the only alternative was to work
harder, and much of this burden fell on women whose job was daily work in the fields.  
Hiring labor had previously been possible because opium was convertible into cash to hire
labor or, as was common, the laborers would be paid in balls of opium; since many were opium
addicts, they simply worked to fulfill their addiction.  This was no longer possible in Revealed
River.  Cash was not as readily available, both because of the difficulties of selling produce and
because there were many demands on what capital there was (car payments, school fees, food). 
The effects of the developmental cycle on household status once had been obviated by access to
wage labor, but by the 1990s that strategy depended on access to capital that was extended too
far.  Still, hiring labor was still an option for those households with sufficient cash income.  In fact,
given the centripetal tendencies of much of agricultural production, including the increased
distance of some fields, hired labor appeared to be even more important than previously.  There
were numerous itinerant laborers in and out of Revealed River throughout the year, some hired to
spray pesticides or fertilizer on crops, but most hired to watch over distant fields and herds of
cattle.  These laborers were Lahu, Yunnanese Chinese, and some Tai Yai (Shan) refugees from
Burma.  There were, as yet, no Lisu laborers in Revealed River, although Lisu had become
laborers for wealthy Lisu and Chinese in See the Tiger Village (Hutheesing 1990a:168-173;
Hutheesing 1999).  And while laborers were still “nowhere men,” many more had long-term
dependency relationships with their Lisu employers, just as the Lisu were more dependent on the
laborers.  A Lahu couple hired by a Lisu household visited the village together or separately at
least once a month.  The woman came to her employer’s household when she was sick to get
medicine; the man came to get paid or to consult about a problem with the cattle herd he was
watching.  Lahu laborers were prevailed upon to remove the bundles of old clothes in the disposal
of evil spirits.  In another case, several young Yunnanese Chinese men were hired for an entire
harvest and housed in an empty house next to that of their employers.  But the households that
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hired labor were usually those in the larger, wealthy households of each faction.  Far more people
were unable to hire labor at all; young households could not longer ameliorate their position in the
household developmental cycle with hired labor as they had in the opium economy.  
The only other way to increase household productivity was to eliminate consumers.  This
is partly what lay behind sending children to school.  Children were sent to school, either in the
lowlands or at least to the village Mountain School as soon as parents could get them accepted. 
This relieved the burden of production on the workers in the household.  Children’s return by the
age of 15 made a great deal of sense in terms of the c/w ratio, as at that time they were able to
work as hard as adults.  Schooling meant that 27% of the population was not in the village for at
least nine months of the year.  Clearly this would have substantially reduced the burden of work
on producers to feed consumers.  There were an average of 4.84 people per household in
Revealed River.  If we consider the children in schools out of the village to not be members of the
household (for at least part of the year) in terms of consumption of household resources, that
number is further reduced to 3.53 people/household.  
In the end the way to increase household productivity was through harder work.  The
burden of this fell particularly on the young women in the household.  In the agricultural season,
girls left their house at dawn and rarely returned before dark.  In Nam Long, Payap University/TG-
HDP survey in the mid-1980's showed that farmers worked 18 days/month during the rainy
season from May to October and 16 days/month during the dry season from November to April. 
However, my observations were that farmers in Revealed River worked more days, about 20-22
days per month in the agricultural season and young women, the mainstay of the labor force,
worked as much as 25 days per month.  I will examine some of the reasons for this when I
discuss young people’s marriage strategies in the next chapter.  
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Discussion
Household form was the result of both pre-existing practices and adaptation to local
conditions.  As the locus of strategizing, we can expect practices to shift to allow household
members to dynamically respond to the conditions of rapid economic and political change they
faced, particularly as they threatened the economic and thus social viability of Lisu households. 
This resulted in subtle shifts in household practices and composition as people adapted to new
opportunities and constraints.  These shifts did not fundamentally change the form or function of
the household, especially from the perspective of the Lisu themselves.  Fundamental structural
form was maintained despite profound economic change (cf. W ilk 1984), through choosing
strategies in keeping with culturally-formed goals, keeping in mind that these were not unified,
homogeneous goals but rather a repertoire of sometimes conflicting principles and strategies.   
 To understand the nature of the shifts in Lisu households, we need to look at both
external and internal dynamics (Kinoshita 1995; Fertig 2003; Plakans and W etherell 2003). 
Focusing merely on household structure polarizes internal and external processes (Heald 1991). 
These were tribal cash croppers, so the crop grown – opium – had been the key element in the
household resource and labor allocation (internal dynamics) and people’s relationship with the
world (external dynamics).  Changes in the global political economy and Thai state policy in the
form of drug policy and environmental policy that affected land tenure presented a shifting set of
constraints and opportunities that were addressed through strategies within the household first
and foremost (although not exclusively).  Just as in the nineteenth century opium had created a
new set of opportunities that enabled the emphasis of a particular set of cultural values such as
autonomous households and display of repute, the new political economy created a transformed
set of constraints and opportunities that had specific effects on the dynamics of intra-household
relationships.  The key economic factors were the replacement of a single, valuable crop (opium)
with a range of commodities; increased dependence on insecure markets; dispersion of
agricultural land over the landscape of northern Thailand and into Burma; and a decreased ability
 I was familiar enough with three other villages in the cluster to observe similar patterns in60
household size and composition there as well.  However, I was not able to carry out censuses in
these villages and so do not have specific numbers for them.  
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to migrate out or to open new lands.  The new system required diverse roles and strategies. 
There was a need to fulfill a range of economic activities with more specialized personnel; a
greater need for skilled management by a household head; and increased workloads for women,
especially in terms of weeding of degraded fields and travel to distant plots.  Internal dynamics
brought into play included the consumer/worker ratio, experienced as drudgery, and tensions
between the structurally constructed social interests of people such as father/sons, older
brothers/younger brothers, or parents/children.  People adapted to changed conditions in ways
that attempted to maintain their experience of household autonomy and repute, egalitarianism and
respect.  Specific strategies included evicting opium “addicts” from the village as an attempt to
maintain household autonomy in the face of state military intervention and sending children to
school as a means of remedying their experience of increased drudgery and simultaneously
preparing children to develop skills appropriate for future viable households.  The rules had not
changed, but which rules and how they were put into practice had shifted and transmuted.  Part of
the reason for this is that households behaved as if the developmental cycle existed and people
strategized based on their conceptions of their future (Heald 1991; Chelcea 2003).  As Lisu in
Revealed River Village attempted social reproduction in altered circumstances, their strategies
had unintended consequences. 
Household Size
A salient point was that the average household size  of 4.84 people per household in
Revealed River was smaller than reported for Lisu households elsewhere in northern Thailand. 
W hen children in boarding schools are eliminated from calculations, then the average was an
astoundingly small one of 3.53 people per household, at least for nine months of the year.   60
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Table 4.1.  Average Size of Lisu Households in Thailand
Year Location / Source Average People/Household
1969-1970 Ban Lum (Durrenberger 1971) About 6 people/household
1968-1970 Evil Peaks (Dessaint and Dessaint 1992) 5.90 people/household
1960s-1970s Regional (Tribal Research Centre survey)
(Kunstadter 1983:16, 19)
6.33 people/household 
1980s See the Tiger (Hutheesing 1990a) 5.20 people/household
1988 Regional (Tribal Research Institute)
(McKinnon and Vienne 1989)
6.11 people/household
1992-1994 Revealed River Village 4.84 people/household
(1992-1994) Revealed River Village, sans school children 3.53 people/household
1997 Lisu in national census of 20 northern
provinces (Highland Economic and Social
Development Promotion Office 2000).  
5.90 people/household
Small household size in Revealed River can be attributed to a number of factors, some
the random result of the point in history at which Revealed River stood, and others due to
meaningful patterns as a result of adaptation to conditions in Thirty Thousand.  The population of
Revealed River was small and thus may not be representative of social processes (Bedford
1980:29).  Given the time period, the average household size could be the result of historical
accident, a matter of where many households were in the developmental cycle, that is, this could
be the result of a larger percentage of young households (nuclear) at this point in time in the
village rather than a historical trend reflecting real adaptation through reduction of household size
(Hammel and Laslett 1974).  
The average household size had been reduced in part by the migration of three
households in 1991.  These had been larger households with an average of a little over 7.3
persons/household.  At least one, likely two, were stem households.  Although I never met these
people, I speculate that they were under more pressure than other households due to having a
higher number of children in the household than average; 10 children left the local school when
these households left, which indicates that not only were there an average of over three children
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per household, they were apparently too young or too poor to attend lowland schools.  This would
have been a tremendous burden on the adults of these households.  Village gossips claimed that
these families had left because they had opium addicts in the family and chose not to expel them. 
However, the pattern of out-migration and three subsequent cases in 1992 (also large families,
but one an older household with several daughters of marriageable age) was that households
chose to remove themselves, they said, due to lack of land close to Revealed River and access to
better land resources elsewhere.  As I will discuss later, their migration appears also to have been
due to their positions outside of the emerging patrilineal kinship structure of Revealed River.  
Small household sizes might have been due, as well, to accidents of life rather than
deliberate strategies.  There were 2-3 female-headed households in Revealed River, due to the
husband’s absence, usually in jail.  These households had three members each, a mother and
two young children.  The developmental cycle of these households had been short-circuited and it
is likely that they would never recover from their grinding poverty.  In a village of this size, the
average was also skewed by the presence of one single elderly woman’s household; eliminating
that one household brings the average household size with children up to 4.95 people/household. 
In addition, there was the phenomenon of absent elder sons, even if unmarried or divorced (their
wives usually having returned to their natal village).  Being a member of a household meant, in
practical terms, living under one roof and working together, participating in rituals and social
relationships of hierarchy, avoidance, and obligation.  It was some time before I discovered that
there were several young adult males who had disappeared into the drug trade.  
Finally, other factors in small household size were the result of intentional actions on the
part of Lisu actors in relation to household composition, even if compelled by the political
economic system.  Most striking was the removal of elderly parents from Revealed River Village. 
This would almost certainly have altered average household size and the appearance of nuclear
vs. stem households.  However, most who remained in Revealed River who had sent their opium-
using elderly parents away were very reluctant to speak about it, so I have no reliable figures.  In
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short, the small average household size emerged out of factors that are related to the transformed
conditions to which households adapted; a number of small strategies in each household resulted
in these numbers overall.  
However, household size may reflect specific cultural conventions on the basis of which
families consciously adapted as they planned for the future.  There is an economic element; like
other opium-growing peoples in northern Thailand, average household size tended to be larger
than those of non-cash-cropping upland ethnic minority people (Kunstadter 1983; Highland
Economic and Social Development Promotion Office 2000).  On the other hand, cultural
processes specific to the Lisu brought about different household composition from other opium
growing upland groups.  Durrenberger’s work illuminated the production logic involved in Lisu
household composition.  The importance of the ratio of consumers to producers in the Lisu
household is indirectly indicated in other ways.  Calculations based on a 1977 Tribal Research
Centre Survey showed the Lisu had a dependency ratio of 77.4, meaning a very low proportion of
children under the age of 14 and adults over the age of 60 compared to the population between
the ages of 15-59.  In contrast, the Hmong dependency varied between 100.3 to 107.7 and the
Lahu dependency ratio was 111.7 (Kunstadter 1983:22).  This indicates different cultural
processes involved in birth rates.  In short, there was a culturally constructed tendency toward
smaller households.  
There was, furthermore, a strong cultural tendency toward establishment of separate
households as soon as viable.  One reason was the cultural logic of household autonomy and
repute.  Another was that the taboos on interaction, particularly between daughters-in-law and
fathers-in-law, were burdensome in daily life.  The speaking taboos were incentive for younger
married couples to form their own households because having her own household gave a woman
some measure of relaxation of vigilance over her language and behavior.  W omen resisted their
subordinate status in their in-laws’ household.  W hile a young wife’s status would relatively
increase when her husband’s younger brother took a wife, Lisu practice was to not have two
  There was almost no chance of Chinese children being accepted into government schools. 61
They were far less likely to have “blue cards.”  They were defined as illegal and dangerous to a far
greater degree than other upland ethnic minority peoples.  Furthermore, many preferred to send
their children to Chinese-language schools, so their children tended to be in private schools. 
Their parents moved to town to oversee the children while trading or working in waged jobs to pay
for school.  
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young married couples under one roof, so this was not an avenue for improvement of her position. 
In fact, an older wife asserting power over a young wife gave rise to considerable conflict within
households.  The cultural logic of household autonomy made independent households the
conventional means by which both sons and their wives achieved repute, despite the increased
risk of drudgery or poverty.  
There were fewer stem households in Revealed River than there had been in Evil Peaks. 
This was due to some extent to the age structure.  Headman Daeng and his brothers mostly had
children before the age of marriage; in contrast, most of Kowboi’s faction was old enough to have
children of marriageable age.  Of the Chinese faction, those remaining in the village were young
and had explicitly limited fertility; Chinese with older children had left the village in order to take
them to private schools.   61
At the same time, the tendency toward nuclear households was given impetus by the
allocation of land by the Project on the basis of households (15 rai/household).  W hile this policy
was not in full effect, it was constantly threatened and all the villagers knew the plan.  Establishing
a new household as soon as feasible made it possible to negotiate for land allocations with the
Project before Project personnel put a stop to the opening of new land altogether.  They were very
unsympathetic to frequent requests for permission to open new land and constantly threatened to
end or freeze allocations, requests they habitually defined as mendacious, but they found it far
more difficult to deny land to a newly established household.  I will discuss the effects Project land
policy had on marriage and kinship structures in the next chapter.  
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A Demographic Transition?  
That the absence of school age children made such a difference in average household
size bespeaks the large number of children in the village.  Astoundingly, it appeared that 45% of
the village residents were children under the age of 15.  This was the result of most of the
households having parents in their 40s or past and at least 3-4 children; more had 5-6 children
who lived to adulthood.  That generation was having children (or were near it, being in their teens). 
However, most of the parents in their late 20s to 30s had only two to three children.  This could
have been due to later age at marriage; they may not have been planning to have only two
children.  But the fact that in many cases the youngest child was four or five indicates that
planning was involved.  I should note here that Thailand had a very successful family planning
program that was renowned for having reduced its population growth rate through educational
programs and making birth control technology widely available (Knodel, Havanon and
Pramualratana 1984; Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya 1987).  Furthermore, the Thai
government was deeply concerned by the fact that the upland ethnic minority peoples had a much
higher population growth rate than did lowland Thai, especially as upland minority peoples were
not “racially” Thai (W inichakul 1994; Gillogly 2004).  Most younger women in Revealed River went
to hospitals or clinics to give birth, especially for their first child.  It is likely that there was a
decrease in mortality rates for infants and women because of this use of technological medicine
for birth, as was noted for the Hmong (Kunstadter et al. 1993).  At clinics, women were exposed to
the Thai program for population control.  Thai nurses would have very strongly encouraged Lisu
women to practice birth control.  Few young people spoke of it openly; sons and daughters-in-law
would never speak of such things in front of their parents or parents-in-law due to avoidance
taboos, and they were working far too much to spend much time with me.  But unmarried women
and a few older married women told me confidentially that women went to lowland hospitals to get
birth control shots or pills, and I found the detritus of birth control (condom packages and empty
birth control packets) around the village.  Gossip also told me that a number of women had had
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an “operation” to prevent further children, although none of my informants claimed to have had the
surgery themselves (it was at shame to discuss sexual matters, rather than shame at controlling
fertility).   
There were two key factors in couples’ strategies, perceptions of overwork and concerns
about lack of resources in the future.  Parents told me constantly that raising children was very
hard work.  Given their work loads, young couples took steps to space out or limit the number of
children they had and sent young children to school to reduce that burden.  The other factor was a
profound sense of insecurity about the availability of resources for their children to establish their
own households in the future.  Married couples, even single women, spoke often, worriedly, about
the future availability of land and how their children would make a living.  This anxiety was
exacerbated by the fact that the nature of state control changed with policy set in Bangkok.  Again,
sending children to school was a strategy to open up options for them by expanding their skill
sets.  As a result of stresses on the household as a unit of production, married couples had
apparently chosen to limit their fertility.  
I can not say that these patterns were not cyclical trends created by the developmental
cycle (e.g., Kinoshita 1995).  This is a snapshot, and only time will tell.  However, I am arguing
from people’s statements of their concerns, observations of strategies, and local explanations for
them.  Revealed River was unusual due to the Project’s influence. The irony of the Project was
that while people under its aegis had begun to control fertility, the pressures of over-population
were pushed to outside of the Project area through out-migration of large families and resident
families finding land to use in other parts of the north.  
Nevertheless, there appeared to be a mini-demographic transition occurring, especially
for those families with sufficient land to stay in the village.  At first glance, this seems to counter
demographic transition theory as few of the women of the now-child-bearing generation had
attended school (Udjo 2001).  The value of children had shifted, however.  It did not have to do
with a decrease in the need for household labor; households were increasingly dependent on
  Many elderly parents smoked opium for the pain of arthritis and other illnesses.  This was the62
population removed from Revealed River Village when they expelled opium ‘addicts.’ 
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having a wide range of laboring adults in order to manage the diverse economic activities they
undertook in the new agricultural system (cf. Caldwell 1996).  It had far more to do with the
immediate experience of concern about adequately caring for their children in the face of
increased work loads for women and, possibly, the loss of elderly parents  who had once looked62
after children while parents went to distant fields.  Intergenerational wealth transfers were not
measurable, but considering the important role of adolescent and adult children in working for
their parents (intergenerational wealth transfers from children to parents) (Caldwell
1976:139-146), it did not appear that this was a critical factor in the increase in use of family
planning in any straightforward way.  The immediate impetus for many young parents had to do,
rather, with household members’ assessment of the constraints under which they labored,
particularly the lack of land and their conceptions of a future of increasingly limited resources. 
This is in keeping with the economic opportunity hypothesis that falling expectations and the
sense of increased competition for limited resources will bring about reduced fertility rates as
married couples become cautious about opportunities and their ability to raise their children
(Abernethy 2002).  Specifically, as  the ‘frontier’ of northern Thailand receded and the availability
of land for inheritance declined, people controlled their fertility (Hammel and Goldstein 1996).  A
good parent, Kowboi told me sadly, must make sure his children can marry and become
independent, and he was not sure if he would be able to do this for all of his seven children (all
married or of marriageable age).  Lisu parents therefore sought to expand their children’s
opportunities through education.  This is analogous to findings for Thai farmers, where education
levels rose especially where there were insufficient land resources for all of the children of a
household (Foster 1978a:437-438).  The Lisu of Revealed River continued to strategize within
their framework of meaning and social obligations, but these resulted in an accumulation of
unintended change.  
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Labor and Households in the New Political Economy: Domestic Time, Historical Time,
Structural Continuities
Nevertheless, intergenerational transfer of wealth is a key mechanism in Lisu strategies
when considered in light of the domestic developmental cycle.  Caldwell argued that the
demographic transition was marked by intergenerational wealth transfer reversals: from child to
parent in traditional, agrarian society, to parent to child in industrialized society (Caldwell
1976:139-146).  I can not say whether parents or children received more in Revealed River
society; it is not clear cut because the situation was in flux, formed by the conjunction of domestic
and historical time.  The Lisu cultural construction was that parents worked hard for children when
they were young, paid for sons’ bridewealth, and bestowed silver jewelry on daughters when they
married.  In the new economy, the value of intergenerational wealth transfers to children had
perhaps increased or, at least, it had become imperative that children to receive such transfers.  It
consisted of land and a house (albeit not a permanent structure) for sons and their wives; possible
expenses for school, such as uniforms and supplies; and silver.  The silver bestowed on children
had attained new significance as a source of capital, so that giving it in marriage exchange had an
opportunity cost as it could not then be invested in new capital for agriculture.  Yet none of this
takes into account the labor that children potentially contributed to their parents’ household.  This
labor can not be calculated simply by the value of the crop produced.  It had a value beyond that
both for subsistence and status display for household repute, and much of it had to do with the
time allocation possibilities of having more producers for the household head to manage. 
Furthermore, daughters and daughters-in-law put a tremendous amount of work into household
agricultural production.  This was highly valuable.  The direction of intergenerational wealth
transfers as a marker of fundamental change from “traditional” to “modern” society is
unpersuasive in this case.  Lisu had been involved in a global trade for over a century, as
demonstrated in Chapter 2.  Cash cropping was not new; to understand smaller household size
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and birth control practices , we must look, rather, at the specific characteristics of the post-opium
economy.  
Intergenerational wealth transfers are interesting in terms of the founding of new
households, socially constructed positions within the household, and the kinds of obligations and
debts created (or not created) in such transfers.  A central element of the demographic transition
model is the chain between inheritance and reproduction.  It assumes limited economic “space”
and that overpopulation is avoided through restriction of marriage to those who can inherit an
economic niche.  However, this is functionalist.  Rather, niche mechanisms are relevant only for
the behavior of specific social groups in historically specific ways (Fertig 2003).  Here,
intergenerational wealth transfers are significant in Lisu practice as part of their imagined future,
that for which they plan.  A processual perspective better explains Lisu social relationships in
conditions of change.  It is in their actions that the structure emerges; through reproduction, the
structure is transformed.  
Potential intergenerational wealth transfers were significant in that it was part of married
couples’ assessments of their children’s future and thus had consequences for household size. 
But it was also important to children, as potential transfers were an important part of the reason
that children saw their interests as being tied up with those of their parents despite differential
assimilation to the dominant Thai national culture and young couples’ “natural” (to Lisu) desire to
become autonomous were heightened by young men’s greater knowledge of new crops and
markets, and frustration with their fathers’ adjustment to change; and by young couples’ sense of
urgency to get land allotments before it became impossible in the threatened future of more
stringent state restrictions.  It also heightened the already inherent tensions between older and
younger brothers because inheritance had increased in importance in establishing new
households.  The formation of new households became a stress point in terms of children’s
interest in achieving independence, parents’ goal of facilitating this, and parents’ needs to
maintain control over children’s labor.  
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One of the clearest points of tension was that between older and younger brothers.  Older
brothers faced particular problems in fulfilling their goals.  In the past, older siblings and their
spouses had received an intergenerational transfer of wealth through marriage exchanges, but
also of labor as the parents helped them to open up their first fields and build a house.  Under the
opium economy, access to land, the fluidity of opium as a commodity, and the availability of hired
labor had ameliorated this risk. W hat the younger son inherited after having cared for his elderly
parents to their death was whatever silver rupees had been hoarded from good opium sales, land
that the sons themselves had cleared and planted, and a less than substantial house, both of
which latter resources would be abandoned with migration.  By the 1990s, with the severe
limitations on land, inheritance had increased in importance and younger brothers were at an
advantage.  The economic risks for young households were more severe and this risk fell
disproportionately on older brothers.  I could not measure direct tension between brothers, but it
was clear that older brothers in Revealed River had a higher rate of opium addiction and
abandonment of their families.  Young households seeking economic prosperity and culturally
defined success were also far more likely to take the risks of growing opium or, in the political
economy of drug production interdiction in northern Thailand, to become mules in the drug trade. 
Other data, discussed earlier, also indicates that households that became involved in opium
production tended to be young households, which tended to be poorer (Ramitanondh and
Somsawasdi 1992; Salzer 1993).  As the households of younger brothers tended to be further
along in the developmental cycle with children of working age when they became independent on
the father’s death, they rarely faced the poverty and risks that their older brothers had.  For
younger households, on their own, seeking the goal of an autonomous household with repute in a
newly harsh economic environment, many men folded.  Their wives returned to their parents’
  Conditions did not necessarily improve for young women with children who left their husbands63
or lost them to the drug trade or jail.  The women lived in separate households in their father’s
compound.  W ithout another adult to share labor in the household, they struggled to survive
economically.  This was discussed in Chapter 3.  
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household because their husbands did not work; the men went to town seeking wage labor and
failed to return; they got involved in the drug trade and became addicts or were arrested.    63
The small average household size in Revealed River also presents a conundrum as other
literature indicates that larger households are more adaptive to modernized market-oriented
agriculture by allowing control of a more diverse pool of labor (Heald 1991).  The complex labor
processes entailed by diverse production systems required tighter management (W ilk 1984).  In
terms of the social organization of labor in Revealed River, the key point was that different
allocations of labor were required by the temporal and spatial complexity of the new production
systems.  This created a sense among Lisu villagers of being overworked because of the wide
range of tasks to be carried out, many in competition with each other.  Management became
critical; it was, in fact, the most important factor correlated with household agricultural success
(Salzer 1993).  Broad dichotomies such as traditional vs. modernized agriculture are in fact
unhelpful here (W ilk 1984).  
The Hmong, in contrast to the Lisu, have increased household size, a culturally available
strategy given the pre-existing cultural value placed on patrilineal extended households with
patriarchal power, as well as polygyny (Cooper 1983).  In contrast, Mien household form suggests
opposite tendencies in household dynamics that allowed shifts between small and large
households in specific historical circumstances.  In the days of the government opium monopoly,
rights to grow and buy opium were granted to Mien “chiefs,” and many households in one village
increased their size through adoption in order to expand production.  The Mien, in fact, were
famous for this high rate of adoption of children from other ethnic groups who were then fully
incorporated into their Mien household (Miles 1972a; Miles 1972b).  Here, the history of Mien
relations with lowland kingdoms and economic conditions produced a shifting structure over time
  Hmong and Mien are not related to Lisu ethnically or linguistically, nor were they related64
historically until they moved into the same territory in northern Thailand.  It is an accident of
Southeast Asian history that they are all, today, opium-growing “hill tribes.” 
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(Jonsson 2001a, 2001b).  The historically specific political economy and the dynamics of social
structure in each case created different household forms that were, nonetheless, structurally
enduring.  The logic of Lisu social structures is quite different from these two cases in that
autonomous, equalitarian households remained a primary feature of Lisu social structure even in
the face of profound political and economic change.   Lisu culture assumed equality among all64
full households.  It  placed a high value on household autonomy; on achieving and displaying
repute, particularly through hard work; placed a ritual emphasis on protection and prosperity of
each household, unconnected from other households; and understood full adulthood to be
achieved at marriage and establishment of one’s own household.  All of these features pushed,
inexorably, toward establishing households early despite conditions in the agricultural system that
favored larger households of a diverse labor pool managed by a household head.  
Autonomous households appear to be an enduring social form.  An appropriate analogy
here are Tibetan, Tibetanized, and partially-Tibetanized societies, which shared these
characteristics with Lisu on the basis of historical contact and linguistic commonalities. Social
structures were fluid and multifaceted, thus able to adapt to the variety of political and economic
conditions in which Tibetan societies existed (Samuel 1993:128, 131, 146, 149-152, 335, 363;
McKhann 1998).  The household was the basic building block in these societies historically and
across the region, with an emphasis on the continuity and preservation of the household.  In
certain conditions, continuity of the patrilineage was also a significant element in this repertoire,
but even where the patrilineage was relatively muted the preservation of the household endured
as an important value especially where there was property to pass on.  Ritual constituted the
household as a microcosm, starting with marriage or, in the case of Lisu, with the establishment
of a separate household.  Each household head was a ritual specialist; each lineage had its own
religious specialist.  Households and individuals worked out their own destinies using whatever
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capital – social, cultural, economic – their fate provided (note repute or myi -do , where myi  can3 5 3
be glossed as fate and  do  as work or effort).  Social relationships tended to be contractual, fully5
recognizing each individual’s distinct fate; similarly, the principle of equivalence of all full
households reflected the lack of relationships of patronage or dependency among households. 
Developed in the fragmented political landscape of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia, household
and localized descent groups gained importance.  How can one social form be viable despite
these changes?  The household form appears to be a dynamic and flexible form of adaptation for
these societies.  Localized patrilineages, allegiance groups, and household-centered practice
gave Lisu flexibility to adapt to local circumstances and allowed them to incorporate elements
from new situations without essential change in the underlying premisses of ritual, household, and
kin structures.  Lisu strategies were in keeping with existing structural forms and resulted,
ironically, in smaller households, but with the emergence (or, perhaps, re-emergence) of inter-
household relations that allowed more access to a pool of labor that could be allocated to a range
of different tasks.  This must be understood both in terms of the specific features of the
organization of agricultural production in Revealed River and the prior text of social relationships
and cultural principles.  
From this perspective, the household developmental cycle has both cultural and
economic significance to Lisu practice.  As a cultural frame, it is part of the Lisu conception of how
to be Lisu; the economic features circumscribed material possibilities; together these formed the
parameters of their imagined future.  The characteristics of the system were the result of the
intersection of two times – that of the household developmental cycle and that of the history of
opium, swiddening, and population movement.  It is the economic features that have been
transformed through the interdiction of opium and swiddening, with consequences for Lisu
strategies for achieving their imagined future, a mature and autonomous household with the
freedom to move as a means of conflict resoluton.  History intersected with this to create new
forces in the household.  
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Households at a particular point in their developmental cycle – that of maturity – that
intersected with the beginning of restrictions on land use and opium production, had had an
advantage.  They had had more labor available and thus more land opened that they were able to
claim ownership of as the Project began to map land use.  They also had surplus from opium
cultivation that they were able to invest in the new means of production, such as trucks, seeds,
and chemical inputs.  Households that were relatively labor-poor at the time of the Project
inception in the early 1980s or were newly formed faced devastating stresses and strains.  In
addition to the households that migrated just before the start of my fieldwork, the three
households that left Revealed River while I was there tended to have large families (five daughters
in one household, four children under the age of 17 in another) and said they lacked sufficient
land in the area of Revealed River to make a living.  Land-rich households benefitted in other
ways.  They could afford to let land lie fallow, and for longer periods, while still having enough land
to keep in production.  Conversely, land-poor households could keep little fallow land and were
compelled to use short fallow periods, resulting in prevention of soil recuperation, reduction of
yields, and increase in both weed invasions and labor inputs necessary to obtain sufficient
production (cf. Perz and W alker 2002:1022).  The household resource base had been frozen by
state control of land, and the Lisu experienced a freezing of the developmental phase of the
domestic cycle.  
  In similar ways, the Romanian socialist state had appropriated the excess space of
“landlord” households that the owners had conceived of as residential space held for their family
as it matured (Chelcea 2003).  Generally similar processes were underway in the Project.  In this
context, the hording of land by “wealthy” farmers made a great deal of sense.  The heads of larger
households with adult and older adolescent households not only wanted to be able to open more
land to take advantage of their labor pool and build household repute, although this was
fundamental to the cultural logic of being Lisu.  They were also anticipating land needs in terms of
the future phases of the developmental cycle in the face of the state’s appropriation of local
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natural resources, that is, land.  Disjunctions between historical time, annual agricultural cycles,
and the household developmental cycle (Heald 1991) also resulted in spatial dispersion of the
household’s agricultural land and other economic enterprises as households attempted to
accommodate the developmental cycle to historical conditions and the transformation of the
annual agricultural cycle.  These resulted in shifts in social interests, ability to fulfill social
obligations (for at least some households), and adjustments in household composition if only for
part of the year.  Such concerns were also in action in inter-household social relations.  
The issue of the regular cyclical changes in household size was one I raised several times
with Project officials in regard to how land had been allocated recently and how they intended to
allocate it in the future.  The developmental cycle of the Lisu household was completely out of
their purview, however.  The most they told me of their consideration of the problems of future
land allocation was that they intended to incorporate the village and all of its territory as a
cooperative and then allow land allocations to take place within that set amount of land.  The
Project’s failure to recognize the developmental cycle short-circuited or circumvented the
household developmental cycle, that is, households could not count on the rewards of hard work
and development toward a mature household form.  Historical time had intersected with domestic
time to create new inequalities and concretize old ones.  
The household can be seen as an activity group (W ilk and Netting 1984), and from this
perspective, cultural change can be conceptualized as a shift in the size and level of the groups to
perform activities necessary to economic survival.  From this perspective, the household is losing
its independence in reproduction (W ilk 1984).  State control has seeped into the economic
domain of the household.  However, this is not the only perspective that makes sense of intra-
household dynamics in Revealed River.  The cultural logic of being Lisu structured the process by
which Lisu villagers adapted new practices and their specific practices make little sense outside of
understanding the structural contradictions of social relationships, the ways in which structural
positions channeled practices in keeping with their understanding of their relationships with others
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in the household and planning on the basis of an imagined future based on the ebb and flow of
household size and the possibilities for repute.  
Given the nature of intra-household relationships and culturally-constructed goals of
household form, Lisu households remained small.  Fission of new households still occurred as
soon as feasible despite the apparent disadvantages of small households in an agricultural
production system that required control over a diverse labor pool; the household had to take on
new management responsibilities (W ilk 1984).  How were the requirements of the agricultural
system met within the context of Lisu social structural principles?  It appears that alternative
means of organizing and controlling labor outside of intra-household relations emerged.  Clusters
of agnatic kin allowed both household autonomy and the control needed for complex labor
processes.  The household remained a dynamic and flexible unit; it was its relations with other
households that was the locus of transformation in social relationships. 
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CHAPTER 5
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG HOUSEHOLDS: MARRIAGE, ALLEGIANCE GROUPS, AND
PATRILINEAGES
Lisu households were marked by a great degree of autonomy, especially under the opium
economy.  Earlier researchers found few significant overarching social structures, noting the
practical lack of patrilineal relationships in everyday life and connections among households within
villages to the extent that they wondered if the village was a relevant category at all.  Households
interacted, of course, if by nothing else than by marriage and labor exchange.  Kinship was
relevant for marriage, but only for as little as ensuring clan exogamy.  In the post-opium economy
of Revealed River, the expression of social structure was transformed at those points of
interaction among households, that is, marriage and post-marital residency and the basis of labor
exchange on patrilineal relations rather than affinal or sororal relations.  These transformations
were actualized through strategies to control access to land and cultivate political connections
within the village.  In short, the most significant domain of adaptation to the post-opium political
economy was inter-household relationships.
Three Weddings
Turtle’s Marriage and Divorce
A young man, Turtle, had suffered weakness and dispiritedness.  His father, the shaman
of the Laoyipha lineage, held a small soul-calling ceremony in response to Turtle’s anomie.  Turtle
attributed it to weakness from a bout of malaria for which he’d been hospitalized.  The village girls
said he was pining after a lost love, a girl associated with the Yipha faction whose family had
moved due to quarrels with Headman Red over the previous failed marriage between the girl’s
  Relationships between the two main lineages in the village were strained, having worsened65
after an arranged marriage between a younger brother of the headman and a daughter of the
maw mong (servitor to Old Grandfather Spirit) at that time.  W hen the bride left the groom, her
parents refused to return the bridewealth; according to the bride’s family, he was at fault for his
drunken behavior, long visits to the lowlands, and infidelity.  Some time later, the headman got
drunk, took a shotgun, and fired several shots around the village including the house in which I
was living.  Shortly thereafter, the maw mong’s family left Revealed River Village for a satellite
village.  
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family and Red’s younger brother.   Not long after the soul-calling ceremony, Turtle’s family65
arranged for a marriage with a girl from distant village east of Chiang Dao mountain.  Turtle was
pleased; he had seen the girl at a dance and she looked like his lost love, so he readily agreed to
the marriage.  A large brideprice was paid, acquired by selling a significant portion of the
household’s cattle herd.  But the marriage only lasted a couple of months.  It soon became
apparent that the bride did not like her groom.  Despite her in-laws showing great friendliness to
her, she was quiet and uncommunicative and refused to be alone with her husband.  She did what
was required of her but showed none of the liveliness and energy that new brides usually showed. 
The groom’s father diagnosed soul loss and performed an elaborate soul-calling ceremony on her
behalf.  The bridge he built was a nearly usable bridge over the drainage trench in front of the
family home, decorated with whittled bamboo and white paper cutouts.  Concurrently, the soul of
the groom was called as well.  It was to no avail.  In time, the bride openly stated that she thought
her husband silly, too talkative, and not at all attractive (several village girls agreed with her, with
amusement).  The bride was an orphan under her uncle’s guardianship and she had felt coerced
into the marriage, either because she and her uncle did not get along or because her uncle
wanted the bride price.  She ran away and not long after married another man.  Despite this, her
uncle returned only half of the considerable brideprice that had been paid.  Still another soul-
calling ceremony was carried out for the unhappy and embarrassed young man a few months
later.  Perhaps it worked, as not long after he remarried to a girl from a nearby village – happily. 
Turtle’s experience was held up to me by young women and often by their mothers as one of
many examples of the ill that could come when parents forced their children to marry against love. 
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It also showed the possibilities for marriage where there was sufficient wealth available for bride
price. 
‘Awu’s Scandal and Marriage
‘Awu was Kowboi’s youngest son.  He was healthy, cheerful, hard-working, much loved by
his family, and developmentally disabled (Down’s Syndrome).  W hen the marker of adulthood is
marriage, what position was he in?  His brothers were married and like other boys and girls, he
was interested in marriage.  One night, whispers of a scandal passed around the village.  ‘Awu
had snuck into the house of a family associated with his father’s allegiance group as affines and
tried to ‘do things’ to a young girl there.  The village watched with bated breath – in the old days, I
was told, Kowboi would have had to take his son out into the forest and murder him if he
continued such behavior.  And then, one morning, I was invited to their house to meet ‘Awu’s wife. 
They had had a small wedding ceremony known as a “spirit worship” marriage ceremony.  The
bride was a Lisu girl from the next village over the ridge, about a half hour away.  She was
pregnant with a “forest child,” out of wedlock, something deeply disapproved of and an unusual
occurrence.  In this case, the father of the child refused to marry her (he was reputed to be the
Thai mountain teacher in that village).  Her status made it an inexpensive marriage.  Kowboi had
resolved the problem of his son’s developing sexuality and potentially ambiguous social position
by marrying him to this shamed young woman, who also gained adult status and a degree of
respectability.  
‘Awu’s and his bride’s parents had successfully fulfilled one of the most important
responsibilities of parents, that of marrying off their children.  The principle of pairing was
expressed in the idea that all adults should marry.  Kowboi had explained this to me shortly before
New Year 1993.  You couldn’t get anything as one, he had told me, you needed two, like
  Chopsticks was a metaphor for prospective brides and grooms and for a bridal couple.  See66
Hutheesing 1990a: 204-5 for songs containing this metaphor.  A predominant theme among Lahu,
a Tibeto-Burman group closely related to Lisu, was that chopsticks came in pairs (Du 1995).  This
emphasis on pairs as potent and productive was carried through in scheduling of New Year
celebrations at Revealed River.  Festivities had to occur in twos because all good things, that
which is productive, come in pairs.  One year, the Forestry Center that ran the Project scheduled
a village cluster celebration for the fifth day of New Year, compelling village elders to schedule a
sixth day to balance it out.  Longer celebrations increased the expense; usually only the wealthiest
villages could maintain six days of celebrations. 
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chopsticks, and others agreed.   Lisu in northeastern India (recent migrants from northeastern66
Burma) stated that life became complete only by marriage; it was like a coin, male on one side
and female on the other.  Life could only bloom when the male and female combined and united. 
One of the fundamental duties of Lisu parents, therefore, was to ensure that their children married
(Maitra 1993:128-129, 147-148).  Kowboi was especially aware of this as his next eldest daughter
should have been ready for marriage that New Year.  She was a good worker and she had
learned all the New Year dances.  But she was sick with lupus nephritis and could not marry that
year – or perhaps ever.  Rather than dance and court and sing, she was often in Chiang Mai at
the University Hospital, and Kowboi worried for her. 
Ai Yi’s Second Son’s Marriage
One day in 1993 I was called to Ai Yi’s house, the younger brother of Kowboi.  Ai Yi and
his wife had just concluded negotiations for the marriage of their second son to Ai Yi’s sister’s
daughter.  The groom’s sister, Alema, told me he had liked this girl for a long time.  The girl was
openly smiling in a way unusual for brides.  The mothers of the bride and groom sat next to each
other celebrating; they were, perhaps, even more pleased than the bride and groom.  The
marriage was an excellent strategy as the bride did not have to leave her neighborhood; it
consolidated relationships that previously had been based on affinal/allegiance group
relationships; and it did not potentially split any land holdings.  Due to the close relationship of the
bride and groom, the bride price was said to be reasonable and respectable.  The mother of the
groom said it was the same as had been paid by the bride’s father’s family for the bride’s mother
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(to the groom’s patrilineage) 30 years previously – 300 rupees – and a little extra in the wedding
feast.  They could not tell me how much it was worth in Thai baht, frustrating me very much until I
realized that it was in part this non-convertibility which allowed them to unambiguously
demonstrate repute to the gaze of the community on the basis of an un-countable display of
wealth.  Such a marriage brought repute without huge expense.  This brideprice given for the
groom’s mother, incidentally, was in keeping with figures given by Dessaint for Evil Peaks.  The
marriage feast was cheerful, well-fed, and moderately well-liquored, but small, confined to the
members of the allegiance group of upper Revealed River.  
Marriage
For a village the size of Revealed River, there seemed to be few marriages.  I was there a
year before a marriage took place in the village.  A reason became apparent in the New Year
celebrations of 1994.  I joined a group of male lineage elders sitting on a ridge above the dancing
at one of the upper village houses, observing and commenting on the boys and girls dancing as
elders do.  They noted the number of marriageable girls in the village and expressed sadness that
there were too few boys for their girls.  They considered strategies to get the girls married.  
That year, one of the satellite villages in the Thirty Thousand cluster had scheduled their
New Year celebration for the month after most other villages’ celebrations.  This was possible
because of the vagaries of the lunar calendar.  Each village servitor kept track of the lunar
calendar for his own village with the help of the elders, and as a result the calendar might differ
from village to village, or even within the village if there were rival factions with rival servitors of the
Old Grandfather shrine.  They also adjusted the calendar to fit local needs.  In 1969, Evil Peaks
postponed its New Years celebration for 30 days because it would have fallen during the opium
harvest (Dessaint 1972a:90-91), and Lahu villages made such adjustments as well when they
were getting in their opium harvest (Jones 1967).  In addition, Lisu in northern Thailand were
notorious for their lack of interest in counting anything (a point noted by Durrenberger,
  The Lisu of Nujiang Canyon in Yunnan had a “famous” bird and flower calendar that helped67
them to determine when to start various farming activities.  This was based on the time of year
that certain natural phenomena occurred, such as the blooming of flowers, the calls of birds and
variations in the growing grasses.  There were ten months, each named after a bird or flower
(Chen, Huang and Zhu 2003:9-10).  Such a calendar would have been useless for the Lisu who
migrated south.  
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Hutheesing, and the Lisu college students who had formed their own local NGO as well),  so that67
there were no wide-ranging checks against a given servitor’s variations in counting.  The ritual
calendar was, like the groups of households in villages, unregulated by overarching structures of
systematization.  
The elders discussed why the smaller village had scheduled its New Year for a year later. 
Some claimed that the much smaller village, which had an even higher proportion of unmarried
girls than Revealed River, chose the later month in hopes of attracting more visitors and thus
young men to court and marry the girls.  The other reason given was that the village had invested
heavily in planting barley on contract to the Boonrawd Breweries, and due to late harvest and
interference from the Project they had not received their payments in time to make the
expenditures needed at New Years – retrieval of pawned silver, new dresses, liquor, pigs, and the
other elements of status display.  Thus, the village made practical decisions oriented toward
facilitating households’ display of repute and to help household heads to fulfill their responsibility
to get their children married.  This redounded to the repute of the village.  Revealed River Village
elders both admired and were jealous of the strategy.  
In this section, I will discuss shifts in marriage strategies, both in terms of the constraints
faced in establishing marriages and new households, and the strategies of Lisu parents and
children in bringing about marriage.  Marriage in Revealed River was a domain in which changes
in household strategies were active and visible.  Strategies about when and whom to marry and
where to live shifted in response to the social and economic context in which people lived. 
Marriage had become more difficult to achieve as a result of lack of disposable wealth, which was
related to land scarcity.  Key consequences for social structure were increase in age at first
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marriage, a related shift toward patrilocality, an increase in agnatic density, and a re-emphasis of
patrilineality.  The trigger for change was the shift in context, not in culturally possible practices. 
Shifting conditions re-shaped every-day assessments of relationships by households and brought
about culturally consistent changes because people’s practice existed within a cultural framework
in which alternative strategies existed.  To understand the way in which “responding to the shifting
conditions of its existence ... the cultural order reproduces itself in and as change” (Sahlins
1985:xii), we must understand the interests of people in different social positions.  Age at first
marriage, bridewealth, reasons for marital instability, and the desired characteristics of a spouse
are ways of looking at the culturally constructed interests of different social actors in order to
highlight the changes in marriage practices.  
Historical Marriage Practices
Marriage for southern Lisu was based on bridewealth, but specific practices varied
considerably over time and by location.  Only three historical documents available to me
mentioned Lisu social structure, and they had little to say about kinship and marriage; clearly their
comments were informed by the authors’ roles as colonial explorers and Christian missionaries. 
Fraser’s work was based mostly on the Flowery Lisu in the central part of Lisu distribution in
Yunnan, and in far northeastern Burma.  Rose and Brown made contact with the Black Lisu, but
had greater contact with the more southerly and easterly Flowery and W hite Lisu of the Sino-
Burma frontier.  The recent ancestors of the Lisu of northern Thailand migrated from these
Flowery Lisu populations in Burma.  The writers did not clearly distinguish among the different
groups of Lisu when discussing marriage practices.  Nor is it in most cases possible to correlate
marriage practices with economy, polity, or even other features of the social structure.  However,
these give us an idea of the range of culturally appropriate behavior.  Clearly there were variations
in the marriage structures. 
  Both Dessaint and Hutheesing reported that Lisu claimed that exchange of brides was sure to68
result in the death of one of the four spouses (Dessaint 1972a:146; Hutheesing 1990a:108). 
This did not seem to be a problem in Revealed River Village where one of the four marriages I
observed was a bride exchange. 
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Marriage tended to occur at a young age, before the age of 25 for a young man and
usually by the age of 15 or 16 years for a girl (Rose and Brown 1911:263; Scott and Hardiman
1983 I:(1)588; Fraser 1922:ix).  Lisu were renowned for the early age of marriage for girls even in
northern Thailand.  Marriage was initiated in a number of ways including: arranged marriages;
negotiation for a bride initiated by the groom’s family through a middleman, possibly a village elder
or male relative; elopement; and exchange of brides between families (Rose and Brown
1911:263; Fraser 1922:ix-x; Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1)588).  
Arranged and negotiated marriages were depicted as the norm, or at least the ideal. 
Brideprice was set at the time of betrothal, unless brides were exchanged between families, in
which case there was no brideprice paid.  The ideal was that the same sum was given for a
daughter as her father had given for her mother (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1) 588; Fraser
1922:ix), but observers varied in their reports of what that amount was.  Rose and Brown stated
that the brideprice varied from eight to ten ounces of silver, about 25 British shillings (Rose and
Brown 1911:263); Fraser that it was between five and fifty rupees (Fraser 1922:ix-x); and Scott
that the common amount was ten rupees regardless of the “qualities” of the bride, but it had
formerly been much higher, one hundred and fifty rupees (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1) 588). 
No mention was made of brideservice as an element of exchange.  However, according to Fraser,
if a family had only daughters, a son-in-law was adopted into the bride’s family (Fraser 1922:x). 
Bride exchange was practiced only among poor families who could not afford bridewealth
(Maitra 1993:149-150).   It was thus a form of marriage with less repute.  Another variation was68
elopement.  In Kengtung State (northeastern Burma) in the late nineteenth century, marriage was
often by elopement.  After hiding in the jungle for a few days, the couple returned to their village
and a payment made to the bride’s parents (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1) 588).  Kengtung State
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was an area of dense opium cultivation and a site of much warfare by the northern Tai states
resisting British and Siamese control.  It is likely that bridewealth was related to opium prices that
varied depending on markets and warfare.  Payments were made to the woman’s parents, or her
husband and his family if she had been married.  Eloping was a low status form of marriage
(Fraser 1922:x) because even if the brideprice was as high as 150 rupees, it avoided the expense
of feasting, including a further exchange of wealth at the ceremony and provision of a great deal
of rice beer, pork, and rice to be consumed over the course of the day and night (Fraser
1922:ix-x).  Marriage celebrations could be even more elaborate further south, continuing for three
days (Rose and Brown 1911:263); these, too, would have been opium-growing peoples.  Marriage
was a key venue for the display of household repute through feasting and exchange of
bridewealth for those with wealth, one of the few opportunities for competitive feasting. 
Cross-cousin marriage, particularly patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, was valorized
although rare (Fraser 1922:ix; Dessaint 1972a:146; Durrenberger 1971:16; Hutheesing
1990a:106-108, 160; Maitra 1993:149-150).  In some districts in northern Burma and Yunnan, one
FZD/MBS marriage was practiced in each generation, so that marriage was tantamount to an
exchange across generations.  However, there was no evidence of superiority of wife-givers to
wife-takers, as among some Kachins (Fraser 1922:ix), an indication of the egalitarian relations in
marriage among the Lisu of northern Burma and western Yunnan.  In fact, it is difficult at first
blush to figure out if someone had truly married a patrilateral cross-cousin because the same
term, lo -piyo  is also used for anyone who is a potential mate from a different lineage. 3 5
By and large, however, most Lisu young people chose their own partners, and
negotiations occurred for the sake of “propriety” (Rose and Brown 1911:263); although this is
counter to Fraser’s observations that marriages were arranged (which might have been due to his
perspective as an American missionary or because he worked further north in Yunnan).  At
community activities and rituals, boys dressed beautifully in turbans, cowries, and swords and
competed to work hard in order to impress girls.  Rose and Brown wrote about observing one
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young couple “slip away” together at the dance following a communal labor day and return to
declare their betrothal.  The role of the bride’s father seemed only to be to facilitate the marriage
payments; the next morning, the father of the bride-to-be lobbied to have his prospective son-in-
law work as a guide across the mountains for the British party in order to ensure that the groom
had the resources to make a large marriage payment (Rose and Brown 1911:263).  
Thus, bridewealth, both the brideprice and exchanges through feasting, appeared to vary
with locality and economy.  The brideprice amount was tied to social relations between the affines
and/or to the wealth of the groom, that is, either to long-term marriage exchanges or to immediate
status display of the groom’s family.  Acceptable alternative strategies for marriage were
elopement and, more rarely, bride exchange.  Opium would have given young people more
autonomy in marriage choice as access to land and this cash crop made young people less
dependent on their parents for permission and the payment of bridewealth; bride exchange was
infrequent due to the disposable wealth available through opium, allowing higher status marriages
because of the availability of wealth.  
Marriage within a “clan” was forbidden regardless of “actual” kinship.  In some districts,
certain clans were held to be related to others and marriage forbidden between their members.
Marriage prohibitions appeared to these observers to be the only significant role played by clans in
social relations (Fraser 1922:iii; Enriquez 1921:73; Rose and Brown 1911:268), although clearly
this was not true for Black Lisu, for whom clan-based feuding was widely reported.  Observations
among Lisu in northern Thailand were in keeping with attenuated roles for clans and patrilineages,
where most breaches of marriage rules were resolvable with a ‘fine’ added to the brideprice.  
Divorce was said to be “impossible” (Scott and Hardiman 1983 I:(1) 588); adultery with a
married woman was said to be a serious matter and her husband could ask for a substantial fine
(Fraser 1922:v).  Premarital sex was said to be very uncommon and having a child out of wedlock
was a great disgrace; the father had no claim on the child and he was heavily fined unless a
marriage could be arranged (Rose and Brown 1911:263).  
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Little of this conflicts with accounts of Lisu marriage in northern Thailand decades later,
although it is so vague that it would contradict little.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, age at
marriage was in the teens for girls and early twenties for boys (Dessaint 1972a:141).  However,
with the contraction of the opium economy by the 1980s, the average age at marriage had risen to
19.5 years for females and 24.1 years for males (Hutheesing 1990a:193), and had since risen
even more.  
A significant difference was bridewealth, which had increased greatly through the peak of
the opium economy. 
Table 5.1.  Historical Bridewealth in the Opium Economy
Year of Marriage Mean Brideprice Mean Groom Service (in years) N
Evil Peaks Village (Dessaint 1972a:181, Table 20)
Before 1910 phya : 50 5 a
baht (old): 300 b
baht (new) 889-1143
1.33 3
1911-1920 phya : 1105
baht (old): 660
baht (new): 1956-2515
2.17 3
1921-1930 phya : 1005
baht (old): 600
baht (new): 1778-2286
0 2
1931-1940 phya : 1905
baht (old): 1140
baht (new): 3378-4343
2.33 6
1941-1950 phya : 208.55
baht (old): 1251
baht (new): 3707-4766
3.10 6
1951-1960 phya : 276.75
baht (old): 1660
baht (new): 4920-6325
0.48 12
1961-1970 phya : 340.25
baht (old): 2041
baht (new): 6049-7777
0.68 26
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See the Tiger Village (Hutheesing 1990a:195-196)
Before the 1960s phya : 3735
baht (new): 2238
N/A 17
1960s-1970s baht (new): 9,950 N/A. 32
1970s-1980s baht (new): 16,944 N/A. 9
 
Phya  is a silver rupee.  One of the pre-1910 marriages involved payment in kind,a 5
consisting of an ox, three pigs, and a length of cloth.
The equivalencies in baht are based on research among the Hmong in the mid-b
1970s.  Rupees were silver coins used throughout upland mainland Southeast
Asia, called rupees after the British colonial silver coin.  They were of high quality
and often melted down for silver valuables such as jewelry and decoration for
clothing, as well as used as cash.  Eight thousand baht was worth 350-450
rupees in 1974, which comes to 17.78-22.86 baht/rupee.  But the rupee had been
re-valued from 6 baht/rupee to over 20 baht/rupee (Cooper 1984:138-139). 
Durrenberger (1971) does not give the equivalency for silver; Dessaint is not clear
on this point, but it appears that silver coins were equivalent to a little over 10
baht.  In this table, old baht are the pre-1974 value and new baht are the post-
1974 value.  Regardless of what a silver rupee was “worth”, both Dessaint’s and
Hutheesing’s data shows a considerable increase in brideprice in the mid-
twentieth century and likely the entire exchange of bridewealth increased as well,
given reports of large feasts of several days and legendary drunkenness.   The
‘scarf’ money received during the wedding ceremony (given to the couple by the
guests at the ceremony) increased from 519 baht for the older generation to
1,900 baht for their daughters (Hutheesing 1990a:196).  The fact that the rupee
was re-valued upwards to nearly 3 times its previous value further indicates an
increase in wealth circulated at marriage, as silver rupees (and jewelry, made
from melted-down rupees) were the main means of exchange (baht were not in
wide circulation in the hills before the mid-1970s). 
There are inherently inflationary tendencies to bridewealth because respect is gained by
the relationship between what is customarily given and what is actually given (Collier 1988:97). 
Among the Lisu, what was customarily given was the amount that had been given for the bride’s
mother, and repute was gained where the bridewealth was equal to or more than that.  As such,
one would expect a mild inflationary trend from generation to generation.  The figures above
indicate a far more rapid inflation in bridewealth (including brideprice, wealth exchanged at the
marriage ceremony, and brideservice) than would be expected from the model, particularly in the
post-W orld W ar II years.  At the same time, opium cultivation had expanded considerably in the
inter-war and especially in post-W orld W ar II years (McCoy 1972; Cooper 1984:104).  The
inflation in bridewealth was related to this increase in the circulation of wealth, allowing
  Times of brideservice varied.  People in Revealed River said that 1-2 years of brideservice had69
been customary, but a longer period could be negotiated. 
245
households to display repute through the main means of doing so, payment of bridewealth.  W hile
there was a ritual role for the bride’s fathers’s oB (wu  pha ), there does not appear to have been5 5
a similar role for the groom’s father’s oB and the cash for bridewealth seemed to come from within
the groom’s household if for no other reason than that migration patterns often resulted in the
groom’s father’s brothers not living nearby.  
There was an interplay between brideservice and bridewealth in Lisu society, both in
terms of systemic correlations and in household strategies, but there was no cut and dried
relationship between the amount of brideprice and time of brideservice indicated in the above
table.  It is noticeable that both brideprice and brideservice were high from 1931-1950.  Expansion
of opium cultivation resulted in increased needs for labor in order to expand cultivation, as was
evident in Dessaint’s and Durrenberger’s research.  The way to wealth was through expansion of
fields.  Land was free; labor was the relatively scarce resource.  Labor had high value, and a
household that controlled the labor of productive adults was wealthy (Durrenberger 1983b). 
Marriage negotiations entailed discussion of brideprice, what was to be given at the feast, post-
marital residence of the couple, and length of brideservice, if any.  Fathers of brides sought as
long a period as possible of brideservice.  As it was ‘customary’ for a young man to live with the
bride’s family for up to three years,  any lessening of that time required payment of a fine by the69
groom’s family, but if they were wealthy and powerful, it also enabled the groom’s family to keep
their son’s labor and gain their daughter-in-law’s as well.  In this, marriage became a means of
expansion of the labor pool, but also of the allegiance group of a powerful household.  Longer
brideservice increased the likelihood that the couple would stay with her family when they
migrated.  Yet brideservice could be onerous.  Dessaint was awakened one night by gunshots and
a man yelling “Stop him! Stop him!”  A father-in-law had made such excessive demands on his
son-in-law’s labor and the rest of his wife’s kin had taken so much of his opium as part of the
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marriage payments that the son-in-law had run away.  The young man was retrieved and the
headman and elders negotiated better conditions for him in the form of longer time to make
marriage payments and less labor demanded (Dessaint 1972a:110, 130).  For their part, boys
sought to marry with a higher brideprice and avoid brideservice altogether, as they felt they would
better benefit from expending their labor in their own fields for the benefit of their own household
(Dessaint 1972a:180). 
Transformations of Marriage in Revealed River Village
Age at Marriage
One of the significant changes in household formation in Revealed River Village was the
increase in age at marriage.  This phenomenon is often related to ‘modernization,’ particularly the
education of women (Caldwell 1976:142; Ezra 2003), but this was not the case in Revealed River. 
Rather, it was part of a more general trend among the Lisu having to do with constraints on
household resources, both in terms of access to land and the ability to accumulate bridewealth.  I
found that young women who married in Revealed River were in their early to mid-20s.  It seemed
that age at first marriage had increased in other villages in the cluster as well, although the pattern
was not so clear as in Revealed River.  In Chiang Rai, the phenomenon of later marriage was so
severe that girls, shamed that they had not married by their 20s, ran off to the lowlands to work
(usually ending up in some form of the sex trade) or committed suicide (Hutheesing 1990a:153-6,
168-171; Hutheesing, personal communication, March 1994).  One incident of a Lisu girl who
climbed a telecommunications tower and threatened suicide by jumping because her suitor was
too poor to pay bridewealth for her was widely reported in the international media.  The suicide
was averted when the chief of police of Mae Sai (Mae Hong Son Province) promised to pay the
bridewealth and host the wedding (Reuters 1998).  
The mechanism at work in later age at first marriage may have been marriage and
intergenerational wealth transfer, as argued in the demographic transition model, but I do not
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believe the phenomenon of later marriage can be understood from a functionalist stance.  Rather,
strategies occurred at the household level.  In the case of preindustrial continental Europe, access
to resources such as a house or land is assumed to have been relevant for individuals in their
decision to marry.  This has been referred to as the niche mechanism, said to regulate
reproduction.  The assumption is that economic space is divided into a limited number of “niches,”
or self-sufficient positions; the ability to marry required possession of such a niche, for instance,
through inheritance; therefore, only some could marry and the population was limited (Fertig
2003).  But niche transfers explained only a small fraction of the timing of marriages in the short
run because market mechanisms overrode them, for instance, demands for wage labor, lessening
dependence of children on inheritance from their parents.  In addition, people of different classes
practiced different strategies (Kinoshita 1995).  In the end, “the niche concept may be rather
understood as a familial strategy of small proprietors to control their children” (Fertig 2003: 13). 
Niche transfer mechanisms restricted marriage primarily in the context of state or communal
policies to enforce regulations (Fertig 2003).  In the Project area, land resources were constrained
by the policies of the state toward upland watersheds; decrease in wealth was due to national and
international drug production interdiction strategies.  The carrying capacity of the mountains of
northern Thailand has arguably been overwhelmed.  But this was not a matter of ecosystem
equilibrium.  The carrying capacity of the region had been increased by the introduction of opium,
allowing a flow of global wealth into the region that overcame previous limitations on local carrying
capacity.  State intervention had made it ecologically less possible for this population to continue
to live at previous standards of living.  Many people recognized this limitation in large part because
it was a matter of state policy and intervention within one generation, resulting in very conscious
strategizing on the part of individuals and at the household level.  
“W e are poor,” Lisu told me countless times, “W hen will we be allowed to grow opium
again?”  There were very real economic constraints with which households had to deal in
establishing marriages and new households.  It seemed that people were waiting for better years;
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household heads (both fathers and mothers) were treating this as a short-term, temporary
constraint.  This was not an irrational expectation, given periodic repositionings of government
policy in light of international policy, the flow of trends in development, and state bureaucratic
politics.  People were waiting – for land to help their children establish viable households and for
the cash to pay bridewealth – and as a result, marriage was delayed.  
Bridewealth
The proximate cause of delay of marriage was decrease in available wealth for marriage
exchanges due to the contraction of the opium economy and loss of access to land.  Bridewealth
was very expensive as a result of its inflation in the days of the opium economy.  However, the
perception of decreased availability of wealth must be put in perspective by two factors: a
decrease in the value of labor as a source of household wealth and repute, and increased
demands on use of household wealth for investment in making a living.  In this economic context,
Lisu parents could call on a cultural repertoire of marriage types that potentially cost less.  
Amounts of bridewealth.  
Every aspect of bridewealth was negotiated.  Marriage and bridewealth payments wove
together networks of relationships and obligations among households, all on variable time periods
of half-finished transactions and pending payments, what Hutheesing called an “...unstable marital
structure with oscillations between shame and repute” (Hutheesing 1990a:106).  The network of
marriage often depended on other people getting married.  If a young man’s family needed the
bridewealth from a daughter to enable them to ‘buy a bride’ for a son, and most other families
were in the same position, a kind of marriage gridlock occurred – with everyone facing the same
constraints, there was no one appropriate to marry, especially since the qualities of a good spouse
had changed somewhat.  Both girls and their parents included such factors as access to land and
capital in their evaluations of potential grooms.  Bridewealth had apparently not decreased in
response to these pressures, but it did seem that it had not continued to rise at the same rates it
  I found the emphasis on thirty thousand interesting.  Christian Lisu in northeastern India70
(migrants from northeastern Burma in the 1960s) asserted that marriage in the past had been
paid for by 30 cows and 30 household utensils (Maitra 1993:149-150, 174-175).  
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had in previous decades (cf. Cooper 1984 on the Hmong).  Despite the difficulties in establishing
marriages, bridewealth had by no means decreased in the Thirty Thousand cluster.
Thirty Thousand had a reputation for being an area of high bridewealth; local lore had it
that it received its name because the standard bridewealth payment was thirty thousand baht. 
W hile thirty thousand  was unrealistic, high bridewealth was indeed typical of the area, and that70
was in keeping with its role as a major opium producer in the recent past and reputed transit point
for heroin.  Bridewealth in Revealed River was typically 20,000 baht, which was high; it was,
conservatively, almost 3 times the value of 35 years previously.  In See the Tiger Village in the
1980s, ten years previously, bridewealth averaged around 10,000 baht and went as high as
20,000 baht, including marriages of widows and divorcees (Hutheesing 1990a:195).  There, the
elders complained of inflated bridewealth, which Hutheesing attributed to the heroin trade.  One to
two generations previously, it would have taken a Lisu one year to acquire the brideprice, but by
the 1980s it took more than two years if they could have grown opium poppies (Hutheesing
1990a:178).  As discussed in the previous chapter, opium gave a far higher return to labor than
any other crop; the end of the opium economy severely reduced the wealth available for
bridewealth.  
Bridewealth could not decrease because of the Lisu culture of repute; to accept a lower
brideprice than had been paid for the mother was a public concession of decline in status, a
source of shame not only for the parents of the bride, but for the bride herself and for her children
(Hutheesing 1990a:113).  As is amply demonstrated in Hutheesing’s work, loss of repute with
economic disintegration has had profoundly negative impacts on Lisu conceptions of self,
particularly evident in the increase in suicide of girls and young women and the disappearance of
young men into the drug trade and addiction.  At the same time, wealth still existed in segments of
Lisu society where people had become involved in the heroin trade.  In the cluster around See the
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Tiger Village, heroin trading villages were forming a marriage elite (Hutheesing 1990a:179).  One
might expect that marriages took place earlier in these villages (Dahal, Fricke and Thornton
1993).  In Thirty Thousand Village, there seemed some evidence of differences in marriage
exchange and feasting among villages believed to be involved in the heroin trade and those not
involved, but I was unable to conclusively determine if this was the case.  
The main signs of adjustment to economic hard times were delay of marriage and an end
to the increase in bridewealth that had occurred over the previous 30 years.  The lack of wealth
for marriage was as much a matter of increased needs to spend household resources on other
activities and items in order to make a living as it was a matter of decreased objective wealth, but
absolute poverty was how the older Revealed River people conceptualized and spoke of it.  W hen
I refer to wealth, I do not mean to imply that these people had been wealthy by world standards –
far from it – but that they had lived well, within their own conceptions of household repute and with
relative economic security.  This was not the case anymore.  Other factors were involved in this
lived experience of increased poverty, particularly the great costs and insecurity of subsistence.  A
used truck, for instance, cost 120,000 baht (approximately $5,700 US in the early 1990s), so one
truck was worth about six brides!  The means by which households gained wealth was no longer
through expansion of production but through capital investment – trucks, land, fertilizer,
pesticides, education.  In the opium economy, wealth had come through expansion of production
by opening new land, and the key to that had been labor.  In the post-opium economy, each year,
households had to strategize the means to subsistence, and bringing another producer (with
resultant pregnancy and the immediate experience of an unfavorable consumer/producer ratio)
into the household was a lower immediate priority in the face of other needs for capital.  
Forms of marriage and marriage ceremonies.
Given such constraints, households called on culturally appropriate strategies that might
have been uncommon a generation before, particularly types of marriage that entailed smaller
exchanges.
  Durrenberger found there was the skeleton of a moiety system.  There had to be two clans or71
lineages in the founding of a village, and certain clans were believed to be more complementary
than others (Durrenberger 1971:10-18; Dessaint 1972a:40, 93).  However, all efforts at
encouraging intermarriage among the two Lisu ‘halves’ of Revealed River Village had failed.  I
believe that the requirement of two lineages founding the village was related to the diarchic
structure of villages in that the headman, a political position concerned with leadership oriented
toward the outside world, and the maw mong, the servitor of the Village Guardian Spirit and
concerned with blessing within the village, were separate and complementary (see Samuel 1993;
Tooker 1996).  One position each was held by the two main Lisu factions in the village.  
In addition, drinking was strongly discouraged in Revealed River.  This was in great contrast to72
previous reported behavior for Lisu.  The Chinese had a saying: “Lisu for liquor; leeches for blood”
(Fraser 1922:v).  The Lisu were said to use millet or maize for liquor even if they were short of
food (Anderson 1871:355; Forrest 1908:264; Dick 1987:36).  They especially drank a great deal at
weddings.  In inclement weather or when there were visitors, it was the custom to drink heavily at
the house of the most prominent leader of the village (Kingdon-W ard 1986 [1923]:204).  Both old
men and women drank, and far more than young people.  People became quarrelsome while
drunk (Kingdon-W ard 1986 [1923]:204; Fraser 1922:v).  In Revealed River, one stated reason for
the informal ban was an incident in which a woman died of alcohol poisoning at New Year. 
However, the other sub-text of discourse on alcohol was its increasing association with Thai
identity.  Many Thai forestry officials were very heavy drinkers, as had been the soldiers posted in
the village.  As Lisu associated drinking with Thai (and with their agents in the village, for instance
the headman was frequently drunk and dangerous, a casualty of having to host Thai visitors), Lisu
in Revealed River increasingly rejected it.  
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One form of marriage, full of repute, was a FZD/MBS marriage, a patrilateral cross-cousin
marriage.   Ai Yi’s son’s marriage was of this type.  Another of the economies of bridewealth was71
in smaller, more frugal ceremonies.  Hutheesing (Hutheesing 1990a) has written and spoken of
the wedding feasts at which older women drank heavily and sang wedding songs all night.  I only
saw one such all night affair, at a nearby village reputed to be involved in the heroin trade; it was
also on the trekking routes (opium and trekking were often associated, see Seewuthiwong 1989;
Leepreecha 1997; Jinakul 1999).  Interestingly, this was a bride exchange, a type in which
bridewealth was not expected according to historical records.  I attended the wedding feast at
Revealed River Village and it was muted.   The girls complained because there would be no all72
night dancing.  My attendance, along with my sister (who was visiting), was the high point because
we contributed 100 baht each to the couple to bless the marriage (scarf money).  The return
wedding a couple of weeks later was an extraordinary event with hundreds of people, older men
singing the Lisu legends in one house; boys and girls dancing to the pipe in one clearing; and men
and women singing the flirtatious counter-singing in another clearing.  There was liquor, there was
  This was highly ironic given the amount of wealth exchanged in Thai marriage ceremonies73
among the middle classes, which practiced indirect dowry.  ‘Obligatory gifts’ to the wife included a
diamond ring, a house, and literally piles of cash brought in on silver platters.  Frugality and self-
sufficiency, however, were central organizing principles of the Project, keeping with Buddhist
philosophy of the “middle path” and Thai romantic conceptions of rural communities (Nartsupha
1999).  Many of the Thai working in the mountains were of lower to lower-middle class in origin. 
They had attended state technical and teaching colleges, not the prestigious universities.  They
had created an oppositional identity in which they rejected the social class hierarchies of Thailand,
including demonstration of status through conspicuous consumption and wealth display.  
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pork, there were mounds of rice, and no one from Revealed River Village; because they could not
reciprocate, attending would have lost them repute.  
I suspect that more elaborate marriage ceremonies in Thirty Thousand were held when
the various Thai development agents were away from the village because the Thai, particularly
Project officials, criticized the Lisu for any ostentatious display of status.   Most of the villagers73
were anxious to both appease the forestry officials and to exhibit poverty, although these practices
were counter to the Lisu cultural logic of repute, because of the power the officials held over their
ability to make a living.  Thai forestry officials and mountain teachers judged Lisu status displays
to be irrational.  Nevertheless, small weddings could not be explained only by villagers’ concerns
about the opinions of Thai officials; there were very real, objective resource constraints on the
degree of display. 
The cultural framework of marriage practices allowed for a type of wedding based on
minimal ceremony within the circle of the nearest kin.  These were “spirit worship” marriages as
opposed to “money on the altar” type marriages.  Two of the four marriages that took place in the
years I was in Revealed River were of this type, although the third held a small enough ceremony
within the form of “money on the altar” that it was nearly indistinguishable from it.  According to
Hutheesing, “spirit worship” marriages were without repute as compared to the “money on the
altar” marriages, but holding such a marriage did not prevent holding the larger ceremony later on. 
One woman in See the Tiger, whose parents-in-law had died and left her husband unable to make
the final bridewealth payment, was working for her own brideprice for the sake of her household
repute and especially the repute of her daughter when she married (Hutheesing 1990a:112-113). 
  Silver coins in the shape of crescents had been used as early as the Tang Dynasty in China74
(these were known as pua, which is essentially the Lisu term for silver coins) and the Thai
kingdoms after Ayutthaya used silver coins that looked like bullets.  However, it was not until the
period of European mercantilism that silver became the universal currency in mainland Southeast
Asia with the unprecedented influx of silver brought about by improved extraction techniques and
South American mines (Reid 1993:27, 99-107). 
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This was a future-oriented investment, for her daughter’s bridewealth would be determined in part
by what hers had been no matter when paid or by whom.  W hile no such specific strategies were
expressed to me while in Revealed River, people spoke of many things as if they were waiting for
better times, not just to carry out marriages, but to carry out the significant ceremonies and
feasting that would demonstrate their repute.  Their strategies were informed by their imagined
future.  
An interesting point was the role of silver rupees.  Silver was metaphorically associated
with women and marriage.  Prayers for blessing included the phrase “let the left hand have gold;
let the right have silver” and “let there be silver in the sleeping room and gold in the eating place.” 
Left was associated with male in this cosmological system (Durrenberger 1989:35; see also
Hutheesing 1990a:112).  Silver had been, for a time, the main item of bridewealth exchange.  This
was historically specific.   W hile silver certainly existed in the mines of Northern Mainland74
Southeast Asia, the amount of silver increased in the colonial period.  This, along with
dependence on a cash crop, made silver the prime marker of wealth in upland societies.  Silver
rupees, or phya , were cash and used as such, although certainly symbolically important.  In the5
1990s, the silver rupees were not made any more and there was attrition due to conversion of
coins to jewelry and pawning (Hutheesing 1990a:177) or sale of silver in order to buy rice and
trucks, according to people in Revealed River Village.  The beautiful black velvet jackets heavy
with silver tear-drops worn by boys had disappeared, although the girls’ vests remained. 
Supposedly some households had caches hidden, but the main currency had become Thai baht,
part of a national cash economy, and countable.  Corresponding with this change, bridewealth
transactions took place primarily in baht rather than phya , although phya  was the preferred form. 5 5
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In a sense, therefore, silver rupees had become a form of valuable rather than currency, rare and
highly valued as a symbol of women and marriage, and controlled by the senior generation.  This,
along with the sheer size of bridewealth, ensured a far greater dependence of children on parents
to get married.  It explains the pleasure of Ai Yi and his wife at being able to pay in phya .  5
Marriage payments had become a barrier to marriage.  Households faced a practical
problem of how to accumulate bridewealth when there was less surplus from agriculture and
greater need for investments in economic activities in hopes of finding something as profitable as
opium had once been; when, in fact, labor did not reap the rewards it once had.  These
displacements in the context of shifting political and economic conditions transformed the
resources available to households and were experienced as limits to household wealth and
repute.  They were not perceived as a permanent destruction of what they considered essential –
establishing their children in marriage (parents) or getting married (children), maintaining
autonomy, and displaying repute.  Their strategies were oriented toward fulfilling their goals in the
face of these conditions and as such, Lisu parents were able to draw on a range of strategies for
bringing about marriage – bride exchange and lower status forms of marriage.  But in Revealed
River, the culturally appropriate strategies on which they drew did not include brideservice despite
its prevalence just a generation before. 
Brideservice. 
Both brideservice and bridewealth had been possibilities, a point of manipulation in
household decision processes and establishment of new households, thus the developmental
cycle.  Brideservice had been a way for young men without access to resources to marry sooner. 
And yet, in Revealed River, brideservice had not increased, as will be seen, due to perceptions of
land scarcity.  This shift in strategy had unintended consequences for political and kinship
relations there.  
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Brideservice was a possibility in the continuum of strategies to get married.  Young men
without resources (orphans, an idiom common in courting songs, e.g., “I am an orphan, pity
me...”) had had the option to marry into a girl’s family’s group in the sense of living with the bride’s
father and working for him (not by taking his name).  Fifty-five percent of respondents in See the
Tiger village stated that grooms lived with the bride’s family because they could not pay the
bridewealth (38% stated that it was because their family had no son) (Hutheesing 1990a:196). 
This had been an appealing option to household heads because it increased the labor available to
the household; rather than losing a daughter, they gained a son-in-law and the couple was hoped
to be more likely to remain with the allegiance group after the negotiated period of service was
completed.  
In this sense, brideservice was a replacement for bridewealth payments, validating
marriage in socially acceptable terms, by elders, as argued by Collier (1988).  But as experienced
by boys who got married, it gave them potential autonomy in establishing marriage, adulthood,
and their own household when and where they chose.  It had been at least theoretically possible
for a young man to earn his bride almost entirely by his own efforts, whether through brideservice
or by accumulating bridewealth himself.  A young man could accumulate the capital for
bridewealth himself by growing opium, although that would take a year or two; or he could marry a
divorcee, widow, or a non-Lisu for whom no brideprice need be paid (Dessaint 1972a:150). 
Cooper gives an example of a young man supplying his own bridewealth; the young man’s
parents were opium addicts and could not buy him a bride, so he cleared and planted his own
opium field at the age of seventeen.  Such a son-in-law was welcome even if the bridewealth was
lower because of the advantage of establishing a cross-clan relationship (Cooper 1984:138, 179). 
For Lisu, the potential independence of young men fit the coign of household autonomy under the
opium economy: the ability to move to avoid authoritarian leaders; to avoid dependency or choose
a patron oneself rather than be coopted; the ability to establish a household that was economically
autonomous through the profits of opium and the availability of hired labor; and the trope of
256
repute.  Goods could, indeed, be used to create or dissolve obligations, albeit only on a strictly
contractual basis.  Long-term obligations between two parties involved in exchange were always
explicitly negotiated and Lisu did not accept that there were any implicit long-term social
dependencies or debts involved, a point that often brought them into conflict with Thai
(Durrenberger 1975).  All of this had been supported by the wealth of the opium economy. The
fact that brideservice existed and men could earn wives through their own labors put limits on the
power of senior kinfolk over their juniors (Meillassoux 1972; Collier and Rosaldo 1981:289).  But
brideservice was rare in Revealed River in the 1990s.  The lived experience of young men in
Revealed River today is that they have lost independence, the ability to strategize and take action
by themselves for themselves.  
  W ith the changes in the agricultural economy and increase in poverty, one might expect
the incidence of brideservice marriage to have increased as young men sought to marry in the
face  their parents’ household resource constraints or household decisions to invest household
resources elsewhere especially since increasing labor was not as critical to household wealth as it
had once been.  This was the case in See the Tiger Village (Hutheesing 1990a:180), but not in
Revealed River ten years later, where the opportunities for a poor or independent young man to
pay for his wife himself had disappeared.  I knew of only two recent marriages in which the groom
had moved to the bride’s household.  In one case, the young man had been arrested for opium
possession and was in the central jail in Bangkok.  In the other, tragically, the groom had
committed suicide.  The young widow, Amima, attributed his suicide, at different times, to the
ghost of a Lahu suicide that haunted that part of the village and to his unhappiness at living with
her family, feeling both unwanted and overworked.  Amima’s family, affinally-connected to
Kowboi’s allegiance group, were poor and the groom himself had little or no family and no money. 
A year or so after her husband’s suicide, she moved to the lowlands to look for work when her
parents’ home was destroyed by fire, the first woman of Revealed River to do so, and against
village regulations.  There, she worked as a cook for a “bee-keeping” enterprise, and while it was
  This led to one of my more interesting field encounters.  W hen Amima first disappeared, her75
family was deeply worried.  They delegated me to try to find her in town and bring her back, an
impossible task in a city as large as Chiang Mai.  I expressed my concerns about Amima’s fate to
contacts who were Lisu activists at a hill tribes NGO.  Through them, I met Dara, a Lisu woman
who was working as a prostitute.  Her clientele were primarily foreigners, which meant she had a
lot of freedom (contrary to perceptions of prostitutes in the United States, these women do not
usually have pimps, nor are they drug-addicted).  She downplayed my concerns about Amima’s
safety.  “If she’s smart,” Dara told me, “she’s going to be better off.”  She then described the
benefits to prostitution from her point of view – you get payed to party, you get far more money
than you’d ever get in the hills, it’s your money and you don’t have to give it to your fathers or
brothers, and you don’t get burned and wizened by working in the sun all day long.  Like many
prostitutes with foreign clientele, she had a few long-term clients and hoped to marry one of them,
a Swede, and move to Sweden soon.   
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hinted that she was involved in sexual relationships at that place (“bee-keeping” being a metaphor
for sexual intercourse), her family strongly asserted that she was not a prostitute when she
returned and the headman attempted to deny her entry to the village.   75
Other people in Revealed River began to use this case as an example of why
brideservice was a bad idea.  But the underlying reason for parents not accepting brideservice for
their daughters became apparent later when girls from that allegiance group told me that they
could not marry a poor boy without bridewealth.  As one teenage girl put it, “my mother said it’s
our custom to have the boy live with the girl’s family so that the mother can teach her, but we can’t
bring husbands in any more.  I have to leave my home because we have to save the land for our
brothers.  There’s too little land.  So we have to marry a boy whose parents have land and move
out.”  
Boys needed to marry to become men and political actors in their own right.  Given the
particular type of economic change that had taken place in Revealed River, boys had become
more dependent on their parents to provide bridewealth, which strengthened the authority of
senior kin.  At the same time, senior kin faced constraints in allocation of wealth among marriage
and investment in agriculture and supplementary economic activities, made all the more essential
yet tenuous by the demands of constrained land resources.  Boys had to wait for their parents’
decisions in a way that they might not have had to previously.  My experience with the
marriageable boys and girls of the village is that they were somewhat obsessed with getting
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married (and definitely obsessed with courtship!); many spoke of being deeply impatient to marry,
as Turtle had been in the example that began this chapter.  I heard of only one case in which a
Lisu married without bridewealth, a college-educated political activist whose mother had died and
father was an alcoholic; he married a woman outside of his ethnic group who already had children
from a previous marriage.  Thus modernization and globalization had increased the power of
parents rather than that of the more educated and assimilated young.  
Divorce
Marriage had been somewhat unstable in the opium economy, but for Lisu in villages
hard-hit in the post-opium economy even long-term marriages had become unstable.  W hile I saw
little evidence of this in Revealed River, Lisu from See the Tiger and other villages in northern
Thailand stated that “trial” marriages (marriages that broke up before there were children) had
become increasingly common.  Hutheesing frequently discussed divorce as a problem in modern
Lisu life (Hutheesing 1990a:184). 
It had not been unusual for first marriages to fail because of incompatibility or lack of
interest in the spouses in being married.  As most young couples married “for love” on the basis of
very little acquaintance, it was not unusual for one or both to decide they did not like each other on
closer acquaintance or because the parents found the marriage unsuitable (in one case, the
groom’s parents thought the bride’s lineage had dangerous spirits).  There were three divorces in
Evil Peaks over a three year period, all among couples who had recently wed and did not have
children; the bridewealth was not necessarily returned (Dessaint 1972a:140-141).  Hutheesing
also had several accounts of girls resisting marriage and running away shortly afterwards; in many
cases the marriage was encouraged by their parents but the bride simply ran away to another
relative.  In these cases, what portion of the bridewealth was to be returned was negotiated
(Hutheesing 1990a:116-117).  Many of the elderly men in Revealed River admitted to having had
a previous wife, briefly, who was “no good” or had “a bad mouth.”  (None of the older women were
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willing to admit previous marriages.)  As often, one or the other of the couple simply did not like
the other or were unhappy being married and ended it.  
More recently, many marriages were ended by young women. Reasons young women
gave for ending a marriage was that the man was lazy, did not work, was a drunk or an opium
abuser.  In one case, that of the headman’s younger brother, his wife accused him of infidelity
because of his activities in the lowlands.  Marriage instability was often related to opium or heroin. 
W hile still rare, opium and heroin addiction were rising among Lisu young men, and was often
given by young women as the reason for the end of a marriage.  In the past, young men “played
with the pipe,” experimented with opium smoking in the years before they married.  Such
experimentation became far more risky when they used heroin, which was far more addictive than
opium had been.  W ith the outlawing of opium, heroin had replaced opium in all the ways that it
had once been used in the village because it was easier to find and transport. As one senior Thai
social activist put it, “The brackish water has been drained and replaced by salt water,” and
addiction rates had risen.  Poorer families were at great risk for problems with opium.  As
discussed previously, a poor family could not make ends meet without opium.  Young men
became involved in the drug trade as couriers.  The great risk was that they would start to use the
drug they transported; the drug lords preferred addicted laborers as they were more controllable. 
In some cases, young men had become drug addicts; in others, they were jailed. 
Hutheesing attributed the increased stresses and strains on marriage to men’s loss of
repute, their inability to fulfill their obligations in hunting and marketing opium.  Married women in
1980s See the Tiger Village felt that men were not fulfilling their roles in part because they could
not hunt and did not bring the cash from selling crops home for the female head of household to
budget for the household, as was her right and duty; rather, the men spent it in drinking, gambling,
and buying things other than what she felt was needed (Hutheesing 1990a).  Another factor was
the labor demands of the post-opium economy.  Although labor was not the primary source of
wealth it once had been, that did not mean that men and women did not work as hard as ever – in
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fact, they may have been working even harder.  But that labor was worth less in terms of
amassing household wealth (cf. Borgerhoff Mulder 1995).  Much of these labor obligations fell on
girls and young women, particularly daughters-in-law; girls and young women in Revealed River
worked far more hours than calculated by Salzer (1993); they felt over-worked and under-
acknowledged, working harder than ever for an uncertain future.  An intriguing comparison is the
example of a Lahu village in the late 1960s in which a high number of the young men left their
wives, complaining of the burdens placed on them.  They practiced uxorilocality and in-marrying
men were expected to work for the bride’s family.  This village had been in one location for almost
60 years and depended heavily on opium, but the local environment was severely degraded and
they were very poor (Jones 1967).  The burden of compensating for environmental degradation by
increased work was disproportionately born by young Lahu husbands and Lisu wives in these two
cases.  Lisu highly valued hard work – “if we don’t work, we don’t eat!” I was told.  But work
without the hope of future reward took its toll.  
Choosing a Spouse
Historically, marriage among opium-growing Lisu was based on the personal
characteristics of the spouse far more than creating inter-lineage ties, and marriage was primarily
based on personal choice.  Senior kin did not choose spouses for their boys; girls were not
passive recipients of male interest.  Most marriages were stated to be for love or at least
attraction.  Because young people had a great deal of choice in their spouse, the standards by
which they evaluated potential spouses illustrates how social position created different marital
interests (cf. Dahal, Fricke and Thornton 1993).  In addition, fathers and mothers had slightly
different interests in marital choice. There were both conflicting and converging interests among
parents and children in marriage.  Under the constraints of marriage in post-opium Revealed
River, boys and girls needed to demonstrate to their parents that they were ready for marriage
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and to potential partners and partners’ families that they were worthy of marriage. They had to
fulfill the expectations of Lisu society as expressed in family relations.  
My information on current marriage choices came from girls and mothers of marriageable
boys and girls; boys were not inclined to talk seriously with me (as I was classified as a single
female and thus marriageable).  Fathers of marriageable children would discuss the overall
strategies of marriage with me, but far more generally and never when their children were near,
due to family speaking taboos.  W hat girls and boys talked about was rather different from what
their parents talked about.  Fathers and mothers had slightly different perspectives.  Fathers, for
instance, were far more likely to categorically state that Lisu were patrilineal and patrilocal. 
Mothers acknowledged this, but told me “Ajarn [Thai: Professor], that’s true, but the thing we did
was keep our daughters with us;” they hoped for uxorilocality for at least a year and to try to get
their daughters married close by.  In an essential way, they did not trust daughters-in-law to stay
with them and care for them in old age.  
New Year was the venue for all of the actors to evaluate the marriageable young.  During
the dancing, village leaders and older women took the opportunity to assess the prospects for
marriage in their village.  W ho was beautiful, who danced well, who wore the family silver, who
displayed repute?  The old women sat on the sidelines and sang of the repute their village
displayed through the dancing of the bedizened boys and girls.  Boys and girls also carefully
evaluated their partners; boys cut into the circle to dance next to a girl they liked, girls smiled and
giggled and made sure they had a handkerchief ready in case a brother cut in next to her, as they
were not allowed to hold hands in the dance.  For several weeks after New Year, young men and
mothers visited widely (both together and separately) – visiting relatives was a good way to meet
and appraise girls as potential wives and daughters-in-law.  In the past, final choices were typically
made at “Little” New Year a month later, with the profit from the recently harvested opium crop
funding bridewealth and immediately preceding the beginning of the agricultural year when labor
would be needed.  
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Lisu stressed that their marriages were based on love.  Love was based on “the mutual
recognition of beauty,” beauty being pleasing facial features and clear skin, but also a pleasant
personality (Dessaint 1972a:140), although Hutheesing disagrees that this was the basis for
marriage (Hutheesing 2002).  Ideas of beauty reflected practical interests in a spouse’s
characteristics.  Beauty was marked by the health and hardiness of the boy or girl and also by
their dress, a reflection of household prosperity and repute.  The characteristics desired of a bride
were that she be beautiful – defined essentially as strong, healthy, with a round face, fair skin, and
long glossy black hair – industrious, intelligent, agreeable and even-tempered, able to cook rice
well, and that she display modesty or “shame” (sha -taw  ).  A girl who “wandered around,”1 3
immodest, sexually active, who traveled to town without her father or brothers, who argued, was
proud and unkind or gossiped too much, was shunned; a girl who did not marry was assumed to
be a bad girl (cf. Hutheesing 1990a:68, 101-102, 196-197 for further discussion).  Maitra added
that a good woman should not be greedy; be clean; and be smart and brave (Maitra
1993:156-157).  In the 1990s, these were still the fundamental features of a “good” girl, although
the increase in numbers of girls going to school or work in town (from other villages, if not
Revealed River) meant that “wandering” was not as denigrated as previously.  Beauty was shown
through attention to personal appearance by both boys and girls.  For girls, no matter how late
they returned from the fields, no matter how cold it was in the mountain winter, they washed as
soon as they returned and powdered their faces with perfumed powder after dinner, decorating
their hair in barrettes and bows.  A degree of boldness and self-confidence were greatly admired,
in company with energy and industry.  Intelligence and presence of mind were extremely
important as well.  A woman who had repute and brought repute to her household had to be able
to plan, organize, budget, farm, and collect products in the forest.  Potential mothers-in-law
focused far more on attributes of virtuousness, hard work, cleanliness, obedience, and respect for
her elders; it was especially important that a girl carefully practice the taboos among household
members and kin.  A “good woman” was defined by her traits as a potential wife and female head
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of household; at no time was a “good woman” defined as a mother and girls were not evaluated
by their procreative potential.  
The traits of a good man were that he be industrious; not gamble, fight, smoke opium, or
drink too much alcohol; that he not wander too far too often, for although men were acknowledged
to travel a great deal more than women, a man’s first duty was to his parents and, in time, to his
wife; be respectful to his elders and never speak “loosely,” foolishly or insultingly; loyal and
obedient to his parents; kind-hearted and honest; and most of all, intelligent and bold.  A good
husband was also expected to hunt and to sell opium (Hutheesing 1990a:196-197; Maitra
1993:157).  A boy’s good looks were important; the first requests I had for medication were to
clear up the acne of marriageable boys.  Older women viewed a good husband as a good
manager, opening new fields on time; planting crops; marketing the crops; and bringing the
money home, where she had rights in its allocation.  Hunting was also an important male role, but
in Revealed River in the 1990s this mostly fell to boys.  A shaman was considered a poor
marriage choice, due to the taboos on sexual contact, food taboos, and the alcohol consumption
involved in shamanistic performance.  So, too, with the servitor of the Village Guardian Spirit’s
shrine; when the maw mong left Revealed River, many indicated that it was just as well as he was
too young to have to forego sex as often as those rituals entailed.  Girls and women also
considered the difficulties of marrying a youngest son, as they would have to live with the groom’s
parents for a long time.  This women’s perspective was contradictory to the recent advantage
younger sons had in acquiring land. 
Girls liked boys who were smart, able to talk well (or, in the recent past, I was told, skillful
at courtship singing); clean, healthy, and strong.  Girls, even those who had been to school, did
not specify they wanted an educated husband.  However, they mocked boys who could not speak
or read Central Thai; in practice, they expected at least minimal literacy in Thai.  This was, in fact,
essential to manage the household’s agricultural economy in the post-opium economy.  
264
Parents’ concerns revolved around the repute of the household of a potential son- or
daughter-in-law, particularly the economic viability of a household that their daughter might join
and whether there were any addicts in the family.  These indicated the possibilities for economic
security and household repute.  Girls told me the Chinese in the village were wealthy because
they bought all their rice, but risky husband material because of their predilection to opium
addiction.  Family alliance generally entered into consideration of marriage partners from a
personal perspective (although in the one case of an attempt to join the two main factions of
Revealed River by marriage, failure and conflict within the village ensued).  Potential affines
should be hard-working and agreeable; fair-minded, so as to negotiate a fair marriage exchange;
and kind to their son- or daughter-in-law.  The latter was a particular issue for daughters and
mothers.  Girls sometimes told me, looking over the other faction’s neighborhood, that they would
never marry “those people” because they beat their wives or did not adequately care for them
when they were sick, which nowadays entailed taking them to the hospital.  Mothers and their
daughters, and sisters, preferred to live near each other after marriage to facilitate labor
exchange, so women often preferred a groom from the village or near by. 
A more recent constraint on marriage was the viability of the new household that would be
formed due to the lack of land for agriculture.  Marriage strategies of households entailed parents
making decisions to ensure a good future for their children.  Key in this was restricting access to
existing land resources by keeping sons, especially youngest sons, and ensuring that daughters
married out, settling with their husband’s family.  That is, rules of patrilocality had achieved new
prominence.  Not only parents worried about land availability; the younger generation did as well,
as young women often told me in evaluating prospective beaus.  Alema had a beau, a nice young
man related to her father’s allegiance group.  He was cheerful and very hard-working, much more
so than other boys his age because his father was ill.  But, Alema said, she could not marry him
because he did not have “blue card.”  Because he did not have legal residency in Thailand, this
left him, technically, at risk of being forced to leave Thailand, but most of all it meant that he did
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not have legal access to land.  His ambiguous legal status vis-a-vis land in addition to his tenuous
kinship and political connections within the village (his father was an in-marrying affine) meant that
she thought her parents would not let her marry him.  His was not a household of repute.  These
concerns structured decisions about marriage and post-marital residence.  It also arranged their
ideas about the people around them and how they dealt with each other. 
Young women were constrained because their opportunities for marriage were subject to
social judgment of them as good workers, and to abandon or defy one’s parents was to gain a
reputation as poor marriage material.  Lisu used the concept of good behavior to denote repute
(Hutheesing 1990a:160).  A girl who did not work hard found it hard to make a good marriage.  It
often seemed to me that the adolescent and young adult females of the village carried the weight
of most of their household’s agricultural production on their backs.  They spoke constantly of how
much work they had done, seeking acknowledgment.  W hile fathers, mothers, and brothers
casually wandered in the forest hunting and gathering, or sat on the porches of houses chatting,
the girls were laboring.  In the off-season, girls sat on their porches or those of close neighbors
(allegiance group or patrilineally related) and endlessly embroidered new gaiters; sewed new belts
and dresses on sewing machines; and made the hundreds of colored strings with pompons that
made up the tail that adorned the back of their dresses.  This was how a girl showed herself ready
for marriage, and worthy of it.  The exception was that daughters-in-law worked even harder; I
once heard a 17 year old girl gloat that since her brother had married she could take it easy
because her sister-in-law had to do most of the work.  In addition, marriage meant that young men
began more concentrated agricultural labor, a point my 17 year old friend also gleefully took
advantage of to spend more time at home.  
Young men were dependent on their parents for bridewealth.  Marriage without parental
support (or an older sibling’s, if the parents had died) was only possible through brideservice. 
None of the young Lisu men I spoke to believed they could ever earn enough money to pay
bridewealth by themselves; “it’s impossible” they told me ruefully.  They had before them the
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example of many Yunnanese Chinese and Lahu itinerant laborers, apparently with no family
support at all, working in Revealed River.  This was no life they wanted for themselves.  Young
people did not see themselves as having greater autonomy in spouse choices for two reasons:
the Lisu history of choice in marriage (comparison to the recent past), and the lack of real
alternatives to life in the hills with their parents (constraints on the imagined future).  
Alternatives to Marriage
Despite their greater knowledge of Thai language and practices and possibilities for
migration to the lowlands, children were not in an increased position of strength in marriage.  This
was the case for culturally specific reasons – Lisu cultural history, the opium economy, and the
particular changes that had taken place in the mountains of Thailand – and for this reason was
unlike other cases in which young people were in increased position of strength to choose
spouses as a result of post-colonial economic changes (Borgerhoff Mulder 1995; Ensminger and
Knight 1997).  Complicated relationships between larger social change and marriage practices
were significant in individual and household strategies (cf. Fricke, Thornton and Dahal 1998).  The
ebb and flow of power associated with different social positions had shifted.  In this case, the
young were in fact in a position of greater dependence and Lisu society had in some senses
begun to resemble an “equal bridewealth” (Collier 1988) society far more than previously.
Migration had once been the main means of conflict resolution in Lisu villages (Dessaint
1972a).  Decrease of available land and Thai state policies to sedentize upland ethnic minority
peoples had resulted in a near-end to migration throughout the uplands by clusters of people who
were allied to each other through kinship or marriage.  In the 1990s, migration appeared to be
more individualistic and oriented toward the lowlands, drawing off the poor and the young into
illegal and quasi-legal employment, as was the case with See the Tiger Village.  In Revealed
River, conditions of migration were different, perhaps due to the solidarity of village institutions. 
Very few people migrated permanently from Revealed River Village, except for poor families, and
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a few boys and young men; there were only two young women who left, probably working in the
sex trade.   Revealed River Village had the protection of the Project against many of the economic
disasters of the transition out of the opium economy as seen, for instance, in See the Tiger
Village.  For these economic reasons alone, there was a lower percentage of young men and
women going to the lowlands to work.  People talked about the lowland towns and cities as full of
interesting things, but also as dirty and hot.  Most of all, they were profoundly uncomfortable in the
lowland Thai context.  Thai held many stereotypes about upland ethnic minority peoples (that they
were promiscuous, never washed, and had tails), of which the Lisu were well aware.  In most
cases, people saw little to draw them to town.  W age work in the lowlands paid poorly and was
unsteady.  Furthermore, Thai labor relations were patron-client in form, but Lisu resisted the
relationship of dependency, of older sibling/younger sibling, inherent in Thai employment.  They
sought far greater autonomy.  Project leaders complained that Lisu laborers insisted on being paid
on a daily basis but would leave as soon as they had earned what they wanted.  The Project
preferred Tai Yai (Shan) illegal refugees from Burma as laborers, people they could control and
who were grateful for work, that is, people who could be made into dependents.  W age work in
the town presented a model of autonomy and “freedom,” a point that many young women came to
talk to me about (using the Thai word isara, ‘freedom’), but cut off from household and kin without
the possibilities of achieving repute.  Individual freedom meant leaving the web of social
relationships and the creation of a new identity, which few young people seemed inclined to do no
matter how dreamily they spoke of freedom from their parents’ demands. 
The impossibility or difficulty of making a living in the hills did draw Lisu from other villages
to town.  A number of Lisu made a living off of the tourist industry by selling handicrafts and
performing shows, which allowed them far more autonomy than wage labor; was performed by
people within their family networks; and in which they were not penalized for their difference by
Thai and actually rewarded for it by foreigners.  Of course, there was far greater potential for
dissolution of existing familial bonds and social obligations toward each other in the lowlands.  A
  According to a U.N. report released for the 15  International AIDS Conference in Bangkok,76 th
Thailand, July 2004, every 10 minutes a person infected with HIV dies in Thailand.  Out of a
population of 63 million people, 600,000 are known to be living with HIV (Macan-Markar 2004). 
Village reactions to infection can be extreme (Nimmanaheminda 2004).  
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young Lisu prostitute I met, actively involved in the attempt to form a union for prostitutes,
expressed a discourse of freedom from obligations.  And yet, several Lisu from her village knew
her and respected her; her relationships had not been dissolved, no matter how attenuated she
might have depicted them as being.  In another case, I was asked to translate between an elderly
American and his very young Lisu intended bride by her mother, so that the mother could ensure
that her daughter would be safe and cared for.  The mother transferring mother/daughter
household relations to the lowlands, even when marrying off a very young girl to an elderly
foreigner.  Their actions were structured by a prior text of household strategizing and
management; they had yet to experience the unintended consequences.  
One reason that girls and women did not leave (except for school) was that Revealed
River Village had decreed that no young women were to go to the lowlands except in the company
of a family member.  The local rationale for this was fear of a returning woman bringing AIDS to
the community.   Although young men frequently left the village for long and short periods of time,76
there was never any concern that they would contract HIV and infect the community.  Note, also,
the assumption that young women would be involved in the sex industry and that young men’s
sexual activity was unmarked.   Any young woman who left by herself was forbidden to return to
Revealed River.  This was probably ultimately unenforceable.  But girls felt that if they left, it would
be virtually impossible to marry in the village; one of the two young women who left perceived her
chances of marriage as spoiled before she left.  In one case, a fairly well-educated girl was
pressured by her father to go to town to work in his sister’s tourist souvenir business and his
daughter resisted vehemently.  To her, going to town even with family support cut her off from her
interests in the village, opened her to insinuations of prostitution, and marked her as unsuitable for
marriage.
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Discussion
The practice of marriage in Revealed River varied in significant ways from its practice
under the opium economy.  There was later age at first marriage.  Bridewealth was still high, but
brideservice had decreased.  One point of negotiation at marriage, the choice between
bridewealth and brideservice, had disappeared.  W ith the decrease of the practice of brideservice,
the practice of uxorilocality had also decreased; bridewealth and patrilocality had achieved
prominence.  In the transformed economic context of Revealed River Village, young men had
become more dependent on their parents to provide bridewealth. 
Choice of a marriage partner was not constructed within a structure of alliance in which
senior men bestowed their daughters according to their political needs.  The lack of enduring
marriage alliance structures was likely related to the structure of the opium economy.  I saw only
one case of an attempted alliance marriage, arranged by the senior kin of the two major factions,
but it failed and exacerbated conflict between the two groups.  The case of cross cousin marriage
could be interpreted as an alliance marriage, but the discourse surrounding it was of repute
through good bridewealth (on the groom’s family’s side); consolidation of land and allegiance
group relationships (on the bride’s family’s side); and love and personal choice (on the newly-
married couple’s and their siblings’ side).  Rather, Lisu marriage patterns can be described as
“dispersed” (Strathern 1968).  
There had been an inflationary tendency in bridewealth because respect (or, in the Lisu
case, repute) came from exceeding the expected amount (Collier 1988), which was the brideprice
paid for the mother of the bride.  But other factors were also involved.  The agricultural
prominence of opium, a cash crop with a strong global market, particularly in inter-war and post-
W orld W ar II eras when improved global infrastructure expanded the global market, brought about
inflation in bridewealth and earlier age at marriage likely related to the need for women’s labor
(and men’s, especially since boys did not work the fields consistently until they were married). 
The opium-growing peoples of northern Thailand tended to be marked by earlier age at marriage
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than did non-opium growing peoples, even if of the same ethnic group (W ongprasert 1977;
Kunstadter 1983).  Dessaint also attributed high bridewealth to the increased demand for labor
when Lisu increased opium production (Dessaint 1972a; Dessaint and Dessaint 1992).  However,
labor was not recruited through marriage in a simple and uncomplicated way.  Aside from hiring
Karen or Lahu labor, there was also the possibility of recruitment of labor through bringing in a
son-in-law and affines into allegiance groups.  The institution of brideservice meant that the
bride’s family had rights in the groom’s labor as well, at least for a time, and the groom who
desired to establish an autonomous household more quickly had to pay extra in bridewealth to
avoid brideservice.  
Marriage is the “product of strategies ... oriented toward the satisfaction of material and
symbolic interests and organized by reference to a determinate set of economic and social
conditions (Bourdieu 1977: 36).  The strategies in the opium economy were to control labor and
fulfill repute with completed marriage payments.  National drug control and watershed
conservation strategies brought about a different set of strategies in marriage and household
formation, resulting in later age at first marriage.  Expansion of production had come to entail
intensification, which led to alternative investments – diversification of agriculture and capital
investments, or in alternative or supplementary enterprises.  Recruitment of labor became a less
valuable strategy for establishing household repute because households could no longer expand
production by increasing the labor pool to open up new land.  Lisu perceived this as a surfeit of
girls due to land shortages.  But practically, as each household strategized, there were other
things on which to expend household resources than bridewealth, at the same time as which the
labor of daughters-in-law and sons-in-law provided less of a benefit than in the period of
expansion of the opium economy. 
In these conditions, we would expect an increase at age of marriage and decrease in
bridewealth payments (Borgerhoff Mulder 1995:577-579).  In northern Thailand, age at marriage
was increasing, but bridewealth had not decreased for various reasons, including the cultural logic
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of repute and the involvement of some Lisu villages in the heroin trade.  Hutheesing observed the
rise of a marriage elite funded by heroin profits, but I did not see this in Revealed River.  Rather,
Lisu actors in Revealed River turned to other forms of marriage that were “repute-able” in the Lisu
frame, such as bride exchange and cross-cousin marriage.  Alternatively, a lower status form of
marriage ceremony could take place with the hope of carrying out a higher status ceremony in a
better future that they hoped would replicate the past.  All of these were part of the Lisu cultural
repertoire of strategies that had been practiced infrequently in the opium economy when high
bridewealth marriage had been possible, albeit not as full of repute as bridewealth marriage. 
Shifting economic contexts transformed marriage practice from an emphasis of one element to
another within the same framework, a point of manipulation that had not been necessary to
practice when opium profit was available. 
The fact that labor was less valuable did not mean that boys and girls, young married men
and women, worked less than they had, they in fact probably worked harder but without the
rewards previously available.  There was no alternative to marriage in running off to the lowlands,
based on the lived experience of Lisu as disparaged minority peoples and on their cultural
framework of how to achieve adulthood, an autonomous household, and repute – all of which
depended on being married.  Similarly, parents’ cultural obligation to ensure that their children
married structured the possibilities of their practice.  The desired results within the Lisu cultural
framework of repute were not always possible and there was a “degeneration of repute” in many
places (Hutheesing 1990a).  In places such as See the Tiger, there was a very high rate of girls
and boys entering the sex and drugs trades, along with high rates of suicide and HIV.  In
Revealed River, households had been able to manipulate the structure by using previously
uncommon forms of marriage, fulfilling their culturally-formed obligations in satisfactory ways. 
Later age at marriage and decrease in brideservice and uxorilocality can be examined for
how they functioned, but that does not mean we can take a functionalist stance.  Bridewealth
served to limit or expand the rate of marriage and reproduction depending on conditions.  It was
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the fulcrum or the valve that regulated relations between household formation / biological
reproduction and land / available resources.  But bridewealth did not have that function, even
though it was a real, if unintended consequence of bridewealth in Lisu society.  Lisu cosmology
contained these assumptions, linked to economic conditions: power flows from wealth; wealth is
the result of productivity; wealth leads to repute and power (Durrenberger 1989:32).  Repute was
based on wealth and achieved through hard work, but also contingent on the ability to get children
married and the ability to get children married was based on the ability to achieve a certain level of
production.  W hen that level of production was not achievable, then households waited.  And so,
households in Revealed River were to some extent still awaiting the return of the opportunities
they had once known.  Later age at marriage not related to the decreased value of labor in a
simple intentional or functionalist sense.  Rather, households made strategic, adaptive decisions
within objective conditions and according to their understandings.  Strategies in these conditions
were to wait or to make use of different forms of marriage.
It is worth considering what alternatives there were to the hegemonic marriage structure. 
Girls’ marriage strategies were re-oriented toward consideration of citizenship status and the
possibilities of the groom having good access to land.  Boy’s marriage strategies of marrying by
dint of their own efforts, through their own opium field or brideservice had vanished.  They could
still consider marrying a divorcee or widow for whom there was no brideprice; or marrying outside
of the Lisu ethnic group.  A more radical response would have been to move outside of the Lisu
cultural framework, as was the case in conversion to Christianity.  Christianity forbade both
bridewealth (Maitra 1993:155-156) and sacrifices to the spirits and ancestors, so that Christian
households were able to invest household resources elsewhere (Hutheesing 1990a:182).  This
was a big attraction of conversion among the poor, and for those who sought to jump to a
completely different framework, as in See the Tiger Village.  Conversion to Christianity was
uncommon in Revealed River; I met only one male household head who had converted.  This
man told me of how his children had successively sickened and died until he could not longer
  There were other points in which Lisu society in the opium economy did not adhere to the77
brideservice / bridewealth models.  There was no cultural construction of women in terms of
reproduction and pollution, nor were gender relations based on men’s ability to appropriate
women’s labor through the ritual/cosmological system.  I certainly observed this among the Kwaio
of the Solomon Islands.  Their constructs seem far more appropriate for the Pacific and perhaps
Island Southeast Asia.  Lisu ritual did not focus on renewing male energy against women’s various
uses of it; women’s spheres of ritual power did not emphasize femininity.  Rather, as in
brideservice societies, all humans were viewed as independent and reliant.  W omen were not
valorized for their procreative abilities nor as mothers.  Boys generally did much less work than
girls, spending their childhood until marriage running around in the forest hunting.  The main
status difference for boys was whether or not they were married; marriage allowed them to
become political actors, as in brideservice societies.  Gifts exchanges were not a significant
element of Lisu society, at least to a far less degree than I had noted in other societies such as
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afford to make sacrifices to his ancestors to save his children.  Impoverished, he turned to
Christianity.  Christianity was cheaper, he told me, more suitable for poor men like him, and would
allow him to eventually accumulate wealth because he saved so much by not making ancestral
sacrifices.  On the other hand, this was a household of no repute in the village and his surviving
children were mercilessly teased by the other children for his choice.  It all depended on whether
one sought repute.  Similarly, marriage to a Lahu or Akha woman made marriage possible, but
brought no repute.  The reputable options in effect incorporated boys as young married men into
the hegemonic marriage structure of Lisu.  
In these particular, local, conditions of new constraints on marriage, power had subtly
shifted toward parents.  Parents held control over land, cash accumulation needed for
bridewealth, and silver as a prestigious scarce valuable.  Boys were more dependent on their
parents to provide bridewealth; girls had to work harder in order to attract a marriage partner. 
There was less opportunity for boys to open their own fields and earn much of their bridewealth or
demonstrate their suitability for marriage; and the option of brideservice had closed as well.  This
sounds like a bridewealth society (Collier and Rosaldo 1981; Collier 1988).  Boys’ and girls’
adherence to culturally-approved performances of hard work to demonstrate their readiness and
suitability for marriage could, indeed, be seen as part of a hegemonic marriage structure.  
However, Lisu society in the opium economy did not adhere to such categorizations of
brideservice / bridewealth societies in most respects (Collier and Rosaldo 1981; Collier 1988).   It77
the Kwaio.  There was, rather, a tendency to save (or hoard), perhaps as historical accident of the
environmental and political instability of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia and reliance on
regional trade networks.  Bravery and personal courage (BS) were important personal traits, as
was respect (repute) (= BW ).  As will be seen below, marriage and affinal relationships were a
very limited basis for political power.  Rather, there were faction leaders who helped their followers
in disputes but lacked the power to give orders as there were no dependencies on which to build
leadership and little basis for economic control.  Such faction leaders did not hold feasts, conduct
warfare, or organize interregional trade (although there’s evidence that the Lisu of Nujiang were
involved in such political structures).  There was a considerable drive to achieve parity rather than
power over others.  Conflict resolution was extremely difficult if the conflict occurred among
people of different, opposed, factions and the main means of conflict resolution was to move
away.  In this context, the most important point was to refrain from provoking others even by
talking about them; damages were paid as restitution for gossip.  There was no reference to rules
and obligations; resolution depended much more on the talking ability of the parties involved.  The
brideservice/bridewealth model can be successfully critiqued in terms of attributed causality
(marriage vs. the prestige system) leaving the categories of BS/BW  intact (Kelly 1993).  Certainly
some of the aspects scrutinized in the BS/BW  model are very useful; they are ‘good to think.’ 
However, the categories of BS/BW  themselves are too rigid for the case of the Lisu, in which we
see other permutations of the dynamic interaction of the key variables than envisioned in this
model.  The dynamics of relationships of hierarchy and egalitarianism, dependence and
autonomy, accumulation and exchange, are differentially amplified or reduced by the position of
Lisu on the periphery of regional states.  In many respects, Lisu were “hill peasants” (Izikowitz
1951); their incorporation into global capitalist markets and the particular traits of the local opium
production economy along with the varied cultural and political relations they had with local states
interwove to create a diverse range of possible strategies resulting in dynamically shifting
structures that are not well accounted for in the BS/=BW  model.  
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is true that marriage payments from the groom’s family to the bride’s family secured rights to a
woman’s production and reproduction and placed the groom in a relationship of debt to the senior
kinfolk who had provided the young man with the means by which to achieve adulthood; and that
indebtedness was often repaid by work (Collier and Rosaldo 1981:278-9), but this was all
contractual in basis and there had been no enduring culturally sanctioned obligations.  Boys and
girls achieved adult status through marriage, but Lisu culture is constructed so that parents’ status
was also established by their children getting married.   Furthermore, the lived experience of boys
and girls can not be dismissed.  They, like the senior men, had a legitimate interpretation of their
society upon which they acted.  Boys and girls had a great deal of choice in their partners and
there was very little parents could do to enforce a particular marriage (especially one that
endured).  Parental power had been extremely limited in the opium economy.  A boy could marry
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by earning all or most of his wealth through his own labors, even though he might establish
temporary relations of dependence with a senior man for the elder’s negotiating abilities or
through brideservice to the father of his wife.  But boys perceived this as being their choice and
acted within the framework of their own autonomy.  Girls distributed themselves more than being
distributed by their seniors.  They could marry much as they wished; there had always been
someone other than a boy their parents preferred to take them in marriage.  Boys and girls were
valuable and the social field was fluid.  Marriage did not generally result in alliance (except in a
restricted sense to be discussed below).  Historically, there were few specialized valuables of
great symbolic value to which elders had privileged control.  W ealth was in the form of cash (silver
rupees or local currency) or in opium, which could be used to buy things or pay for labor or
bridewealth, just as was cash.  The nature of the political ecology – the environmental suitability of
opium, the value of the crop in the world market, access to hired labor to overcome labor
constraints – allowed everyone, including young people, access to the means of production and
achievement of autonomous households of repute.  The obligations of juniors to seniors (or
dependency of juniors on seniors) were therefore shallow and limited.  This was congruent with a
practical  ideology of autonomous households.  Ritual supported this in that no household was
dependent on another for access to the spirits.  Migration was based on open access to land,
which also allowed young households a great deal of play in their strategizing to achieve
autonomy and repute.  From the perspective of those actors, they had the means to avoid
dependence and establish autonomous households.  This was not mere mystification or
misrecognition.  An ecologically appropriate crop, a ready market, and open lands – the opium
economy – all created economic conditions that in practice gave boys and girls the opportunities
for autonomy by avoiding most dependency on elders in order to achieve prestige in their cultural
system (here, ‘repute’) if they labored.  
The reality of the power of boys and girls in the opium economy is further demonstrated
through the substantial changes in the past two decades.  By the 1990s, land was not open
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access and labor was not the means to wealth; means of production required substantial capital
investment; bridewealth had become a limited resource; silver rupees were no longer a form of
cash but a specialized valuable in the hands of the elders.  In keeping with Meillassoux’s
argument (and Collier’s variation of it) that senior kin controlled access to the valuables needed to
marriage, this had become somewhat true in Revealed River.  They did not distribute women, but
they could limit opportunities for marriage by their control of wealth and valuables – in part through
enforcement of the ideologies of patrilocality and patrilineality.  
Allegiance Groups to Patrilineages
A final shift in social structure in Revealed River was that from predominance of
allegiance groups to relationships based on patrilineal ties.  There were a number of mechanisms
by which this was brought about.  One was the de-emphasis on brideservice, a significant means
by which affines had been incorporated into allegiance groups.  This can be related to concerns
expressed by parents and their marriageable children about land tenure and post-marital
residence, but it can also be attributed to shifts in the kind of labor relationships that were more
effective in the post-poppy agricultural economy.  Practically speaking, this meant increased
reliance on patrilineal kin in daily life.  However, patrilineal kin relationships were also imbued with
a hierarchical moral force through ritual, language, eating taboos, and cultural expectations of
obligations that made it socially important.  It was not that patrilineality became predominant; it
had been ideologically dominant (at least to men) even in the opium economy, but rarely
practiced.  W ith shifts in economic and political conditions, patrilineality became not merely
spoken of, but practiced.  
There was also a move toward virilocality because of lack of land and this was an
intentional strategy on the part of parents of marriageable children.  Parents constantly worried
about where the land for their children was going to come from.  Children of marriageable age
were well aware of these problems as well.  Constraints of land and citizenship status of possible
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grooms greatly reduced a girl’s choice of marriage partners, especially if her parents were
concerned about the viability and security of their child’s new household.   
Allegiance Groups
 In the opium economy, allegiance groups were the most salient domain through which
households interacted with each other on an everyday basis.  Households were linked as nodes
into relationships of mutual care and services through allegiance groups, which structured inter-
household relations on the basis of siblingship, marriage, friendship, or alliance with a powerful
man.  At its most fundamental level, allegiance groups entailed exchange of agricultural labor,
sharing a rice mortar and making liquor, and depending on each other for emergency needs. 
They also cooperated in rituals that allowed status display and required extra-household labor,
such as weddings and soul-calling ceremonies.  There were no other elements keeping the group
together, such as obligatory, formally defined shared ritual, co-owned land, or the continuity of
genealogical ties and these alliances did not last beyond a generation nor across space, often
morphing at times of migration. 
Allegiance groups expressed the political interests of households, united by their support
for a faction in political and legal disputes in the village (Durrenberger 1970b:18; Dessaint
1972a:44, 342; Hutheesing 1990a:70, 72, 161), depending always on perceived need and utility to
the participants.  Allegiance groups were, therefore, inherently friable and the dynamics of their
formation and dissolution created the dynamics of village growth and dispersal, related to the
cycle of agricultural productivity in an area.  Productive areas brought wealth and repute to
households; such households attracted alliances; settlements expanded rapidly.  Thirty Thousand
in the late 1960s was one such area (Durrenberger 1970b).  W here there was ‘no repute’ – due to
conflict or low productivity – people left (Dessaint 1972a).  As Dessaint wrote:
Migration, then, is an integral element in this dynamic social organization. 
Migration is a means of realigning social relationships.  Each move is an
opportunity to cooperate with or separate from other individuals or households
within the potential social field.  Frequent migration gives the advantage to a
  Remember that wealth and power arose out of the stage of the household developmental78
cycle, so this would be a man with adult children, surplus labor, and the ability to accumulate
surplus wealth.  Leaders also attracted an allegiance group through being the first to settle a
newly-opened, highly productive opium growing area, as Thirty Thousand had been.  
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small, easily mobile social group such as the household to be the basic unit of
Lisu society.  The egalitarian nature of southern Lisu society rests largely on the
continued ability of each household to seek to improve its social, political and
economic position by migrating into a more favorable environment (Dessaint
1972a:48).  
Composition of the groups changed over time and depending on the nature of the task
(Dessaint 1972a:44, 48; Hutheesing 1990a:161).  A household could belong to more than one
allegiance group at a time, for instance if it was in a village where both parents of the husband
and wife lived.  The boundaries were shifting, informal, and unstable (Dessaint 1972a:44). 
Multiple and cross-cutting claims for affiliation and the potential for shifting allegiances in the
context of migration “...allow[ed] the individual household a great deal of flexibility” in their
alliances (Dessaint 1972a:48).  No group was in a position to induce more permanent allegiance
or create dependencies (Hutheesing 1990a:161). As such, allegiance group relationships had to
be constantly renegotiated.  This was in keeping with the profoundly egalitarian nature of Lisu
social relationships in the opium economy.  
The allegiance group often consisted of a core of siblings of more or less equal status or
affines and others attached to a powerful, wealthy man for a period of time.   In this, allegiance78
group leaders were more like big men than patrons in a patron-client relation.  Allegiance group
relations did not occur in a stratified society and all members considered themselves at least
potentially equal; the relationships were not enduring; allies could and did leave whenever they
were dissatisfied; there was little substantial wealth difference between the allegiance group
leader and his allies; the position was by no means inherited; the leader was not seen as superior,
nor was there any discourse of his superiority, especially since repute was not a limited good.  He
became a leader by his hard work, demonstration of his managerial skill, and his ability to speak
well and forcefully, that is, through his charismatic personality.  Practically speaking, an allegiance
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group leader was most likely a wealthy man in the opium economy because he was a mature
man, with a household at a mature stage in the developmental cycle, and surplus labor to
manage.  It was, therefore, ephemeral wealth and power.  Those in his allegiance group were
attracted by his demonstrated myi -do , and got blessing from being near him.  On the other hand,3 5
leaders or headmen sometimes gained more political and economic control through privileged
contacts with Thai officials, serving as middlemen in the opium trade, and negotiating exemptions
from Thai anti-opium laws.  In this, a headman could serve as a patron.  Lisu were notoriously
resistant to such power, however, and stories of the murder of headmen are legion.  In the post-
poppy economy, these political and economic relations have changed.  W ealth has become
inheritable.  The headman of Revealed River was the son of a notorious and powerful headman. 
The current headman had, in effect, inherited his position along with a considerable amount of
capital.  He also had far superior contact with Thai officials, which has put him in a powerful
political role in the village.  But note that this occurred on the cusp of the transition to the post-
poppy economy, when opium profits were, if a household was at the right stage in the
developmental cycle, converted into capital for the new economy (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
Despite its contractual basis, the allegiance group was referred to by its participants in
kinship terms as ni , which technically meant siblings (the children of one mother and one father). 1
W hile it appeared as a male, political domain, it was common for allegiance groups to form
around sisters, their father, and the sisters’ husbands (Dessaint 1972a:44, 48).  Sisters’ everyday
cooperation in domestic and agricultural labor thereby became the basis of allegiance groups;
through the regular exchange of labor, they reinforced and validated the allegiance group as a
work group and as a kinship-based group, albeit not patrilineally-based.  This group then attracted
affinally-related, or even non-related households.  
A significant source of members of an allegiance group was in-marrying men who
performed brideservice.  In the days of the opium economy, both the bride’s and groom’s families
attempted to keep the couple with them.  The terms of brideservice were negotiated at the time of
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the marriage.  The matrix between brideservice/bridewealth, uxorilocal/patrilocal was a point of
manipulation between the bride’s and groom’s parents, and the bargain made about who lived
where and for how long was a matter of relative authority and the strength of the allegiance
groups of the bride’s and groom’s households.  A household with much repute – productive
agriculture, wealth, blessing – was much more likely to keep the couple.  This was possible
because of conflicting principles of patrilocality and uxorilocal post-marital residence.  Despite the
ideology of patrilocality, uxorilocality was recognized as appropriate for at least a delimited period
of time, ranging for a period of 1-3 years, until the wife’s father died, or after children were born to
the marriage and the couple moved out to their own house.  The conditions required that the
couple migrate with the bride’s father; to fail to fulfill these conditions meant that a find had to be
paid to the bride’s father.  As a result, many couples lived uxorilocally (Durrenberger 1971:10-18,
44-48; Durrenberger 1976b:303-305; Hutheesing 1990a:124).  The practice of brideservice made
it possible for productive and wealthy (therefore by Lisu definition powerful) families to induce the
couple to stay after the term of brideservice was completed; members of the son-in-law’s family
might join them, giving rise to the affinal basis of allegiance groups.  Thus countervailing
tendencies between lineage and allegiance, based on the principle of seeking repute for oneself
and one’s household, was used by local ‘big men’ in bringing affines and allies into his orbit.  The
means to attain wealth and power was through manipulation of social and labor relations within
the framework of allegiance groups (Dessaint 1972a:49).  People were attracted to a ‘wealthy’
household as a source of blessing, one with repute with which other households could have
relations that brought them repute (Durrenberger 1976c).  To fulfill the expectations of other
people, to have repute, a person had to have access to wealth.  If he was generous and if other
households had repute in a place, then they received blessing for further wealth, and they stayed
together.  Clearly, the repute of a wealthy household had much to do with agricultural productivity
and the labor within the household, that is, mature households in the household developmental
cycle were far more likely to attract an allegiance group, the more so in that they had sufficient
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labor to exchange.  Yet this also made them unstable.  W ith changes in economic conditions or a
man’s senescence and inability to maintain relations of repute with his followers, the allegiance
group would break apart.  
Allegiance groups were especially important in legal and political disputes.  Because there
were few effective overarching social institutions active in the village, disputes had to be handled
by negotiation.  A powerful man could negotiate disputes among members of his allegiance group,
but there was no one who could negotiate disputes between members of different allegiance
groups; it was difficult to reach an admission of guilt much less a settlement (Durrenberger
1976c).  The powerful men who held such groups together had few functions outside of attracting
followers and mediating disputes among them.  Trading and feasting were occasionally shared on
a contractual basis.  They did not organize warfare, as there was none at this time (Dessaint
1972a:49).  
Occasionally, a strong and domineering headman arose and even united several villages. 
But such authoritarian leadership was rarely stable.  Lisu resented headmen who attempted to
assert too much power.  Although the usual reaction was migration, they were infamous for killing
importunate headmen.  Lisu of Ban Lum reported the killing of such a headman shortly before
Durrenberger’s arrival.  In Fang, one Lisu headman gathered great power with the support of a
local Thai official and was eventually assassinated.  Others also reported violent ends to headmen
who became too powerful (Dessaint 1972a:36-37; Durrenberger 1976c; Lewis and Lewis 1984;
Hanks and Hanks 2001:88).  This reflected Lisu concepts of honor, respect, shame, potency, and
autonomy – in short, the set of meanings that constituted myi -do   – as pointed out by3 5
Durrenberger, but also the type of political and economic relations Lisu had with the lowlands in
which they rejected patronage and maintained autonomy vis-a-vis local states (Jonsson 1996b).  
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Patrilineages
The structural principle of patrilineality appeared to be far less significant than the
allegiance group in the time of the opium economy.  W hile the dominant ideology, it had little
practical reality as observed by Dessaint and Durrenberger, and other social structures were as
likely to be salient in everyday life.  Practice in Revealed River in the 1990s differed considerably
from practice in the opium economy as patrilineages emerged as a more salient structure.  This
arose out of changes in marriage, adaptation to land tenure conditions, and the end of migration. 
 
Historical Evidence of Clans and Patrilineages
Unsurprisingly, colonial explorers and missionaries were particularly interested in “clans”
or lineages among all the people they encountered, in keeping with their orientation toward tracing
“blood” relations of different societies to each other.  There was a great deal of localized variation
in clan names so that even though all found evidence of clans, they found very little consistency in
naming throughout the territory in which Lisu lived.  Their lists of clans (eleven in one case, twelve
in another) had an overlap of only three names (Rose and Brown 1911:268; Enriquez 1921:73). 
In districts in which Lisu and Kachin lived together, Lisu took Kachin names for their clans
(Enriquez 1921:73).  There were many Lisu with Chinese clan names who claimed Chinese
descent, but also many Lisu with Lisu clan names who also claimed Chinese descent.  There was
no connection between clan and territory; lineages were not landholding social units.  Fraser
disgustedly concluded that one could not determine descent by virtue of clan name (Fraser
1922:iii).  The only function of clan names appeared to be marriage prohibition.  In the end, these
observers decided that Lisu clan names had little more significance then British surnames.  Given
how widely scattered Lisu were, it appeared that only localized kin groups could have been
important in everyday practice.  
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Patrilineages in the Opium Economy
In Lisu villages in the northern Thailand in the opium economy, patrilineages (Lisu: zo ),3
again, existed but appeared to be organizationally unimportant in large part because the members
of patrilineages were too dispersed to function in the village; they did not hold land, they organized
economic action only minimally, and patrilineages were less important for political action than
allegiance groups.  Reckoned genealogies were shallow, in keeping with the rapid rate of
migration dispersing members of the patrilineage non-contiguously across the landscape.  They
were important locally mostly for exogamous marriage and in ritual, particularly recruiting help in
performing ceremonies.  Durrenberger termed these localized patrilineages.  Again, researchers
noted their diversity in putative ethnic origin; a few were said to be pure Lisu and the rest either
Chinese or Lahu in origin (Durrenberger 1971:10-18; Dessaint 1972a:26; Durrenberger
1976b:304; Hutheesing 1990a:158-159).  Nevertheless, to be Lisu was to have patrilineage, and
in-marrying Lahu or Chinese created a patrilineage for themselves in accordance with this cultural
code, with particular ritual consequences discussed below.  
Patrilineal relationships were especially likely to be activated or at least cited in certain
contexts, such as migration.  Dessaint claims that the migration decisions of a household head
were most influenced by senior patrilineal kin (Dessaint 1972a:40), at least those near whom he
lived.  One reason given for migration was the need to be near patrilineage mates for their
assistance in carrying out rituals.  W hen visiting a distant village, a man sought out people of his
lineage; due to ritual differences, it was safer to stay with them rather than risk offending another
lineage’s ancestor spirits (Durrenberger 1971:10-18).  As a reserve to increase or absorb
populations, kinship relations provided nodes along which population could redistribute itself in the
landscape (Dessaint 1972a:23).  But in the context of the opium economy, most people were
welcome anywhere relationships could be found or formed.  W omen, as I observed in Revealed
River, also strategized to live near female kin in order to share agricultural labor and child care in
ways that they would not or could not with co-resident affines with whom they did not share
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obligations as potentially binding as with their mothers and sisters (a patrilineal relationship
through the husband of the mother and the father of the sisters).  
People talked about patrilineages as if they were important, and patrilineal relationships
were at least an idealized behavior and referred to in discourse about relationships.  As such, it
provided a moral authority for relationships outside the household.  Lisu talk about their allegiance
groups used the idiom of kinship, the term used being nei , siblings of one mother and one father1
(Dessaint 1972a:44), although, interestingly not of the patrilineage (zo ) even though patrilineality3
is implied in the siblingship relationship.  This was pronounced enough that Dessaint was led to
believe that patrilineal relationships were at the core of allegiance groups (Dessaint 1972a:44). 
However, his data in Table 4 shows that only 36% of households were patrilineally related to the
core leader; 51% were related affinally; and 13% were unrelated.  Of the patrilineally related
allegiance group members, one was a FFYBS, a quite distant relationship in Lisu terms; others
were daughters of the leader and their households.  Furthermore, lineage membership could be
changed in particular cases.  A maw mong at Evil Peaks changed his lineage from his father’s to
his mother’s lineage because the latter was numerically larger at Evil Peaks and he thought that
this way he would better represent the village; in other cases, a bride changed her lineage in order
to permit a marriage with an otherwise forbidden lineage mate (Dessaint 1972a:145-147).  Thus,
allegiance groups arose out of the dynamics of the household developmental cycle in which
agnatic relations were significant but not the solely significant structure.  On the other hand,
patrilineality was far more possible on the ground when a household head was mature and had
adult married children living with or near him.  This is further evidence of the cultural centrality of
patrilineality.  It was an ideal that was not achievable by everyone but always spoken of as the
standard.  
The ideological dominance of patrilineality was pervasive enough that it was difficult to
determine the nature of a kinship relationship among people in an allegiance group.  A man
associated with Headman Red’s faction told me they were brothers; on further questioning, it
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eventually became clear that the kinship tie between them was attenuated at best, but that he
worked with Headman Red because his father had been a close ally of Headman Red’s father.  It
is interesting that the discourse of patrilineality legitimated the relationship.  Dessaint believed that
relationships among patrilineal kin within an allegiance group would generally be closer than
affinal relationships (Dessaint 1972a:44); while this may well be true, in some cases the
patrilineality could arise out of the relationship as a model for close cooperation.  
There was a concomitant ideology of patrilocality; even with brideservice, uxorilocality was
deemed temporary.  As a Lisu woman sang, “There is no tradition to stay in father’s place.”  A
woman became a member of her husband’s patrilineage, at least theoretically; a Lisu metaphor
states: “A woman is a leaf on the tree of men” (Hutheesing 1990a:115).  W omen’s mobility was
limited in terms of patrilineality and patrilocality; a woman was not supposed to visit households
not related to her husband’s patrilineage, who were supposed to be her closest neighbors
(Hutheesing 1990a:72, 85, 92), or in practice, outside of her household’s allegiance group (which
might not have been patrilineal in composition even if constructed as patrilineal in discourse). 
Patrilineality was lived through kinship idiom as well.  Avoidance taboos were based on patrilineal
kinship.  Most elderly women in the village were called a -zara  (FM); when a household lived1 5
uxorilocally, the children called their MM a -zara  rather than a -phu , the usual term for MM1 5 1 5
(Hutheesing 1990a:123-124).  Thus, patrilineages existed ideologically, expressed in discourse
and kin terms.  
The issue of whether patrilineages existed or not for Lisu is muddied by our conceptions
of what a lineage should be.  Thus, previous researchers on the Lisu recognized that patrilineages
existed because Lisu talked about them as important in their social relationships, justified
strategies in terms of them, and used kinship terminology that expressed patrilineality.  But
Dessaint and Durrenberger, particularly, struggled with the very real lack of patrilineages’
everyday existence because they did not objectively exist by the standards of the concept of
unilineality in the literature of the time – agnation was dispersed, members of the patrilineage did
  This is not to say that there was projection of “sentiments” onto more distant relations and the79
“jural domain”, cf. Malinowski, Radicliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes.  Such an
understanding reifies the distinction between intra-household (domestic) and extra-household
(jural, public) domains.  
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not own property together, decisions were not corporately made, genealogy was often shallow
(four or at most six generations (Dessaint 1971a:93)), and there were no detailed clan histories
(although Hutheesing (1990a) disagreed; my understanding of the stories sung at weddings was
that they were clan histories but with details of places traveled through rather than a list of people
and names).  Rather than conclude from this that unilineality does not exist (Kuper 1982), it is
more useful to consider in what sense patrilineages existed for those people, the Lisu, who spoke
as if patrilineages existed, and look at what other social structures were in play with or against
patrilineages.  Patrilineages, certainly according to adult men, were a fact of Lisu life, but there
were countervailing social structures, such as uxorilocality (deemed temporary) and women’s
control of the domestic sphere and desire to exchange labor with sisters.  Given the dynamics of
the household developmental cycle, control of labor as a means of expansion of production, and
the wealth of opium and the possibilities of migration, conditions arose in which the countervailing
social structures of uxorilocality and sororal labor exchange were more congruent with fulfilling the
goal of household repute.  It is more useful to evaluate patrilineages as the Lisu saw them than to
essentialize them as proxies for territory, blood, and political structure.  In the opium economy,
patrilineages existed much as a privileged model for extra-household relations arising, perhaps,
out of the model actualized within the household.   In this, they were experienced most79
immediately in daily relationships among local agnatic relatives or in discourses of allegiance
group co-members the constructed themselves as being a type of patrilineal kin. 
Nevertheless, patrilineages existed as descent structures and this was experienced in
daily relationships with deceased ancestors of the patrilineage through the medium of ritual.  The
patrilineage was widely dispersed due to the vicissitudes of migration in the opium economy, so
that local agnatic relations dominated over deep patrilineal relationships, but patrilineal
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relationships were nevertheless instantiated in ancestor rituals carried out in the household and
among members of the localized patrilineage members.  These were shamanic rituals; marriage
ceremonies; and funeral ceremonies.  Every Lisu had to be a member of a patrilineage, and for
most (not all), their relationship with their ancestor and lineage spirits was an essential element of
their ritual and sense of security in a dangerous world full of animist spirits ranging from distant
ancestors to the lord of the land and the spirits of the fields, mountains, streams, rocks and even
the spiney porcupine, all of whom made people sick when offended.  W hen a young groom
performed brideservice he felt uncomfortable because he was parted from his lineage spirits living
in his in-laws’ house.  No such discomfort or ritual danger was reported for women living
patrilocally as her husband’s lineage spirits also protected her.  The wedding ceremony included
bowing to the ancestors of the bride by both the bride and the groom, said to be a recognition that
she was being taken away to her husband’s patrilineage.  Nevertheless, a woman did not give up
her relationship with her ancestor spirits nor they with her – her deceased parents, older siblings,
and more distant lineage spirits could either protect her or cause her illness, just as her husband’s
lineage spirits did for him.  Shamans of her natal patrilineage would be consulted if an illness was
not resolvable through contact with her husband’s patrilineal ancestors.  
Despite the dispersal of patrilineages, a discourse of the oB/yB relationship and
particularly of the oB as a senior male of the lineage deserving of respect was pervasive.  The
Village Guardian or Old Grandfather Spirit has an assistant, his younger brother. The Old
Grandfather spirit fulfilled the role of the older brother in the spirit world and toward those living in
the village; he took care of the people (and domestic animals!), was the guardian of morality, was
consulted when disputes could not be settled; the younger brother assisted him, sometimes with
amusing results (Durrenberger 1971; 1989).  W hen visiting a different village, the visitor was
supposed to seek out and pay their respects to his FoB (wu -pha ) in the village, assuming he had5 5
patrilineal kin in that village.  The older brother of the father of the bride led negotiations and was
referenced throughout marriage songs as the one ‘giving’ the bride and receiving the bridewealth
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(Hutheesing 1990a).  This does not mean that the oB was always materially involved, due to
distance and dispersal of agnatic kin; if no older brother was actually available or if he was not
well-spoken, another male elder served the role of speaking for the group.  There was, however,
no discourse on the groom’s side of the role of the FoB.  Nevertheless, agnatic links were central
to the organization of Lisu society.  In cases of divorce, sons ideally stayed with their father’s
patrilineage. 
Descent relationships were most clearly expressed in people’s relationship with their
ancestors.  Most Lisu households had ancestor altars in the house, opposite the central entrance
to the house from the verandah.  On this shrine, set above a sleeping platform for senior males,
were two shelves on which were placed several small bowls, and at times when a ritual was about
to be or had recently been performed, paper prayer flags, incense sticks, and string.  The number
of bowls had to do with both the depth of the lineage and whether descendants had been told to
keep or remove a bowl for a particular ancestor spirit.  In general, when people died they got a
bowl on in spirit altar.  On one shelf were the bowls for the deceased mother and father of the
male head of household (a -zra  and a -pa ), although in at least one household bowls were1 5 3 3
placed for the deceased parents of the female head of household as well. There were also bowls
for the grandparents of the household head; there might be bowls for deceased adult siblings
(male or female), in all cases I observed for older siblings of the household heads.  Collectively,
these are the ancestor spirits, also known as the house spirits (h’i -ku -nei ), but most commonly4 3 5
referred to simply as a -pa  or a -zra  just as elderly men and women in the village were called a -3 3 1 5 3
pa  or a -zra  by the youth of the village.  3 1 5
On the other shelf were bowls for the lineage spirits known as nei -za .  After three5 3
generations, the house spirits became nei -za .  The most junior of the lineage spirits was the5 3
FFF, called a -pa -mo  (as is the Village Guardian Spirit) and it is this lineage spirit on whom3 3 5
people depended the most.  A -pa -mo  was most frequently called on to intercede with the3 3 5
abundance of other spirits in the Lisu cosmology and appealed to in soul calling ceremonies when
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a person’s soul is lost, evidenced by malaise and inability to work.  A -pa -mo  communicated with3 3 5
people through shamans, and was most likely to have been the lineage spirit to call a man to be a
shaman.  In contrast, the house or ancestor spirits could make people sick, but they did not
communicate with their descendants through the shaman but only through the lineage spirits that
possessed the shaman.  Nevertheless, all of the household altar spirits (ancestor and lineage)
were called on to protect and care for household members.  If they failed to do so, their
descendants accused them of having no repute and senior lineage spirits chastised the junior
lineage/ancestor spirits if they did not aid the living with accurate information about which spirit
had been offended and what rituals to carry out to make amends for the offense.  Indeed, if
lineage spirits did not take care of their descendants, they lost their power (do ); in a sense, if they5
did not work, they did not eat.
Some lineages only went as deep as the grandfather of the household head (pei-pa)
(Durrenberger 1971:58).  These were ‘Chinese’ or ‘Lahu’ lineages, said to be founded within the
last three generations by a Chinese or Lahu man married to a Lisu woman who took on Lisu
ethnic identity.  Because everyone in Lisu society had to have a patrilineage identity, they formed
their own lineages (this inflow of people incorporated into Lisu society through these cultural
codes can be seen historically, I believe, in the variety of patrilineage names throughout the Lisu
population in northern Thailand, Burma, and southwestern China, many of which seem to have
been derived from place names, cf. Fraser 1922). 
Shamanism was another venue that demonstrated the role of lineage spirits in Lisu life,
through the selection by the spirits of a shaman and by the way shamanic ritual was used to cure
illness.  A shaman (nei -pa ) was a man chosen by a lineage spirit who made him sick with a5 5
specific syndrome of seizures, grinding of teeth, seeing visions, speaking unintelligibly, passing
out, weakness, and inability to work.  As word of the man’s condition spread, shamans in the area
approached the novice shaman to initiate him.  In this initiation, the senior shaman called his own
lineage spirit and the spirit then questioned the initiate about the skills, powers, and hierarchy of
  They would have had recourse to other means of divination or called for help from a shaman80
in another lineage; this made them dependent on the good will of shamans in other lineages and
likely more vulnerable to unresolved conflict with spirits. 
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seniority of his lineage spirits (Durrenberger 1989).  There was then a group possession in which
all of the shamans underwent possession at the same time.  For his first formal possession, the
neophyte shaman was first be ‘ridden’ by the most junior of his lineage spirits, the Great
Grandfather (a -pa -mo ) and then by other lineage spirits who wished to communicate through3 3 5
him.  The role of the senior shamans was to protect the neophyte from being possessed by
dangerous spirits, such as jungle spirits and the spirits of lineages other than his own.  Following
this, the junior shaman continued to train with a senior shaman from his own lineage, or as the
Lisu put it, the spirits of the senior shaman instructed the spirits of the junior shaman, for the
initiation is not so much to train the shaman as to train the lineage spirits (Durrenberger 1971:53-
57; Durrenberger 1989).  In shamanic rituals, lineage spirits possessed the shaman in the order of
their power and seniority.  
Because the most junior spirit eligible to recruit and possess the shaman was a great
grandfather spirit, Lahu and Chinese lineages did not have shamans because their FFF was not
Lisu.   On the rare occasion when a member of a lineage with no lineage spirits showed all the80
signs of spirit possession for years, the neighboring shamans determined from their spirits that he
was indeed selected to be a shaman, and his lineage was upwardly recalculated to allow him an
a -pa -mo  (Durrenberger 1989).  I suspect that this had occurred in the case of the Yipha lineage3 3 5
shaman. 
Shamanic rituals are by their nature public performances (shamans do not become
possessed by themselves and for themselves), making them an instantiation of patrilineal
relationships among the living and the dead.  As it was one’s own lineage spirits that either made
one sick or allowed one to become sick, and because it was their role to protect their
descendants, it was the lineage spirits who were consulted at any serious illness.  In calling on a
shaman to communicate with the ancestors, there was a hierarchy of resort.  The closest kinsman
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who was a shaman would regularly be consulted, but in cases with no ready resolution,
increasingly senior shamans were called on.  Married women might call on a lineage brother if it
was thought that her own patrilineage spirits were involved (see examples in Durrenberger 1989). 
At New Year, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Laoyipha lineage held several large rituals in which
their local members consulted with their ancestor and lineage spirits to ensure that all was in order
for the coming year.  These rituals took place starting at the house of the senior shaman for the
patrilineage and progressed down to the most junior shaman.  These were widely attended by
members of the local patrilineage and as such were a venue for the enactment of agnatic
relationships with the living as well as with the dead, the ancestral and lineage spirits.  
In addition, patrilineages were said to have distinct personalities.  Dessaint gave the
example of the Fish and the Bee lineages in Evil Peaks Village.  The Fish lineage was known for
its diplomacy and the Bee for its quick tempers.  As such, they were considered a good team for
dealing with local spirits (1971a:41).  Representatives of at least two patrilineages had to settle in
a new village to balance each others’ personalities.  
Patrilineages in the Post-Opium Economy
In Revealed River, patrilineages had gained new prominence.  The two main factions in
the village were, at their base, allegiance groups that had been concretized by the processes of
incorporation into the national Project and the constraints on land and migration.  But processes
were also underway in which they were becoming more patrilineally structured than had been the
case in Evil Peaks.  The mechanisms by which this occurred was attrition of affinally- or alliance-
related households from the village and a tendency toward patrilocal post-marital residence.  
For example we can look at the Laoyipha lineage.  It was the lineage of the headman, an
official position that was supposed to be elected but was in fact appointed by Project officials.  The
lineage had been founded in Revealed River by the headman’s father, a powerful and aggressive
leader.  This lineage was represented by four brothers, their wives, and children; the headman’s
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mother and an unmarried daughter; one sister and her husband and children; and one other man
and his family, who claimed patrilineal kinship with the headman.   These latter two households
lacked sufficiet land and capital.  The sister’s family was not closely allied with the Laoyipha
lineage in legal and political disputes, and in fact appeared to avoid political life in the village.  The
man who claimed patrilineal kinship on examination was found to have a rather attenuated
connection based on a past alliance between his father and the headman’s father. 
W ithin this lineage, however, the eldest brother of the Laoyipha lineage had his own
diffuse allegiance group.  He was considerably older than the other living sons and widely
recognized as very “traditional” or old-fashioned.  He was the shaman of the lineage, although
rarely consulted.  This was the father of Turtle.  His eldest daughter had married and brought in
her husband, but he was in jail in Bangkok on a drugs charge.  A number of households were
associated with this household, but shared only minimal daily activities.  In particular, they did not
share a rice mortar as a group.  Most of the Laoyipha lineage, in fact, did not use a rice mortar
because they bought most of their rice.  The women gossiped and complained about each other
constantly.  They did attend New Year shaman ceremonies and carry out ritual together, and
identified themselves to outsiders (me), by their lineage and relationships to people in it (the
headman, the shaman, the store owner, the truck driver, that is, the four brothers). 
The Yipha lineage was led by Kowboi although another man was the head shaman of the
lineage, and still another had been the servitor of the Village Guardian Shrine.  The structure of
this group more closely resembled the largest of the allegiance groups discussed by Dessaint in
Evil Peaks in that they shared two rice mortars – a sure sign of allegiance – and attended extra-
household rituals.  Those households with daughters exchanged agricultural labor on an almost
daily basis.  The core of this lineage grouping was patrilineal, however.  Kowboi’s three married
sons lived in his neighborhood with their wives; of the married daughters, all had gone to live
patrilocally.  Just next door was Kowboi’s yB, Ai Yi, who had two sons and three daughters.  The
sons had married and settled patrilocally, although the eldest had vanished into drug addiction
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and his wife and children had since returned to her mother’s house in another village.  Ai Yi’s
second son was the one who married his patrilateral cross-cousin; like Kowboi’s daughters, his
married daughters lived with their husbands patrilocally.  There was another cluster of two
households near Kowboi’s homestead.  These were patrilineal kin but not deeply involved in daily
labor exchange with the central core of the faction, possibly because they had few daughters
living with them.  
In addition, five to six affinally-related households lived here in the upper section of the
village, one being Kowboi and Ai Yi’s Z, her husband, and their children (one of whom married Ai
Yi’s second son).  The sisters-in-law were very close; now past the age of regular agricultural
labor, they spent their days sewing, cooking, and rambling through the forest collecting herbs and
vegetables.  The rest of the non-patrilineally related households tended to be poor and/or young. 
These were among the families who left Revealed River just before or near the beginning of my
stay.  In one case, the family’s stated reason for leaving was that the mother was over-worked
with young children.  She moved to join her sister’s family in Mae Hong Son so that they could
share field labor together; she went to visit and then told her husband she would divorce him if he
did not join her.  People told me that, faced with care of five young children alone, he moved.  In
another family, the father converted to Christianity, supposedly to avoid ritual obligations (he told
me killing pigs and chickens all the time was ineffective and expensive; others spoke of him as a
man who could not fulfill his obligations, a man without repute).  A third was the family from which
a young groom committed suicide; his widow later moved to town to work.  
A shift in relationships among households had occurred and patrilineages had emerged
as more prominent in Revealed River than had been the case in Evil Peaks or Ban Lum.  A great
deal of this was due to a renewed emphasis on patrilocal post-marital residence.  Lisu explicitly
placed this in a framework of conserving limited land resources for the household, particularly its
sons’ present or future households, the descendants of the household.  One of the main means
by which allegiance groups had been built up was through use of affinal relations.  In the post-
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poppy world, such affinal relations were no longer an advantage to the leader of an allegiance
group.  The choices made to ensure the future household of children and response to shifts in
land tenure had resulted in a very conscious choice to favor patrilocality and, concomitantly,
patrilineality.  Patrilineality was a core cultural principle, but who had the power, when, and how, to
bring about this ideal social form had also shifted between the opium and the post-poppy
economies.  In talking to men and women, young and old, about marriage choices, I was struck
by a difference in statements made between elder men and women who had daughters of
marriageable age.  Elder men universally stated that Lisu were patrilineal and patrilocal.  W omen
with marriageable daughters, and often their daughters, started out saying that their tradition was
that women could not stay.  But, they would then point out, it was also their custom for the young
woman and her husband to live with the bride’s family for a period of time after they married and
listed the reasons why it was better for a daughter to stay with her family for some time after
marriage: the most prominent was that brides were young and still needed to learn; their mother-
in-law would not care for them and might even mistreat them;  or that the young husband might
turn out to be bad.  At the root of it, it seemed that mothers would miss their daughters and were
concerned for their welfare, and as the person in control of the domestic sphere, women had had
the power to bring this about.  Lisu cultural principles recognized this, and in the opium economy
this practice could be preeminent.  As political and economic conditions changed, the power to
bring about uxorilocality had decreased.  W ith regret, parents refused uxorilocal marriage.  
Stronger localized lineages in Revealed River were supported by cultural principles of
lineage organization.  W hile not often activated in the opium economy when lineages were
dispersed non-contiguously across the landscape, the principles still existed as a part of the
cultural imaginary and instantiated in ritual practice, as legitimation for relationships, and as a set
of strategic practices depending on contexts.  In the case of Revealed River, increasing resource
scarcity (particularly of land), decrease in the value of labor in building household wealth, and
decrease in cash available since the end of opium cultivation also increased local lineage
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solidarity, if the households of that local lineage had land.  This presented a different set of
problems, of conflicts and shared interests among people, than had existed in the recent past.  It
meant that some lineage members had to be cut out, particularly daughters and their husbands. 
For land-poor groups, there was an increase in disintegration as they married or migrated out to
areas with more land.  At the same time, increasing resource scarcity made individuals
increasingly dependent on their parents and siblings for access to resources and, by extension,
on their lineage mates, who tended to be kin who could be recognizably enumerated and
expected to fulfill the cultural obligations of patrilineal relationships.   
Patrilineality under Conditions of Resource Scarcity
W ith national and international intervention in the highlands of northern Thailand, Lisu and
other ethnic minority peoples there experienced the end of migration, contraction of land
resources, and enclosure of land by state and development agencies.  Concurrently, there was a
re-emphasis on patrilineality within Revealed River.  This is in keeping with literature that stated
that unilineal kinship is associated with restricted land because it functions to delimit rights to
access to scarce resources by keeping certain classes of people out and giving priority to a set of
people defined by descent (Firth 1959; Meggitt 1965). 
Meggitt’s claim of a pattern of a functional relationship between unilineal organization and
scarce land resources was hotly disputed on the basis of the complexity of these systems, their
variability, and the difficulties in operationalizing variables to test the hypothesis (Barnes 1967; De
Lepervanche 1967; Kelly 1968; McArthur 1967; Strathern 1968).  It since been revised by
Frechione and Scaglion, who found a general cross-cultural validity for the hypothesis (Frechione
and Scaglion 1981).  Historical research (Shipton 1984; Glazier 1985), and longitudinal research
(Dwyer and Minnegal 1999; W ohlt 2004) have since upheld the correlation and discussed the
mechanisms by which this occurs.  
  Marriage within the patrilineage was punishable by the ancestors.  In certain rare cases where81
a married couple’s patrilineal relationship was so far back that it could not be recounted, the
marriage could take place by negotiating the payment of a fine paid along with the bridewealth
(Hutheesing 1990a:106) and appropriate ancestral ritual that might include the bride changing her
patrilineage. 
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Lineages as a Conceptual Category
A key point in this discussion is the validity of lineages as a conceptual category.  Most
importantly, we can ask whether such a thing as lineages “really” existed.  W ere lineages chimera
of the British structural-functionalist mind (Kuper 1982)?  W as the idiom of descent as applied to
group composition completely arbitrary (Sahlins 1965:97)?  Certainly British colonial explorers and
missionaries in northern Burma sought social groupings based on “blood and soil” as a proxy for
political organization, and expressed frustration that Lisu had no functionally significant form of
lineage.  Similarly, both Dessaint and Durrenberger concluded that lineages had no functional
reality in Lisu political structure and little in social structure beyond exogamy,  although they81
recognized the importance of ancestor rituals.  Therefore, they concluded, lineage model was of
no relevance to understanding Lisu social structure.  And yet, descent and lineage have failed to
go away, persistently re-appearing in peoples’ representations of themselves and in their
strategies (cf. Rivière 1993; Hviding 1993). 
In the Lisu case, the specific features of lineages can not be assumed on the basis of
British Africanist models or the permutations noted for the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, the
two significant loci for the anthropological discussion of lineage.  Lineages are culturally specific. 
W e must understand lineages as they are in the societies which claim them, not as models.  Lisu
lineages were not corporate, as a result of their history of migration and dispersal.  If that means,
by definition, that they did not have lineages, then the Lisu would be very surprised.  Lisu talked
about lineages as if they existed.  Even at their most attenuated, lineages were an important idiom
for discussing social relationships and descent had reality in people’s practice, especially in ritual. 
Clearly, patrilineages were important in the social order of Lisu, even in the opium economy.  It
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was not that lineage was unimportant, it was that other kinds of social relationships were
important as well.  In considering the relationship between scarce natural resources and the
prominence of patrilineality, I must conclude that Lisu did have ideologically and socially significant
patrilineages, but the extent to which they were practically significant varied with ecological and
political economic conditions.  That is, this phenomenon must be understood not only in relation to
population pressure but to the political ecology and as part of a dynamic process, by which
structural principles became more or less functional and salient in the world as Lisu lived it.  
Theory of Land and Lineage
The debate about the relationship between land and lineage originated in British
structural-functionalism, in which the segmentary lineage structure of permanent, unilateral
descent groups was considered the framework of the political system of relationships among
territories.  Lineage societies were intermediate in numerical and territorial range between very
small societies in which even the largest political unit embraced all of the people, united to each
other by bilateral ties of kinship, and larger societies in which the framework of the political system
was formal administrative institutions.  A lineage system united more people than the first and
fewer people than the latter, likely because there was a limit on the size of population that could
be held together under each type of political structure; this was not population density
(Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940:6-7), a misunderstanding that seems to have entered the
literature (see Fay 2003).  In fact, the population density of centralized government systems
tended to be lower than those of lineage systems; they concluded that a large population in a
political unit and a high degree of political centralization did not necessarily correlate with high
density (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940:7-8; Shipton 1984:613-614). 
Meggitt argued that “where members of a homogeneous society of horticulturalists
distinguish in any consistent fashion between agnates and other relatives, the degree to which
social groups are structured in terms of agnatic descent and patrilocality varies with the pressure
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on available agrarian resources” (Meggitt 1965:266).  His survey of highland Papua New Guinea
“...supported the proposition that the degree of patrilineality is significantly associated with the
availability of arable land” (Meggitt 1965:273-274).  This was a synchronic systemic confirmation
of Firth’s observations over time in Tikopia, where he found that increasing land pressure resulted
in “a division of land holdings by married brothers, a tendency to restrict the interests of married
women in their lineage land, and a sharper definition of personal rights in land as against rights of
other lineage and clan members. ... Tikopia unilaterality has been reinforced by [land] pressure”
(Firth 1959:180).  
Firth’s analysis seems to have drawn little critical comment, but Meggitt’s hypothesis drew
much attention.  The issue of how to define lineages arose, particularly that of whether peoples’
claim to being agnates could be upheld by anthropological analysis of data (McArthur 1967).  If
people were not “really” agnates, then agnatic density was more apparent than real and agnation
was not restricting access to land; if their lineages did not in fact adhere to the lineage model,
Meggitt’s argument correlating patrilineality with population pressure was spurious.  Controversies
about how to conceptualize and analyze social structures, particularly whether groups were
cognatic or unilineal, abounded.  It is in the context of anthropological understandings at the time
that Sahlins could write “...there is no particular relation between descent ideology and group
composition” (Sahlins 1965:104).  
Criticisms of the critique of Meggitt’s hypothesis could also be made from an ecological
point of view.  Many of these early discussions disregarded both the ways in which the
environment is formed through human action and how political conditions structured distribution of
resources.  Environmental variables were often treated as passive, unchanging features.  In an
earlier assessment of the validity of the concept of unilineality, for instance, Barnes referred to
ecological differences between Africa and Highland Papua New Guinea, but reduced it to the type
of livestock and the existence of permanent tree crops or fertile and presumably permanently
cultivated land, and therefore made it a matter of accumulation and control by lineages (Barnes
299
1962).  Another criticism was that population pressure could not be operationalized.  Indeed, it
may never be possible to formulate a single rule valid for evaluating carrying capacity across all
situations.  Determining population pressure involves population densities, distributions, the
productivity of the environment and of the mode of production, each complex in its own way (see
discussion in Chapter 2, “Population Pressure”).  All land in a given region was not usable to the
same degree, so that over-all absolute density mattered less than local distribution of population
(Kelly 1968:37; Shipton 1984:619).  Even where resources were sufficient for the population as a
whole, not every social group in the population had sufficient resources, for instance cultivating
less productive or accessible plots (W ohlt 2004).  Earlier criticisms of Meggitt’s claim assumed
unitary, integrated kinship systems.  Strathern, for instance, made an underlying assumption that
adaptation to stress occurs on a systemic or societal level (Strathern 1968).  The goal was to
determine which was the dependent and which the independent variable.  Finally, demographic
processes themselves have their own dynamic, complicating any ability to assign clear values and
independent or dependent status to one factor or another (Kelly 1968:37-45).  In one of the more
carefully operationalized critiques of Meggitt, Kelly concluded that kinship structures were not a
dependent variable in relation to population pressure; rather, “any given society’s response to
pressure on land resources is mediated by the existing structure and the established lines of co-
operation within that structure” (Kelly 1968:63).  There were viable alternatives for resolving local
imbalances other than patrilineality. 
These criticisms have been addressed in more recent studies with improved methodology
and, most importantly, longitudinal research that documents the transformations in social structure
between loose and tight lineal structure over time, in specific conditions.  Meggitt’s formulation of
the relationship between kinship structure and land scarcity appears, in retrospect, to be
inherently functionalist, whatever his intentions.  It compared patterns of kinship and population
density at an isolated slice of time, without consideration of the complexities of two inherently
dynamic systems responding to changing conditions and each other.  It posited a broad
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association that was easily dismantled by consideration of the variation that existed in specific
cases.  Ecological relationships had been simplified in the model.  Nor was any mechanism
posited to explain how such an association came about.  In the absence of such a mechanism, it
left a simple functionalist relationship between kinship and resource management, as if one
dependent system were adapting to another, independent, one.  It is interesting that Firth’s earlier
observations on the rise of patrilineal kinship practices on Tikopia with land scarcity seems to
have given rise to far less criticism; in that case, he had delineated the mechanisms by which the
transformations occurred, and no necessary functional relationship between population,
resources, and kinship were inferred.   
Nevertheless, several studies operationalizing population pressure through different
markers have shown an association between lineage and population pressure.  A more recent
and carefully operationalized world wide survey upheld Meggitt’s hypothesis (Frechione and
Scaglion 1981).  Regional historical work upholds the general pattern (Shipton 1984). 
Longitudinal work showing how and when a society undergoes such a transformation in kinship
structure and practices has also upheld the relationship between patrilineality and scarce land
resources (Dwyer and Minnegal 1999; W ohlt 2004).  These studies have also benefitted from
more subtle theoretical conceptualizations that recognized the inherent dynamic processes of
both environment and social system, and the processual interaction between structure and
behavior.  The underlying themes had been ideology and behavior, culture and environment, and
which was dominant, as if the dynamics of the two were unconnected.  Recognizing the extent to
which neither environment nor social structure are mere dependent variables of each other was
key to understanding what is, in fact, a clear correlation.  These studies have used more careful
conceptualizations of carrying capacity to assess population pressure.  Population density had
been used as a marker for what was essentially carrying capacity and population pressure, used
in the sense of land scarcity (Shipton 1984:613-614).  Carrying capacity as an analytic concept
has proven difficult to quantify, but it can be observed on the ground.  The perception of
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availability and productivity of land is the key factor.  People make a carrying capacity judgments
about their resource base (Bayliss-Smith 1980).  They can look at their fields and recognize that
there will be insufficient land for their children or that productivity was insufficient to provide the
level of resources that they currently enjoyed, as was the case for a fringe Enga clan (W ohlt
2004), and whether the land tenure system was viable or not given future expectations (Dwyer
and Minnegal 1999).  Intensification can also be a marker of increased population density
(Boserup 1965; Frechione and Scaglion 1981).  
Using such re-conceptualized assessments of carrying capacity, cross-cultural statistical
analysis has shown that kin group discreteness, particularly patrilineality, was correlated with
intensification of cultivation, marked by shortening of fallow; this stood for population pressure. 
Kin group discreteness was measured by formal kin authority, restriction of usufruct rights to kin
group members, inheritance of land, and a sedentary settlement pattern (Frechione and Scaglion
1981).  Using historical population figures, Shipton showed that the territorially unified
patrilineages were found in east Africa only where there was relatively high population pressure
and land scarcity.  Systems organized on the basis of territorially defined chiefdoms and
communities with political hierarchy were found in areas with lower population densities (Shipton
1984:613-614).  W ohlt overcame Strathern’s (Strathern 1968) stricture that Highlands systems of
lineage and resource control were ultimately incomparable due to the range of variation through
his careful use of genealogies and garden inheritance histories for one fringe Enga group over
time.  The number of individuals admitted to the group varied inversely with the density of
occupation and the mode of incorporation (more distant affines and cognates vs. closer agnates)
also co-varied with degree of density of occupation.  “The degree of correspondence between the
ideal alternative recruitment principles and relationships of hosts to incorporated individuals in
practice covaries directly with the pressure on land” (W ohlt 2004).  In lowland Papua New Guinea,
longitudinal research among the Kubo and Bedamuni demonstrated that social relationships
covaried with local systems of resource management; as land became scarce, the ideal of free
  Strathern, for instance, posited the unity of clan in the face of warfare as a key factor in defining82
lineage in Highlands society (Strathern 1968).  This was not a factor for Lisu, but increasing the
labor pool was.
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access to land gave way to an ideal of restraint, and affinal kin were far less likely to request or be
given land (Dwyer and Minnegal 1999:374-375).  In short, the pattern between unilineality and
scarce land resources must be understood temporally and processually; as active agents, the
people who enforce patrilineality or make use of friendships and affinal or matrilateral links
strategize within the context of not only immediate limits to carrying capacity, but their evaluation
of an imagined future.  
In Meggitt’s model, patrilineality existed in and of itself; it was assumed to be a unitary
social structure.  Much of the discussion around the association between patrilineality and scare
land resources failed to recognize other social principles that underlay the specific, observable
social structure, without adequately considering the importance of incorporating non-agnates as a
source of labor, for instance.  The significance of this point is illustrated by the Lisu case in the82
opium economy, particularly the importance of labor constraints and the dynamics of the
household developmental cycle as the primary limit on productivity.  Recruitment of labor was also
important for a fringe Enga group studied by W ohlt, as labor helped to clear new land for
cultivation (W ohlt 2004) and may have been significant for small scale states in East Africa where
the uneven spread of population due to the carrying capacity of the region led to migration of
newly married sons neolocally into less populated albeit less fertile lands (Shipton 1984).  Non-
agnates are more than a group of people opposed to a unitary group of agnates; they are other,
positively-valued types of people such affines, matrilateral kin, and other types of people affiliated
to each other through non-kin relationships such as exchange (Feil 1984:53).  Stressing unity of
the lineage conflates kinship with polity.  But in fact, the relative emphasis upon alliance and
descent varies depending on the context in which these ideas inform practice.  In an alliance
society such as that of the Kachin (particularly the gumsa Kachin), descent was a formative part of
the polity and alliance through marriage an important part of political relations (Leach 1965
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[1954]).  But for Lisu, descent was not the main organizing political principle and marriage alliance
did not create political relations.  There were other organizing principles, all oriented around the
repute of the household, which was closely associated with the regional political economy.  These
variations and interconnections must be related to concomitant structures and processes.  
 Interestingly, genealogical depth turned out to be of no statistical significance as a
measure of kin group discreteness (Frechione and Scaglion 1981).  W e have, perhaps, valorized
descent constructs such as genealogical depth, when they were simply features dependent on the
local political economy (land, political rights) and regional relationships.  For instance, tee
exchange in the New Guinea Highlands can be linked to the historical development of economy
(sweet potatoes, pig production) and exchange, which underpinned more inclusive, exchange
oriented groups in the W estern Highlands as compared to the more bounded and isolated groups
in the Eastern Highlands (Feil 1984).  Elaborate and deep genealogical claims to descent and
lineage ownership of land have emerged in the context of land rights adjudication in Kenya
(Glazier 1985).  A classic example of variation between genealogical shallowness and depth in
different political and economic conditions is the Kachin of northern Burma (Leach 1965 [1954]). 
In general, the dispersal of populations across northern mainland Southeast Asia would have
hindered the association of territory with ancestry.  
These discussions came down to issues of practice vs. ideology: W hich was to define
patrilineality?  The case of the Lisu of Revealed River illustrates that the question “‘Is this a local
group or a descent group?’ ... is too crudely phrased” (Strathern 1968:39) because of the shifting
dynamics of the political economies in which they lived.  People themselves relied on a range of
structures and practices.  It is essential to understand that practices of land claims depended on
“prior structural configurations” (Kelly 1968:35), but which structures?  The great variability shown
in comparative studies of Highland societies were not examples of either/or.  Rather, such
inherent variability provided a framework within which change occurred (Dwyer and Minnegal
1999).  W hat occurred was a shift in practice, not in underlying ideas or ideology because
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variability was inherent in the social and cultural framework and which elements were expressed
varied with shifting contexts.  The question is not just the validity of our rubrics, but what people
themselves do and how they justify it. 
Emergent Patrilineality and Resource Scarcity among the Lisu of Revealed River 
Both patrilineal and allegiance ideology and practice existed among Lisu, but the degree
to which each prevailed varied with political and economic conditions.  Lisu people of Thirty
Thousand worked within a framework of patrilineality, but there were other variables of greater or
lesser importance and congruency with patrilineality as well.  How they practiced patrilineality
depended on what was possible and what was feasible.  The contradiction between individual and
household repute could be in conflict or irrelevant to patrilineality, as it was in the opium economy,
but in the post-poppy economy, patrilineality became the means by which to achieve repute,
especially through the viability of future households of one’s children.  The inherent variability and
contradictions of prior structures is essential to understanding the nature of Lisu adaptation, which
occurs on the level of individuals’ strategizing within their cultural framework. 
It is useful to delineate some of the traits by which various scholars have sought to define
unilineality and its axes of variation, and compare these criteria to Lisu social organization in the
opium and post-poppy economies.  
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
Lineage Model, variable factors Lisu — Opium Economy Lisu — Post-Poppy Economy
Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940)
Segmentary lineages No; multiple lines of cleavage,
not all kinship based.
No, but this would be long
cycle, so no evidence either
way, possibly for northern
Lisu?
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
Lineage Model, variable factors Lisu — Opium Economy Lisu — Post-Poppy Economy
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Permanent, enduring lineal
attachment to land
Not in daily practice, but in
ideology, household level
ritual (and some village ritual).
Increasingly longer cycles
with transmission of property
and sedentization makes this
possible.
Heredity
Descent (transmission of
property, rank office (Also in
Kuper))
No inheritance of rank status,
office; some transmission of
wealth across generations
through bridewealth; some
inheritance of minimal
property, all portable. (Black
Lisu, no material support for
rank status except through
trade and relations with state)
Inheritance of land, capital or
investments; increased
transmission of wealth
through bridewealth.  
Transmission from F to Ss.
Political functions 
Kinship as primitive polity,
Minimal political
centralization (also in Kuper)
No – allegiance groups
significant politically organized
cliques, but these worked
against encompassing
political organization.  Leaders
are like “big men,” but with
only limited local power. 
(Black Lisu, leaders with
material or political support
could demonstrate power.)
Yes, in the context of state
interventions.
Political centralization due to
state penetration; state
potentially favors
patrilineal/agnatic relations by
negotiating with powerful
heads of allegiance groups,
who are now heads of
patrilines.
Kuper (Kuper 1982)
Corporate – kinship and
territory 
Lineages and clans are not
land holding groups.
Incipient territoriality
(decreased migration, state
demarcation and allocation of
land), but still based on
localized patrilineage.
Exogamous Yes, but negotiable
dispensations common.
Yes, still negotiable in theory,
but post-marital residence
(the main means of
negotiation) is not.
Unilineal Ideologically, yes; in practice,
as likely to use other types of
kinship (matrilateral, affinal)
and non-kinship relations to
establish allegiance groups.  
Ideologically, yes;
functionally, more so than in
the past, along with
decreasing functionality of
allegiance groups.
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
Lineage Model, variable factors Lisu — Opium Economy Lisu — Post-Poppy Economy
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Status distinctions within the
group depend on descent 
Difference in status between
agnates and non-agnates
(also in Barnes)
Ideologically, yes, but not in
practice.  Dessaint says there
are distinctions, but his
examples do not clearly show
this.  Personal traits (hard
working, assertiveness, luck)
could make an affine the
leader of a group. 
Increasingly so; non-agnates
are at a disadvantage in land
access and political relations. 
Patrilineal ancestors as
guardians of the agnatic
principle (also in Barnes)
Yes, on household level
(taboos), marriage, and village
“morality,” but not in terms of
maintaining unilineality in
practice.
Yes.
Genealogical depth, a
founder (also in Barnes)
Varying from 3-6 generations
deep, related to dispersal
through migration; clan
histories are lists of places
traveled through rather than of
named ancestors.  No
founder.  
Incipient, maw mong is of
“founding” lineage –
headmanship, too?  Note
diarchic structure
Barnes (Barnes 1962)
Bounded v. unbounded
affiliation 
Unbounded. Bounded.
Virilocality (patrifiliation) Not dominant practice, but
ideologically significant.
Yes, conscious choice
regarding land access.
Agnatic density (cumulative
patrifiliation) 
Low, but variable from village
to village.
Increasing patrifiliation
resulting in increased agnatic
density, especially for the two
dominant lineages in
Revealed River. 
Counter-agnatic filiation
requires special dispensation
from agnatic dogma 
Yes, but very common
through payment of bride
price, fines
Yes, but not as possible in
practice now as non-agnates
are not welcomed.
Descent as morally
evaluated and sanctioned
Yes. Yes.
Descent as a mechanism of
recruitment and ascribed
relationships
No; descent was one of many
elements of recruitment to
groups, ideologically
significant but not functionally
so, depending on village.
Yes, identity and social
relationship as patrilineage
member is ascribed and is
now main means of
recruitment.  
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
Lineage Model, variable factors Lisu — Opium Economy Lisu — Post-Poppy Economy
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Multiplicity of cleavages or
potential cleavages 
Yes, the hallmark of Lisu
social structure was the
multiplicity of cleavages.
Fewer options for fission
through dispersal; multiple
cleavages subsumed in
household and lineage.
Degree of optation High optation, high level of
affiliation with non-members
of patrilineage.  
Main mechanisms for
optation being eliminated; low
possibility of non-patrilineal
affiliation.  
Plurality of membership Yes. Decreasing.
Group solidarity v. network
cohesion 
Network cohesion. Group solidarity.
Membership (lineage) v.
residence (unbounded
affiliation)
Residence. Membership, but arising out
of land constraints and
patrilocality.
Single home (lineage) or
multiple homes (unbounded
affiliation)
Frequent moves over the
course of a life time, with
possible concurrent changes
in allegiance group
membership.
Single – few alternatives
given decreased possibilities
for migration.
Automatic operation of rules
and group level ties in
exchange (lineage) v.
individual initiative (bounded
filiation) 
Individual initiative, especially
in leadership and alliance with
leader.  Patrilineal
identification was generally
ascribed but overridden by
alliances created by individual
household.
Possibilities for individual
initiative in group formation
decreased.  Automatic
application of rules regarding
lineage identification and few
opportunities for changing it. 
No group ties in exchange
(yet?).
Lineage elders and seniority
(lineage) v. big men
(unbounded affiliation) 
Leadership by individuals with
repute, power, potency.
Lineage elders and seniority
more politically and
economically important.
Group solidarity (lineage) v.
multiple affiliation, flexibility
and maneuverability
(unbounded affiliation)
Multiple affiliation; flexibility
and maneuverability the
hallmark of Lisu social
structure
Group solidarity increased as
multiple affiliation less likely.
Concentrated marriages
(enduring connubial alliances
among lineages) (lineage) v.
marriage dispersed
(unbounded) 
Dispersed. Dispersed; terms of choosing
spouse in transition, but not
necessarily toward
concentrated form as little
evidence yet of enduring
alliances across generations.
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
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Need to limit people with
access to scarce resources
(unilineality) v. need for
increased strength with
members (warfare)
(unbounded affiliation) 
Unbounded affiliation:
Increased strength in numbers
of people in local residence
desirable due to need to
attract labor and for protection
against bandits. 
Unilineality: Need to restrict
access to scarce land
resources; warfare definitely
not an issue.
Inheritance (and BW )
important (lineage) v.
relatively low level of
inheritance (unbounded
affiliation)
Inheritance insignificant.  BW
important, but boys had
options for independence.
Inheritance importance
increasing.
BW  dependency of juniors on
seniors increasing.  
High dependence on agnatic
kin for economic support
(lineage) v. possible to use
others’ resources (low
dependence) (unbounded) 
Low dependence on agnates
for economic support, high
level of use of “others’”
resources; but due to open
land access, rights to land
defined by labor upon it.
Higher dependence on
economic support of agnates,
especially for land and capital
investment, bridewealth.
Contextual shifts of
opposition and alliance
Not evident. Not evident, except vis-a-vis
the state.
Chronic segmentation v.
catastrophic
No evidence; alliances shift on
the basis of multiple
cleavages or potential
cleavages based on village
conflict or better economic
opportunity.
No evidence of chronic
segmentation, but this would
take more than one
generation. 
Strathern (Strathern 1968)
Stress on unity of the clan
group
Yes, in ideology. Yes, in ideology.  
Alliance/marriage among
groups as key form of
political alliance
No, although Durrenberger
posits rudiments of a moiety
organization.
Attempts made in Revealed
River failed.  
Frechione and Scaglion (Frechione and Scaglion 1981)
Formal kin group authority,
coercive power involving kin
group members
Very little. Increasing coercive power
due to parental control of
bridewealth and access to
land
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Lisu Patrilineages in the Opium and Post-Poppy Economies
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Usufruct rights in kin group
agricultural land limited to
group members
No. Currently negotiated by Lisu
household as dynamics of
marriage, post-marital
residence and household
relations shift.
Inheritance of land No. Increasing among Lisu,
although strictly speaking
what was inherited was the
rights to cultivate land, as the
state controls land.
Sedentary settlement pattern No. Yes, again, due to state
restrictions. 
Rivière (Rivière 1993)
Length of cycles: 1
generational (transference of
bone/semen and blood/flesh)
v. 2 generation or longer
cycle involving transmission
of name, ritual
One generational cycle,
developmental cycle of
household is key element.
Now longer cycles as well –
due to transmission of land,
permanent settlements; and
incorporated more intimately
into state and historical time.
Functional v. ideological Ideological, not functional. Ideological and increasingly
functional.
Burton (Burton 1997) (three of the following five traits)
Members consistently and
accurately identify members
of their own and other
groups
Yes. Yes.
Members recognize
responsibilities to other
members.
Minimal, occurring more within
context of household or
allegiance group. (Obligations
recognized but not activated.)
Yes, although primarily to
members of localized
patrilineage, within village.
Discernible organizational or
management functions at
group level.
No. Emergent, especially vis-à-vis
outsiders (Thai officials).  
Rights or properties can be
held by group.
No. Yes, but only localized
patrilineage.
Relations between different
groups are ‘political’ in
nature.
No – politics not handled by
localized patrilineage but by
allegiance group.
Increasingly true, especially in
context of Project
assumptions.
  I recognize the confusion inherent in this terminology, given that so much of the kinship83
literature uses alliance to refer to marriage exchanges and the relationships established by
those.  However, Lisu allied with each other on the basis of economic opportunity and political
support in village disputes.  They were allies.  
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Table 5.2 demonstrates the ways in which Lisu social structure in the post-poppy
economy had shifted toward more features of lineage than found among Lisu of the opium
economy in regard to descent group ideology and affiliation.  In post-poppy northern Thailand,
patrilineages were more important in daily practice and strategy than allegiance groups.  This
came through patrilocal post-marital residence, patrifiliation, and resultant increased agnatic
density.  If we had not seen patrilineages previously, this would have been a great surprise.  All
Lisu did not exhibit this shift toward patrilineality due to variation in the economic and political
conditions under which Lisu villages existed.  Dr. Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong, working with Lisu,
Hmong, and Karen villages in highland development projects throughout the north, noted the
strength of Lisu patrilineages, but noted that agnatic density and activation of patrilineages in daily
life was hindered by dispersal across the landscape of northern Thailand.  In contrast, in See the
Tiger, social structures, including patrilineages, were disintegrating.   In the opium economy,
descent had been salient in intra-household social relationships and rituals significant only to a
limited extent in extra-household relationships, in large part because patrilineal relatives might not
be present and neighbors were as likely to be affinal, matrilateral, or friendship (alliance based)83
as patrilineal.  One way to look at this is to say that the key point is the extent to which
patrilineages have become functional lineages (Rivière 1993).  They became functional through
the increased practice of patrilocality, which increased agnatic density and thus made
patrilineages of greater social, economic, and political importance in everyday life as people’s
strategies became increasingly congruent with their principles of descent.  The ideology of
lineages was significant in practice because descent ideology, reproduced through ancestral
ritual, provided the cultural repertoire on which people drew as conditions shifted.  Patrilineage
was the prior structure.  That is, Lisu social structure was marked more by cumulative patrifiliation
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(Barnes 1962) than deep descent; unsurprisingly for people who had migrated so far and fast,
genealogies were still shallow (3-7 generations).  
W hat is interesting and changeable about Lisu society was the degree and extent of
patrifiliation, leading to agnatic density.  W hich principles people used to affiliate themselves with
a group of people in Lisu society varied depending on the features of the political economy and
ecology.  In the opium economy, multiple cleavages and possible affiliations provided the means
by which population was distributed across the landscape depending on the economic and
ecological conditions people they encountered.  They strategized on the basis of needs for labor
and possibilities for repute, which had specific consequences for the “strength of patrilineality” but
did not make Lisu more or less patrilineal in ideology, ritual, and intra-household relations. 
Patrilineality existed in the opium economy, but mainly in  household relations, ancestor rituals,
and ideal relations.  Among Lisu in northern Thailand, there were certain elements of a shared
being marked by lineage membership in that a typical personality was attributed to members of
particular lineages (“peacemakers,” “hot-tempered”) and villages were assumed to function more
smoothly if the characteristics of the lineages in it were complementary.  This fits Strathern’s
criterion that patrilineages stressed the unity of the clan group, symbolized by shared paternal
substance or common descent from an ancestor (Strathern 1968).  But by and large, rather than
common participation in shared paternal substance, patrilineage membership was marked by
ritual on the household level; households gained blessing from the ancestors and shamanistic
rituals brought together the members of the localized patrilineage.  Lineage connections were also
important in communications networks that facilitated migration decisions.  W hen traveling, Lisu
looked for fellow lineage members with whom to stay in order to avoid running afoul of someone
else’s ancestors.  Exogamy was also an important function of Lisu patrilineages, remembering
that in cases where marriages did not adhere to lineage exogamy the bride or groom could
negotiate a change in her or his patrilineage identity, paying a fine, and practicing appropriate
ritual to avoid illness inflicted by the ancestors or other spirits when the ancestors withdrew their
  Note the interesting difference in levels of comparison.  For the Highlands, the comparison is84
inherently whether lineages or alternative kinship and alliance structures were significant in
resource allocation; in Africa, the contrast has been between lineage society and small-scale
states.  One was an ecological argument and the other a political one.  
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protection.  However, both patrifiliation and the variety of other ways in which people were
recruited to a patrilineage or allegiance group were features of Lisu society.  Strathern refers to
such practices as equivocal for defining the degree of patrilineality of a society; this “split between
dogmas relating to group unity and attitudes to recruitment” made it impossible to assess the
strength of patrilineality in the case described by Meggitt (Strathern 1968:50).  But the split seems
to me to be a red herring.  Lineage features were not completely absent among Lisu in the opium
economy and the ideology of lineage was prominent.  Patrifilial practices were validated by
reference to their ideology of patrilineality and already existing patrilineal ritual practices in that
patrilocality of sons was the ideal form of post-marital residence even in the opium economy,
whether actuated or not.  In this, Rivière’s distinction between ideological and functional lineality is
appropriate to understanding Lisu practice.  He cites Crocker on the Bororo as an example of a
society that was not ideologically matrilineal, but was functionally matrilineal (Rivière 1993).  In the
Lisu case, patrilineal ancestors were “guardians of the agnatic principle,” expressed through
ancestor ritual in the household, and while individuals had occasional flexibility in affiliation it often
had to be validated by dispensation from agnatic dogma, for instance, by changing one’s
patrilineage.   
A key difference between Lisu patrilineages and the African and Highlands PNG
patrilineages discussed in the literature is that Lisu patrilineages were not landholding units; even
recent landholding is on a household basis (and, strictly speaking, all that is owned is use rights
as the state owns the land).  Another key distinction was that tribal warfare did not occur, although
clan feuds had been common in the north among Black Lisu in the past.  The lack of warfare
might account for the lack of stress on unity of the clan group that seemed so important in
Highlands PNG societies (Strathern 1968).   As such, lineages were not a form of polity, as84
  See footnote 36, Chapter 3.  85
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assumed by in British structural-functionalism (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940).  Southeast Asia
has rarely attracted this sort of notice of unilineality because of the pronounced non-unilineal
structure of kinship and the low population density.  It is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the existence of lineages as an either/or situation.  Lisu can be seen as an
example of both cognatic and unilineal practice in different contexts.  Like autonomy and hierarchy
in Lisu households, both existed in relation to each other, and which was more apparent reflected
the political (and economic) environment in which Lisu lived their culture.  These contradictions
within society may reflect their history, that is, of fluctuating models of alignment with states and
against states – the diarchic  model of village organization was an expression of the same sort of85
contradiction and Lisu cosmology similarly demonstrated ways in which Lisu both assimilated and
encapsulated their relationships with powerful external polities and peoples (Durrenberger 1989).  
Looked at from the African perspective of contrasting lineages and small scale states,
that is, lineages as a primitive polity, other interesting contrasts between Lisu lineages and the
lineage model appear.  In descent-based systems, domestic groups were attached to the land
and ownership was claimed through “ancestral traces,” particularly graves.  In contrast, small
scale states were marked by locality (territory)-based systems where membership was based on
residence (Shipton 1984:616).  Lisu in the opium economy exhibited the residential mobility typical
of locality-based systems and small states: membership in the community was determined by
place of residence; there was no probationary period for newcomers; full cultivation rights were
granted to all community residents by a headman; and fields were laid out in patches, their
placement bearing little or no correspondence with the genealogical relationship of land holders. 
Lisu land was “owned” by a range of spirits (including Thai, Shan, animist spirits and others) and
only village land was ritually held by a Lisu spirit, the Old Grandfather Spirit (Durrenberger 1989;
Hutheesing 1990b:9); cultivation rights were gained on the basis of prestations to the Old
Grandfather Spirit, and while this was mediated by the servitor, who was usually a senior male of
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the original Lisu patrilineage in the village, his role in day-to-day life was mainly as a guardian of
morals.  Therefore, the Lisu land use system, especially under the opium economy, resembles
these locality-based systems far more than descent-based ones.  
The locale-based social structure of Lisu, however, was not because they were
incorporated into local states.  On the contrary, Northern Thailand was an empty land,
uncontrolled territory, in the period in which Lisu migrated there, and local states had little interest
in uplanders (Jonsson 1996a; Jonsson 1996b; Tagliacozzo 2001; Hanks and Hanks 2001; Maule
2002).  Rather, locale-based systems reflected migration histories and the open access to land at
that time.  Flexibility was supported by opium and the long-term history of Lisu relations with
states.  But state structures, no matter how locally attenuated, were significant in this particular
social structure.  The Lisu long-term history of relations to states created practices oriented
toward the maintenance of autonomy in the face of the domination of empires; forced labor and
conscription into armies; alienation of land and involuntary resettlement; taxation and punitive
raids (discussed in Chapter 2).  Furthermore, the role of opium in Lisu social structure is the result
of the particular histories of England, India, and especially China.  Finally, the conditions Lisu face
today are the direct result of their incorporation into the nation-state of Thailand.  Scarcity of land
is due in large part to the Thai state’s enclosure of vast swathes of mountain land in order to fulfill
its own economic goals.  Preserving watershed forests not only plays well on the international
stage of the fraternity of nations, but ensures sufficient water for hydroelectricity for
industrialization and farming to grow sufficient rice for export, in short, for economic modernization
in the global context.  Global processes live in Revealed River, but in unique ways, mediated by
the Thai nation-state and framed within local social processes (cf. Jackson 2003a; Jackson
2003b).  
Mechanisms 
One of the problems with Meggitt’s hypothesis was the lack of an underlying mechanism
by which a kinship structure became key in allocation of resources.  Frechione and Scaglion’s
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revival of the hypothesis of a relationship between unilineality and land scarcity showed only
correlations, although strong.  Such models assume that discrete kin groups “evolved” in
response to Boserupian intensification and kinship was the best way to control the labor needed
for intensification.  They defer to Meggitt in assuming that increased kin group discreteness would
resolve conflict over land (Meggitt 1965:273), although they mention that in fact the immediate
cause of increase in kin group discreteness might be kin solidarity in the face of warfare as a
result of increased population density.   Situations without warfare, then, become far more difficult
to explain, although Firth explicitly stated that unilineality reduced conflict over land, and there was
no warfare in Tikopia at that time (Firth 1959).  W hat other mechanisms exist by which unilineality
increases with land scarcity?  The problem is better understood by addressing it in a culturally and
historically specific way and by moving beyond a general, outside-the-system functionalism. 
Examining the choices made by individual actors in the context of their assessments of land
resources, productivity, and the risks and benefits of incorporation of cognatic or affinal kin allows
allows us to understand the mechanisms by which such social transformations occurred. 
Processually-oriented work looking at the same group historically or longitudinally allows us to
understand the mechanisms as they shift within the existing structure.  Social structures must be
understood in the context of the full range of elements of that social structure, alliance, affiliation,
siblingship, descent, that is, the relationships of social relationships (Kelly 1977, 1985).  Among
those mechanisms mentioned in more recent work from Papua New Guinea are that the degree
of filiation or affiliation occurred depending on its perceived benefits – the need to open new land,
to occupy borders of territory adjacent to enemies, provide numbers in times of warfare, or
connections and reciprocity when periodic frosts occurred people became refugees; or to restrict
access when carrying capacity has been reached (W ohlt 2004).  In other cases, the definitions of
appropriate generosity to resident guests shifted with shifting contexts.  Resident “guests” became
aware that they needed to practice restraint in requests for aid and land when resources were
scarce.  This was mediated on the hosts’ part by their recognition that while their immediate
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interests made generosity unviable, expectations of future needs meant that they needed to
practice motivated generosity to maintain alliances that they might need in the future (Dwyer and
Minnegal 1999).  
However, Firth’s work on Tikopia provides the best analogy to conditions I observed in
Revealed River.  Here, island conditions strictly delimited land, much as the Project’s application
of national watershed land policy had, and the only options open to households were either
emigration, which was limited, or to constrain access to land using social structural mechanisms
already in place, that is, ideals of patrilineal inheritance and privileged access to land for those
who were patrilineally related within the same household (brothers who were sons of the same
father).  Previously in Tikopia, there had been considerable freedom of usufruct as long as title
was uncontested.  Those using land had to acknowledge the owner’s rights through presentation
of first fruits.  Land was also granted to a married daughter or sister, perhaps as a dowry, and her
children’s rights to continue to farm this land were sometimes recognized.  W ith increase in
population, a result of the breakdown of the practice of restricting marriage and fatherhood to only
the eldest brother, owners’ attitudes hardened and there was a sharper definition of land interests. 
The rights of married women to cultivate her natal clan’s land were severely curtailed; personal
rights of household members in land as against the rights of members of other lineages was more
sharply delineated; usufruct was rarely granted both because the owners wanted to use the land
and because they feared contestation of their title; and cropping patterns changed as people
planted crops such as manioc that did not require fallow land in order to mark usufruct or title.  At
the same time, brothers subdivided their land not at the death of the father as in the past but on
the marriage of the son (Firth 1959:158-179).  In short, “Tikopia unilaterality as been reinforced by
[land] pressure” (Firth 1959:180). 
Among the Lisu in Northern Thailand, delineation of patrilineal rights emerged out of the
aggregate of individual household decisions to conserve their household land resources for the
next generation of their patrilineage – their sons and their sons’ households.  The rights of married
 While this could, through one lens, be seen as a transition from tribal to peasant society, in86
fact Lisu had been a type of peasant for generations, or at least on the cusp of tribe and
peasant, as they had been producing a cash crop for global markets.  It is, perhaps, debatable
wither the distinction between tribe and peasant is legitimate in Northern Mainland Southeast
Asia.
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women to cultivate land in her natal place, land opened in labor with her father and brothers and
therefore belonging to the localized patrilineage, were curtailed by the enforcement of patrilocal
post-marital residence to the extent that the practice of bride service had nearly ceased.  This
closed the door on a main mechanism of recruitment into the allegiance group, which was also
the means by which boys with no resources had effectuated marriage.  In the past, affines,
matrilateral kin, and allies had been welcomed, but in modern Revealed River the rights of
patrilineal household members in land were more sharply drawn and enforced.  In the past, aside
from open access to land, Lisu who had gained usufruct by clearing land could grant that usufruct
to others if asked (and presented with payment that included a bottle of liquor).  Households
migrating to the village also requested recognition by the Old Grandfather Spirit and no one was
denied (although others might have left if they did not want to live with the newcomers).  But in
Revealed River, fallow land was at risk of being marked as abandoned and vacant, allowing state
appropriation.  Households maintained tight control over the land by using it.  In these conditions,
usufruct was rarely granted outside of the patrilineage because the owners wanted to use the land
in the future and maintain the informal title granted them by the Project by their use of it.  Here, a
difference between Tikopia and northern Thailand was that state land policy in Thailand has been
the impetus to decreased carrying capacity, while in Tikopia, the delimitation of land was a pre-
existing natural condition but contact with the west (especially missionization) had result in
changes in marriage practices that resulted in an increase in population.  However, in both cases,
global forces resulted not in a breakdown of kinship structures, as assumed in popular depictions
of the effects of globalization, but an elaboration and sharper delineation of kinship, legitimate
kinship ties for access to land, decrease in recognition of collateral relationships in accessing land
and an increase in the importance of unilineal relationships.   86
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The Dominance of Patrilineages in Revealed River
Patrilineality in Revealed River did reflect political processes, and this reinforced the
emergent patrilineality.  Land tenure was deeply political in the context of the Project; “rich
farmers” hid their holdings from the Project and from other, land poor families who might in the
past have been affiliated with them in allegiance groups.  In the conditions of the 1990s in
Revealed River, the land “rich” did not perceive themselves as rich because they were hoarding
for their children’s future.  This changed the nature of political relationships; the leading lineages
could not afford to be generous to affines and allies, to display repute by attracting a large group
of followers.  The land tenure system was viable or not given future expectations (Dwyer and
Minnegal 1999), and the expectations of Lisu in Revealed River were not optimistic.  Strategies to
accumulate and validate land by these lineages entailed favoring agnatic kin over other types of
kin or allies.  
One reason for the dominance of two patrilineages in Revealed River may be historical
accident.  Revealed River was a medium-sized village with two main Lisu allegiance groups.  In
Revealed River, the lineages of the two main allegiance group leaders (one of whom was still
alive), were relatively land wealthy because of the maturity of their households in the
developmental cycle at the point in history when the Project began to limit land use.  Households
that had tenuous connections or were unaffiliated with one of the major patrilineages (whose
elders had once been the center of allegiance groups) were under a great deal of economic
pressure.  This was in part because many of these poorer households were at a stage in the
household developmental cycle in which they had many consumers and relatively few producers. 
As newer households, they had also had little land when land limitations were put into place. 
Getting permission to open new fields required political support in order to negotiate with Project
personnel.  But they got little support from allies through their non-agnatic connections with
households of the main factions/patrilineages, no longer shared common interests with their
former allegiance groups, and so left in search of kin with whom they could share labor in places
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where land was available.  The poor who complained of the lack of land were constructed as non-
compliant in Project discourse (greedy, not willing to sacrifice for the good of the nation) and
Project personnel pressured faction leaders to bring them into line.  One way to bring them into
line was by, in effect, cutting them out.  Problematic households were forced out, thereby
transferring land use problems to areas outside the Project area.  Most of the households that left
Revealed River immediately before my arrival or during my stay were affinal or matrilateral kin to
the two main patrilineal groups.  For the dominant lineages, the discourse of patrilineality was a
“representational kinship” (Hviding 1993:803) that strengthened their position vis-a-vis the Project
by making local forms of authority more legible to the state, but also strengthened patrilineal ties
in the context of state control of agriculture and land resources.  
In this political environment, there was a clear sense that certain villagers did not have the
same rights to land as the bigger, founding lineages.  Given the profound egalitarianism espoused
by Lisu, how did this come about?  In the opium economy, new immigrants had had to ask
permission to settle if the village was already established.  They paid a fee to the maw mong and
made a presentation through him to the Village Guardian (Old Grandfather) Spirit; and made
prestations to the headman.  This was depicted by Durrenberger as pro forma and no one was
denied the right to settle (Durrenberger 1989).  To this day, the New Year dancing that blesses
each household for the coming year starts one night at the home of the maw mong and the next
night at the house of the headman, before circling around the entire village in clockwise or
counter-clockwise direction.  For a young woman to not dance at these houses is considered
insulting to the household where she does not dance.  By its nature, these rituals acknowledged
some degree of ownership rights or at least prior and superior rights of founding lineages and
reminded the rest that they were newcomers.  Tensions about this were present in Revealed
River in regard to both land and political power vis-a-vis the Thai state.  
The smaller number of dominant lineages in the village allowed greater agnatic density,
which also allowed them to establish a social and political dominance in the village, in part through
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strategic relationships with Project personnel, making the senior leader of each lineage more like
a patron than a big man who had attracted people to his allegiance group by his repute.  In this
way, they were able to maintain dominance of land resources.  As in other ethnographic cases,
groups that were more homogeneous in kinship composition had an advantage in positioning
themselves to justify their claims to land.  Agnatic influence in access to land was a consequence
of both land scarcity and the historical conditions that created that scarcity (Fay 2003:7, 25)  That
is, history determined the actual conditions, but agnates were able to, and apparently chose to,
restrict access of non-agnates to “their” land.  This was in contrast to See the Tiger, where there
were seven patrilineages, scattered about the village rather than living in recognized
neighborhoods within the village (Hutheesing 1990a:84).  The diversity and size of a village such
as See the Tiger did not allow this sort of coordination – but neither did they have the advantage
of working with one major institution instead of a plethora of small-scale capitalists looking to
exploit their land and labor.  
In the end, the political economy of the environment was a key element in the particular
forms that Lisu society took, and in this as well the Lisu case differs from that studied by Meggitt. 
The great degree of inter-household autonomy had been replaced by a set of structures that
already existed within Lisu social structure.  As the political economy changed, Lisu drew on
different possibilities within their existing social structure to adapt.  In this case, the re-emergence
patrilineality in marriage practices permitted households, the core unit of Lisu society, to adapt,
and as a result a different set of inter-household relationships, the allegiance group, went into a
decline.  Neither set of relationships disappeared, but simply came to the fore as conditions
changed.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation is a study of how transformations in Lisu social structure were patterned
by both historically conditions and global political and economic forces.  It is a study of how
globalization is enacted on the ground through the filters of national and international policies and
economies.  But it is striking that the profound changes in the conditions in which Lisu lived had
not brought about wholesale transformation of their social structure; rather, there were patterned
consistencies between the opium and the post-opium societies.  This arose out of the
heterogeneity of key features of their society that allowed flexibility in their responses to changes
brought about by the execution of anti-opium and anti-swiddening policy in northern Thailand. 
The contradictions between principles of hierarchy and autonomy, descent and residential
household, for instance, expanded their repertoire for dealing with conditions of change while still
within their own cultural framework.  
The Economy of Opium Swiddening
W hen introduced in the early nineteenth century as a cash crop, opium became a central
part of Lisu adaptation to their environmental and economic conditions (cf. Chapter 2).  The
places Lisu lived were marginal lands for agriculture; furthermore, western Yunnan was a place
prone to warfare and natural disasters; populations shifted across the landscape in response to
earthquakes, fires, landslides, warfare, and forced relocation.  Trade was an integral part of the
adaptation of these populations, in large part due to these political and environmental conditions. 
At the point at which opium became a significant cash crop, a number of political processes had
made trade difficult.  Trade networks had been disrupted by the Panthay (Muslim) Rebellions,
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which decimated the population of Hui or Muslim Chinese who had dominated much of the trade. 
In addition, the inroad of colonial trade had shifted trade to ports, dislocating regional overland
trade networks at the same time that the Han and Tibetan administrations were weakened, giving
rise to banditry, warfare, and rebellions.  Into this gap came opium, a plant well-suited to the
ecological conditions of upland Northern Mainland Southeast Asia and a commodity with an ever-
expanding market.  Opium was easy to grow, easy to transport, easy to store, and easy to sell. 
Opium allowed a population such as the Lisu to live in marginal environments that they might not
otherwise have been able to survive in by transferring resources from wealthier regions that
bought opium to the people of these marginal regions.  
Opium provided the Lisu with the means to adapt to the political economic conditions of
the nineteenth and twentieth century in Northern Mainland Southeast Asia.  Specifically, opium
facilitated the movement southwards of the population of Lisu and other uplanders.  Factors in the
push of Lisu and other upland non-Han groups was related to the demographic transition of
Yunnan by a massive influx of Han, and because of the violence and political instability of
conditions in Yunnan with the extension and then weakening of Chinese government
administration.  Opium gave Lisu a quick, storable, transportable form of wealth that could be
converted into cash or used for display.  Their migration south was also supported by access to
open lands in northern Burma and northern Thailand.  Shortly after opium became significant in
upland economies, the southern Lisu population began to rapidly migrate southward into the
relatively peaceful lands of northern Burma and northern Thailand where they could practice
pioneering swiddening, had access to trade networks to sell opium and other crops, but where
they had to deal with very little government administration.  There, they took advantage of and
created their own in-between space, a non-state space, that became essential to their self-
identification.  
Opium had become the nexus of adaptation and survival in Lisu society in Thailand and
also the medium by which Lisu participated in the global economy; this global trade also
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supported their autonomy.  Ironically, the marginality permitted by and even inherent to opium and
swiddening became defined as a problem as Thailand turned itself into a modern nation-state. 
The illegality of opium brought the Lisu into the gaze of international drug control programs;
environmental concerns turned that gaze ‘green.’  Opium and trees became the main
problematizations by which the Lisu were incorporated into the Thai state.  By the 1990s, opium
interdiction had been successful and watershed conservation had allowed the state to take over
most of the uplands of northern Thailand as forest reserves, which resulted in the potential
alienation of upland minority farming peoples from the land.  
Opium interdiction and watershed conservation transformed the Lisu economy.  It ended
open access to land and migration as well as cultivation of the mainstay of their economic system. 
This brought about striking changes in the Lisu agricultural economy.  Opium had been the key
element in household resource and labor allocation.  The new economy created a transformed set
of constraints and opportunities for Lisu households.  Transformations in the agricultural economy
in Thirty Thousand led to the diversification of agricultural activities, both spatially and temporally. 
At the same time that their most productive and marketable crop was interdicted, the enclosure of
mountain lands created severe land constraints for most Lisu.  They were not able to migrate or
open new lands and had to shorten fallow of mountain lands, resulting in loss of fertility. 
Knowledge of the consequences of land limitation and concern for the future led many Lisu
farmers to seek out a variety of parcels of land across northern Thailand and even into Burma in
order to diversify the types of plots they had access to and thus crops they could grow. 
Diversification of land holdings would, they hoped, reduce the risks of complete loss of farm land if
the state took possession of any of their land.  The range of agricultural activities required closer
control of a pool of labor and specialization within that pool – e.g., truck driver, store keeper,
middleman.  Labor had to be available to send to distant fields throughout the agricultural season;
cropping patterns had become more complex; agriculture was more dependent on farmers’
knowledge of markets in order to know what to plant and when, as well as how and where to sell
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crops.  All of this had consequences for the allocation of labor and for social relationships among
households, both along the vectors of labor exchange and access to land.  Diversification of land
holdings also expanded the range of their access to different types of markets as they could
develop relationships within different local marketing networks.  Lisu families also sent their
children to lowland boarding schools to prepare them for the future.  
Social Transformations with and without Opium
Opium had been central in the formation of the social structure of Lisu in northern
Thailand.  It had financed and facilitated a particular social forms; its interdiction undercut the
basis of this historically specific Lisu society.  W hen it became a significant cash crop in the early
nineteenth century, it fulfilled a number of needs in Lisu society at that time.  Opium funded
marriage and migration; opium and open lands made independence and egalitarianism possible. 
Individual households could be autonomous.  There was little need or opportunity for dependence
on lineage elders or patrons because everyone had access to the means of production (making a
living) and reproduction (opium wealth and open lands made it possible for young men to finance
a large part of their own marriage).  Conflict was as often as not resolved by the injured party
moving away; intra-household tensions between adults could soon be resolved by splitting the
household.  The dispersal of population across the landscape militated against the formation of
enduring villages.  Rather, we find the atomization of patrilineages and fission of villages within a
few years of their founding.  That is, there was no attachment to place, to graves, or to an
‘ancestral’ territory when people moved so often.  This form of Lisu society was based on
autonomous households that joined together on a contractual basis for joint enterprises, even for
village-level ritual.  These traits became the hallmarks of Lisu society in northern Thailand at the
height of the opium economy.  
Adaptation to the post-poppy economy brought about specific adaptations at the
household level.  Households experiencing resource constraints relieved the burdens on the
household of non-producing consumers by sending young children to lowland boarding schools. 
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Additionally, formal Thai education prepared children for different economic strategies in the
future and made it possible for them to deal with officials of the Thai state, a task that school
children and young adults frequently took on for their parents and grandparents.  Increasing their
level of education was also oriented toward gaining legitimacy in Lisu relations with Thai, who
tended to look down on Lisu as uneducated barbarians.  This strategy looked to a continuing
constrained future, enveloped by the Thai state, regardless of adults’ constant hope of a return to
the days of household economic and social autonomy. 
There were specific results for household labor allocation.  The post-opium agricultural
economy required increased capital input into farming and diversification of crops and economic
strategies.  This promoted increased authority by the male head of household as a manager of
the diverse strategies required in the new economy.  Land resources influenced what could be
produced and how much; capital resources influenced which farm enterprises could be realized
and how well other production factors used; but management capability determined how well land,
labor, and capital were utilized.  Management capability included decision-making on site
selection of fields; selection of crops to be grown in each field; determination of field size
manageable by the labor pool available to the household; timing of farming activities; and
marketing.  Management capability was apparent when some farmers tested and adopted a new
profitable crop or cropping technology more quickly than other farmers; or reacted more skillfully
than others to changes in farming conditions; or invented their own, more efficient, farming
techniques.  Under these conditions, the managerial skills of the leader of the labor unit was the
greatest determinant of agricultural success of a household. “In broad terms, one could say that
more capable farmers allocate their available resources (land, labour, capital) more efficiently
than others” (Salzer 1993:40).  In Revealed River, land constraints made a farmer’s skill in
determining how to fallow or what crops to plant in rotation to preserve fertility and his
management of labor that had to be sent to distant fields were even more significant in that
farmer’s success.  
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Under these conditions, the patriarchal authority of the Lisu father was congruent with
management requirements of the new agricultural system.  He had the moral authority, rooted in
the ideology of patrilineality and enacted in household ancestral and social ritual, to assign tasks
to his sons,  their wives, and his unmarried daughters, and could reasonably expect them to be
carried out.  In her study of two groups in Kenya, Heald (1991) found that extended patrilocal
households allowed more flexibility in labor organization.  There was a low degree of autonomy in
daily household routine.  The collective interests of those involved in cooperative agricultural
enterprise balanced out the intersecting and potentially divisive interests.  In contrast, small,
autonomous households had more difficulty controlling sufficient labor and were poorer.  Similarly,
in Belize, W ilk found that household clusters working together had an advantage in cash crop
production as they could accumulate and concentrate capital more effectively for agricultural
investment.  However, the scheduling advantages were most significant, as many tasks in
diversified cash crop production required fine scheduling due in part to the distance of fields that
might require work all at the same time.  Again, the common interests involved overcame cultural
tendencies toward more autonomous household groups in conditions of higher human/land ratios
(W ilk 1984).  In the case of Lisu of Revealed River, the increase of agnatic density created
advantages in the face of household autonomy, while the ethos of patrilineally-based household
hierarchy (F to Ss, oB to yB) allowed more decisive management of land, labor, and capital for the
advantage of the localized patrilineage group.  The authority of the father was further reinforced by
his control of an increasingly scarce essential resource – land for cultivation and wealth for to pay
brideprice (cf. Chapters 3 and 4).
As the political and agricultural economies of Thirty Thousand changed, so too did
practice in regard to marriage and allegiance groups, that is, in relationships between households. 
The key mechanism for change in marriage and allegiance groups was post-marital residence, a
point at which strategizing had once been possible in order to increase productivity, wealth, and
household repute.  In the post-opium economy, households conserved available capital to invest
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in land, trucks, new seeds, and other inputs to the fields.  Labor was not the source of wealth
anymore; labor in and of itself was not perceived to be as valuable as it once had been.  In these
conditions, early marriage had little benefit and considerable costs.  In strategizing to bring about
marriage ceremonies with repute by paying bridewealth at least equal to what was paid in the
past, marriage of sons was delayed in hopes of accumulating more wealth for bridewealth in a
good agricultural year.  The aggregate effect of parents not letting their sons marry was a delay of
marriage for girls as well.  In the past, labor could be recruited through the practice of
brideservice.  By keeping the young couple with the bride’s parents for up to six years after their
marriage, a great deal of extra labor was secured.  But this labor was not as valuable as it once
had been, and measured against the need to conserve the household’s limited land resources by
restricting it to the sons of the male head of household, brideservice fell into abeyance.  
Changes in post-marital residence resulted in a higher rate of patrifiliation and increased
agnatic density, with consequences for relations among households in Revealed River,
specifically the decrease in multiple strands of affiliation and allegiance groups.  Households
undertook social strategies to conserve each household’s limited land resources, which included
not welcoming allies, affines, and kin counted along female lines (mother’s brother, groups of
sisters).  Patrilineages did this most effectively for the Lisu of Revealed River.  However, it must
be kept in mind that lineage structures already existed in Lisu society and were not created out of
whole cloth.  Patrilineality was ideologically valorized, if not always practiced in daily social
relationships, and so strategies for patrilineality were privileged as responses to the stresses of
the constrained resource base.  Practice shifted depending on context and what they perceived
their opportunities and constraints to be.  Lisu social structure was fluid and susceptible to
variable permutations in its expression without moving outside of their cultural framework.  They
used the repertoire that existed to deal with new situations, a repertoire conveyed over time
through household relations and ritual (cf. Colson 1979:23).  
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W hy were marriage and patrilocality the point of transformation?  Marriage organizes
obligations and such obligations shape political life, if by that we mean relations among the
different groups within a society (Collier and Rosaldo 1981:278).  Kinship and marriage are key
points for understanding relationships such as cooperation in political or economic action.  This
does not make marriage the source of inequality, but kinship provides the idioms by which people
organized obligations and rights (Kelly 1993).  Most importantly here, marriage and household
formation were critical points in the mediation of relations between the environment and social
processes since marriage is a point at which new households are formed, who will people them
determined, and resources allocated to the next generation (Dwyer and Minnegal 1999:379).  
In looking at transformations in Lisu social structure with the end of the opium economy,
we see that marriage and land use rules were used to restrict access to household resources. 
Marriage was not about alliance, per se, but about establishing young people as adults. 
Household developmental time continued as a cognitive frame, the means by which the
transformed future was brought about.  Marriage and household formation were linked to
household wealth.  Household wealth was possible through control of labor (opium economy) or
access to land (post-poppy economy).  Marriage was timed by the age of the children marrying
and the wealth available to the parental household; thus, marriage was delayed in conditions of
limited resources.  Post-marital residence was a matter of the relative wealth of the parental
households involved and their need for labor (opium economy) or by their access to land (post-
poppy economy) and became the point of transformation.  Allegiance groups and patrilineages
were two different ways to get people to adhere together, either for managing labor (opium,
allegiance groups) or for control of land and wealth (post-poppy, patrilineage), in either case to
demonstrate household repute.  As a result of land constraints, patrilocality and agnatic density
increased in Revealed River.  Patrilineal relations became pragmatically more important in
everyday life, supported by ancestral ritual and patrilineal ideology, and politically important in
relations with the state.  This obviated the importance of allegiance groups as a base of allies in
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political and economic processes; in fact the process by which patrilineality was being re-
emphasized meant that matrilateral kin, resident affines and allies were a liability.  Power now lay
in agnates’ control of access to land, not in the ability to attract labor in conditions in which
autonomy of households had been maintained in part by their ability to migrate, as had been the
case in the opium economy.  
How repute was achieved was transformed, not the cultural framework of possibilities. 
That framework was based on the ideal of household repute – parents’ desire to get their children
married, children’s desire to get married, the possibility of a viable household in the transformed
agricultural economy, and how best to achieve that.  Transformations in the agricultural economy
required a larger cooperating labor group; patrilineal ideology of hierarchy and obedience
counteracted the principle of household autonomy, especially in the context of young household’s
dependence on the parents of the groom for access to capital and land.  Even if population had
not increased, the appropriation of land by the state for national parks and watershed
conservation created land scarcity.  The interdiction of opium further exacerbated resource
constraints.  All of this resulted in overstepping of the carrying capacity as measured by the
perceptions of Lisu farmers.  They experienced the lack of land to open fields, decreased fallow
periods, declining returns on fields, and lack of cash to fulfill household obligations as a loss of
repute.  They adapted existing structures to address these problems in their own households and
the future households of their children, particularly sons.  Marriage pressures on girls created a
transformed decision-matrix in which they had to consider land rights and citizenship in choosing
spouses, which resulted in patrilocal post-marital residence and the increased importance of
patrilineages in lived experience.  As migration became difficult, boys depended more on their
parents for access to land.  They also depended on their elders for marriage payments, both the
cash needed and access to the silver money (phya ) that had become a scarce valuable symbolic5
of marriage.  Inheritance became a more secure method of securing access to land than hoping
to open land someplace else.  The mechanism here was individual choice, although that choice
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occurred within a dominant structure, a structure that emerged out of global and national political
economies that they could not alter.  Transformations were an unintended – but not unrecognized
– result of each individual’s evaluation of resources and assessment of the risks and benefits of
incorporation of more distant kin.  As practice shifted, it contributed to the renewed practical
emphasis on an individual’s agnatic kin, their father’s land holdings, and their patrilineage.  
Continuity and Change: The Mutability of Lisu Social Structure
Lisu populations lived along the Salween (Nu) River, and from north to south they showed
a gradient of involvement in and assimilation to Tibetan (north) and Chinese (central, south)
political styles.  Lisu social structure throughout its distribution ranged from hierarchy to
egalitarianism, depending on factors such as wealth from trade, work as mercenaries, and
patronage by local states.  Nevertheless, a common substratum of meaning existed for Lisu and
other partially-Tibetanized Tibeto-Burman peoples.  Key among these was the centrality of the
household as the basic unit of social organization.  Relationships among households through
marriage, kinship, and political systems took different forms depending on political and economic
conditions.  In a sense, Lisu social structure can be seen as being “pre-adapted” to adapt to a
wide range of conditions.  The cultural patterns that Lisu called on in their adaptation to new
conditions when opium was introduced in the nineteenth century and when opium and swiddening
were interdicted in the twentieth century already existed in Lisu society.  That is, Lisu social
structure was marked by an inherent flexibility that allowed adaptation to the wide range of political
and economic conditions under which each population lived.  
Elements of Tibetan social structure provide an interesting analogy to Lisu social structure
because of their regional, economic, religious, and social proximity to each other and cultural
congruity or influence for part of Lisu history.  Tibetan and Tibetanized societies were marked by
fluidity and flexibility in which a great deal of importance was attached to the continuity of lineage
or household, depending on the salient institutions in each community.  The importance of the
patrilineage was relatively muted in most cases, but preservation of the household to the next
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generation was an important value where there was significant property to pass on to the
subsequent generation (Samuel 1993:130, 149-50).  I should point out that it was rarely the case
that there was significant inheritable property in the population of Lisu who migrated south; being
migratory did not contribute to the accumulation of wealth.  This had changed with land
constraints and sedentization in late twentieth century northern Thailand.  
The household was the basic unit.  The lineage was not a matter of a straightforward
ideology of patrilineal descent.  “In practical terms the operative unit was a residential group of
households and their members ...” (Samuel 1993:130).  This held for Lisu villages in northern
Thailand in the opium economy as well.  Much Tibetan folk religion was oriented toward protection
of the household, consisting of a system of deities and rituals such as those of marriage “by which
the household [was] constituted as a microcosm” (Samuel 1993:151).  In Tibetanized remote
agricultural communities, some rituals were performed on behalf of the village comprising an
annual cycle of ritual devoted to local spirits and to ensure the prosperity of village fields (Samuel
1993:130), as was the case for Lisu ritual to the Old Grandfather or Village Guardian Spirit.  In
Tibetan institutions there was an emphasis on horizontal linkages and avoiding giving all power to
a single individual.  For instance, in centralized societies two persons would be appointed to a
local official position, one lay and the other religious.  In remote agricultural villages, ritual duties
rotated among the village households (Samuel 1993:130, 152).  A similar type of duality, which I
have called diarchic structure (after Tooker 1996), existed in Lisu villages as well.  Compared to
the societies of China and India, Tibetan societies had much less of a collective orientation. 
Households and individuals worked out their own destinies using whatever capital – material and
ideological – their own karma provided (Samuel 1993:146), thus analogous to the Lisu concept of
myi -do .  Social relationships tended to be treated as contractual, even marriage (Samuel3 5
1993:152), as was the norm among the Lisu.  
Tibetan, including partially-Tibetanized, agricultural communities, throughout their range,
were fundamentally similar but marked by variations in social forms under varying conditions. 
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This resulted in the relative emphasis or muting of features throughout the range of Tibetan
societies. The social organization of Tibetan societies was multifaceted and polyvalent, able to
adapt to different political and economic conditions (Samuel 1993:335), and yet maintaining an
essential continuity.  In the context of the variety of forms of rulership, the household and localized
descent groups retained importance as the front line of adaptation throughout the range of
Tibetan societies.  In his study of variations in kinship forms on the Yun-Gui Plateau, McKhann
found that “exclusive matrilineal or patrilineal reckoning represented particular historical
transformations which were strongly conditioned by political, religious and economic factors
obtaining in particular localities" (McKhann 1998:41).  The basic building blocks of these societies,
such as households, lineages, or political roles were marked by fluidity.  This “generalizing
tendency” helped Tibetan societies to cope with the enormous range of social, political, and
religious institutions in which they occurred (Samuel 1993:141, 335) living in multiple peripheries
(McKhann 1999:201).   Analogous processes are enlightening for understanding the strength of
continuity in the face of great change in Lisu society.  W hen opium and ease of migration
facilitated atomization, autonomous households predominated and patrilineal and village
structures attenuated as people dispersed across landscape, but ancestor ritual and social ideals
of patrilineality remained.  An ecological argument is that specialization increases immediate
output at the expense of long-term sustainability, while maintaining social structural fluidity
expands the repertoire of strategies available to actors in a range of conditions (Colson 1979:23). 
From this point of view, Lisu, like other Tibeto-Burman peoples, seem to have been the equivalent
of generalists.  
People remember strategies through collective memories, stories of what they did when
the rains did not come (Colson 1979:19-20).  The Lisu cultural repertoire included patrilocality and
patrilineality, maintained even when not practiced through remembrance of ancestors, the
centrality of descent in ritual, and the daily enactment of seniority hierarchy in social interactions
through speaking and eating taboos.  Changed occurred within the context of multiple cultural
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patterns that offered repertoires for adapting to change, developed over a regional history of living
in shifting spheres of authority (see Chapter 2).  Lisu culture allowed the incorporation of elements
from new situations into Lisu society particularly into the spirit cosmology, which acknowledged
and contained spiritual representatives of the multiple spheres of authority Lisu encountered in
their migrations.  Values of household autonomy and lineage dominance were used differently in
different contexts, but both pre-existed within the Lisu frame.  Lisu already had structures and
solutions in place to address new conditions imposed by the Thai state.  
Kinship in a Global World
The relationship between family structure and economic conditions is a key issue in the
literature on households and the family.  It has been argued that increased involvement in
commercialized markets brought about fragmentation of kin networks, nuclearization of extend
family households, and increased individualism (Parsons 1943; Goode 1963; Shorter 1975;
Caldwell 1982; Plakans and W etherell 2003).  Similarly, the role of kin in family life is assumed to
be reduced in modernization (Ariès 1962; Tadmor 2001).  The breakdown of the family in
modernity and globalization remains a popular conception.  This process appears evident in the
Lisu history of growing opium for global markets.  Households were autonomous and patrilineage
and village structures attenuated.  Yet, patrilineal ideology kept these structures present in Lisu
culture; they were not destroyed.  Historical research in Europe suggests cultural continuity
despite radical economic change.  There are two main interpretations of this.  One is that the
nuclear household form was common to western Europe before the rise of capitalism (Laslett and
W all 1972; Goody 1972; Segalen 1986).  Another is that the maintenance of kin networks
alleviated the effects of insecurity in access to resources (Szanton 1972; Stack 1974; Hareven
1982).  Both of these hypotheses can be upheld in the Lisu case.
Modernization and globalization have not destroyed Lisu kin relations.  On the contrary,
there has been an efflorescence of extended kin structures, here the patrilineage, among the Lisu
of Revealed River.  The dynamic interplay of household autonomy and patrilineal dominance may
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have been built into Lisu social structure.  But we need to examine both the existing social
structures and the particular forms of globalization that impinged on Lisu social structure to
understand the historically specific forms of Lisu society.  Different forms of globalization have had
different effects on social structure.  Globalization is not a unitary force that steam rolls all before
it, homogenizing the diverse peoples of the earth.  Globalization took the form of both economic
and political penetration, the nature of that penetration varied over time, and globalization worked
on varying forms of social structure formed, in part, by earlier interactions with global political and
economic forces.  
The Lisu and their life with opium is an example of globalization starting long ago and far
away.  Early globalization created conditions congruent with some features of Lisu social
structure; later globalization was congruent with another set of features of Lisu social structure. 
W e see here the interplay of global forces and the social structure on which globalization acts. 
Historically, the global economy penetrated Lisu society by means of a valuable drug crop with an
expanding world market, ensuring a reliable cash income used to supplement subsistence
horticulture.  Existing patterns of regional trade mediated Lisu contact with the global merchant
economy as opium was bought and sold along with other small-scale commodities by itinerant
Chinese (often Hui) traders.  Similarly, the role of the global opium economy in Lisu society was
mediated by regional political structures, particularly the nebulous government control of the
uplands of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia by regional states.  The mobility of upland
populations further militated against secure administration of these areas.  People such as the
Lisu, therefore, were not subject to the control of warlords or corrupt government officials who
might have compelled them to grow opium to the exclusion of other crops; that is, involvement in
a global market did not dictate relations of economic or political dependency.  This was an in-
between space of little government control, whether good or bad, yet with locally mediated access
to global markets.  The political and geographical liminality of these uplands and the people in
them was further heightened by the illegality of opium – even when trade or production was
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legalized, it was usually regulated (as in the Royal Thai Opium monopoly and British opium policy
in Burma).  These were conditions that favored the practical dominance of the household in Lisu
social structure over the patrilineage.  Allegiance groups, flexible and based on contractual social
relations, were more congruent with the conditions of open land, migration, lack of political
intrusion, and the profitable and reliable cash crop that was opium.  Historical global processes
attenuated patrilineal kinship; there was little need for it in everyday life.  
As the nature of globalization has changed, so has its effect on people.  Globalization is
mediated through the structures of the nation state and its relationships with the dominant political
and cultural powers (Jackson 2003a, 2003b).  The modernizing nation-state of Thailand has
cemented its control of the borderlands of Thailand and the people living there by means of
application of international narcotics and environmental policy that have the similar goal of
controlling these out-of-state places.  In this, the goals of the Thai state and global policy are
congruent, although not completely so.  The effects of global and national political and economic
processes have had particular effects on the range of types of social relationships.  As the Thai
state has put global drug and environmental policy into place in the mountains of northern
Thailand, Lisu have adapted through reliance on already existing patrilineal ideology to
consolidate their position.  Practicing patrilineality has been, for Lisu, a reasonable response to
the need to conserve household resources over time.  Patrilineages were also strengthened by
their role in political negotiations with the Project – the agent of state penetration in Thirty
Thousand.  The ideology of the patrilineage as a unitary social unit created a sense of common
interests among people within the lineage, and this structured people’s actions to work together as
a kin group vis-à-vis the state.  The household remained the central social unit as the cultural goal
was household viability and repute, but the way in which household repute was achieved changed
and relationships among households transformed.  Patrilineages became dominant over friable
allegiance groups, most particularly through the medium of marriage strategies. A performative
view of kinship allows us to see how social structure is produced and reproduced through social
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action (Peterson and Taylor 2005:108), in this case, actions that resulted in the greater
prominence of either allegiance groups or patrilineages.  
This creates a rather startling sense of continuity and supports Laslett’s contention of
continuity in household forms with modernization, i.e., that household forms seen as unique to
capitalism in fact preceded it (Laslett 1983).  Lisu social forms were based on generative
principles, albeit sometimes contradictory, of Lisu society.  Nevertheless, the particular
transformations also had as much to do with the social structure on which globalization acted.  
In understanding how patrilineality re-emerged among the Lisu of Revealed River and the
extent to which this supports Meggitt’s hypotheses of the relationship between land scarcity and
unilineality, we must remember that ecology can not be treated as an autonomous variable. Land
use depends on social as much as physical constraints.  Here, the key environmental constraint
was in fact political – Thai state policy toward forest and narcotics, which in itself was formed by
both global policy and the interest of the Thai state in consolidating control over its borderlands. 
The relationship between the environment and social structure took place through the household,
but was actualized based on strategies founded upon the structural principles of Lisu life.  The
transformations of Lisu social relations were already inherent in Lisu social structure.  The
patterns or principles were there, attenuated or dominant through Lisu history, and it was on this
repertoire of culturally formed social strategies that people drew for adaptation to changing
conditions.  These were not oscillating social structures that switched from one form to another
like binary on/off switches.  One society does not simply change by contact with another; it is not
that one society is dynamic and the other stable, one dependent and the other independent. 
Change was a historical process and took place through the active practices of living people who
worked from what went before as the prior structure channeled paths of practice.  
In the progress of Lisu people southwards from the hinterlands of Yunnan, they have
moved increasingly from being on the margin to being enveloped into global processes.  This
began with the introduction of opium cultivation, which moved them from marginal bandits and
337
occasional mercenaries for local kingdoms to producers in a world economic system albeit still
out-of-the-way producers.  In the late twentieth century, opium and swiddening made them objects
of development programs that also served as the main vehicle their incorporation into the Thai
nation-state.  Yet these changes have occurred within the frame of their own historically formed
social dynamics and local/regional dynamics (Evans 2002).  
In examining the relationships between economy and social forms, we can see the
persistence of household structures through time despite changing political economies in part
because the link between economic activities and household structure is internal to the household
as relationships are culturally defined, setting limits to the possible structural solutions to
historically specific problems (Carter 1984).  The household is the locus of adaptation, although
adaptation here means both stability and transformation.  Stability occurs as members of the
household attempt to maintain their relationships with each other because household relationships
emerge out of culturally meaningful rights and obligations to family members within the household. 
They also attempt continuity, to reproduce these relationships over time and across generations,
demonstrated through the household developmental cycle.  On the other hand, the household can
be seen as the locus of adaptation that leads to transformation as the relationships among
households are responsive to changes in the political economy.  The mechanism lies in strategies
for stability, but in efforts to maintain the household, changes have occurred both over time,
between generations (inheritance or the formation of new households, for instance), as well as in
political relationships with other households (from allegiance groups to patrilineages).  That is, it
was the relationships among households that were more responsive to political and economic
conditions.  It was a twofold process: household members attempted to fulfill their social
obligations to each other and to this end, their relationships with other households were
transformed.  The specific forms of these transformations, however, lay within the sometimes
contradictory social principles of autonomy and hierarchy.  W hich social forms predominated
depended on the ecological, economic, and political conditions that encompassed Lisu society,
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not only in the contemporary world but throughout their history.  The Lisu household remained
primary in part because it was a structure that had demonstrated flexibility in adapting to the
encompassing political and economic regional and global forces in which Lisu people lived.  In the
end, globalization can not be seen as a unitary, homogenizing force in the worlds of marginalized
peoples; economic and political change have not resulted in uniform social transformations. 
Rather, the specific social transformations were in response to the long history of globalization
and well as to the specific features of globalization not only in Southeast Asia, but in terms of
national policy toward the uplands of northern Thailand.
The Lisu are both subjects and objects of global processes and have been for a very long
time.  Looking from the outside, they appear powerless objects in the face of overwhelming
change.  The trade in narcotics trade created particular social forms; international forestry and
narcotics policy has eradicated the economic base of their society in northern Thailand, with little
to replace it beyond the illegal drug trade and the sex industry.  Yet, the Lisu of Revealed River
met each challenge with unswerving vigor.  The older generation reminisces over the lost ideal
crop of opium, but the people I met continually strategized to create a better life for themselves
and their children.  “If we don’t work, we don’t eat,” I heard.  So they kept on working to create a
new space for themselves in the increasingly globalized local world in which they lived.  
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